8. Aristotle's Four Causes and the Ten Predicaments

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Four Causes as Organizing Principle: Aristotle’s distinction of material, formal, efficient (mover/maker), and final causes provides the framework for understanding why there are exactly ten categories
• Thomas Aquinas’s Systematic Division of Predication: Three fundamental ways something can be said of a subject: (1) what pertains to essence/nature (substance), (2) what inheres in the subject (accidents), (3) what is denominated from something extrinsic
• Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Denomination: The critical distinction between properties inherent in a thing and those said of it by reference to something outside it
• Action, Passion, and Their Distinction from Motion: How efficient causation generates two distinct categories
• Extrinsic Measures: Time, place, and position as external measures from which things are denominated
• The Special Human Category (Habitus): Man’s unique predication through external artifacts that are neither causes nor measures

Key Arguments #

The Necessity of Four Causes #

• Material cause: That from which something comes to be and remains in it (the letters C-A-T in the word “cat”)
• Formal cause: That which completes the nature (the ORDER of the letters)
• Efficient cause: The mover or maker necessary to arrange matter in form
• Final cause: The purpose or end for which the efficient cause acts
• Together, these four causes force recognition that any unified thing depends upon all four

Extrinsic Denomination by Efficient Cause Only #

• Only the agent/efficient cause allows extrinsic denomination; matter and form are intrinsic
• The final cause does not cause anything apart from the agent—it moves the agent, so causality flows through the agent
• Therefore, only the agent cause generates predicaments that involve something outside the subject
• This yields two categories:
  • Ἀγία (Action/Acting Upon): The agent denominated from its effect on something external
  • Πάσχειν (Passion/Undergoing): The patient denominated from receiving from an external agent
• Example: “I am kicking you” (action) vs. “You are being kicked by me” (passion)—these require reference to something outside each subject

Distinguishing Action/Passion from Mere Motion #

• Becoming hot (intrinsic change in quality) is classified under the category of quality, not action
• Being heated by the stove (extrinsic causation) is classified under passion because it involves external causality
• The difference is whether you abstract from external causality or include it
• Motion considered in itself (in categories of quantity, quality, or where) differs from action/passion precisely because the latter require reference to extrinsic cause

Extrinsic Denomination by Measure #

• Time and place are the two extrinsic measures
• Time yields the category quando (when): denomination from temporal measure
• Place yields two categories:
  • ubi (where): denomination from spatial location
  • situs (position): adds the ORDER of one’s parts in place to “where”
• Unlike place, time already includes the notion of order (before and after) in its very definition (“the number of motion according to the before and after”), so no separate category for temporal order is needed

Important Definitions #

• Cause (κατὰ τὸ εἶναι): That upon which something depends for being or for coming to be
• Substance (οὐσία): What is said of a subject by reason of what it is; does not exist in another as in a subject
• Denomination: Naming something from another thing (e.g., “white” from “whiteness”; “cat” from the arrangement of letters)
• Material cause (ὕλη/materia): That from which something comes to be and is in it—etymologically from “mother” (the source)
• Formal cause (μορφή/forma): That which completes the nature of what it is
• Efficient cause (ὁ κινῶν/agens): The mover or maker; only this can provide extrinsic denomination
• Final cause (τέλος/finis): The end or purpose for which an agent acts; moves the agent rather than causing independently
• Action (ποιεῖν/agere): The act of the agent toward another external thing
• Passion (πάσχειν/pati): The reception of action from an external agent (“undergoing”)
• Quando: The predicament of “when”—denomination from time
• ubi: The predicament of “where”—denomination from place
• situs: Position or arrangement of parts in place
• Habitus: The special human category—being clothed, armed, or shod; denominatio from something extrinsic that is neither cause nor measure

