27. The Four Senses of End and the Four Species of Quality

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Four Senses of End (Terminus/Telos) #

Aristotle identifies four fundamental senses of ’end':

1. End as terminus of magnitude - The point is the end of the line; the surface is the end of the body. This concerns continuous quantity.

2. End as limit of motion or action - That toward which motion proceeds (not that from which). The destination of a journey is the end of the motion.

3. Both extremes of motion - The Latin phrase largo modo includes both the point of departure and arrival. Every motion is between two terms.

4. End as essence and definition - The substance of a thing, its essence (essentia) and definition (definitio). Knowledge is perfected when one arrives at the definition of a thing.

Distinction: End vs. Purpose #

Berquist emphasizes that the end of motion (where motion stops) differs from purpose (that for the sake of which). A man runs a mile and stops - the stopping point is the end of motion (second sense), but his purpose might be health or exercise (a different sense entirely).

Relationship of Ends and Beginnings #

Aristotle concludes that ends and beginnings are related but asymmetrical: every beginning is in some way an end, but not every end is a beginning. For example, we speak of the ’two ends’ of a line but never the ’two beginnings.'

Application to God #

Berquist applies this to the theological claim that God is “Alpha and Omega” - both beginning and end. He distinguishes:

• God as efficient cause (beginning/mover)
• God as final cause (end/goal of all things)

This suggests reality as circular (God is both beginning and end) rather than linear.

The Four Species of Quality #

Aristotle distinguishes quality into four species:

1. Habit and Disposition (habitus, dispositio) - stable states disposing one well or badly toward one’s nature

2. Natural Ability or Inability (potentia vel impotentia naturalis) - inborn powers like reason, will, sensation

3. Undergoing Quality (passio) - sensible qualities like hot, cold, wet, dry, colors

4. Figure and Form (figura, forma) - shape and configuration

Why Quality is Said “in Many Ways” #

Quality is equivocal by reason (aequivocum a ratione) - it has multiple senses related but distinct, similar to how ’end’ has four meanings. The four species are distinguished more like senses of a word than by strict logical division through binary opposites.

The Priority of Habit Among the Species #

Thomas places habit first because:

• Nature is what is first considered in a thing
• By habit one is disposed well or ill toward one’s nature
• This connects to virtue and vice, the good and evil
• Habits are more manifest to us than abstract natural powers

Quality vs. Relation #

Berquist emphasizes that power (potentia) and knowledge (scientia) are fundamentally qualities (second and first species respectively) that have relations following upon them. They are not essentially relations:

• Power is an absolute quality ordered toward action
• Knowledge is an absolute quality ordered toward the known
• The relation to something else follows upon these qualities

Alteration and Motion in Quality #

Alteration (alteratio) occurs only in the third species (undergoing qualities). The fourth species (figure) undergoes no alteration because geometry has no motion. The first species (habits) involves acquiring dispositions through repeated action—a kind of violence to oneself—rather than simple alteration.

Grace as a Quality #

Thomas argues that grace must be reduced to the first species of quality but is not properly called a habit (habitus). Rather, it is a habitudo (way of having oneself, or dispositional state):

• Grace is not in the third species because it is not a passion (passio) or undergoing quality
• Grace is not in the second species because it is supernatural (super naturam), not natural power
• Grace is not in the fourth species because it pertains to the mind, not the body
• Therefore grace belongs to the first species but presupposes and roots the theological virtues

Grace gives the soul a spiritual being (quaddam esse spirituale) or spiritual existence—a participation in the divine nature—distinct from the natural being the soul possesses by creation.

Character in Sacraments #

Character impressed by certain sacraments presents a related but distinct problem. While involving a relation (as a sign), it requires an underlying absolute form (quality) rather than being a pure relation.

Key Arguments #

Why Aristotle Orders the Categories Differently in the Metaphysics #

In Metaphysics V, Aristotle treats the four senses of end before the categories of relation, even though in the Categories he treats substance first, then quantity, then relation (not quality). This is because:

• There was a widespread view (Platonic) that everything said to be of something else is relative
• Aristotle shows that some things appearing relational (like power and knowledge) are fundamentally absolute qualities with relations following upon them
• This necessitates treating substance, quantity, and then quality (not relation) as more fundamental

The Problem of Distinguishing Grace from Acquired Virtue #

Both grace and virtue are in the first species of quality, yet they differ:

• Virtue (virtus) - acquired habit disposing us well, immediately ordered to act (believing, hoping, loving)
• Grace (gratia) - infused habitudo giving the soul spiritual being, ordered to that spiritual elevation rather than immediately to act
• Grace is presupposed as the root (radix) from which the virtues proceed

Important Definitions #

End / Terminus (Greek: telos) #

• The limit or boundary of something
• In motion: the point toward which movement proceeds
• In essence: the definition that completes knowledge of a thing
• In causality: that for the sake of which something is done (final cause)

Disposition (dispositio) #

• A certain order toward something
• Can be easily lost (temporary mood) or stable (habit)
• Implies being well (bene) or badly (male) disposed toward one’s nature

Habit (habitus) #

• A stable disposition defining character
• Either virtue (well-disposing one toward nature) or vice (ill-disposing)
• Distinguished from momentary states or transitory conditions

