10. The Central Question of Philosophy and Knowledge

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Central Question of Philosophy #

Core Question: Does truth require that the way we know something be identical to the way it actually is?

• If yes: We can only know things as they are; any knowing that differs from how things are is false
• If no: We can know things in ways they do not exist without falsity; what must correspond to reality is our judgment/statement about things, not the mode of knowing itself

This question is “central” because it brings together everything philosophers discuss—both how we know (logic, epistemology) and how things are (metaphysics)—and determines each philosopher’s entire system.

Consequences of Answering “Yes” #

If truth requires identity between the way we know and the way things are:

1. Plato’s Response: Since we know things in confused, imperfect ways initially, and later distinctly, and since order in ideas must mirror order in things, then the most confused notion in our mind (being said of all things) must correspond to the most fundamental reality. This leads to identifying “being” with God.

2. Spinoza’s Principle: “The order in our ideas is the order in things.” Combined with the claim that we truly know things, this forces the conclusion that confused ideas have confused referents in reality.

3. Pantheism in German Philosophy: Hegel and other German thinkers, following this principle, reach strange conclusions:

   • Being passes over into non-being (because being without determination is indistinct)
   • God becomes identified with the totality of confused being
   • This error runs through 19th-century German university philosophy (documented in Denzinger)
   • Even modern thinkers like Kuhn and Karl Rahner contain pantheistic elements

4. Kantian Response: Recognizing something is wrong (things are not as we know them), but implicitly accepting the “yes” answer anyway, Kant concludes: we cannot know things; we only know phenomena through the structures of our mind.

The Aristotelian-Thomistic Answer: “No” #

We can truly know things in a different way than they are, provided:

1. The key principle: What must correspond to reality is not the mode of knowing but the judgment about what we know
2. Falsity arises only in the judgment: We can know X in separation (even though it doesn’t exist in separation) without error, as long as we don’t claim that X exists in separation
3. Examples of valid separation:
   • Mathematical knowledge: Understanding a cube without matter, even though cubes always exist with matter
   • Sense knowledge: Tongue tastes sweetness without whiteness; eye sees whiteness without sweetness—neither is false
   • Universal knowledge: Understanding humanity without knowing this particular human
   • Logical knowledge: Understanding the student as a philosopher before knowing he is a grandfather

Divine Knowledge and Eternity #

The question becomes acute with God’s knowledge:

• God’s knowledge is eternal: not in time, all at once, no past or future
• Yet God truly knows past, present, and future
• To God, the past and future are present in His eternal knowledge
• If the “yes” answer were true: This would be impossible—God could not truly know the future as future while knowing it as present
• But if the “no” answer is true: God can know all things (past, present, future) eternally without falsity, because the correspondence required is in the truth of His knowledge, not in the mode of knowing

Boethius’ Solution (Consolation of Philosophy, Book V): Working from Platonic premises initially, Boethius eventually adopts Aristotelian reasoning to understand divine knowledge. He realizes that to understand eternity, one must accept that God knows in a manner (eternally) that differs from how things are (in time), yet this involves no falsity.

Everyday Examples of Valid Non-Correspondence #

Remembering the Past:

• The past is not present now
• Yet when we remember something, the past becomes present to our memory
• There is no falsity in the past being present to us in memory
• Falsity would arise only if we claimed: “Because I remember X now, therefore X is now”

Order of Discovery vs. Order of Reality:

• We may know A before we know B, even though B comes before A in reality
• We know ourselves before we know our parents, yet parents preceded us
• We learn about Aristotle before learning about Alexander, yet Alexander knew Aristotle
• There is no falsity here if we don’t claim our order of knowing reflects the order of reality

Augustine’s Example:

• Augustine observes that thinking (cogitatio) is known before being (esse)
• Yet in reality, being precedes thinking
• This is not false knowledge; Augustine can correctly reason: “If something is thinking, it must be”
• The error would be claiming that because thinking is known first, therefore thinking is first in reality

Key Arguments #

The Structure of the Error #

1. Premise 1: When we truly know something, there is correspondence between knowledge and reality
2. Premise 2 (Hidden): This correspondence must extend to the mode or manner of knowing, not just the content
3. Conclusion: The way we know must be the way things are
4. Refutation: Premise 2 is false. Correspondence means our judgment (our claim about the thing) must be true, not that our mode of accessing the thing must mirror its actual mode of being

Why Aristotle’s Position Preserves Truth #

Truth is defined as the correspondence between intellect and thing (adequatio intellectus et rei). This means:

• The intellect’s judgment must match reality
• The intellect’s mode of operation need not match the thing’s mode of existence
• A true statement can be the result of knowing things in separation, confusion, or reverse order, as long as the final judgment is correct

Important Definitions #

The Central Question (φιλοσοφική Ερώτηση) #

The question that determines an entire philosophical system: whether truth requires identity between the mode of knowing and the mode of being. Berquist calls it “central” because it bridges epistemology and metaphysics, touching everything philosophy addresses.

Truth (as correspondence) #

The adequation of intellect to thing—the judgment of the intellect must correspond to reality, though the intellect’s way of operating need not correspond to the thing’s way of existing.

