4. Difficulties in Investigating the Soul's Nature

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Five Central Difficulties About the Soul #

Aristotle identifies major obstacles in investigating what the soul is:

1. Method of Investigation - Is there one universal method for defining what anything is, or does each subject require its own method?

2. Genus and Category - Into which fundamental category does the soul fall? Is it a substance (ousia), a quality, a quantity, an ability (potentiality/dynamis), or an act (actuality/energeia)?

3. Unity vs. Multiplicity - Is there one universal definition of soul applicable to all living things, or different definitions for different kinds of souls (plant, animal, human)? The moderns find it strange that Aristotle speaks of “the soul of a dog” or “the soul of a tree.”

4. Parts and Operations - Does the soul have parts or is it partless? Should we investigate the whole soul first or its parts? Should we study powers before acts, and acts before their objects?

5. Definition and Properties - Does knowing what the soul is help us understand its properties, or do the observable properties help us understand what the soul is? In mathematics, we know definition first; in natural science, we often work from effects backward to substance.

The Two Opinions in Plato’s Phaedo #

Berquist examines two pre-Aristotelian theories Plato presents, both containing partial truths but ultimately inadequate:

Theory 1: Soul as Distinct Substance

• The soul is a complete substance separate from the body
• Metaphor: a sailor in a boat (the soul inhabits but remains distinct from the body)
• Also present in earlier Greek thinkers who understood soul as breath (pneuma), leaving the body at death
• Problem: Creates disconnect between the soul’s suffering and the soul’s thinking about relief - contradicts our unified inward experience of being a single entity
• Problem: Would the soul oppose itself when we fast or resist bodily passion?

Theory 2: Soul as Harmony/Order

• The soul is merely the arrangement or harmonious organization of bodily matter
• Metaphor: tuning a piano or arranging chairs in rows - organization of pre-existing elements, not addition of something new
• Problem: Can an order or harmony oppose the body itself? Socrates asks if there can be “a harmony of harmony” or “an order of order”
• Problem: When death occurs (disorganization), the harmony doesn’t go somewhere else - it simply ceases. This seems to deny the unity and integrity of the soul as an entity.

Socrates’ Arguments Against the Harmony Theory #

In the Phaedo, Socrates argues:

• The soul sometimes opposes the body’s desires (fasting, resisting passion) - but would mere organization oppose itself?
• The soul has its own virtue independent of the body - but what would be “virtue of virtue”?
• Soul has operations independent of body (understanding/intellection) - but if soul were merely bodily organization, it would have no activity without the body’s activity
• Soul has knowledge of eternal things and existed before the body - but how could organization pre-exist?

Inward Experience of Soul-Body Unity #

Berquist emphasizes that our common experience contradicts both extreme positions:

• When I feel pain and think about how to relieve it, the one suffering and the one thinking are the same being - not a separate soul happening to notice a body’s pain
• Losing a limb feels like losing part of myself, not like a sailor abandoning a boat
• This reveals the inadequacy of both theories and requires a third understanding: the soul as form (morphe) of the body

Key Arguments #

The Principle: “What is Through Itself is Before and Cause of What is Through Another” #

Berquist discusses this Aristotelian principle (cited by Thomas Aquinas) with attention to translation nuances:

• Greek: proteron and ition (or in some readings kai ition, “and cause”)
• The principle operates as both:
  • Chronologically: God can see himself without us; we cannot see God except through him
  • Causally: That which subsists through itself is the cause of what depends on another
  • Ontologically: God exists necessarily; creatures exist contingently through dependence on God

Arguments About Self-Motion and the Soul #

Berquist notes pre-Aristotelian thinkers’ errors:

• Some thought: “The soul moves the body, so the soul must itself be moved” (reasoning that nothing moves another unless moved itself)
• Some attributed motion to soul as being fire or atoms (self-moving elements)
• Problem: If atoms randomly move the body, there would be no regularity - a cat wouldn’t consistently move toward food rather than toward danger

Modern Confusion About the Soul’s Definition #

Berquist observes that today the word “soul” has lost its general meaning:

• People often say “a dog doesn’t have a soul” meaning it’s not immortal
• This conflates the particular (immortal human soul) with the general definition (soul as principle of life)
• Similar confusion occurs with “virtue” - people think only humans have virtue, forgetting the sharpness of a knife is its virtue
• Understanding requires recognizing the general first, then particular instances

Important Definitions #

Soul (ψυχή / anima) #

The first principle of life in living bodies; that which makes a body alive rather than non-living; the organizing principle that gives matter the status of a living body.

