20. Pleasures, Desire, and the Hierarchy of Souls

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Pleasure and the Three Orders of Life #

Berquist distinguishes three kinds of pleasures corresponding to different grades of being:

• Animal pleasures: Shared with beasts (eating, sensory gratification, etc.)
• Human pleasures: The union of body and soul; pleasures like music and art that engage both senses and reason
• Angelic/Divine pleasures: Pleasures of understanding—understanding God, the soul, and truth itself

Human pleasures are “most pleasingly proportioned to man” because they are too high for animals yet too low for angels, reflecting man’s nature as composite of body and soul.

The Problem with Utilitarianism #

Mill and the Epicureans argue that pleasure and pain are the sole criterion of good and bad. Critics object that this reduces human philosophy to “bestiality.” Mill replies by distinguishing higher pleasures (intellectual, spiritual) from lower pleasures (sensory), maintaining that those who have tasted both prefer the higher pleasures.

Berquist argues there is something incomplete in Mill’s reply: if pleasure remains the whole criterion for what is pursued, the way of judging is still the way of a beast, regardless of which pleasures one prefers. True human judgment recognizes that reason can see other reasons for loving something besides pleasure—namely, truth and justice themselves.

Appetite and Its Two Forms #

The appetitive power (ὄρεξις, orexis) divides into:

• Desire for the pleasant (ἐπιθυμία, epithumia): Sense desire for what is agreeable to the senses
• Anger/spirited appetite (θυμός, thumos): A desire for revenge or to get even; the desire arising when something is difficult to obtain

Berquist clarifies that anger is not merely the emotion but a fundamental desire to restore equality, to “get even.”

Touch as Foundation of All Desire #

Aristotle argues that all animals having touch (which all animals possess) also have pleasure and pain, and therefore desire. Touch is the most fundamental sense because:

• It is the only sense present in all animals
• It is a sense of food (the dry, moist, hot, and cold)
• Hunger and thirst are desires for what touch senses
• Touch involves the very life of the body (being cut up, being too hot or cold are known primarily through touch)

The Order of Knowledge: Objects → Acts → Powers → Soul #

The lecture clarifies the epistemic priority in understanding the soul:

1. Objects come first in definition (what is sensed or understood)
2. Acts proceed from objects (seeing color, hearing sound)
3. Powers/abilities are known through their acts (the power to see is known through the act of seeing)
4. The soul is known through its powers and acts

For example, the definition of the ability to see is to see; therefore, color is in the definition of sight. The acts are before the powers in definition, and the powers are before the soul in definition.

Why Appetitive Power Does Not Create a Distinct Grade of Life #

Wherever sensation is present, pleasure and pain necessarily follow, and therefore desire. Appetite does not constitute an independent level of life because it automatically accompanies sensation and reason. This is why Aristotle identifies four grades of life (not five), even though the soul has five powers.

The Hierarchy of Understanding Powers #

Berquist distinguishes between:

• Discursive power (διανοητικόν, dianoetikon): The power of reasoning, moving from one known thing to another; characterized by discourse and calculation
• Understanding/Intellect (νοῦς, nous; Latin: intellectus): The power of direct intellectual intuition; grasping first principles and universal truths without reasoning

Reasoning is to understanding as motion is to rest. God understands everything directly and never reasons; angels understand directly. Man must reason, which shows the weakness of human intellect compared to angels—but reasoning itself depends on prior understanding of first principles.

Intellect and Reason in Man and Angels #

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between the understanding (intellectus) of an angel and the reason (ratio) of a man:

• An angel’s intellect (intellectus) grasps everything directly without reasoning
• Man’s reason (ratio) must reason things out discursively

This distinction is an example of equivocation by reason: the common term “intellect” or “understanding” is predicated of both, but man’s reasoning is a defective or incomplete form of understanding (called “dark understanding” by some). Man keeps the new name “reason” because his understanding is imperfect; it must work through discourse.

