14. The Soul as Form and First Act of the Body

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Body-Soul Unity #

Berquist opens by critiquing historical attempts to explain the relationship between soul and body:

• Plato’s Position (Phaedo): The soul is a complete spiritual, immaterial substance distinct from and separable from the body. Problem: Cannot explain the obvious unity of the human person—how one subject thinks and feels pain simultaneously.
• Harmony Theory: The soul is merely an accidental form of the body, like the harmony of a lyre. Problem: Cannot explain why the soul performs operations not dependent on the body (understanding universals, opposing bodily desires).
• Modern Materialism: Many avoid the problem entirely by refusing to discuss the soul at all.

Aristotle’s Solution: The soul is the substantial form of the body—a middle position that preserves both the unity of man and the transcendence of certain operations.

Six Divisions Leading to the Definition #

Arístotle arrives at the definition through systematic division on two sides:

On the Side of the Soul Itself:

1. The soul belongs to the genus of substance (not quantity, quality, or relation)
2. Within substance, it is form (not matter or the composite)
3. It is first act (not second act/operation)

On the Side of That Which the Soul Informs:

1. It informs a natural body (not artificial)
2. A living body (having life)
3. A body composed of tools (organically structured for multiple operations)

The Definition: Soul as First Act #

The soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools.

First Act vs. Second Act:

• First act: The form or ability that makes something actually what it is (e.g., the soul, the ability to see)
• Second act: The operation or activity that flows from first act (e.g., seeing, thinking, moving)
• An animal asleep is still alive (possesses first act) but is not operating (has not achieved second act). This proves the soul is first act, not operation.

Substantial Form:

• The soul gives being to the composite, not merely an accidental property
• When the soul departs, the body ceases to be a living body (the matter remains but the form is gone)
• This is why a dead eye or painted eye only equivocally (in name only) remains an eye

Matter and Form as Relatives (σχέσις) #

Berquist emphasizes that matter and form are correlatives—they naturally belong together and cannot be understood separately:

• Like “double” and “half,” they are intrinsically related
• A particular soul cannot inform just any body
• The human soul requires a human body with human organs; the plant soul requires a plant body
• This explains why the soul departs when bodily dispositions are lost—not because the soul is accidental, but because the body must be properly disposed to receive and maintain the form
• Application: One art cannot use the tools of another art; similarly, one soul cannot inform another body

Political Philosophy Parallel #

The relationship between form of government and people mirrors the soul-body relationship:

• The form of government is to the people as the soul is to the body
• A democratic form cannot be realized in a people unprepared by education and custom
• The U.S. State Department’s attempt to impose Western democratic forms on African nations fails because the people lack the requisite ethos and customs
• When the people’s customs change (ethos), the government effectively changes even if its appearance remains the same
• Thus political science and sociology belong to the same science because they study relatives

Key Arguments #

The Argument from Unified Experience #

• The one who feels pain in his body and the one who thinks about how to relieve that pain are one and the same person—this is immediate inward experience
• To deny this unity is to deny obvious experience
• Therefore, any theory that cannot account for this unity (like treating soul and body as two complete substances) fails

The Argument from Sleep vs. Waking #

• A sleeping animal is not seeing, not moving, not performing any of the characteristic operations of life
• Yet a sleeping animal is still alive
• If the soul were the operations (second act), the sleeping animal would be dead
• Therefore, the soul must be the first act—the form that makes the body capable of operations, not the operations themselves

The Argument from Transcendent Operations #

• If the soul were merely an accidental form of the body (like harmony of a lyre), it could do nothing except through the body
• But the human soul understands universals not in the body; it sometimes opposes the body
• Therefore, the soul cannot be merely an accidental form; it must be substantial form
• Yet if the soul were a complete substance distinct from the body, we could not explain the unity of human experience
• Therefore, the soul must be the substantial form of the body (a middle position)

The Argument from Proportional Likenesses #

Arístotle illuminates the definition through two proportions:

