Lecture 20

20. Highest Genera and the Distinction Between Substance and Accident

Summary
This lecture explores how the highest genera (genera with no genus above them) are distinguished, arguing that multiple highest genera must exist because the word ‘being’ is equivocal rather than univocal. Berquist demonstrates that substance and accident represent fundamentally different ways of being, and uses Aristotle’s categorical framework to show how all other categories relate to individual substances.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Highest Genera #

  • If every genus had a genus above it, infinite knowledge would be required before knowing anything
  • Yet we demonstrably come to know things by definition (odd numbers, even numbers, squares)
  • Therefore, there must be highest genera—genera that are not species of anything above them
  • The most universal names (being, thing, something) demonstrate the existence of highest genera
  • These universal names cannot have anything more universal above them

The Equivocity of ‘Being’ #

  • The word ‘being’ is equivocal, not univocal—it has multiple meanings
  • When Hamlet says “to be or not to be,” he refers to substantial being (life itself), not accidental being
  • A man and his health are not “things” in the same sense
  • A man and a dog are both “things” in a similar sense (both substances)
  • Because ‘being’ is equivocal, there cannot be one highest genus; there must be multiple highest genera

The Fundamental Distinction: Substance vs. Accident #

  • Substance (ὑποκείμενον, hypokeimenon): exists in itself, not in another; the subject in which other things exist
  • Accident (συμβεβηκός, symbebekos): exists in another as in a subject; cannot exist independently
  • Everything else in reality is either said of individual substances or exists in them
  • All other categories have reference to and depend upon individual substances

The Four-Fold Division of Being #

Aristotle’s framework for understanding what is:

  1. Said of something but not existing in something (universal substance)
  2. Existing in something but not said of something (individual accident)
  3. Both said of and existing in something (universal accident)
  4. Neither said of nor existing in something (individual substance)

Key Arguments #

Why There Must Be Highest Genera #

  1. The Infinite Regress Problem: If every genus had a genus above it, we would need to know infinitely many genera before knowing anything; but we clearly know things by definition
  2. The Universality Problem: Since genus is always said of more things than species, if every genus had a genus above it, there would always be a more universal name; yet we reach completely universal names (being, thing, something) that cannot be more universal

Why There Are Multiple Highest Genera #

  • The word ‘being’ is used equivocally when applied to substance and accident
  • Examples: a man and his health; a substance and its accidents; Hamlet’s “to be” meaning life versus “to be in Massachusetts” meaning location
  • Because ‘being’ does not have one univocal meaning across all things, there cannot be a single highest genus of all things

How Highest Genera Are Distinguished #

  • They are distinguished by examining how something can be said of individual substances
  • The way a universal substance is said of an individual is different from how an accident exists in an individual
  • Everything in the categories relates back to individual substances in one of two ways: either it is said of them (predicates) or it exists in them (modifications)

Important Definitions #

Key Categorical Terms #

  • Substance (οὐσία, ousia): what a thing is; exists in itself; the primary category
  • Accident (συμβεβηκός, symbebekos): what inheres in a subject; exists only in another
  • Universal (καθόλου, katholou): said of many things (e.g., man, dog, animal)
  • Individual/Singular (καθ’ ἕκαστον, kath’ hekaston): belonging to one thing only (e.g., Socrates, Champion the horse)
  • Said of (κατηγορεῖται, kategoreitai): predicated of something as its nature
  • Exists in (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, en hypokeimenō): inheres in something as its subject

Examples & Illustrations #

Substance vs. Accident #

  • A man and his health: the health of the man is not a separate thing like a dog in another room; it is something of the man
  • A man’s nose and the shape of his nose: not two separate things like nose and ear
  • Socrates and his virtues: the virtues exist in Socrates but are not what Socrates is

Clothing and the Nature of Man #

  • Man alone among animals needs different clothing for different occasions (weddings, graduations, daily wear)
  • Other animals have natural tools (claws, horns, wings); man has the hand and reason
  • Different occasions require different clothing, illustrating man’s dependence on reason and his “infinity” of need

Four Categories of Being According to Aristotle #

  1. Universal substance: man, dog, animal (said of many; not existing in another)
  2. Individual substance: Socrates, Champion (the famous horse) (neither said of nor existing in another)
  3. Universal accident: health, shape (said of many things; existing in subjects)
  4. Individual accident: the health of Socrates, the shape of Champion (existing in a subject; not said of anything)

Equivocity of ‘Being’ #

  • A man and a dog are both “things” in essentially the same way (both substances)
  • A man and his health are “things” in different ways (substance vs. accident)
  • Hamlet’s use of “to be” (life/death) vs. “to be in Massachusetts” (location)—different meanings, different referents

Notable Quotes #

“To be or not to be, that is the question.” — Shakespeare’s Hamlet, used to show that ’to be’ without qualification means substantial being (life itself), not accidental being

“When you say to be without qualifying it, you think of substantial being, in the case of a man, his very life.”

Questions Addressed #

Q: Does every genus have a genus above it? #

A: No. If it did, infinite knowledge would be required before knowing anything, yet we demonstrably know things by definition.

Q: Are there most universal names? #

A: Yes. Being, thing, and something are completely universal. There cannot be something that is not a being, or something that is not a thing.

Q: Is there one highest genus of all things? #

A: No. The word ‘being’ is equivocal, not univocal. Being means something different when applied to substance versus accident.

Q: How are the highest genera distinguished from one another? #

A: By examining how something can be said of individual substances. Some things are said of substances as their nature; others exist in substances as modifications. This twofold relation distinguishes the different highest genera.