Key Arguments #

Mill’s Defense and Its Inadequacy #

1. The objection: Utilitarianism is a philosophy for beasts because it makes pleasure the sole criterion of the good
2. Mill’s reply: Humans have pleasures that beasts do not (intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual pleasures), and those who have tasted both prefer the higher pleasures
3. Berquist’s assessment: While Mill’s point is “worth saying,” it does not fully overcome the objection because:
   • If pleasure remains the whole criterion for judgment, the way of judging remains the way of a beast
   • Reason can see other reasons for loving something besides pleasure: truth and justice are desirable even when they bring no pleasure
   • The common man, not tasting higher pleasures, tends to excess in lower pleasures, which is more excusable; but the wise man who restricts himself to pleasure as a criterion still judges like a beast

Why Touch Is the Foundational Sense #

1. All animals have touch
2. Touch is the sense of food (sensible qualities: dry, moist, hot, cold)
3. Therefore, all animals capable of touch are capable of pleasure and pain
4. All animals capable of pleasure and pain have desire
5. Touch is essential to bodily life itself (sensing injury, heat, cold, etc.)

Important Definitions #

Epithumia (ἐπιθυμία): Appetite as sense desire; specifically, desire for what is pleasant to the senses. The senses know good and bad by what is agreeable or disagreeable to them—a more limited way of knowing good and bad than reason, which can recognize justice and truth as desirable apart from pleasure.

Thumos (θυμός): The spirited appetite; a desire that arises in response to difficulty or opposition. Often rendered as “anger,” but more precisely the desire to get even, to restore equality. Distinct from mere emotion; it is a fundamental appetitive power.

Ὄρεξις (orexis): Appetite or desire in general; the desiring power that necessarily accompanies sensation and reason.

Dianoetikon (διανοητικόν): The discursive power; the power of reasoning and moving from one known thing to another. Related to discourse (λόγος, logos) and calculation (λογισμός, logismos).

Nous (νοῦς): Understanding or intellect; the power of direct intellectual intuition, grasping first principles and universal truths. In Latin: intellectus; in English: understanding or intellect.

Logos (λόγος): Reason, discourse, or rational principle. When Aristotle speaks of those having reason and thinking (λογισμός), he means the ability to reason through discourse, related to calculation and sequential thought.

Intellectus (Latin): The power of understanding, corresponding to Greek nous. Used by Thomas to name both the power itself and the virtue (intellectus or synesis) that is the natural grasp of first principles.

Examples & Illustrations #

Mozart and the Cat #

Berquist describes playing Mozart for years while his cats were present. The cats completely ignore the music, showing no response to it. When he tries to get sandwich meat from the kitchen, however, the cat is immediately alert, looking up at loud sounds. This illustrates that:

• Animal pleasures (food) engage animals directly
• Human pleasures (music) do not reach animals because they require the union of sense and reason
• Mozart is not “displeasing to the ear if it were it would cease to be music,” yet it passes through the cat entirely because the cat lacks the rational component

Flavor as a “Seasoning” of Touch #

Aristotle notes that flavor is related to tangible qualities (hot, cold, dry, moist). Hunger and thirst are desires for these tangible objects. Flavor adds refinement to these, but the basic sensible objects of appetite are what touch senses, not what sight or hearing senses.

Notable Quotes #

“The philosopher would rather be wise than appear wise; the sophist would rather appear wise than be wise.” — Aristotle, Metaphysics, as cited by Berquist on the choice of life that distinguishes the philosopher

“Music can never be displeasing to the ear if it were it would cease to be music.” — Mozart, as cited by Berquist

“If pleasure is your whole criterion for judging what is to be pursued, then your way of judging is still the way of a beast.” — Berquist’s critique of utilitarianism

“The distance between the greatest human mind and the angelic mind is much greater than between the greatest philosopher and the most ignorant peasant.” — Thomas Aquinas, as cited by Berquist’s former teacher Kasirik

Questions Addressed #

Why do all animals with touch have desire? #

Answer: Because touch necessarily brings pleasure and pain, and appetite (desire or aversion) necessarily follows from pleasure and pain. The pleasant is naturally desired; the painful is naturally avoided.

How is Mill’s distinction between pleasures inadequate? #

Answer: Even if humans have higher pleasures than beasts, if pleasure is the sole criterion for what is good, then the very way of judging remains the way of a beast. Reason must recognize that some things (truth, justice) are desirable in themselves, not merely because they are pleasant.

Why is discursive reasoning dependent on prior understanding? #

Answer: If you understood nothing before reasoning, you would have nothing to reason from. Therefore, there must be an understanding before reasoning (understanding of first principles) and understanding after reasoning (reasoned-out understanding or scientia). God and angels possess only understanding; man must reason because his understanding is incomplete.