6. Definition, Substance, and the Problem of Defining the Soul

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Nature of Definition and Its Limitations #

• Definition (from φοίνιξ, phoenix—limit/boundary) must fit exactly one thing, like city limits contain only that city
• A definition should contain no part of another thing within it
• The problem: Can all things be defined in the same way?
• Aristotle explicitly raises this question in Book VII of the Metaphysics regarding substance and accidents

Substance vs. Accident: Two Different Types of Definition #

• Substance: A thing that exists by itself, not in another subject
• Accident: Something that exists only in another subject and cannot exist independently
• Consequence: Accidents must be defined as “something of another,” bringing the subject into the definition
  • Example: Health (accident) = good disposition of the body; cannot be defined without reference to body
  • Example: Moral virtue (accident) = good disposition of the soul
• Substance: Can theoretically be defined by itself without reference to another thing

The Unique Problem of the Soul #

• Is the soul a complete substance (like Plato believed)?
• Is the soul an accident (like the harmony theory suggests)?
• Or is the soul something in between—a form (substantial form) that is part of substance?
• If the soul is a form, it cannot be defined entirely by itself, but must be defined as something of the body it animates
• This resembles how an accident must be defined, yet the soul is not truly an accident

Historical Opinions on the Soul’s Nature #

Those treating the soul as substance:

• Plato: Immaterial substance imprisoned in the body
• Ancient materialists: Soul as water, air, fire, or atoms (gross material substances)

Those treating the soul as accident (quality):

• Simmias in Plato’s Symposium: Soul as harmony of the body
• Others: Soul as arrangement or ratio of bodily elements

Those treating the soul as quantity:

• Pythagoreans: Soul as self-moving number

Arguments Against Each View #

• Against the harmony theory: Socrates argues in the Phaedo that if the soul were merely the harmony of the body, it could not resist bodily urges (hunger, sleep, etc.). Yet we do resist these urges.
• Against the soul as purely spiritual substance: This creates a problem of unity—how can one understand the integral experience of a human being (one person thinking about pain while experiencing that pain)?
• The problem of unity: When I am in pain and thinking about how to relieve my pain, it is the same one who suffers and who thinks. This is not like a mother caring for her child; the experiencer and the thinker are identical.

The Etymology of Error and Disordered Reason #

• Error (Latin) and plane (Greek) both derive from roots meaning “to wander”
• Planets (πλανήται, planetai) literally means “wandering stars”—stars that do not maintain fixed positions relative to others
• Fixed stars (ἀστέρες, asteres) remain in the same position relative to each other
• Philosophical insight: Error is fundamentally a disordered movement of reason
• When the mind does not follow the proper road (methodos), it wanders into error
• Connection to logic: Thomas Aquinas teaches that logic helps reason proceed in three ways: orderly, easily, and without error—these three are interconnected; order prevents error

Key Arguments #

The Cause-Effect Distinction in Definition #

• Definition by cause (what makes something be what it is) vs. definition by effect (what results from its nature)
• Socrates’ question to Euthyphro: Is something pious because the gods approve of it, or do the gods approve of it because it is pious?
• Applied to the good: Is it good because it is desired, or is it desired because it is good?
• Augustine on the beautiful: “It pleases our eyes because it is beautiful” (not vice versa)
• Conclusion: Defining by effect does not fully reveal the essence

Why Defining Accidents Requires Reference to Another #

• Accidents, by their nature, exist “in another”
• They cannot logically be defined without mentioning the subject in which they inhere
• This does not mean accidents are arbitrary or poorly understood—it reflects their metaphysical status
• Examples: Health cannot be defined except as the good disposition of a particular body; virtue cannot be defined except as the good disposition of the soul

The Problem of the Soul’s Definition #

• If the soul is not a complete substance but a form, it occupies a middle ground
• Like accidents, it may need to be defined as something of another (the body)
• Yet unlike accidents, it is genuinely substantial (a substantial form)
• The definition must somehow capture this dual status
• This explains why previous theories fail: they treat the soul either as purely independent (losing unity with body) or purely dependent (losing the reality of the soul as a principle of life)