Habitudo #

• A way of having oneself; a dispositional state
• Thomas uses this term for grace to distinguish it from proper habit
• Presupposes or roots something more fundamental

Natural Power / Ability (potentia naturalis / impotentia naturalis) #

• Inborn powers of the soul (reason, will, sensation, growth, reproduction)
• Distinguished from acquired abilities gained through habituation
• The second species of quality

Undergoing Quality / Passion (passio) #

• Sensible qualities like hot, cold, wet, dry, white, black
• Easily transitory, subject to alteration
• The third species of quality
• Called passio because they either engender passion in the senses or are caused from passions

Spiritual Being (esse spirituale) #

• The kind of elevated existence grace imparts to the soul
• Distinct from and superior to the soul’s natural being
• Involves participation in the divine nature

Examples & Illustrations #

The Point and the Line #

Berquist uses the point as the end of the line to illustrate the first sense of end. The surface is similarly the end of the body. He extends this: “I’m extending the iron map. Right here, that’s the end of me.”

Journey and Purpose #

A man makes a journey to a destination. The destination is the end of his motion (second sense), but if he traveled to restore his health, health is his purpose (a different sense). Death is the end of life in the sense of motion’s terminus, but not the purpose of life.

Acquiring Courage Through Practice #

Aristotle says one becomes courageous by doing courageous things. Yet if one is already doing courageous things, how is one not already courageous? Berquist explains: one does it with a certain violence to oneself, forcing oneself until the habit forms. A college student with public speaking anxiety signs up for a speech course where he must speak before the class repeatedly. Through this violence to himself, he gradually builds confidence.

Children at Mass #

Berquist observes that children reading petitions at Mass show no fear of speaking before a crowd. This suggests that habituation from a young age prevents fear from developing, unlike adults who learned fear earlier.

The Farmer and Relations of Reason #

Berquist humorously notes it would be difficult to explain relations of reason (like “today is before tomorrow”) to a farmer, who deals with real relations in planting and harvesting.

Terminology: Height vs. Quality #

When renewing his driver’s license, height (a quantity, measured in feet and inches) is different from “how are you?” (which asks about quality). One would not answer “how are you?” with “five foot eight.”

Distinguishing Sensible Qualities #

The elements are distinguished by hot, cold, wet, and dry—sensible qualities of the third species. These are the primary qualities by which bodies differ from one another.

Questions Addressed #

Why are there four senses of end rather than fewer or more? #

Aristotle identifies these four as the fundamental meanings discoverable through analysis of how the term is used in natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics. They are not arbitrary but rooted in the structure of being itself.

How does the end of motion differ from the purpose of motion? #

The end of motion is the point at which motion ceases (where I stop running). The purpose or final cause is that for the sake of which I moved (health or exercise). These are distinct senses and must not be confused.

Why is the first species of quality (habit) treated before the second (natural ability)? #

Although natural ability seems more fundamental ontologically, habit is placed first because:

• Nature is what is first considered in understanding a thing
• Habit disposes us toward our nature (well or badly)
• This orientation toward nature makes habit more relevant to understanding virtue and human flourishing
• Habits are more manifest to our experience than abstract powers

If grace is a quality, which species is it? #

Grace is reduced to the first species but is not properly a habit. It is a habitudo—a dispositional state or way of having oneself—that gives the soul a spiritual being. It presupposes and roots the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) which are habits in the powers of the soul.

How can quality be a single genus if it has four seemingly disparate species? #

Quality is equivocal by reason—it has multiple related but distinct senses, like ’end’ (telos) has four senses in Metaphysics V. The species are distinguished more like different meanings of a word than by strict logical division. This makes quality less unified as a genus than quantity.

Are power and knowledge really relations? #

No. Both are fundamentally absolute qualities (power in the second species, knowledge in the first) that happen to have relations following upon them. Power is ordered toward action; knowledge toward the known. But this ordering does not make them essentially relational in the way things in the genus of relation are.

Notable Quotes #

“The most common mistake in thinking is mixing up the senses of words.” — Duane Berquist (on distinguishing different meanings of ’end')

“Is reality more like a straight line or like a circle? If God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things, then reality is like a circle.” — Duane Berquist

“Although the ratio of principia, the notion of a beginning, belongs to potency, and that ratio of beginning is in the genus of relation, nevertheless, that which is this beginning of action and passion is not a relation, but some form absoluta.” — Thomas Aquinas (on why power, though relational in one sense, is fundamentally a quality)

“Grace is the health of the mind.” — Chrysostom (cited by Thomas Aquinas)

“Grace is reduced to the first species of quality, but it is not properly the same as virtue, but a certain habitudo, which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as if it is the beginning and the root.” — Thomas Aquinas

“Although there are other modes of quality, nevertheless all in some way are led back to these four species.” — Thomas Aquinas (defending Aristotle’s completeness)

Contextual Theological Implications #

Berquist connects the philosophical analysis to Christian theology:

• God as both alpha and omega (beginning and end) suggests circular, not linear, reality
• Grace as spiritual being relates to St. Peter’s claim that we “partake in the divine nature”
• The character impressed by sacraments (even if difficult to categorize perfectly) involves a quality founded upon spiritual relationship
• The theological virtues proceed from grace as their root—a hierarchical structure of supernatural dispositions