24. Sensation as Undergoing: Potency and Act in Sensing

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Sensation as Undergoing (Pascein) #

• Sensing is fundamentally a being acted upon by its object, not an active process
• The Greek word pascein (Latin passio) originally means suffering in the sense of being acted upon in a way contrary to one’s nature
• Aristotle extends this term to sensing, where being acted upon is perfective rather than harmful
• Berquist argues “undergoing” is a better English translation than “suffering” because it avoids the connotation of harm
• The sensory power receives the sensible object and is thereby actualized

The Problem of English Translation #

• English words like “suffering,” “power,” and “potency” are “stuck” in their first meanings
• “Suffering” in English suggests harm, obscuring the perfective nature of sensation
• “Power” suggests active ability to act upon something, not passive receptivity
• “Undergoing” better captures the idea of being acted upon (correlative of “acting upon”) without necessarily implying harm
• The word “able” and its derivatives (breakable, movable) better express passive capacity in English

Distinction Between Potency and Act #

• The sense is initially in potency (ability/potential) to its object
• Sensation actualizes this potency through the presence and action of the sensible object
• Just as cold water in potency requires actual fire to become hot, the sense in potency requires the sensible object to sense
• Once actualized through sensation, the sense is “in act” or engaged in the second act of sensing

Refutation of Empedocles #

• Empedocles: “by earth we know earth, by water we know water”—like knows like through material composition
• His theory contains an element of truth: the known must be in the knower in some way
• But Empedocles errs by thinking this means material composition—that the soul contains the same elements as what it knows
• First objection: If senses were composed of what they know, they should know themselves (but the eye doesn’t see itself, the ear doesn’t hear itself)
• Second objection: If senses already possessed what they know, they wouldn’t need external objects (but they do require external objects to sense)
• Conclusion: The sensitive power is not in act but in potency initially; it requires being acted upon by its object

Analogy: What Can Be Ignited Does Not Ignite Itself #

• Water being heated requires actual fire; it doesn’t heat itself despite having potency for heat
• Similarly, the sense doesn’t sense without the sensible object despite having potency for sensation
• This principle shows that potency requires an external actualizer

The Two Uses of “Sensing” #

• Aristotle points out that “to sense” is used in two ways
• Sometimes it means merely possessing the ability to sense (e.g., “he sees” meaning he has the power of sight, even while sleeping)
• Sometimes it means actually exercising the power (e.g., “he sees” meaning he is currently seeing)
• Similarly, the sense itself can be in potency (ability) or in act (exercising that ability)
• This explains why sensation is not continuous: we possess senses but don’t always actualize them

Suffering/Undergoing as Motion and Act #

• “Suffering and being moved and being at work are the same” (in some sense)
• Motion is a certain act, though imperfect act (as established in natural philosophy)
• Sensation involves motion/undergoing, which is itself a kind of act
• The grammar of active verbs (“to see,” “to hear”) can mislead us into thinking sensation is active, but it is actually passive

The Role of External Objects #

• External objects are absolutely necessary for sensation
• Without the presence of the sensible object, the sense cannot be actualized
• This is why we cannot sense without the object being present
• The object, being already in act, acts upon the sense in potency

Key Arguments #

Against Empedocles: Two Objections #

1. Self-Sensing: If the senses were composed of the elements they know, they would know themselves through that same composition. But the eye does not see itself, the ear does not hear itself. Therefore, senses are not composed of what they know.
2. External Objects Required: If the senses already possessed what they know through material composition, they would not need external objects to sense. But they do require external objects. Therefore, senses are in potency, not in act initially.

For the Potency-Act Model #

• The sense is in potency before sensation occurs
• Sensation is the actualization of this potency by the sensible object acting upon it
• This explains why external objects are necessary
• This explains why sensation is not continuous
• The parallel with the water and fire illustrates this perfectly

Against Misleading Grammar #

• The active grammatical form of verbs like “to see” and “to hear” can deceive us
• These verbs appear active but are actually passive (the object acts upon the sense)
• This is an example of the fallacy of figure of diction (Greek: schema lexeos), where the ending of a word seems to signify something other than what it does
• We must not be misled by grammar into thinking sensation is active when it is fundamentally passive/receptive

Important Definitions #

Pascein (πάσχειν) - Suffering/Undergoing #

• First meaning: being acted upon by another in a way contrary to one’s nature (truly harmful suffering)
• Extended meaning: being acted upon in a way that perfects or actualizes one’s nature
• In sensation: the sense is acted upon by the sensible object and thereby perfected/actualized
• The Greek word was “carried over” from the first meaning to the second by retaining the core idea of “being acted upon” while dropping the idea that it must be contrary to nature

Dynamis/Potentia (δύναμις/potentia) - Power/Ability/Potency #

• First meaning: active power or ability to act upon something (hence English “dynamite” and “potent” stick to this meaning)
• Extended meaning: passive ability or capacity to be acted upon
• In sensation: the sense has the potency/ability to receive sensible forms
• English words like “able” (breakable, movable) better express this passive sense than “power”

Aesthesis (αἴσθησις) - Sensing/Sense #

• Can mean either the act of sensing (sensing as activity)
• Or the power itself (sense as faculty)
• Aristotle uses this word in both ways, creating potential ambiguity in translation
• Berquist translates the first occurrence in 170 as “sensing” (the act) rather than “sense” (the power)

