50. The Second Tool of Dialectic: Distinguishing Word Senses

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Second Tool: Distinguishing Word Senses #

The ability to distinguish the senses of a word is fundamental to sound reasoning. Every statement is made in words, and failure to distinguish word meanings leads to misunderstanding, unclear communication, and sophistic fallacy.

Two key dangers of failing to distinguish word senses:

1. Misunderstanding and lack of clarity - One cannot fully grasp what is being said
2. Equivocation - The most common mistake in thinking, according to Aristotle (the father of logic). One reasons from words in different senses without recognizing the difference

Benefits of distinguishing word senses:

• Provides clarity about what is actually being said
• Avoids the fallacy of equivocation
• Can multiply probable opinions (e.g., “good” as useful, pleasant, or reasonable yields three different probable statements)

Methods for Distinguishing Word Senses #

Aristotle identifies several methods; the most basic are:

1. Looking at Opposites

• The word “dry” has different opposites in different contexts:
  • Dry cloth is opposite to wet cloth
  • Dry wine is opposite to sweet wine
• This reveals that “dry” has multiple distinct meanings

2. Looking at Words in Combination

• “Dry wine” and “dry cloth” have different definitions
• Removing the context word reveals fundamentally different core meanings
• If you define “dry wine” and remove “wine,” the remaining definition differs from defining “dry cloth” and removing “cloth”

The Word “Liberal” as Extended Example #

Berquist provides extensive analysis of “liberal” used in three distinct contexts with different opposites:

These represent three genuinely different meanings, though people often conflate them. A political liberal might believe conservatives are both servile and stingy—seeing a metaphorical likeness between the ethical and political meanings. Conversely, conservatives may actually be more interested in liberal education (classical sense) than political liberals are.

Related example: Shakespeare uses “niggard truth” to mean stingy, accurate praise (without flattery), contrasted with flattering praise that exceeds what is deserved.

The Word “Number” as Complex Example #

“Number” is equivocal but equivocal by reason—the different senses are genuinely related:

Original meaning: A multitude (more than one)

• “I have a number of children” means more than two
• “A few” is opposed to “many”
• One is not a number in this sense

Extended meaning: Includes the unit (one itself)

• Modern mathematics counts one as a number
• This extension has rational grounds:
  • One is composed of units
  • One has mathematical ratios like numbers do (1:2 as 2:4)
  • Euclid’s theorems about numbers only work if one is included as a number

In daily speech, the original sense persists: “Do you have a number of heads? You have a number of arms? A number of fingers?” One would not say “a number of heads” (only one), but would say “a number of fingers” (multiple).

Other Examples of Equivocation #

Seeing:

• The act of the eye (the power of sight)
• Actually using that power (seeing something specific)
• In imagination or memory (“in my mind’s eye”)
• As metaphor for understanding (“the eye of the soul” = reason)

Healthy:

• Applied to the body directly
• Applied to the soul/spirit
• Applied to diet and medicine (equivocal by reason—all relate to bodily health)

Good:

• The useful
• The pleasant
• The reasonable/virtuous
• (Example: premarital sex may be pleasing but not reasonable, hence “good” in one sense but not another)

Science (Scientia):

• Geometry and logic (reasoned-out knowledge via demonstration; knowledge of causes)
• Experimental science (hypothesis-testing; confirmed by observation but not by syllogism)
• Aquinas and medieval thinkers recognized this distinction

Dog:

• A living dog (truly an animal)
• A dead dog (no longer truly a dog, just as a melted ice cube is no longer truly an ice cube)

Lines:

• Straight line vs. curved line (both continuous without width)
• Line in geometry vs. line of argument (equivocal by chance)

Body:

• In substance (a stone, a geometrical sphere)
• In quantity (different genera entirely)

Continuous:

• In geometry: divisible forever, or whose parts meet at a common boundary
• In discrete quantities (numbers): not divisible forever, only down to one
• In proportions: when the same number ends one ratio and begins the next (4:6::6:9)

Key Arguments #

Equivocation as the Primary Sophistic Error #

• Equivocation is the most common mistake in thinking, according to Aristotle
• One can become a sophist—knowingly or unknowingly—by reasoning from words in different senses
• This is precisely what the Topics (Topika in Greek; About Places in Latin) is designed to address

