54. Nature Acting for an End: Three Major Objections and Replies

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Three Major Objections to Natural Teleology #

Berquist systematically addresses objections claiming either that nature cannot act for an end, that it demonstrably fails to do so, or that simpler explanations suffice without invoking purpose.

The Question of Mind and Purpose #

Whether action for an end necessarily requires that the agent itself possess a mind, or whether it suffices for the agent to be a product of mind.

The Problem of Natural Defects #

How to reconcile the apparent purposiveness of nature with the existence of defective outcomes, injuries, and natural disasters.

Mathematical Chance vs. Teleology #

Whether mathematical probability can explain natural order without invoking final causation, and the proper distinction between chance as a means versus pure chance as primary cause.

Key Arguments #

First Objection: Action for an End Requires a Mind #

The Objection:

• The end is a strange kind of cause—it does not yet exist when the action is performed
• How can something non-existent cause something existent?
• This appears to require a mind to have the end in view
• Nature lacks a mind; therefore nature cannot act for an end

Berquist’s Reply:

• Distinction: Action for an end requires a mind in either the agent OR in the agent’s cause (designer/maker)
• Thermostat example: A thermostat acts for an end (maintaining temperature) without having a mind, because it is designed by a mind
• Habituation example: Skilled drivers brake automatically without conscious thought; yet habit was originally acquired through mind (the driving instructor)
• Linguistic precision: Better to say “action is for the sake of something” rather than “action for an end,” avoiding the implication that the agent must consciously aim
• Tool analogy: A knife is for the sake of cutting; a ballpoint pen is for the sake of writing—without these things having minds
• Conclusion: The question of whether nature itself has a mind is secondary; first we must establish that what nature does is clearly for the sake of something

Second Objection: Nature Produces Bad Things #

The Objection:

• End and good are identical
• Nature produces defects (defective babies, earthquakes, hurricanes)
• Therefore, nature does not act for an end

Berquist’s Reply:

• Frequency principle: Bad outcomes are rare; most babies are not defective; most organs function properly
• Comparison to human art: Even the best cooks sometimes burn meat; skilled musicians hit wrong notes; this does not mean their art is not directed toward a good
• Extenuating circumstances: Unlike human artists with minds, nature cannot compensate for external interference (thalidomide exposure, maternal drug use). This is actually evidence FOR teleology, not against it—nature lacks the flexibility to account for such circumstances
• Failure presupposes purpose: The very fact that we speak of “heart failure” or “organ failure” indicates these things are trying to achieve something. Failure only makes sense when there is an intended end. We do not speak of “stone failure.”
• Logical conclusion: If failure demonstrates purposive action, then nature’s occasional failures are actually evidence that it is acting for an end

Third Objection: The Principle of Parsimony (Occam’s Razor) #

The Objection:

• Three causes (matter, form, and mover) suffice to explain phenomena in nature
• Mathematical chance can account for apparent purposiveness
• A fourth cause (end/telos) is therefore unnecessary
• The principle of simplicity dictates we prefer fewer causes

The Empedoclean Model:

• Mindless love and hate randomly combine things
• Most combinations are defective and perish
• By statistical inevitability, good combinations eventually arise and persist
• Modern parallel: Random mutations; most harmful, few beneficial; beneficial strains survive

Berquist’s Reply:

Mathematical Chance as Means vs. Pure Chance #

• Mathematical chance CAN be a means of achieving an end (not proof against teleology)
• Hunter example: A shotgun with 15 pellets creates a spread; the hunter still aims at the bird. The spread is a means, not evidence of non-purposive action
• Military example: Peppering a wooded area where an ammunition dump is suspected. The distribution is calculated to increase the probability of hitting a directed target
• Key distinction: Using mathematical chance as a means to achieve an end is compatible with—indeed, presupposes—purposive action

