44. Understanding as Immaterial Reception: Reason's Object and Potency

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Understanding as Undergoing (Pathos): Like sensation, understanding is a form of receiving or being acted upon. The intellect is acted upon by its intelligible object, just as the eye is acted upon by color or the ear by sound. This reception is immaterial, not material alteration.

• The Immateriality of Reason: Because reason can understand all material natures universally, it cannot itself possess any material nature. Any definite material nature would limit its receptivity, just as a green-tinted eye cannot see all colors.

• The Distinction Between Thing and Essence: In material beings, a particular thing (e.g., Socrates, a circle, water) is distinct from what that thing is—its universal essence. This distinction exists because of matter and continuous quantity. If thing and essence were identical, there could be only one instance of that kind.

• Potency and Act in Understanding: Reason exhibits two kinds of potency and corresponding acts. Before learning, one is in potency to knowledge. After learning, one is in a different kind of potency—able to think about what one has learned whenever desired, without always actually thinking it. The first potency becomes first act (possession of knowledge); the second potency becomes second act (active exercise of knowledge).

• Sensory Impediment vs. Intellectual Enhancement: Strong sensory stimuli temporarily or permanently impede the senses from receiving other objects (loud noise prevents hearing others; bright light causes temporary blindness). However, when reason understands highly intelligible things, it does not prevent understanding lesser things; rather, it enables clearer understanding of them. This demonstrates reason’s immateriality.

Key Arguments #

The Argument from Universal Reception to Immateriality #

• Reason is capable of understanding all material things universally
• Whatever receives an object must lack any definite form of that object to receive all forms of it
• Therefore, reason must lack any definite material nature
• Parallels: The eye lacks color to see all colors; the tongue lacks taste to taste all flavors; transparent glass shows all colors

The Distinction of Thing and Essence Proves Immateriality of Understanding #

• In material things: a particular thing and its universal essence are distinct (Socrates ≠ what-it-is-to-be-a-man; this circle ≠ what-a-circle-is)
• This distinction exists because of matter subject to continuous quantity, which allows for multiple individuals of the same kind
• Reason knows the universal essence separated from particularity and matter
• Therefore, reason must be immaterial to know immaterial universals

Sensory Impediment vs. Intellectual Enhancement Proves Reason Has No Bodily Organ #

• When senses receive very strong objects, they are impeded: loud noise prevents hearing other sounds; bright light causes blindness; strong taste prevents tasting other flavors
• When reason understands highly intelligible things (e.g., advanced geometry), it understands lesser things more clearly, not less
• This opposite behavior proves reason has no bodily organ that can be damaged or disrupted by strong stimuli
• Bodily organs are material and subject to disruption; reason, being immaterial, is perfected by understanding more intelligible objects

Important Definitions #

• Undergoing (Pathos): Being acted upon or receiving. Originally meant suffering in a harmful way, but Aristotle extends it to mean any receiving of an object that perfects rather than diminishes the receiving power. Both sensation and understanding are forms of pathos.

• What-It-Is (To Ti En Einai): The essence or definition of a thing; what makes something the kind of thing it is. This is the proper object of reason—universal and abstracted from matter and particularity. Reason knows the what-it-is of sensible or imaginable things.

• First Act and Second Act: First act is possession of a habit or knowledge (e.g., knowing geometry after learning it; having memorized a prayer). Second act is the exercise of that knowledge (actually thinking about geometric truths; reciting the memorized prayer). Both are forms of actuality, but second act is fuller actualization.

• Continuous Quantity (Quantitas Continua): The property of material things whereby they have parts outside of parts. This is what allows multiple individuals of the same kind (many circles, many men) and is the basis for the distinction between a particular thing and its universal essence in material beings.

Examples & Illustrations #

• Wine Tasting: When tasting wine, one uses bland bread rather than spicy food because strong sensations interfere with the sense of taste. This illustrates how sensory organs are impeded by overly strong objects.

• Bright Light and Sound: A very bright light temporarily blinds the eye; a very loud sound can permanently deafen the ear. These show sensory incapacity from strong stimuli.

• Euclid’s Geometry: Students find the first books of Euclid difficult initially. But after studying more advanced theorems, the earlier material becomes easy. This shows understanding more intelligible things enhances rather than impedes understanding of lesser things—opposite to sensory fatigue.

• The Pythagorean Theorem: Before learning it, one is in potency to knowing it. After learning it, one is in a different kind of potency—able to think about it whenever one wishes without always actually thinking it. This illustrates two kinds of potency and act.

• The Our Father Prayer: One memorizes the prayer (first potency becomes first act). Then can recite it whenever desired (second potency becomes second act). One is not always reciting it, but able to do so whenever one wants.

• Circles and Squares: Many circles can exist (one here, one there) because of continuous quantity. But what-a-circle-is is one universal essence. If this circle and what-a-circle-is were identical, there could be only one circle.

• Socrates and Man: Socrates is a particular man, but what-it-is-to-be-a-man is universal and common to all men. If they were identical, Socrates would be the only man.

• Champion the Horse: If Champion and what-a-horse-is were identical, Champion would be the only horse. But since many horses exist, a particular horse and what-a-horse-is must be distinct.

Questions Addressed #

• Why is understanding like sensation? Both are forms of receiving or being acted upon by their objects. Both involve the receiving power being perfected by its object, but in an immaterial way rather than material alteration.

• How can reason be immaterial if it understands material things? Reason receives material natures formally as intelligible species or universal forms, not materially as particular, extended things. It receives them in a non-continuous, universal way.

• Why must reason lack material nature? If reason had any definite material nature, that nature would prevent it from receiving all other material natures, just as a green-tinted eye cannot see all colors or a salty tongue cannot taste salt.

• What is the difference between a thing and its essence? In material things, they are distinct: Socrates (the particular) is not identical to what-it-is-to-be-a-man (the universal essence). This distinction exists because of matter and continuous quantity. In immaterial things (God, angels), thing and essence are identical.

• Why does understanding enhance rather than impede understanding, opposite to sensation? Because reason has no bodily organ. Sensory organs are impeded by strong stimuli because they are material and subject to damage or temporary incapacity. Reason, being immaterial, is perfected by understanding more intelligible things.

• How do reason’s two kinds of potency relate to two kinds of act? Before learning or discovering something, one is in first potency (purely passive capacity). After learning, one is in second potency—still passive regarding actual thinking, but now actively possessing knowledge. The first potency becoming first act is the possession of the knowledge; the second potency becoming second act is the active exercise of that knowledge.