46. Divine Simplicity and Analogical Language About God
Summary
This lecture explores how human reason, naturally oriented toward understanding material things composed of matter and form, must speak about God who is entirely simple and immaterial. Berquist examines the problem of using concrete and abstract language about God (e.g., ‘God is wise’ vs. ‘God is wisdom itself’), showing why both affirmation and denial of such predicates are necessary. He develops this through analysis of the distinction between what-a-thing-is and the thing itself in material vs. immaterial beings, drawing on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Pseudo-Dionysius.
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
The Proper Object of Reason #
- Reason understands the what-it-is (essence) of things, which is universal
- Sensation grasps only singular, material things
- The object proportioned to our reason is the what-it-is of a sensible or imaginable thing
- Because we naturally understand things composed of matter and form, we are ill-equipped to understand what lacks this composition
The Matter-Form Composition in Material Things #
- In material beings: the thing and its what-it-is are distinct (e.g., Socrates ≠ human nature)
- This distinction exists because of matter and form
- Form is that by which something is what it is
- Matter is the subject receiving the form
- Example: wood (matter) receives chair-form; the shape is not the chair but that by which the wood becomes a chair
Concrete vs. Abstract Predication in Creatures #
- Concrete terms (healthy, wise): signify a subject having a quality
- Abstract terms (health, wisdom): signify the quality itself, not the subject
- “A body is healthy by health” — health is not itself healthy; something else is healthy by it
- Health and the healthy body are distinct; the haver and the had are not identical
- Examples: sugar is sweet (not sweetness), book is colored (not color), mind is wise (not wisdom)
The Problem Applied to God #
- If God is wise, does this mean God has wisdom as creatures do (implying composition)?
- If God is wisdom itself, does this mean God is that by which something is wise (and thus not wise)?
- These two ways of speaking both seem defective when applied to the divine nature
- Yet we cannot avoid using such language
Divine Simplicity as the Solution #
- In God, there is no composition of any kind
- God is whatever He has: “God is whatever he has”
- Therefore, God’s wisdom is not distinct from God; God is wisdom itself
- Yet we must also deny that God is merely that by which things are wise (the abstract sense)
- God is both the subject (concrete) and the form (abstract) without distinction
Affirming and Denying Divine Names #
- Following Pseudo-Dionysius and Thomas Aquinas, we must both affirm and deny predicates of God
- Affirmation: God is wise, just, merciful (because He truly possesses these perfections in their fullness)
- Denial: God is not wise as creatures are (because there is no composition in God; no distinction between Him and His wisdom)
- We can say “God is justice itself” but not “God is that by which things are just” (which would exclude Him from being just)
- When we say “God is love,” we mean what St. John means: God is love itself, with no distinction between His loving and that by which He loves
The Multiplicity of Divine Names in Our Knowledge #
- When we say “God is good, God is just, God is merciful,” we use multiple names
- In God: these are all identical; there is complete unity
- In our mind: there is multiplicity of concepts corresponding to the one God
- The multiplicity is not in God but in our manner of understanding
- As Thomas says: what is one in God is multiplied in our knowledge of creatures
The Circle Analogy for Divine Unity #
- God is like the center point of a circle; creatures are like points on the circumference
- The many radii emanate from one point
- Each creature corresponds to a different radius having a different endpoint
- God is the beginning of all the different perfections in creatures (true love, true knowledge, true justice) but these perfections are not multiplied in God Himself
- Our mind, proceeding from creatures back to God, multiplies in thought what is unified in reality
The Beatific Vision as Unified Knowledge #
- In this life, we know God through predicates and thus through multiplicity
- In the beatific vision (the next life), there will be only one name for God
- The unity of knowledge in the beatific vision reflects God’s actual unity
- In that vision, there will be no multiplicity in our knowledge, only unity
Key Arguments #
Why Definition is Fundamental to Logic #
- Plato’s dialogues constantly ask “What is X?” (What is virtue? What is piety?)
