13. Substance, Categories, and the Trinity
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
Properties of Substance #
- Second property: Substance is not susceptible to more or less (non-quantum)
- One man is not more a man than another man
- One dog is not more a dog than another dog
- Contrasts with quality (one person can be more courageous than another)
- Applies to the substance itself, not accidents
- Third property: Susceptibility of contraries while remaining one in number
- Example: Berquist himself can be hot/cold, sick/healthy, good/bad while remaining the same person
- This property is specific to first substances
Substance vs. Accidents in Definition #
- Definition properly applies to substances, not accidents
- Problem: definition seems to require defining something by reference to what is outside it
- Health defined as “good condition of the body” — but health is defined by something external to itself
- This is not definition in the proper sense
- What it is (essence) is found primarily in substance, especially first substances
- Can speak of definition in other genera (virtue, numbers) but not in the same primary way
First and Second Substance #
- Distinction between first substance (individual: “this man”) and second substance (species/genus: “man”)
- This is a division of analogia, not a division of genus into species
- Second substance is said of first substance as species or genus
- Species is more properly substance than genus
- Only second substance (species or genus of substance) is said of individual substances “as regards what it is”
Individuation in Substance vs. Accidents #
- Individual is found per se (primarily) in the genus of substance
- Substance is individuated by itself (per se)
- Accidents are individuated by their subject (which is substance)
- Example: “this whiteness” in “this subject”
- Two rubber balls: the rubber itself is distinct (different substances), so the spheres are distinct
- Knowledge: your knowledge and my knowledge of the same theorem are distinct because they exist in different minds (different substances)
The Trinity and Hypostasis #
- Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις/hypóstasis) etymologically means “to stand under”
- The hypostasis of the Word is NOT in the genus of substance insofar as it is the hypostasis of divine nature
- BUT the hypostasis of the Word IS in the genus of substance insofar as it is the hypostasis of human nature in Christ
- Hypostasis is ordered to genus or species only through the nature which it has
- Danger of confusion: translating Greek “three hypostases” into Latin “three substances” can sound unorthodox
- The three persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) are distinguished by relations of procession, not by being three substances
- Real distinction between Father and Son, and between both and Holy Spirit, but they are one God (one divine nature)
Substance as Analogical Term #
- The word “substance” is used analogically, not univocally
- Four senses of substance (from Aristotle’s Categories)
- The distinction of substance is a division of an analogate, not a genus into species
- This is crucial for understanding how “substance” applies differently to first substances, second substances, and God
Logical vs. Metaphysical Perspective #
- Logician: considers things as they are in reason; focuses on predication and universality
- Sees species and genus as said of individual substance
- Regards universal as having a kind of secondary substantiality
- First philosopher (metaphysician): considers things as they are beings
- To be said of a subject (predication) means it is NOT a substance
- To be in a subject (as accident is in substance) also means it is not a substance proper
Key Arguments #
Why All Men Are Equal #
- Berquist’s classroom example: some men are strong, weak, healthy, sick, prone to anger, different in knowledge
- Yet all men are called equal in the phrase “all men are created equal”
- This equality is justified by the property that one man is not MORE a man than another man
- Equality refers to substantiality, not to accidental qualities
Why Substance Cannot Be Defined as Accident #
- Definition requires the thing defined to be completely expressed through its elements
- Accidents cannot be defined properly because they are defined through reference to substance (their subject)
- Health is always “condition of the body” — external reference makes it not a true definition
- Substances, especially individual substances, can be defined (or at least species/genera can be)
Why the Trinity Uses the Word Hypostasis #
- The persons of Trinity are really distinct from each other
- They are not distinct by being three substances (which would be three gods)
- The word hypostasis (“that which stands under”) is used metaphorically/analogically
- Just as church “stands under” truth (is the pillar of truth)
- The persons each have the divine nature “under” them as their nature
- The persons are distinguished by relations of procession, not by division of substance
Why God Uses Secondary Causes #
- Two reasons Thomas Aquinas gives:
- To share nobility of causality: Creatures participate in the excellence of being causes, not merely effects
- To create beauty of ordered causes: The hierarchical order of causes is itself beautiful; God wants to create this order
- Example: God could create each human directly (as He created Adam) but instead works through parents
- This allows creatures to thank both God and their parents
Important Definitions #
Substance (οὐσία/ousía) #
