56. Fallacies: The Accident and Simplicity versus Particularity

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fallacy of the Accident (Fallacia Accidentis) #

• The most serious fallacy outside of language and highly deceptive even to wise people
• Occurs when the middle term in a syllogism is not connected to the extremes in the same way
• Arises from inability to distinguish between per se (essential, by reason of the thing’s definition) and per accidens (accidental, extraneous to the thing’s definition)
• Related to the post-predicament of opposites and the distinction of formal opposition

The Fallacy of Simplicity versus Particularity (Simpliciter versus Secundum Quid) #

• Confusion between what is true simply (universally, essentially, without qualification) and what is true somewhat (partially, incompletely, in a limited way)
• More subtle and comprehensive than the fallacy of accident
• Fundamentally rooted in confusion between two modes of knowing
• Affects entire courses of study and fundamental philosophical errors

Key Arguments #

On the Fallacy of Accident #

Classic Example - “Socrates is a species”:

• Socrates is a man (true - per se, because man signifies the nature of Socrates)
• Man is a species (true - but per accidens, because man is a species only insofar as it is said of Socrates)
• Therefore, Socrates is a species (false)
• The Problem: The middle term (man) operates in two different ways: per se in the first premise, per accidens in the second

Why This Fallacy Deceives:

• The argument has perfect syllogistic form
• The premises are necessarily true
• But the necessity of the premises masks the accidental connection in the conclusion
• People cannot distinguish between the reason why something is predicated and the mode of that predication

On the Fallacy of Simplicity versus Particularity #

The Core Distinction:

• What is more known simply (by nature): Known distinctly, completely, through understanding its cause and essential nature
• What is more known to us: Known confusedly, incompletely, more immediately through our limited perception

Why Descartes Commits This Fallacy:

• Assumes the distinct is more certain for us when in fact the confused is more known to us
• Wrongly concludes we should only accept what is distinct and indubitable
• This violates Aristotle’s natural order: we must proceed from what is more known to us (confused) to what is more known simply (distinct)

The Order of Study Consequence:

• In natural philosophy, we should study things in general (less distinct but more known to us) before particular things (more distinct but less known to us)
• Descartes jumps into particulars immediately, reversing the proper order
• This represents “a tremendous mistake” affecting the entire structure of knowledge

Important Definitions #

Per Se (Per Se) vs. Per Accidens (Per Accidens) #

• Per Se: Something belongs to a thing according to what that thing fundamentally is (its definition or ratio); intrinsically essential
• Per Accidens: Something belongs to a thing in a way extraneous or external to its definition; accidentally or incidentally

Simpliciter (Simply) vs. Secundum Quid (Somewhat/In a Particular Way) #

• Simpliciter: Without qualification, universally, essentially, in the full nature of the thing itself
• Secundum Quid: With qualification, partially, in a limited or diminished way, in some respect but not absolutely

Knowledge Modes #

• More known simply (magis notum secundum naturam): More fully and perfectly known in itself; known through its cause and intrinsic nature
• More known to us (magis notum quoad nos): More immediately accessible to our perception; known confusedly before distinctly

Examples & Illustrations #

From Logic #

Induction versus Syllogism:

• Syllogism: The conclusion follows necessarily
• Induction: The conclusion follows only somewhat—the mind is inclined toward it, but not necessitated
• Example: “Every cat I’ve seen is four-legged, therefore all cats are four-legged” (the little boy in Africa who concluded all men are black)
• This is a distinction of simplicity: induction is “somewhat” a proof, not simply a proof

Rhetorical Arguments:

• The enthymeme is like a syllogism but “somewhat”—it proceeds from likelihood (what is true for the most part) and signs (which are not necessary)
• The rhetorical example is like an induction but “somewhat”—it argues from one singular to another singular of the same kind
• These are “diminutives” of the logical forms

From Natural Philosophy and Epistemology #

Wine Tasting:

• Knowing “this is dry red wine” is more known to us and more certain
• Knowing “this is Cabernet Sauvignon” is more known simply but less known to us
• The hidden blueberry wine example: tasters conditioned by tasting Cabernet all evening failed to recognize a different wine
• What is more known to us: The confused general knowledge
• What is more known simply: The distinct specific knowledge

Day and Night:

• More known to us: That there is day and night
• More known simply: That day and night result from the earth’s rotation on its axis
• Effect is more immediately known to us; cause makes it fully known simply
• The earth’s rotation seems counterintuitive (clump of earth doesn’t rotate), yet it’s the true cause

From Theology and Metaphysics #

The Beginning of All Things:

• The early Greek philosophers and poets (Mother Earth, Thales with water, etc.) said matter is the beginning of all things
• Modern materialists make the same error
• The Mistake: They confuse what is prior somewhat (in becoming, in change) with what is prior simply (in being)
• The Truth: Act is prior simply; ability/potency is prior somewhat (in the thing that undergoes change)
• This error leads to materialism rather than recognition of God as pure act

Academic Choices:

• Mathematics is more certain (more known to us with greater certitude)
• But the soul is better to know (more known simply, a better object of knowledge)
• Students wrongly choose mathematics over psychology or ethics because of its certitude
• The Error: Confusing “better in how we know it” with “better in what we know”
• The Truth: “It is better to know a better thing even if imperfectly than to know a lesser thing with perfect certitude”
• Aristotle’s example: “A glimpse of someone we love means more to us than a perfect view of something we don’t care about”

Notable Quotes #

“The fallacy of the accident is the first of the kinds of fallacies outside of speech, and it has more of the power to deceive, even the wise men.” — Albert the Great (cited by Berquist)

“No science which is truly science and has certitude considers about being per accidens. It’s only sophistica that is busy about this, and for deceiving.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)

“It is better to know a better thing even if it’s imperfectly known than to know a lesser thing with perfect certitude.” — Aristotle (cited by Berquist)

Questions Addressed #

On the Fallacy of the Accident #

Q: Why does the argument form appear valid even though the conclusion is false? A: Because it has the perfect form of a valid syllogism and the premises are necessarily true. But the middle term operates in two different ways: essentially in one premise and accidentally in another. People cannot distinguish the reason why something is predicated from the mode of predication.

Q: Why is this fallacy particularly deceptive? A: The necessity and obviousness of the premises masks the accidental nature of the connection. Even wise people are deceived because they do not carefully examine whether the middle term is connected to both extremes in the same way.

On Simplicity versus Particularity #

Q: Is confused knowledge false? A: No. Confused knowledge is true but incomplete. It is more known to us but less known simply. As we gain distinct knowledge, we know the thing more fully.

Q: Why should we study general natural philosophy before particular phenomena? A: Because what is more known to us (the general) is our natural starting point, even though what is more fully known simply (the particular in light of its causes) is what we ultimately aim at. Reversing this order violates the natural order of learning.

Q: Is it better to study mathematics because it has greater certitude? A: No. Certitude is a criterion of how we know, not what we know. It is better to study a nobler object of knowledge (the soul) imperfectly than a lesser object (mathematics) with perfect certitude. We should not let the criterion of how we know determine what we study.

Q: Why do materialists conclude matter is the beginning of all things? A: They confuse what is prior somewhat (in becoming and change, where potential must come first) with what is prior simply (in being and existence). In being, act is always prior; matter (pure potency) cannot exist without form or actualization. This is a grave error leading to the denial of God as pure act.