Why Word Senses Matter for Opinions #

Because probable opinions are all expressed in words, and words are often equivocal:

• There is inherent lack of clarity if one cannot distinguish word senses
• The same opinion expressed in different word senses becomes multiple different probable opinions
• When quoting or referencing others’ opinions, one must clarify exactly which sense of a word they intended

Related to the Categories #

Knowing Aristotle’s categories helps distinguish word senses because:

• Words often refer to different categories (e.g., “body” as substance vs. “body” as quantity)
• Understanding whether a word applies within a single category or across multiple categories reveals whether it is univocal or equivocal

Example: Disposition (θέσις, dispositio)

• Can be its own category (position)
• Can be a species of quality
• Can pertain to the category of quantity (as a disposition of matter)
• Hence used equivocally in three different ways

Example: Habit (ἕξις, habitus)

• Can be its own category (as in “monk’s habit”—clothing)
• Can be a virtue or vice (a quality one possesses)
• Can mean simply “having” something in a positive sense (opposed to a lack)

Important Definitions #

Equivocal word (λόγος, verbum aequivocum)

• A name applied to many things, said in different senses
• Does not signify the same meaning for all things it refers to
• Can be equivocal by chance (meanings have no real connection) or by reason (meanings are genuinely related through some connection)

Univocal word (λόγος, verbum univocum)

• A name said of many things, said with one meaning
• Signifies the same thing for all things it refers to

Genus (γένος, genus)

• A name said of many things, other in kind, signifying what they are
• Always has more than one (more than one species)
• Must use the word “many” meaning “more than one,” not “a few”

Difference (διαφορά, differentia)

• A name said of many things, other in kind, signifying how they are or what they are
• Like genus, must have more than one (more than one species)

Examples & Illustrations #

Dry Cloth vs. Dry Wine #

When you say “the cloth is dry,” dry is opposite to wet. When you say “the wine is dry,” dry is opposite to sweet. The existence of different opposites reveals that “dry” has more than one sense.

Grade Inflation at Harvard #

Berquist describes a French professor at Harvard who gives two grades: an inflated grade for the official record and a real grade so students know what they actually deserve. This illustrates the distinction between flattery (praising beyond what is deserved) and “niggard truth” (accurate, stingy praise).

The Word “Many” #

When a genus or difference is defined as having “many” species, which sense of “many” is meant? “Many” as opposed to “a few” means more than two. But as opposed to “one” it means simply more than one. A genus always needs more than one species, but may have only two (e.g., numbers divided into odd and even, or habit into virtue and vice).

Faculty Raises and Political Liberals #

Berquist recounts how politically liberal professors, when voting on faculty raises, voted exactly according to their own pocketbooks—choosing distribution methods that favored their own ranks. This illustrates the distinction between “liberal with other people’s money” (political sense) and “liberal with one’s own money” (virtue sense).

Notable Quotes #

“Equivocation is the most common mistake in thinking, according to the father of logic.” - Berquist, on Aristotle

“A word is equivocal if it has more than one meaning, right? It doesn’t have to have five, six, seven, right? Some of them do, but you have to have that—more than one.” - Berquist

“If every word had to be explained by other words, you could never explain any word. If you knew no words without other words, you wouldn’t know any words.” - Berquist

Questions Addressed #

How can one avoid equivocation? #

By carefully distinguishing the different senses of words through: (1) examining their opposites in different contexts, and (2) observing how they function in combination with other words. Understanding the categories helps identify when a word applies to different genera.

Why is equivocation called “the most common mistake in thinking”? #

Because when one reasons from words in different senses without recognizing the difference, one commits sophistic fallacy unknowingly. Since all probable opinions are expressed in words, and words are often equivocal, this is an ever-present danger.

Is the distinction between the word “number” in the sense of “more than one” and the mathematical sense (including one) important? #

Yes. Euclid’s theorems about numbers only hold if one is counted as a number. Yet in daily speech, one would never say “I have a number of heads” (only one head). This shows that “number” is genuinely equivocal, though equivocal by reason rather than by chance, because one and numbers are genuinely related.