- Aristotle’s Topics is substantially about definition
- Definition makes what a thing is distinctly manifest
- Modern symbolic logic has reduced definition to a footnote, losing sight of reason’s true object
- To reject interest in definition is to reject the use of reason itself
Why We Cannot Avoid Both Ways of Speaking #
- We cannot speak of God only in concrete terms (God is wise) because this implies composition
- We cannot speak of God only in abstract terms (God is wisdom) because this seems to exclude Him from being wise
- Therefore, we are forced to use both ways and acknowledge both are partially inadequate
- This reflects the fundamental inadequacy of our natural way of understanding when applied to the immaterial and simple
Why the Subject and Predicate Must Differ in Our Speech About God #
- When we say “God is good,” the subject and predicate have different meanings in our understanding
- If they had exactly the same meaning, we would be repeating the same thing: “God is God is God is God”
- Yet in reality, they are identical in God
- This multiplicity of meaning in our thought corresponds to the one reality in God
- Thomas points out that our statements about God must contain a multiplicity of meanings or we learn nothing new about God
Important Definitions #
What-It-Is (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι / quidditas) #
- The definition that makes what a thing is distinct from the thing itself
- The universal essence known by reason
- In material things, distinct from the thing itself because of matter and form
- In immaterial things (angels, God), identical with the thing itself
Form (μορφή / forma) #
- That by which something is what it is
- Contrasts with matter as the subject
- Example: the chair-form is that by which wood becomes a chair
- In immaterial beings, there is no matter to receive form, so being and essence are one
Matter (ὕλη / materia) #
- The subject that receives form
- The principle of individuation in material things
- The reason why many individuals of the same species can exist (e.g., many humans)
- Not present in immaterial beings (angels, God)
Concrete Term (concretum) #
- A word signifying a subject that has a quality or form
- Examples: healthy, wise, colored, sweet
- Signifies the subject or haver, not the quality itself
Abstract Term (abstractum) #
- A word signifying the quality or form itself, separate from any subject
- Examples: health, wisdom, color, sweetness
- Signifies that by which something is what the concrete term says
Examples & Illustrations #
Health and Healthy #
- A body is healthy by health
- Health is not itself healthy; rather, something else (a body) is healthy by possessing health
- Health is the form; the body is the matter or subject
- This illustrates the distinction between the haver and the had in material things
Sugar and Sweetness #
- Sugar is sweet, not sweetness
- Sugar has sweetness, and by that sweetness it is sweet
- Sugar and the sweetness in sugar are not identical
- Sweetness itself is not sweet; it is that by which sugar (and other things) are sweet
Mind and Wisdom #
- The mind of Aristotle is wise (concrete)
- But the mind is not wisdom (abstract)
- The mind has wisdom and is wise by the wisdom it has
- The distinction holds: the haver (mind) and the had (wisdom) are different
Book and Color #
- The book is colored, not color
- The book has color; by color it is colored
- Color is that by which the colored becomes colored
God as Wisdom #
- We say “God is wise” (concrete)
- But can we also say “God is wisdom” (abstract)?
- In creatures: wisdom is not the subject itself; only subjects are wise
- In God: there is no composition, so God is both the wise one and wisdom itself
- But if God is only wisdom, is He wise? We are forced to say both yes and no in different senses
Pythagoras and Divine Wisdom #
- When called wise, Pythagoras refused the title, saying “God alone is wise”
- The great Greek philosophers agree: either God alone should be called wise, or God alone in the perfect sense
- This illustrates that human wisdom is imperfect and fundamentally different from divine wisdom
- Yet we cannot say God is not wise; we must say He is wise in a way transcending our categories
Questions Addressed #
How can we speak truly about God if our natural object is material things? #
- Problem: Our reason is naturally proportioned to understanding material things composed of matter and form. God has no such composition.
- Solution: We must use both concrete and abstract language about God, affirming and denying them. In doing so, we acknowledge the inadequacy of our natural way of understanding while still speaking truthfully.
- Principle: The multiplicity in our speech reflects not multiplicity in God but multiplicity in our mode of understanding.
Why isn’t the distinction between subject and predicate in statements about God a real distinction in God? #
- Apparent problem: If “God is good” and “God is just” are both true, and they seem to mean different things, doesn’t God have multiple properties?
- Resolution: In our mind, there is a real distinction of meaning (we have two different concepts), but in God, all such properties are identical.
- Reason: God is altogether simple; what is one in Him appears as many to our composite intellect.
How do we reconcile saying both “God is wisdom” and avoiding saying “God is merely that by which things are wise”? #
- Tension: If wisdom is abstract (that by which something is wise), then saying God is wisdom seems to exclude Him from being wise. But if we say God is wise (concrete), we seem to imply composition.
- Resolution: We must affirm that God is wisdom itself (eliminating any distinction) while also affirming that God is wise (not merely the abstract principle).
- Mechanism: Because God is entirely simple, being the subject and being the form are identical in Him, though our understanding must differentiate them.
Why is definition fundamental to logic and reason? #
- Answer: Definition makes what a thing is distinctly manifest. To reject definition is to reject the primary object of reason.
- Consequence: Modern philosophers who deny real definitions have abandoned the proper exercise of reason itself.
- Evidence: All great ancient philosophers (Plato, Aristotle) made definition central to inquiry.
Notable Quotes #
“A thing is singular when sensed, but universal when understood.” — Boethius (cited by Albert the Great at the beginning of logic)
“The universal is therefore the first thing to be considered in logic.” — Albert the Great
“Don’t call me wise; God alone is wise.” — Pythagoras
“In that day, there will be only one name for God.” — Old Testament prophet (quoted by Thomas Aquinas on the beatific vision)
“God is whatever he has.” — Thomas Aquinas (principle of divine simplicity)
“What is one in God is multiplied in the creature.” — Thomas Aquinas (principle applying to human knowledge of God)
“God is altogether simple.” — Thomas Aquinas (foundation for understanding divine predication)