Examples & Illustrations #

The CAT Example (Four Causes) #

• The word “cat” depends materially on the letters C, A, T
• But if you remove any letter, you no longer have “cat”—so material dependence is undeniable
• Yet the SAME letters could spell T-A-C (Thomas Aquinas College) or A-C-T—so the word also depends on the ORDER of letters (formal cause)
• The letters do not arrange themselves—someone (Berquist) had to arrange them (efficient cause)
• But why? Because he wanted to discuss his favorite animal (final cause)
• This forces recognition that any unified thing depends on all four causes

Making Tea and Heating Water #

• Becoming hot (the water acquiring heat as a quality): Classified under quality because it’s intrinsic change; you can consider it without reference to an external cause
• Being heated by the stove: Classified under passion because now you must reference something external (the stove) causing the change
• The stove heating the water: Classified under action because the stove must reference something outside itself being affected
• This shows the difference between intrinsic motion/change and extrinsic causation

Standing, Sitting, and Positional Dependence #

• Standing: Requires something external (the floor or ground) to stand on; not merely a bodily arrangement of parts
• Same bodily arrangement while falling from an airplane: Not standing, because you lack the external support (situs requires extrinsic reference)
• Crouching: A man in sitting posture without a chair is not actually sitting; true sitting requires external support
• Laying down: Requires a bed, sofa, or floor—something external
• The intrinsic arrangement of parts is the same, but the extrinsic reference (position) is what makes it truly “standing,” “sitting,” or “laying”

Measurement and Extrinsic Reference #

• Using a cup as a measure: A cup of rice is denominated from an external measure (the cup)
• Height measured on a wall: You are measured/denominated by an external standard
• Counting crowd size at March for Life: Estimate based on area occupied—an external measure
• Robinson Crusoe tracking time: Using sunrises as an external measure of days
• Wine in bottles: The wine is denominated by its volume according to the inner surface of the container (external measure)

The Special Human Category (Habitus) #

• Other animals: Armed, clothed, shod by nature (fur grows thicker in winter; claws, teeth are natural parts)
• Humans: Denominated from extrinsic things—clothes, weapons, tools—that are neither causes nor measures of their being
• This shows man’s rational nature: the ability to adapt to circumstances through artifacts
• Example: A bride in her wedding dress; soldiers, firemen, and policemen in uniform—these are special human adaptations
• Unlike animals that naturally adapt, humans use rational choice to don external things suited to purposes

Questions Addressed #

Why exactly four causes and not more?

• Berquist forces students to recognize this necessity through the CAT example: remove any one cause and the explanation becomes incomplete
• Material cause alone doesn’t explain the specific word; formal cause alone (the order) requires explanation of how it got that way; efficient cause requires explanation of WHY the order was chosen; final cause completes the picture

How do action and passion differ from mere becoming or motion?

• Becoming hot is motion in the category of quality (intrinsic)
• Being heated is passion (extrinsic—requires reference to the heating agent)
• The fire being hot is a quality; the fire heating something is action (extrinsic reference required)
• The difference is whether external causality is included in the definition

Why is there no separate category for temporal order like there is for spatial order?

• Thomas notes that time already includes order (before/after) in its very definition
• Place, by contrast, does not include order of parts in its definition of “where”
• Therefore position (situs) is a distinct category that specifies the order of parts in place
• But time itself provides temporal order, so no separate category is needed

How is man’s habitus category different from other extrinsic denominations?

• Action/passion: Denominated from extrinsic efficient cause
• When/where/position: Denominated from extrinsic measures (time and place)
• Habitus: Denominated from something extrinsic that is NEITHER a cause NOR a measure—a special category unique to rational beings

Notable Quotes #

“That which something depends upon for being or for coming to be”—Definition of cause used throughout

“The most undeniable thing that it depends upon”—Berquist’s pedagogical method of forcing recognition of material cause

“You can’t make a cup of tea without logic”—Illustrating how understanding action/passion distinction is necessary even for practical matters

“Your mind is going from confusion to distinction now”—On the pedagogical goal of sharp logical distinctions

“You’ve got to have something outside you to stand on”—The key principle of extrinsic reference for positional categories