Pure Mathematical Chance Cannot Explain Natural Good #

• Under pure mathematical chance, odds for good vs. bad are approximately 1 to infinity (not 1 to 1)
• Chair leg example: To replace a broken chair leg, one specific length is correct; infinite lengths are wrong. Yet nature consistently produces correctly proportioned parts
• Eye example: Countless structural features must be precisely correct simultaneously. The odds against success by pure chance approach infinity to one
• Observation: Nature produces good results almost always, not almost never. Pure chance would produce the reverse
• Second Law of Thermodynamics: Without direction, order tends toward disorder. An army using pure mathematical chance (firing in all directions) would eliminate itself, not defeat an enemy

The Principle of Parsimony Presupposes Teleology (Irony) #

• Newton’s original formulation: “More are in vain when less will serve”—meaning: unnecessary causes serve no purpose, which presupposes action for an end
• Aristotle praised Empedocles for using fewer causes than Anaxagoras, yet rejected Empedocles’ claim that three causes suffice
• Logical irony: Modern thinkers use the principle of parsimony (which is itself based on nature acting for an end) to deny that nature acts for an end
• Conclusion: The very principle invoked against teleology actually depends on it

Important Definitions #

Nature (φύσις) #

• The principle of motion and rest intrinsic to a thing
• Comprises both matter and form
• Defined by its characteristic operations and ends

End (τέλος) #

• That for the sake of which something is done
• The good aimed at in action
• The final cause

Chance (τύχη) #

• An accidental cause of what happens rarely as a result of an action done for an end
• Presupposes purposeful action; cannot be primary explanation of regular phenomena
• Distinct from mathematical chance (probability ratio)

Organic Body (σῶμα ὀργανικόν) #

• A body composed of tools (ὄργανα)
• Living bodies whose parts are clearly for the sake of their functions
• Eyes for seeing, teeth for biting/chewing, heart for pumping blood

Mathematical Chance #

• A calculated probability or ratio (e.g., 1 in 2, 1 in 6)
• Distinct from Aristotelian chance, which is accidental causation
• Can function as a means to an end without disproving purposive action

Examples & Illustrations #

Household & Practical Examples #

• Driver braking habitually: No conscious thought, yet acquired through mind (the instructor)
• Cook burning meat: Even skilled cooks fail sometimes; this does not negate culinary purpose
• Musician hitting wrong note: Accomplished performers make mistakes; evidence of aim, not of absence of aim
• Restaurant seasoning: Even expensive restaurants occasionally over-season food
• Broken chair leg: One correct length from infinite wrong lengths; nature consistently achieves such precision
• Shotgun hunting: 15 pellets create spread around aimed target; mathematical chance used as a means
• Military bombing: Peppering a wooded area where enemy ammunition is suspected; directed probability
• Cooking instructions: Package directions (e.g., “15-20 minutes per pound”) fail to account for oven variation, which a human mind can compensate for; nature, lacking mind, cannot

Natural Examples #

• Defective babies: Rare; most organs remain functional; shows that nature usually succeeds
• Dandelions: Produce countless seeds; some inevitably land in good soil (mathematical chance as means)
• Antibiotic resistance: Random mutations in bacteria; most harmful, few beneficial; beneficial strains multiply
• Embryonic development: Proceeds through ordered stages toward a specific organism

Logical Examples #

• Failure and purpose: “Did I fail to teach you German?” No—because I wasn’t trying to. Failure only applies to intended ends. “Did I fail to teach you philosophy?” Yes—because I was trying. The fact that nature “fails” sometimes (defects, diseases) proves it is trying to achieve something

Questions Addressed #

Can nature act for an end without having a mind? #

Answer: Yes. The agent need not have a mind if the agent is a product of mind (thermostat) or if purposive action has become habitual (skilled driver).

Do natural defects disprove that nature acts for an end? #

Answer: No. Defects are rare exceptions. Even human arts with minds sometimes fail. Failure itself presupposes an intended end—you cannot fail at what you are not trying to do.

Does mathematical chance eliminate the need for a final cause? #

Answer: No. Mathematical chance can be a means of achieving an end (as in hunting or warfare). Under pure mathematical chance with no direction, odds against natural good are approximately 1 to infinity. Yet nature produces good almost always, not almost never.

Is the principle of parsimony a neutral argument? #

Answer: No. The principle itself is based on the assumption that nature acts for an end (unnecessary causes serve no purpose). Therefore, using it against teleology is circular reasoning.