53. Fallacies from Speech: Figura Dictionis and Equivocation

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fallacy of Figura Dictionis (Figure of Diction) #

Definition: A fallacy arising from the mode of speaking (modus loquendi) rather than from the nature of things (secundum rem). One imagines something to be other than what it is because of grammatical or linguistic form.

Core Principle: Things that appear similar grammatically may belong to entirely different categories. The imagination, delighting in likeness, causes error when we cannot discern differences.

How Understanding Differs from Agent-Patient Relations #

The Objection: If understanding and the understood are like agent and patient (as in kicking and being kicked), then:

• One part must act, another must undergo
• Something must fall between them as a medium
• Therefore, an angel cannot understand itself (since nothing can be between a thing and itself)

Thomas’s Response:

• Understanding and the understood are NOT like agent and patient (agens et patiens)
• Kicking involves real separation: the kicker and kicked are distinct entities with a real medium between them
• Understanding involves union: the knower and knowable constitute one beginning of knowledge (unum principium cognitionis)
• The operation (operatio intelligibilis) is not a medium secundum rem (in reality), but only secundum modum loquendi (in manner of speaking)
• The knowing and the known arise from their coming together, not from one acting upon the other

The Fallacy: We are deceived because understanding and kicking are both expressed with active grammar, making them seem like the same kind of thing.

Relations in God and Denomination #

The Objection: If God is named by relations to creatures, these relations must be something in God (since all denomination comes from a form inhering in the subject).

Thomas’s Resolution:

• What something is denominated from need not be a form secundum rei naturam (in the nature of the thing)
• It suffices to be signified per modem formae grammatice loquendo (in the manner of a form, speaking grammatically)
• Example: A man is denominated from action and clothing, neither of which are forms actually in him
• This is figura dictionis: being deceived by how something is grammatically expressed

The Father and Son as One Beginning of the Holy Spirit #

The Objection (Contradictory Dilemma): Either:

1. The one beginning is the Father (then the Son is the Father—contradiction), or
2. The one beginning is not the Father (then the Father is not the Father—contradiction)

• Therefore, the Father and Son cannot be one beginning

Thomas’s Resolution:

• These alternatives are NOT contradictorily opposed
• When we say “the Father and Son are one beginning,” the word “beginning” does not have determinate supposition
• Rather, it has confused supposition for two persons together (confusa suppositio pro duabus personis simul)
• In contradictory opposition, one of the alternatives must be true; but here no third alternative is needed because “beginning” stands indistinctly for both together
• This is figura dictionis: moving from confused supposition to determinate supposition

The Fallacy: The objector treats “beginning” as if it must stand for one person determinately, when it actually stands for two persons indeterminately.

Forms, Substance, and Coming-to-Be #

The Error: Imagining accidental forms (like whiteness, albedo) to be like substantial forms because they are signified in the abstract.

False Conclusions from This Error:

• Some posit that forms are created (not generated)
• Some posit that forms pre-exist hidden in matter

Example of the Error: Michelangelo’s view that the form of the statue was hidden in the marble and he merely revealed it

Thomas’s Correction:

• Forms are not beings in themselves (per se); they have being only insofar as something else (the matter or subject) has being through them
• A form “comes to be” not as a substance comes to be, but by the matter receiving the form
• When clay shaped as a sphere becomes cube-shaped, no pre-existing hidden form is revealed; rather, the matter receives a new accidental form
• The sculptor imposes the form; he does not create it or discover it pre-existing
• Speaking properly: “The form is said to come to be not because it itself is, but because by it something is” (Non quia ipsa sit)

The Fallacy: Imagining forms (signified abstractly like albedo) to be substances with their own being, when in reality they are principles by which other things have being.

Key Arguments #

The Imagination as Source of Error #

Principle: “Imagination delights in the likeness of things; reason wants to know the differences of things.”

Consequence: Imagination can be a cause of error because when we cannot discern differences, likeness leads us astray.

Illustration: Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors—people confuse twin brothers because of their likeness, creating a cascade of comic misidentifications.

Seeing vs. Kicking #

Kicking:

• Proceeds from me outward to you
• Involves real agent (the kicker) and real patient (the one kicked)
• There is a real medium between us

Seeing:

• Does not proceed from my eye to the painting
• Rather, the painting (its color and size) acts upon my eye
• From the union of the seeing subject and the seen object, seeing arises
• Not like kicking: no real medium between knower and known

Common Error: People imagine seeing to be like kicking—something going out from the eye to the object (based on the Latin phrase “my eyes fell upon it”).

Learning and Recollection (Socratic Doctrine) #

Plato’s Teaching: Learning is recollection of what the soul already knows.

