26. The Three Meanings of Sensible and Proper vs. Accidental Sensation

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Three Kinds of Sensible #

Aristotle distinguishes sensibles into three categories:

1. Proper/Private Sensible (idios, per se):

   • Perceived by only one sense
   • Cannot be deceived about it (when the organ is sound)
   • Examples: color for sight, sound for hearing, taste for taste, flavor differences for taste
   • Each sense discerns these things with certainty

2. Common Sensible (koinós):

   • Perceived by more than one sense (some by all five, some by multiple)
   • Examples: motion, rest, number, shape, magnitude
   • Shape and magnitude are continuous and known primarily by sight and touch
   • Known as a modification of the proper sensible

3. Accidental Sensible (kata symboleikos, per accidens):

   • Not sensed as such at all
   • Recognized through something else in us (memory, reason, association)
   • Examples: hearing a ‘cat’ (we hear the meow and recognize it as a cat); seeing ‘sweetness’ in a white frosting (we see white and recognize it as associated with sweetness); hearing ‘Joe’ (we hear his voice and recognize it)
   • We are most easily deceived about these

Proper vs. Accidental Sensibles: Why We Use This Language #

We speak of all three as objects of sense (“I see the color, the shape, the man; I hear a sound, sounds, a cat”), but Aristotle distinguishes them because:

• Proper sensibles affect the sense organ directly as such
• Accidental sensibles do not affect the sense as such; something else in us (intellect, memory, habit) recognizes them
• We are justified in speaking this way because to be, say, a cat ‘happens to’ that sound or that meow sound ‘belongs to’ a cat

The Difference in Deception #

The senses are:

• Not deceived about proper sensibles (if the organ is sound)
• Easily deceived about common sensibles (e.g., optical illusions with line length or shape)
• Most easily deceived about accidental sensibles (e.g., mistaking salt for sugar when both are white, thinking a meow is a cat, being deceived by recorded voices)

This is because:

• Common sensibles are known as modifications of proper sensibles and depend on the organ being undamaged
• Accidental sensibles require something beyond sensation to recognize them

The Nature of Metaphor and Sweet #

Thomas Aquinas explains metaphor through the example of ‘sweet’:

• A metaphor is based on likeness
• ‘Sweet’ can mean: (1) pleasant (to the taste), (2) restful/refreshing (calming the restless or picking one up), or (3) pleasant to think about
• Therefore, “sweet” can be metaphorically applied to God (pleasant, restful, refreshing to contemplate), to a beloved (‘sweetheart’ - pleasant, restful, refreshing to be with), to a beautiful form (which is pleasant, restful, and refreshing to behold)

Key Arguments #

Why We Distinguish Between What Is Sensed “As Such” vs. “By Happening” #

• We must examine whether all three categories of sensible are truly sensed as such or not
• Proper sensibles are sensed as such; the sense is directly affected by them
• Common sensibles are sensed as such, though often as modifications of proper sensibles
• Accidental sensibles are NOT sensed as such; rather, something else in us recognizes them through association
• Example: I hear a meow (proper sensible: sound). Through memory and reason, I recognize this sound belongs to a cat. But the cat as such is not heard; I hear the sound and think of the cat

Why Deception Increases as We Move from Proper to Accidental #

1. Proper sensibles: The organ either receives the proper modification or it doesn’t; if healthy, no deception
2. Common sensibles: These depend on the organ being properly affected and can be affected differently by different magnitudes/shapes; easier to deceive (optical illusions)
3. Accidental sensibles: These require judgment from intellect or memory; most easily deceived because we rely on association and habit, not direct sensation

The Role of Association in Accidental Sensation #

• We recognize accidental sensibles through habit and past experience
• Example: Hearing a melody reminds us of a place or person we associate with that melody; we ’love’ that melody not for its beauty as such but because it happens to be associated with pleasant memories
• This shows that accidental sensibles depend on something else in us—not the sense itself—to make the connection

Important Definitions #

Sensible (Aistheton) #

• As such (per se, kak-a-to): Sensed directly by the sense faculty
• By happening (per accidens, kata symboleikos): Not sensed directly but recognized through something else in us

Private/Proper Sensible (Idios) #

• Cannot be sensed by another sense
• The sense cannot err about it (if undamaged)
• Examples: sight perceives color; hearing perceives sound

Common Sensible (Koinós) #

• Perceived by more than one sense
• Examples: motion, rest, number, shape (primary for sight and touch), magnitude

Accidental Sensible (Kata symboleikos, per accidens) #

• Not sensed as such at all
• Requires intellect or memory to recognize it
• Examples: the individual substance (only intellect knows substance); the cat (only intellect recognizes the meow as a cat)

