60. Motion, Place, and the Eight Senses of 'In'

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Definition of Motion and Its Three Parts #

• Motion (κίνησις) defined as the act of what is able to be as such
• Three essential components:
  1. Act (ἐνέργεια) - actualization of potentiality
  2. Of what is able to be (δυνατόν) - of potentiality, not actuality already possessed
  3. As such (ᾗ) - insofar as it remains in potentiality, not fully actualized
• Motion is not a category itself but occurs within each of the ten categories

Why “As Such” Is Essential to the Definition #

The definition cannot simply be “the act of the movable” because this creates circularity and fails to distinguish motion from other acts:

• Motion vs. Already-Possessed Act: Water becoming hot is not the act of being water (which water already possesses) but the act of water insofar as it is able to be hot
• Incompleteness of the Act: Coming into the room is not the same as being fully in the room. The ability to be in the room remains only partially actualized during the motion. Once fully actualized, the motion ceases
• Essential Ordering to Further Act: Motion must be per se (not accidentally) ordered to a further act. Standing in a doorway is not motion because it is accidental to standing whether one continues further; but coming through a doorway necessarily tends toward being fully in the room. Similarly, learning necessarily tends toward knowing more, whereas imperfect knowing may be accidental to further knowledge

The Problem of Place #

Aristotle rejects the common modern view that place is the dimensions a body occupies:

• Dimensional Theory Problems:

  • If dimensions have length, width, and depth, they constitute another body (however subtle)
  • If dimensions have no substance, how can nothing have dimensions?
  • Why say the body is in place rather than place in the body, given they interpenetrate?

• Aristotle’s Alternative: Place is like the inner surface of a containing vessel (e.g., the inner surface of a glass containing water), not the dimensions themselves

• Philosophical Advantage: This makes sense of why we say bodies are in place rather than with place, and avoids positing empty, dimensionless space

• River Example: Water constantly flows around a post, so the containing surface is always a surface of different water; yet this surface maintains the same relation to the shores, providing stability to place despite the material change

The Eight Senses of ‘In’ (ἐν) #

Thomas Aquinas orders Aristotle’s eight senses of ‘in’ from most sensible to most intellectual:

1. Body in place (most obvious to senses): “I am in this room”
2. Part in whole (as part in a hole): “My teeth are in my mouth” - closely related to the first sense; when a part detaches, it becomes in place rather than in whole
3. Genus in species (in the mind): “Animal is in the definition of dog” - a part of a definition is in the definition
4. Species in genus (universal whole): “Dog is in the genus animal” - distinct from the third sense because species is said of genus rather than composed by it
5. Form in matter: Shape is in clay
6. Whole in parts: The whole is in its parts (inverse of the fifth sense)
7. In active power/ability: “We are in God’s hands” - something is in the power of an agent
8. In the good/end (in the mind and will): “My heart is in this work” - relates to intention and desire

Key Arguments #

Distinguishing Motion Through Its Definition #

Problem: How do we distinguish motion from mere incompleteness or static potentiality?

Solution: Three components must work together:

• The act must belong to potentiality, not to actuality already possessed
• The act must be incomplete (still in potentiality, not fully actualized)
• The act must be per se ordered to further actualization

Without all three, we cannot separate motion from other phenomena.

Why Understanding ‘In’ Matters Philosophically #

Equivocation in the word ‘in’ allows sophists to appear to refute axioms:

• False Sophistic Argument: “Man is part of animal [as part in universal whole], but animal contains more than man [as composed whole], so a part is greater than the whole—a contradiction!”
• Resolution: The word “part” and “whole” have different meanings in each premise; properly distinguishing the senses of ‘in’ prevents the apparent contradiction

Important Definitions #

• Motion (κίνησις): The act of what is able to be as such; the actualization of potentiality insofar as it remains potential and is per se ordered to further actualization
• Potentiality (δύναμις): The ability to be something; capacity for actualization
• Actuality (ἐνέργεια): The state of being actualized; the realization of potential
• Place (τόπος): The inner boundary of a containing body; the containing surface rather than the dimensions occupied
• As such (ᾗ): Insofar as; under a particular aspect or condition

Examples & Illustrations #

The Coming-Into-the-Room Example #

• A person is actually a man and actually a philosopher but able to be in the room
• Coming into the room is the act of this ability while still in ability (not the completed act of being in the room)
• Standing in the doorway is not motion because it is accidental to standing whether one goes further (e.g., checking credentials)
• Becoming hot in water is the act of the water insofar as it can be hot, not the act of being water

Learning vs. Imperfect Knowing #

• A student who knows a subject imperfectly but has no intention of learning more (took course for a requirement) is not in motion
• A student who is actively learning necessarily will know more (motion is per se ordered to further knowledge)
• This distinguishes motion from mere incompleteness

The Character of Monsignor Kasurik #

• One of Berquist’s former teachers who consistently grew in wisdom over time
• Each visit revealed new insights; he was always “coming down” (continuing to learn)
• Contrasted with those who “level off” after formal training and merely “feed themselves” the rest of their lives
• Illustrates the distinction between actual learning (motion toward greater knowledge) and static possession of imperfect knowledge

Place and the Containing Vessel #

• Water in a glass: the place is the inner surface of the glass, not the dimensions the water occupies
• If you remove the water and fill the glass with wine, the wine is now in the same place (the inner surface)
• The post in a river: the inner surface of the water containing it remains in the same relation to the shores even though the water is constantly changing

Notable Quotes #

“If you’re not going forward, you’re going backwards.” (Spiritual writers, cited by Berquist on learning and spiritual life)

“The soul is more where it loves than where it animates.” (Augustine, cited in contextual notes as relating to the eighth sense of ‘in’)

“As such is always opposed or usually opposed to what? By happening, right?” (Berquist, emphasizing the distinction between per se and accidental ordering)

Questions Addressed #

Why can’t motion be simply defined as “the act of the movable”? #

This would be circular and would not distinguish motion from other acts already possessed by the thing. The third part “as such” shows that motion is the act of potentiality insofar as it remains potential, not the act of actuality already possessed.

What is the difference between learning and imperfect knowing? #

Imperfect knowing may be accidental to further knowledge (one may stop learning); learning, however, is per se ordered to further knowledge—so long as one is learning, one will know more. This illustrates why “as such” (the third part) is essential to motion’s definition.

Why is place not the dimensions a body occupies? #

If dimensions are something, they constitute another body; if they are nothing, they cannot have dimensions. Additionally, it makes better sense philosophically to say bodies are in place (contained by it) rather than with place (interpenetrating it), which the inner-surface view explains better.

How does understanding the eight senses of ‘in’ prevent sophistic refutation of axioms? #

By properly distinguishing whether ‘in’ means in place, part in whole, genus in species, or another sense, we can see that the sophist is equivocating—using ‘in’ with different meanings in different premises, making the apparent contradiction dissolve.