- That which exists in itself, not in another
- First substance: individual existing things (this man, this dog)
- Second substance: species and genus said of first substances (man, animal)
- Not susceptible to more or less in its being a substance
- Capable of receiving contraries while remaining numerically one
Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις/hypóstasis) #
- Etymology: “that which stands under”
- In theology: the individual subject that possesses a nature
- In Trinity: each person has the divine nature; they are three hypostases in one substance (one divine nature)
- Distinguished from mere accidents by being the ultimate subject of predication
Individuation (individuatio) #
- Substance individuates per se (by itself): rubber ball A is distinct from rubber ball B because they are different substances
- Accidents individuate through their subject: this whiteness is distinct from that whiteness because it inheres in different substances
Analogia (Ἀναλογία/Analogía) #
- Proportion or ratio between two things
- The distinction of first and second substance is an analogical division, not a univocal genus-species division
- Allows the same term (substance) to apply in different ways to different things
Examples & Illustrations #
The Two Rubber Balls #
- Demonstrates why individuals in substance are distinct per se, while those in other genera are distinct through substance
- Two identical spheres are distinct because they are in different rubber (different substances)
- Two identical qualities would be distinct only because they inhere in different subjects
Knowledge of a Theorem #
- Two people knowing the same theorem: their knowledge is two distinct knowledges
- Why? Because the knowledge exists in two different minds, which are two different substances
- Knowledge doesn’t exist in itself; it exists in the substance (the mind)
The Church as Pillar of Truth #
- Metaphor showing how one thing can “stand under” another without being identical to it
- Church stands under truth through its teaching and tradition
- Analogous to how persons of Trinity “stand under” divine nature
Adam’s Creation vs. Human Procreation #
- God created Adam directly
- But God creates other humans through parents (secondary causes)
- Shows why secondary causes exist: to share in divine causality and to create order
Notable Quotes #
“Is one man more a man than another man? Well, by man you mean courage, yeah, one man more courage, more, but that’s a quality, right? But in the case of the substance itself, is one man more a man than another man?” — Berquist on the non-quantum nature of substance
“The only way you could say that all men are equal is that one man is not more a man than another man.” — Berquist on human equality
“Hypostasis is not ordered to a genus or a species, except through the nature which it has.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)
“Although universal in particular are found in all genera because we had universal in particular what accident right nevertheless in a special way individual is found in the genus of substance.” — Berquist on individuation
“For the logician considers things according as they are in reason… But the first philosopher, he considers things according as they are beings.” — Thomas Aquinas distinction between logical and metaphysical consideration
Questions Addressed #
Why is substance not susceptible to more or less? #
- Because being a man is not a matter of degree — either something is a man or it is not
- Qualities admit of degree (more or less courage) but the essence does not
- This is essential to understanding what makes something a substance vs. an accident
How can accidents be defined? #
- They cannot be defined properly because definition requires expressing what a thing is through its essential components
- Accidents are always defined through reference to their subject (what they inhere in)
- Health is defined as “good condition of body” — reference to something external
- True definition is found primarily in substances
What is the relationship between first and second substance? #
- Not a simple genus-species relationship but an analogical one
- Second substance (species/genus) is said of first substance
- Species is more properly substance than genus
- First substance is primarily substance; second substance is secondarily so
How can there be three hypostases but one God in the Trinity? #
- The three persons are distinguished by relations of procession (Father generates Son; Holy Spirit proceeds from both)
- They are not distinguished by having three different divine natures (which would make three gods)
- They are really distinct from each other but share one divine nature
- The word “hypostasis” applies analogically, not univocally
Why doesn’t God create everything immediately? #
- God desires secondary causes to exist so creatures can share in the nobility of causality
- The hierarchical order of causes is itself beautiful — it reflects divine wisdom and order
- This explains why humans are born through parents rather than created directly
Historical and Textual Context #
- The discussion follows Aristotle’s Categories, continuing from prior lectures on substance
- Berquist references Thomas Aquinas’s treatment in the Summa Theologiae (Prima Pars) and Scriptum on the Sentences
- The De Potentia is cited for Aquinas’s discussion of Trinity and analogical predication
- References to medieval Latin translations and the difficulties of translating Greek philosophical terms
- The lecture includes Berquist’s personal teaching anecdotes with monks and university students