37. Imagination, Sense, and Opinion: Distinction and Definition

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Four Epistemic Powers and Pythagorean Numerology #

• Aristotle identifies four powers/habits by which we discern and speak truth or falsity: sense, opinion, science (ἐπιστήμη/episteme), and understanding (νοῦς/nous)
• These were connected by Plato and the Pythagoreans to the numbers one, two, three, and four respectively
• Understanding (1): Knowledge without reasoning; immediately evident (e.g., “a whole is greater than a part”) — corresponds to the singularity and immediacy of one
• Science (2): Reasoned knowledge demonstrated from premises to conclusion — corresponds to the movement from premise to conclusion
• Opinion (3): Uncertain knowledge with reasons for both sides (yes and no) — corresponds to three possible positions (premise and two opposite conclusions)
• Sense (4): Bodily perception — corresponds to four, the minimum number of points needed to specify a body in space

The Problem: What is Imagination? #

• The central question: Is imagination a power, a habit, or something else entirely?
• Aristotle frames this by asking: if imagination is that by which images come to be in us, and if we make some kind of discernment between truth and falsehood (“it seems to me” vs. direct assertion), then what precisely is this faculty?
• The key characteristic: imagination involves a kind of judgment or appearance (phantasma) that can be either true or false

Why Imagination is NOT Sensation #

• Presence of sensory object: Sensation requires both the power and the act of sensing (seeing requires the eye and light), whereas imagination occurs without active sensation
• Dream evidence: In sleep, one imagines vividly without sensing — images appear with eyes closed and no external stimulus
• Truth value: Sensation of proper sensibles (colors, sounds, tastes) is always true; imagination is frequently false
• Universal presence: Not all animals possess imagination, but all possess sensation

Why Imagination is NOT Opinion #

• Requires conviction: Opinion (δόξα/doxa) requires being convinced of something through reason and persuasion; imagination does not
• Animal possession: All higher animals have imagination but lack reason and therefore cannot hold true opinions
• Contradiction objection: One cannot simultaneously hold two contradictory opinions (the sun is larger than the earth AND the sun is smaller than the earth), yet one can hold the true opinion while imagination presents the false appearance
• Stability vs. appearance: Opinion is a stable conviction; imagination is a fleeting appearance that may contradict one’s firm beliefs

The Nature of Imagination #

• Imagination is a motion (κίνησις/kinesis) produced by the act of sensation that persists after the sensory object is removed
• It is a form of “moved mover” — the senses are moved by external objects and in turn move something internal (imagination) which can move the organism
• Imagination is weaker than sensation but structurally resembles it, like the motion of a ball transferred through collision
• The Greek term φαντασία (phantasia) derives from φαντάζεσθαι, meaning “to appear” or “to seem”

Key Arguments #

Aristotle’s Systematic Elimination #

Against Imagination Being Sensation (De Anima III.3, 427a16-17)

• Sensation requires: (1) the presence of the sensory object, (2) active engagement of sense organ
• Imagination occurs: (1) without sensory objects, (2) with sense organs inactive (sleep, eyes closed)
• Therefore, imagination ≠ sensation

Against Imagination Being Opinion/Conviction

• Opinion requires reasoned conviction and persuasion
• Imagination requires neither reason nor conviction
• A counterexample: one truly believes the sun is larger than the earth (true opinion), yet imagines it to be small (false appearance)
• If imagination were opinion based on sensation, one would have to hold two contradictory opinions simultaneously, which is impossible
• Therefore, imagination ≠ opinion

Against Imagination Being Science or Understanding

• These intellectual powers are always true (about eternal truths or demonstrated conclusions)
• Imagination is frequently false
• These are not universally present in animals; imagination is
• Therefore, imagination ≠ science or understanding

Important Definitions #

φαντασία (Phantasia) — Imagination #

A motion (κίνησις) caused by the act of sensation that persists after the sensory object is removed. It is neither sensation (which requires active sense organs) nor opinion (which requires reason and conviction), but a unique capacity present in higher animals by which appearances (φαντάσματα/phantasmata) arise. These appearances can be true or false.

Pistis — Conviction/Belief #

The state of being convinced or assured of something. It requires reason and persuasion and distinguishes opinion (δόξα) from mere imagination. One possesses pistis when one has reasoned assent to a proposition.

Phantasma — Image/Appearance #

That which appears to the mind or imagination; the content or representation that arises through the imagination. Unlike sensation, a phantasma can deceive because it is merely an appearance that may not correspond to reality.

Examples & Illustrations #

Dreams and Sleep #

• Berquist recounts a dream in which he perceived scenes vividly without actually sensing anything — he was imagining, not seeing
• In the dream, he observed John Paul II in a library singing Pange Lingua near a tabernacle, then suddenly heard what seemed like John Paul II discussing baseball games (which was actually a radio)
• This illustrates that imagination operates without sensation: eyes are closed, no actual light enters, yet images appear internally
• Sleep resembles a kind of cessation where sensation is absent but imagination can continue

The Striped Belt and the Kitten #

• A kitten flees from a striped belt because it resembles a snake and triggers recognition of danger
• The kitten does not flee because the pattern itself is painful to see (a proper sensible) but because the estimative power recognizes the non-sensible intention of danger
• An older, experienced cat would not be similarly deceived
• This shows how imagination and the estimative power can present false threats that are not based on actual sensation

The Sun’s Apparent Size #

• The sun appears to be roughly the size of a hand (can be blocked by extending one’s hand at arm’s length)
• Yet we truly believe the sun is larger than the entire inhabited earth
• This demonstrates that imagination (the apparent size) can contradict true opinion (the believed actual size) without requiring two simultaneous and contradictory opinions
• The imagination presents a false appearance; reason holds the true belief

Questions Addressed #

How does imagination differ from sensation? #

Answer: Sensation requires the presence of the sensory object and active engagement of sense organs; imagination occurs in dreams and with eyes closed, when no sensation is present. Sensation of proper sensibles is always true; imagination is frequently false.

How does imagination differ from opinion? #

Answer: Opinion requires conviction and reason; imagination does not. One can hold a true opinion (the sun is larger than the earth) while imagination simultaneously presents the opposite (the sun appears small). These are not two contradictory opinions but rather a stable belief contradicted by an ephemeral appearance.

What role do the Pythagorean numbers play in understanding these four powers? #

Answer: The numbers 1-4 represent the increasing complexity of cognitive activity. One: immediacy (no reasoning). Two: reasoning from premise to single conclusion. Three: reasoning with multiple possible conclusions. Four: bodily sensation, requiring the minimum spatial specification (four points define a body). This numerical scheme helps visualize how imagination, as a bodily motion, is distinct from the purely rational powers.

Why does Aristotle analyze what imagination is NOT before defining what it IS? #

Answer: By elimination, he narrows the field: it is not sensation (which requires active sense organs), not opinion (which requires reason and conviction), not science or understanding (which are always true and not universally present in animals). This leaves a unique category: a motion produced by sensation that persists and can be true or false—imagination proper.