Lecture 45

45. The Four Kinds of Causes and Their Univocal Meaning

Summary
Berquist examines Aristotle’s distinction of the four kinds of causes (material, formal, efficient, and final), arguing that while each is a ‘cause’ in a different sense, they share a common notion of being responsible for the being or becoming of another. He demonstrates through linguistic and logical analysis how ‘cause’ is equivocal by reason rather than by chance, similar to how ‘part’ and ’thing’ have multiple but ordered meanings. The lecture establishes that this framework of causality is universally applicable to all sciences and philosophy.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Four Kinds of Causes and Their Distinction #

Aristotle distinguishes four fundamental kinds of causes, but each is not called a ‘cause’ in exactly the same sense. This is not pure equivocity by chance, but equivocity by reason—meaning the different senses share an ordered relationship toward a common notion.

Definition of Cause #

A cause is what is responsible for the being or becoming of another. The effect depends upon the cause for its existence or coming into existence.

The Problem of Univocity #

Berquist contrasts this with geometric distinctions: when Euclid distinguishes kinds of quadrilaterals (square, oblong, rhombus, etc.), each is a quadrilateral in exactly the same sense. But with causes, each is not a cause in exactly the same sense. This raises the question: what unifies them if they lack univocal meaning?

Equivocity by Reason vs. by Chance #

The word ‘cause’ is equivocal by reason (ordered to a common meaning) rather than by chance (purely accidental, like ‘bat’ the animal and ‘bat’ the object). This distinction is crucial for understanding how philosophy can meaningfully discuss multiple causes without collapsing into mere homonymy.

Parallels with Other Distinctions #

  • Part: Letters in a word (C, A, T), matter and form in a substance, elements of a definition, particular in a universal—all called ‘parts’ but not in exactly the same sense
  • Thing: Substance (body), accident (health), matter (clay), form (spherical shape)—all called ’things’ but not univocally
  • Substance and Accident vs. Matter and Form: These are overlapping but distinct frameworks for understanding composition

Key Arguments #

Why the Four Causes Are Not Univocal #

The Wooden Chair Example:

  • Material cause: Wood is responsible for the chair
  • Formal cause: The shape is responsible for the chair
  • Efficient cause: The carpenter is responsible for the chair
  • Final cause: Sitting is responsible for the chair

Each is ‘responsible,’ but in radically different ways. The carpenter acts upon external matter; the wood persists within the product; the shape defines what the thing is; sitting is the purpose for which the form was given.

Why Something Unchanging Is Required for Understanding Change #

Matters of the natural world naturally arise to the recognition that something unchanging must underlie change. Examples:

  • A ball hit in the infield and caught in the outfield must be the same ball
  • A stone falling to the ground must remain as the stone throughout its motion
  • A mouse cannot walk through grain that keeps giving way; it needs a substrate that doesn’t move

Matter is not completely unchanging (it receives different forms), but in some sense it persists through change. God, however, is unchanging in a more absolute way.

The Greeks and the Beginning of Things #

The Pre-Socratic philosophers recognized four attributes of what is first:

  1. One (Thales)
  2. Simple (Thales with water)
  3. Unlimited/Infinite (Anaximander—to apeiron)
  4. Unchanging (implicit in discussion of what persists through change)

These four naturally rise from Greek thinking because they think of the first principle as material. However, Thomas Aquinas adds a fifth attribute: Perfect. This becomes apparent only when one recognizes the first cause is not material but like form or mover—i.e., not passive matter but active principle.

The Order of Discussion #

Thomas Aquinas structures discussion of God’s substance around these five attributes but does so in different orders in different works (Summa Theologiae vs. Summa Contra Gentiles), yet each order reveals something important. All attributes are ultimately reducible to these five, and all statements about God’s attributes in sources like Vatican I documents can be traced back to one of these five.

Important Definitions #

Cause (αἰτία) #

What is responsible for the being or becoming of another; that upon which the effect depends for its existence or coming into existence.

Effect #

That which depends upon a cause for its being or becoming.

Equivocal by Reason (ἀνωνυμία κατὰ λόγον) #

Words that have multiple meanings that are ordered toward a common notion rather than purely accidental (as in equivocal by chance).

Examples & Illustrations #

The Wooden Chair #

  • Wood (material cause) is responsible for the chair’s existence
  • The carpenter (efficient cause) shapes the matter
  • The form or shape (formal cause) makes it a chair rather than a table
  • Sitting (final cause) is the purpose for which the carpenter made it with its particular form

These four are all ‘responsible,’ yet the responsibility operates differently in each case.

The Word ‘Cat’ #

Parts of the word include:

  • Quantitative parts: C, A, T (letters)
  • Parts of the definition: the sounds and their order (the letters constitute it)

But these are not parts in the same way. We can say ‘a cat is composed of C, A, and T,’ but we cannot say ‘a cat is C.’ Yet with a square: we can say ‘a square is equilateral,’ ‘a square is a right angle,’ etc.

Change and Unchanging Substrate #

  • If the ball ceases to exist after leaving the infield, the game becomes impossible
  • Motion is impossible unless something remains through the change
  • Matter persists while forms change, allowing motion to occur

Questions Addressed #

How Can Multiple Things Be Called ‘Cause’ If They Work Differently? #

They are unified by a common notion (responsibility for being or becoming) but differ in how that responsibility operates. This is not problematic because words can have ordered meanings (equivocal by reason) that are still intelligibly connected rather than purely accidental homonyms.

What Distinguishes This from Pure Equivocity? #

Pure equivocity would be like ‘bat’ (animal) and ‘bat’ (object)—entirely unrelated. But ‘cause’ has an ordered relationship: all four are genuinely responsible in some way for the thing’s being or becoming, even though the mode of responsibility differs.

Why Is the Framework Universally Applicable? #

Because any knowledge that seeks to understand why—any science that looks for causes—will necessarily inquire after one or more of these kinds of causes. Different sciences may emphasize different causes (e.g., geometry focuses on formal cause), but all sciences that explain ultimately employ this framework.

Notable Quotes #

“A cause is what is responsible for the being or the becoming of another.”

“You depend upon something that doesn’t move, right, in order to walk.”

“It’s kind of an interesting text” [on Vatican I’s discussion of God], “but everything that’s said there was back in one of these five [attributes].”

“Four of the five attributes of God… they have a different meaning, and they’re said of God, and the sign of the matter.”

“These four… rise very naturally [from Greek thought], and in the fifth one [perfection], right, let’s just see different kinds of cause.”