First Proportion (Artificial Tool - the Axe):

• If an axe were a natural body, its soul would not be chopping (second act) but the ability to chop (first act)
• What makes an axe actually able to chop is its form—the arrangement and composition that constitutes it as an axe
• Analogously, the soul is not the living operations but what makes the body capable of living operations

Second Proportion (Natural Tool - the Eye):

• If the eye were a living body, its soul would be the ability to see (not the act of seeing)
• The ability to see is to the eye as the soul is to the whole living body
• This shows the soul is first act—the form that actualizes the matter into a functional organ

Important Definitions #

Soul (ψυχή/psyche) #

The first act of a natural body composed of organs (ὄργανα/organa = tools). The substantial form that actualizes matter into a living being; the principle by which a body is alive.

First Act (ἐνέργεια πρώτη/enérgeia prṓtē) #

The form or ability that makes something actually what it is and capable of its characteristic operations. The soul is first act; operations are second act.

Second Act (ἐνέργεια δευτέρα/enérgeia deutéra) #

The operation or activity that flows from first act. Seeing is the second act of which the ability to see is the first act.

Substantial Form (forma substantialis) #

A form that gives being to a substance, not merely an accidental property. When substantial form departs, the substance ceases to be (matter remains, but the thing itself is gone).

Organic Body (σῶμα ὀργανικόν/sōma organikón) #

A body composed of parts that function as tools for different operations. The eye is a tool for seeing; the ear is a tool for hearing; roots are tools for nutrition. Higher souls require greater diversity of tools because they are capable of more operations.

Matter and Form as Relatives (σχέσις/schésis) #

Correlatives that naturally belong together and cannot be understood separately. A particular form cannot exist in matter not properly disposed to receive it; a particular matter cannot be actualized by a form not suited to it.

Equivocal (ὁμώνυμος/homṓnymos) #

Having the same name but not the same reality. A dead eye or painted eye is equivocally called an “eye” because it has lost the form (ability to see) that makes it actually an eye.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Axe #

If an axe were a natural body:

• Raw materials (wood and metal) = matter in potency
• The form that makes it an axe = substantial form (like the soul)
• Chopping = second act (like operations)
• The soul is not the chopping but what makes chopping possible

The Eye #

• The eye is composed of matter (tissue, fluid)
• The ability to see is the form that actualizes that matter into an eye (first act)
• Seeing is the operation that flows from having the ability (second act)
• A dead eye has the shape but lacks the ability, so it is only equivocally an “eye”

The Ballpoint Pen #

If a ballpoint pen were a natural body, its soul would be its ability to write, not the actual writing. The form actualizes the matter into something capable of writing.

Body in Pain and Thought #

Directly experiencing a muscle cramp while thinking about how to relieve it reveals that the one feeling pain and the one thinking are one subject. This immediate experience proves the unity of man that must be explained by any adequate philosophy of the soul.

Political Forms and People #

African nations receiving democratic forms of government from the West cannot realize those forms because the people lack the requisite education and customs. Just as an improper body cannot receive a particular soul, an unprepared people cannot realize a particular form of government. The ethos of the people must correspond to the form of government, just as bodily dispositions must correspond to the soul.

Questions Addressed #

Q: How can soul and body be one if they are two different things? #

A: They are not two complete substances requiring external unification. The soul is form and the body is matter—form and matter are relatives that naturally belong together. The soul actualizes the body’s potency to be alive, just as the form of an axe actualizes wood and metal into an axe. This is why man is one substance, not two.

Q: Is the soul the operations of life (seeing, thinking, moving)? #

A: No. The soul is the first act (the form/ability), while operations are second acts. A sleeping animal is not operating but is still alive, proving the soul is not the operations themselves but what makes those operations possible.

Q: Can the soul exist in any body? #

A: No. The soul and body are relatives—a particular soul is made for a particular body. Just as one art cannot use the tools of another art, one soul cannot inform another body. The human soul requires a human body; the plant soul requires a plant body.