Correction: Socrates’ dialogue with the slave boy shows that in a syllogism, the conclusion (“every C is A”) is not explicitly known beforehand, though it is contained implicitly in the premises.

Resolution: When I recall the two premises, I come to know the conclusion for the first time; I am not merely recalling it, but deriving it from what I recollect.

Principle: Learning involves coming to know something new by reasoning from what is already known, not merely recollecting what was previously explicit knowledge.

Important Definitions #

Figura Dictionis (Latin: Figure of Diction)

• A fallacy from the mode of speaking rather than the nature of things
• Occurs when grammatical or linguistic form masks metaphysical difference
• Often arises from confused supposition

Confusa Suppositio (Latin: Confused Supposition)

• A term standing indistinctly for multiple things simultaneously
• Example: “beginning” in “the Father and Son are one beginning” stands for two persons together, not for one person determinately
• Contrasts with determinate supposition, where a term stands for one thing

Secundum Rem (Latin: According to the Nature of the Thing)

• What is true in reality; what actually exists or is the case
• Contrasts with secundum modum loquendi

Secundum Modum Loquendi (Latin: According to the Manner of Speaking)

• What appears true based on how something is expressed
• May not correspond to reality

Agens et Patiens (Latin: Agent and Patient)

• The agent: that which acts upon something
• The patient: that which undergoes action
• In kicking: the kicker is the agent, the one kicked is the patient
• These are really distinct and separated

Unum Principium Cognitionis (Latin: One Beginning of Knowledge)

• What understanding and the understood constitute when united
• Not a medium between two distinct things, but a single source from which knowledge proceeds

Examples & Illustrations #

Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors #

• Based on confusion of twin brothers who look alike
• One brother is married; the other is mistaken for the husband and invited to dinner
• He meets the wife’s sister and begins to fall in love with her
• The confusion multiplies as people mistake one brother for the other
• Illustrates how likeness causes deception and error

Mistaken Identity in Twin Situations #

• Berquist recounts being confused with his brother Mark (who was a year and a half older)
• Students would sometimes mix them up despite knowing they were different people
• Real twins can be so alike that they may switch dates to see if their dates notice the difference
• Shows the power of likeness to deceive even when one is alert to the possibility

The Sculptor Revealing Form #

• When Michelangelo sculpts, he speaks of the form being hidden in the marble
• This imagery suggests the form pre-exists and is merely revealed
• But this is misleading: the sculptor imposes the form; the marble receives it
• The form (e.g., the shape of David) did not pre-exist in the stone
• This exemplifies how imagination, delighting in the metaphor, can mislead us about what forms are

Seeing and Looking #

• Common expression: “My eyes fell upon it”
• This suggests the eyes go out from me to the object
• But seeing is not like a projectile leaving the eye
• Rather, I am struck by the beauty or struck by the object’s appearance
• The passive language (“I was struck”) better captures the reality

Drunkenness and Homicide #

• From Thomas’s discussion of sins
• A drunk man commits homicide
• Question: Does he merit two condemnations (one for drunkenness, one for homicide)?
• Or are they a single sin?
• The issue involves whether these are discrete sins (two separate acts) or one continuous act
• The fallacy (figura dictionis) treats discrete things as continuous and vice versa

Questions Addressed #

Why Can an Angel Understand Itself? #

The Problem: If understanding is like kicking (agent-patient relation), and something must fall between agent and patient, then nothing can fall between a thing and itself, so an angel cannot understand itself.

The Solution: Understanding is not like agent-patient relations. The knower and the known are not really distinct; they constitute one beginning of knowledge. When an angel understands itself, it is united with itself (trivially), and from this union understanding arises. No medium is needed because knower and known are not really separated.

How Are Relations to Creatures Really in God? #

The Problem: If relations are really in God (as the objection suggests), then God is composed and dependent on creatures.

The Solution: Relations are not in God secundum rem (according to the nature of the thing), but only secundum modum loquendi (according to the manner of speaking). What God is denominated from (e.g., “Creator”) need not be a form really inhering in God. The denomination comes from God’s nature and activity, but the relation itself (as a real thing in God) is not posited.

How Can the Father and Son Be One Beginning? #

The Problem: If “one beginning” must be either the Father or not the Father, then either the Son is the Father or the Father is not the Father—both contradictory.

The Solution: “Beginning” does not have determinate supposition (standing for one thing). It has confused supposition (standing for two persons together). The disjunction “either the Father or not the Father” assumes determinate supposition, which is not the case. Where supposition is confused, such disjunctions do not exhaust all possibilities in the way they do with determinate supposition. This is a fallacy of figura dictionis—moving illicitly from confused to determinate supposition.