Ability/Potentiality (δύναμις / potentia) #

Capacity to act; power not yet actualized; the passive or receptive dimension of a being.

Act/Actuality (ἐνέργεια / actus) #

Realization; the exercise of a power; active existence or realization of a potential.

Genus (γένος / genus) #

A fundamental category under which a thing falls; used in definition as the broader class to which a particular thing belongs.

Substance (οὐσία / ousia) #

That which has independent existence; that which stands under and supports accidents; what a thing fundamentally is.

Form/Formation (μορφή / forma) #

The organizing principle that makes matter into a particular kind of thing; the actualizing principle that determines what something is.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Harmony Analogy #

If the soul were like harmony:

• A piano out of tune: strings are disorganized
• A piano in tune: strings are organized in proper relationship
• But when piano goes out of tune, the harmony doesn’t “go somewhere” - it’s simply lost
• Death would be disorganization, not separation of soul from body
• Yet our experience suggests death is more like separation than mere disorganization

The Wind and the Soul #

In Homer (or early Greek tradition):

• A dying warrior’s soul begins to leave his body
• A strong wind gusts up and forces the soul back into the body
• This imagery reflects understanding of soul as substance capable of entering and leaving

Defining Things by Effects #

Berquist uses multiple examples of how we come to understand things through their effects:

Comedy and Laughter

• We first know comedy through its effect (laughter)
• We see the theatrical masks - one smiling, one weeping - as signs
• The Aristotelian definition: the laughable is a form of ugliness (like a comic mask’s distorted face) that produces laughter without pain
• True understanding requires grasping not just the effect but what in comedy produces that effect

Virtue and the Knife

• Sharpness is the virtue of a knife
• We recognize sharpness through the knife’s proper operation (cutting well)
• One must know what the knife’s own act is (cutting) to understand that sharpness is its virtue
• Similarly with humans: one must know human’s proper act before understanding human virtue

Sight and Color

• We distinguish the sense of sight from hearing through their objects (color vs. sound), not primarily through studying the powers in isolation
• The object is more immediately known than the power

The Planted Garden Problem #

Berquist mentions discussing with his wife about selecting plants for their yard:

• Each plant has its own individual soul
• People are amused by this notion because they’ve forgotten the general definition of soul
• A plant soul is real but different from animal and human souls

Questions Addressed #

Q: Why do moderns not understand the soul? #

A: Because they’ve jumped immediately to the particular (human/immortal soul) without understanding the general definition of soul. The word has lost its general meaning.

Q: Why should we investigate the parts of the soul before the whole or vice versa? #

A: It’s a genuine difficulty because:

• Some operations require understanding the whole integrated being (e.g., understanding reason’s operation in a unified person)
• Other investigations require understanding parts first (e.g., studying nutrition before movement)
• Aristotle will need to determine the proper order case by case

Q: How do we define the soul if we don’t know its essence directly? #

A: We work from effects and accidents that are more evident to us. The ultimate definition must explain why these accidents necessarily belong to the soul; otherwise the definition is merely dialectical (opinion) rather than true.

Q: Is knowing the definition or knowing the properties more fundamental? #

A: In mathematics, the definition comes first and properties follow necessarily from it. In natural science, we often know properties/effects first and work backward to understand the substance. Both directions matter - ultimately a true definition must explain the properties.

Q: Are all souls the same kind? #

A: No. Aristotle will show there are different types: the vegetative soul (plants), the sensitive soul (animals), and the rational soul (humans). Yet there is also a general definition of soul applicable to all.

Notable Quotes and Statements #

“The moderns don’t even know if they have a soul, right? Let alone what it might be, right?” — Berquist, illustrating modern confusion about the soul’s existence and nature

“For until now, those who speak and inquire about the soul seem to look into the soul of man alone.” — Aristotle (quoted by Berquist), showing that the tendency to focus only on human soul is ancient

“One must be careful, lest they escape one’s notice, whether the account of it is one like that of animal or different for each, as horse, dog, man, God, right?” — Aristotle on the difficulty of determining whether there is one definition of soul or many

“Not only does knowing that what it is seem to be useful for considering the causes of the accidents and substances… But also, on the contrary, the accidents lead in great part to seeing what it is.” — Aristotle on the reciprocal relationship between substance and accidents

“It’s not true because the church adopted it; the church adopted it because it was true.” — Berquist, on why the Council of Vienna’s adoption of Aristotle’s teaching on the soul matters