Falsity (as misjudgment) #

Falsity arises not from knowing something in separation from matter (for example) but from claiming it exists in separation when it does not.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Parent-Child Example #

• A person may know their child before knowing the parents
• Yet parents precede the child in reality
• Knowledge is complete and true (the child exists, the parents exist in the order they do) without the order of knowing matching the order of being
• Falsity would arise only by claiming: “I know the child preceded the parents, therefore the child preceded the parents”

The Student-Philosopher Example #

• One knows a student as a student/philosopher
• One might not know that same person is a grandfather
• The knowledge of him as a student is true and complete, even though incomplete regarding all his attributes
• No falsity; only incompleteness

The Memory Example #

• Past events are not present now
• Yet remembering makes them present to consciousness
• No falsity in the past being present in memory
• Falsity only if one claims: “Because I remember it now, it is occurring now”

The Sense Experience Examples #

• Sugar is both white and sweet
• The tongue tastes sweetness without seeing whiteness
• The eye sees whiteness without tasting sweetness
• Neither sense is false; knowledge is valid though not comprehensive

The Cube Example #

• A cube must always exist with matter
• A mathematician can understand the cube without considering matter
• This is valid understanding, not false abstraction
• The error would be claiming: “Because I understand cube without matter, cubes exist without matter”

The Divine Knowledge Example #

• God knows all future events eternally (not in time)
• Future events will occur in time (in the future, not eternally)
• Yet God’s knowledge is true and not false
• Impossible if the “yes” answer were true; only possible if Aristotle is right

Notable Quotes #

“It’s what we say about things that has to correspond with them, not the way we know them.” (Berquist, paraphrasing Aquinas on Aristotle)

“I can truly know things even in the contrary order in which they came.” (Berquist, on valid knowledge with non-corresponding order)

“The falsity would come if I say that because I truly understand them in separation, therefore they truly exist in separation.” (Berquist, on the proper location of falsity)

“For me to truly know you and your parents, I have to know you and your parents in the way you are, in the order of which you are. So I have to really know your parents before you, otherwise I wouldn’t truly know you or your parents.” (Berquist, on complete vs. false knowledge)

“To understand so far as we can the divine knowledge, you have to realize that the way He knows and the way things are are not the same.” (Berquist, on Boethius’ insight regarding eternity)

Questions Addressed #

Can we know things truly in a way they do not exist? #

Answer: Yes. We can know things in separation, in confusion, or in reverse order without falsity, provided our judgment about them is correct. Falsity arises only in the judgment/statement, not in the mode of knowing.

Does God’s eternal knowledge falsely represent temporal future events? #

Answer: No. God knows all things (past, present, future) eternally and truly. If truth required that the way God knows match the way things are, this would be impossible. But since truth requires only that God’s judgment/knowledge be accurate, not that His mode of knowing be temporal, no contradiction arises.

Why did Plato reject the possibility of true knowledge of changing things? #

Answer: Because Plato answered “yes” to the central question. Since we know changing things in confused ways initially (which mirrors their actual confused/imperfect nature), and order in ideas reflects order in reality, Plato concluded that true, stable knowledge must be of unchanging things (Forms). He could not conceive of knowing changing things in an unchanging way.

Why does Aristotle’s answer preserve both truth and rational order? #

Answer: Because Aristotle denies the identity requirement between mode of knowing and mode of being. We can abstract unchanging universal concepts from changing particular things. We can know them logically and eternally, even though they exist temporally and changeably. This rescues philosophy from Plato’s otherworldliness.

Connections to Course Material #

To Boethius #

Boethius (Consolation of Philosophy, Book V) represents a pivotal moment in philosophy. Initially approaching divine providence and God’s knowledge from a Platonic perspective, Boethius—through dialogue with Lady Wisdom—eventually adopts Aristotelian reasoning. His definition of eternity (later adopted by Thomas Aquinas) presupposes that God’s knowledge, though eternal and unchanging, can truly comprehend temporal future events. This requires accepting that truth does not demand identity of modes.

To Thomas Aquinas #

Thomas Aquinas synthesizes Boethius and Aristotle, defending the Aristotelian position explicitly. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas discusses how God knows things in His eternity without falsity, grounding this in the principle that correspondence (adaequatio) concerns the truth of the intellection, not the mode of the intellection.

To Spinoza and Rationalism #

Spinoza’s principle—“the order in our ideas is the order in things”—is precisely the “yes” answer to the central question. It leads necessarily to pantheism and strange conclusions about being and non-being.

To Kant #

Kant, recognizing that things cannot be as we know them (in temporal succession, in space), accepts the conclusion that we cannot know things themselves (the noumenal). But implicitly, he still holds the “yes” answer: since things cannot be known as we know them, we know nothing of them. His solution is skepticism about metaphysics.

To Modern Epistemology #

The central question remains urgent in modern philosophy. Debates about representation, correspondence theories of truth, and the relationship between consciousness and reality ultimately turn on whether truth requires identity of modes or merely correspondence of judgment.