Energeia (ἐνέργεια) - Act/Being-at-Work/Actuality #

• The actualization or fulfillment of potency
• In sensation: the actual exercise of the sensory power through engagement with the sensible object
• Distinguished from mere potency (ability to sense) by the presence of the object and actual sensing occurring

Examples & Illustrations #

The Eye and External Light #

• The eye cannot see by itself; it requires external objects to act upon it
• If the eye contained light within itself (contrary to fact), it would always be seeing
• The fact that we don’t always see shows the eye is in potency, not act initially

Cold Water and Fire #

• Cold water has the potency to become hot
• Fire, being actually hot, acts upon the water
• The water is not heated by itself; it requires the actual fire
• Similarly, the sense does not sense by itself; it requires the sensible object

Perkwist vs. Cassius Clay #

• Berquist’s hypothetical boxer Perkwist is knocked out by Cassius Clay
• Perkwist lacks the “active ability” to fight back, but he has the “passive ability” to be beaten
• We say he is “beatable” or “breakable”—using passive forms of “able”
• This illustrates how the word “able” naturally extends to passive capacities in English

The Mirror and Self-Knowledge #

• The eye cannot see itself directly, only in a mirror
• This shows the eye is oriented toward external objects, not itself
• If Empedocles were correct, the eye should know itself through material composition

“You Made a Big Impression” #

• Common English expression indicating that someone acted upon another person
• If “I make an impression on you,” I am acting upon you
• This shows in ordinary language how we recognize that objects act upon sensory powers

The Grammar of “To See” vs. “To Be Seen” #

• “To see” appears to be an active verb, suggesting the eye acts upon objects
• “To be seen” appears passive, suggesting the object is acted upon
• But in reality, the sensible object acts upon the eye (passive)
• This is the fallacy of figure of diction: grammar can deceive about the actual causal relation

Cupid’s Arrow and Love #

• Mythologically, Cupid’s arrow shoots you, acting upon your heart
• This vividly illustrates that in love, you are being acted upon by the beloved object
• Even in secular love, we speak of being “wounded” by love or having one’s “heart pierced”
• Yet this is not truly harmful; it perfects the lover

“We Are Shaped and Fashioned by What We Love” #

• Quoted from Gita: we become like what we love
• This illustrates how the soul is actualized and perfected by its objects
• The beloved acts upon the lover, shaping the lover into likeness with the beloved

Notable Quotes #

“Sensing occurs in being moved and suffering, as was said. It’s moved by its object.”

• Aristotle, establishing sensation as fundamentally passive

“The sensitive power is not an act to begin with, but it’s only in potency or ability. Whence it does not sense automatically by itself.”

• Aristotle, refuting Empedocles

“Just as what can be ignited does not ignite itself, without what can ignite… the sense does not sense without the sensible object.”

• Aristotle, establishing the necessity of external objects through analogy

“The word suffering, in English, seems to be stuck in the first meaning very much… the word undergoing, though, in English is more moved to the second meaning.”

• Berquist, on the translation problem in English

“We are shaped and fashioned by what we love.”

• Gita (quoted by Berquist), illustrating actualization through objects

Questions Addressed #

Why is Sensation a “Suffering” or “Undergoing”? #

• Because the sensory power is acted upon by its object
• The sense is in potency (able to sense) but not in act (actually sensing) until the sensible object acts upon it
• This being acted upon perfects the sense, making it actual in the exercise of its power

Why Must We Have External Objects to Sense? #

• Because the senses are in potency (ability) initially, not in act
• Just as cold water requires actual fire to become hot, the sense in potency requires the sensible object to actualize it
• Without the external object, the sense cannot pass from potency to act

How Can Sensation Be “Suffering” if It Perfects Rather Than Harms? #

• The word “suffering” originally meant being acted upon in a way contrary to nature (harmful)
• Aristotle extended it to mean any being acted upon, whether harmful or perfective
• In sensation, we are acted upon and perfected, not harmed
• The extension keeps the core idea (being acted upon) while dropping the harmful connotation

Why Doesn’t the Eye See Itself? #

• Because the eye is oriented toward external objects
• If Empedocles were correct that like knows like through material composition, the eye would know itself
• The fact that it doesn’t shows that knowledge/sensation requires external objects, not internal material composition

Why Do We Use the Word “to See” in Two Different Ways? #

• “To see” can mean possessing the ability to see (even while not actually seeing, e.g., while sleeping)
• “To see” can mean actually exercising the power of sight
• This reflects the distinction between potency (ability) and act (exercise of that ability)
• This explains why sensation is not continuous: we have the sense but don’t always actualize it

How Is Sensation Different from Alteration? #

• Sensation is actualization of potency by an external object
• True alteration involves the destruction of one form and acquisition of another (contrary change)
• In sensation, the sense is not destroyed but perfected; it receives the form of the sensible object
• This is why sensation is a kind of motion (undergoing/being moved), but not a simple alteration

Why Can Grammar Mislead Us About Sensation? #

• Active verbs like “to see” and “to hear” appear grammatically active
• But the sensible object acts upon the sense, not vice versa
• This is the fallacy of schema lexeos (figure of diction): the grammatical form seems to signify something other than what actually occurs
• We must not let grammar deceive us into thinking sensation is active when it is fundamentally receptive/passive