Important Definitions #

• Ousia (οὐσία): Substance; that which exists by itself, not in another subject
• Sumbebekos (συμβεβηκός): Accident; that which exists in another and is incapable of existing independently
• Morphe (μορφή): Form; in this context, substantial form—the principle that makes matter into a living being
• Hyle (ὕλη): Matter; the substrate that receives form
• Topos (τόπος): Place/limit; used etymologically in the word for definition
• Phoenix (φοίνιξ): Limit/boundary; the root of the word “definition”
• Methodos (μέθοδος): Method; literally “the way along” (meta + hodos); the proper road or procedure of inquiry
• Plane (πλάνη): Wandering; error in Greek, from the verb meaning to wander astray
• Aporias (ἀπορίαι): Doubts, puzzles, difficulties; the many confusions about the soul’s nature

Examples & Illustrations #

Health and Virtue as Accidents Requiring Reference to Subject #

• Health is not defined in isolation but as “the good condition of the body” or “the good disposition of the body”
• Moral virtue is defined as “the good disposition of the soul”
• Both require mentioning the substrate (body or soul) in their definitions

The Surface of a Table #

• A surface (e.g., the top of a table) has length and width but no depth
• The surface cannot exist independently; it is the limit of a body
• If you give it depth, you no longer have the surface but a thin body
• The surface is defined by reference to what it limits: “the limit of a body”
• This illustrates how some things require reference to another in their definition

The Point and the Line #

• A point is defined as the end of a line, not in isolation
• The point and the line are different things, but the point seems to exist only in the limitation of the line
• This resembles the relationship between soul and body

The Soul Resisting the Body #

• When hungry, the body urges us to eat, but the soul (reason) can resist this urge
• When tired, the body urges sleep, but the soul can resist (e.g., a driver fighting sleep)
• If the soul were merely the harmony of the body (Simmias’ theory), how could it resist bodily states?
• This practical experience of resistance suggests the soul is not merely dependent on bodily arrangement

The Unity of Experience in Pain #

• When I am in pain and think about how to relieve it, I am not like a mother thinking about her child’s pain
• The one suffering is the same as the one thinking and acting
• This lived unity of experience cannot be explained if the soul is a separate substance distinct from the body
• Nor can it be explained if the soul is merely the harmony of the body

Questions Addressed #

Methodological: Can All Things Be Defined the Same Way? #

• Question: Is there one universal method for defining all things?
• Answer: No. Substances and accidents must be defined differently because of their different ontological statuses.

Metaphysical: What Is the Status of the Soul? #

• Question: Into which category does the soul fall—substance, quality, quantity, or relation?
• Question: If the soul is substance, is it a complete substance (like Plato held) or a part of substance (a form)?
• Preliminary Answer: The soul appears to be a substantial form, not a complete substance by itself, but also not a mere accident. This requires a definition that reflects both aspects.

Epistemological: How Does Disordered Thinking Lead to Error? #

• Question: What is the relationship between error and wandering?
• Answer: Error is fundamentally a disordered movement of reason. When reason does not follow the proper road (methodos), it wanders into false conclusions, just as planets wander across the sky while fixed stars maintain their positions.

Notable Quotes #

“The very etymology of the word definition which comes from phoenix…The idea of the limits of something…No part of the table is outside the limits of the table. And no other chair here or door is within the limits of the table, is it? So inside the definition of a thing…there should be no other thing.”

“If you study logic…substance is a thing that exists by itself, not in another subject. While an accident is something that exists only in another, and is incapable of existing outside of this other.”

“Maybe you can’t define an accident without bringing in the subject in which it exists.”

“Error is the result of a disordered movement of reason. When your thoughts and thinking are out of order, then your mind easily falls into error.”

“When you’re hungry and in pain, and you’re trying to think where you can get food or how you can get rid of this pain, that the one who’s thinking about how to get food or get rid of the pain is the one who’s suffering.”

“The truth is somewhere in between those…that the soul is something in substance rather than an accident, right? But it has to be defined in a way something like the way an accident is defined as something of another. Because it’s not a complete substance by itself. But it’s naturally a part of the complete substance.”

“Logic helps our reason to proceed…orderly, easily, and without error. I think the order there of these three is significant.”

“Error is literally what? Yeah. It’s the result of a disordered movement of reason.”