Examples & Illustrations #

Hearing a Cat #

• What we actually sense as such: The meow (proper sensible: sound)
• What we say we sense: “I hear a cat”
• Why the discrepancy: Through memory and reason, we recognize that this particular sound belongs to a cat
• The accidental sensible: The cat itself (not heard as such, only the sound)

The Meow of Moppet #

• Berquist’s neighbor’s cat makes an awful wailing sound in the morning
• People ask, “Do you hear Moppet?”
• Strictly speaking, they hear a sound (which happens to be Moppet’s vocalization)
• Through recognition (intellect, memory), they know it’s Moppet
• This is accidental sensation

Recognizing a Friend’s Voice #

• You hear someone talking on the telephone
• You recognize the tone of voice and say, “I hear Joe”
• What you sense as such: the sounds (proper sensible)
• What you recognize: that these sounds belong to Joe
• The recognition requires intellect and memory, not sensation alone

Salt and Sugar (The Mischievous Child) #

• A child replaces sugar with salt in a bowl
• Uncle cannot see the difference (both white)
• He puts what he thinks is sugar in his coffee
• He is not deceived about the proper sensible (whiteness; color)
• He is deceived about the accidental sensible (whether it is sugar or salt; substance)
• This shows: we are easily deceived about accidental sensibles, not about proper ones

Sweet Form in Shakespeare #

• “Your sweet form” (metaphor)
• ‘Sweet’ here means ‘beautiful’
• Beauty is pleasant (like sweetness is pleasant to taste)
• A beautiful form is restful to behold (like sweetness is restful/refreshing)
• This is metaphor based on likeness of effects (pleasantness, restfulness)

Artificial Fruit #

• Plastic or artificial fruit in a bowl looks sweet and delicious
• Someone reaches for it thinking it’s real
• Later realizes it’s artificial
• Not deceived about the proper sensible (color, shape)
• Deceived about the accidental sensible (whether it is edible fruit)

The Melody and Memory #

• A melody reminds you of a place (San Francisco) or a person
• You “love” that melody not for its musical beauty as such but because it’s associated with pleasant memories
• The melody itself may not be beautiful, but what it happens to recall is pleasant
• This is an accidental sensible: you sense the sound, and intellect recognizes its association

Optical Illusions #

• Lines of different lengths can appear the same length
• Shapes can appear distorted
• Examples of being deceived about common sensibles (shape, magnitude)
• Shows the senses are more easily deceived about common sensibles than about proper sensibles

Questions Addressed #

Why do we say “I see a man” or “I hear a cat” when we don’t sense these as such? #

• We speak this way because to be a man ‘happens to’ the colored extended thing we see; to be a cat ‘happens to’ the meow we hear
• The individual substance (man, cat) is not sensed as such; only the intellect knows substance
• But our ordinary language reflects the fact that something in us—intellect or memory—recognizes these accidental sensibles
• Aristotle notes that the philosopher should attend closely to ordinary speech, for it often contains truth even when we don’t fully understand it

Why are the senses not deceived about proper sensibles but easily deceived about accidental ones? #

• Proper sensibles affect the sense directly and certainly (if the organ is sound)
• Accidental sensibles require judgment from intellect and memory, which can be wrong
• Common sensibles depend on the organ being properly affected and can be affected differently (causing optical illusions)
• This shows a hierarchy: proper sensibles most certain, common sensibles less certain, accidental sensibles most uncertain

How does Thomas explain the metaphorical use of ‘sweet’? #

• A metaphor is based on likeness
• ‘Sweet’ involves three characteristics: (1) pleasant, (2) restful/refreshing, (3) pleasant to think about
• Therefore, anything that possesses these characteristics can be called ‘sweet’ metaphorically
• Examples: God is sweet (pleasant to contemplate, restful, refreshing); a beloved is sweet (pleasant to be with, restful); a beautiful form is sweet (pleasant to see, restful to behold)

Why must we understand the distinctions of sensibles before understanding the different external senses? #

• Senses are known by their acts; acts are known by their objects
• Different senses (sight, hearing, etc.) have different proper sensibles
• Therefore, understanding what sensible means and how sensibles differ is foundational to understanding why there are multiple senses
• This is the order of learning: distinguish sensibles first, then distinguish the senses by their proper objects

Notable Quotes #

“A thing is singular when sensed, as Boethius says, and universal when understood.” - Reflects the parallel between sensation and understanding discussed in the lecture

“All of these are said to be the object of the sensing, isn’t it?” - Berquist notes how we ordinarily speak of all three kinds of sensible as objects of sense

“Do I really hear Moppet as such? Or did I hear this awful sound that Moppet makes in the morning?” - Illustrates the distinction between what is sensed as such and what is recognized through something else

“The senses are easily deceived about the common sensibles or the accidental sensibles in a way they’re not deceived by their private sensible.” - Key principle for understanding reliability of sensation