53. The Soul as All Things: Knowledge, Form, and Phantasm

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Soul as All Things in Potency #

• Aristotle concludes the soul must be all sensible and intelligible things, but in what manner?
• Not as Empedocles thought: by actually being materially composed of all things
• Rather: the soul receives the forms and species of all things immaterially
• Example: Goliath struck by a stone did not thereby understand stone better—knowledge comes through form reception, not material contact
• The senses and reason are all things in potency (δύναμις), actualizing these forms when they engage their objects

The Hand as Analogy for Universal Reason #

• The hand is the “tool of all tools” (ὀργανον των οργανων) because man’s reason is universal
• Animals with specialized organs (claws, paws) have limited functions: the cat’s claws are for grasping prey and self-defense—limited activities
• Man has the hand precisely because he is the most intelligent animal (contra Anaxagoras): reason can know infinite things, so no fixed instrument is appropriate
• The hand enables painting, writing, eating with a spoon, sawing—infinite possible uses
• Therefore: “Just as the hand is the tool of all tools, so the soul, in a way, is the form of all forms” (forma formarum)
• Man has no fixed “niche in nature” (biological observation)—he is open to all possibilities

The Soul’s Dependence on Phantasms #

• From Book III.7.357: “No one not sensing can learn or understand” (ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν)
• The sensible forms are in phantasms (φαντάσματα)—both mathematical abstractions and properties of sensible things
• The eye sees the red in the object; reason considers the triangle in the image (ἐν τῷ φαντάσματι)
• Critical point: Even after learning what a triangle is, thinking about triangles requires imagination of triangles
• The phantasm is to reason (λόγος) as the exterior sensible object is to sensation (αἴσθησις)
• The difference: exterior sensibles are material; phantasms are already immaterial

The Distinction Between Imagination and Thought #

• Images are of the singular (τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον); thoughts are of the universal (τὸ καθόλου)
• Any imagined triangle must be particular: equilateral, scalene, or isosceles—not all simultaneously
• But understanding “triangle in general” grasps what is common to all particular triangles
• Images cannot be true or false (358): truth and falsehood require σύμπλοκη (entwining/synthesis) of thoughts
• A glass mountain imagined is neither true nor false; only the statement “glass mountains exist” is true or false
• Locke’s error: confusing the image of triangle with the thought of triangle

Key Arguments #

Against Empedocles’ Theory of Knowledge #

1. If the soul knows all things by actually being composed of all things materially, then:
   • Goliath struck by a stone should have understood stone better → but he did not
   • Everything material one touches should be understood → absurd (the wooden chair example)
2. Therefore, knowledge must occur through form reception, not material composition
3. The soul receives forms in potency first, then in act when knowing

Locke’s Paradox About the General Idea of Triangle (358-359) #

1. Locke defines the general idea of triangle as: a plane figure bounded by three straight lines
2. Problem: Are the three lines equal or unequal?
   • If imagined equal → doesn’t fit scalene or isosceles triangles
   • If imagined unequal → doesn’t fit equilateral triangles
   • Seems to require being all and none simultaneously
3. Berkeley’s objection (from Locke’s own admission): this makes no sense, so general ideas don’t exist
4. Berquist’s solution: Locke confuses imagination with thought
   • The three lines are all types in potency (δύναμει), none in act (ἐνεργείᾳ)
   • Like man in general: able to be any race in potency, but no race in act
   • Understanding grasps this potency; imagination cannot (Weitzacker’s principle)

Why Imagination Cannot Grasp Potency #

• Weitzacker (physicist, student of Heisenberg): “When we imagine something, we make it actual in our imagination”
• The senses and imagination only know act, not potency
• When observing a skilled pianist, we see his acts, not his ability
• Therefore, confusing what is in potency with what is in act is a fundamental error shared by:
  • Empedocles (claiming the soul is actually all things)
  • Anaxagoras (saying you can’t get something from nothing, so all must be actually present)
  • Locke (trying to imagine universals)

Important Definitions #

Phantasm (φάντασμα) #

• The image or sensible form residing in imagination
• Different from the thought: particular rather than universal
• The medium through which reason understands material things
• Already immaterial, unlike exterior sensibles

Potency (δύναμις) vs. Act (ἐνέργεια) #

• Three lines of a triangle exist as all types in potency but only one type in act
• What is in potency is not nothing (contra the Megarians), but it is also not actual
• Understanding ability requires distinguishing these: the clay can become sphere, cube, cylinder—all in potency, one in act

Soul as Form of All Forms (forma formarum) #

• The soul receives (and is actualized by) the forms and species of all things
• This is the ground for the statement that “the soul is somehow all beings”
• The highest knowledge because it grasps all things, not limited to particulars

Entwining/Synthesis (σύμπλοκη/σύνθεσις) of Thoughts #

• The putting-together of understood things that creates truth or falsity
• Example: understanding “man” and “animal” separately, then asserting “man is animal” (true) or “man is stone” (false)
• Only at this level of composition does truth/falsity appear, not at the level of simple apprehension

Examples & Illustrations #

Goliath and the Stone #

• Goliath was struck in the forehead by a stone from David’s sling
• One might think: he should have understood stone better afterward
• But he did not—physical contact with stone does not produce knowledge
• Knowledge requires receiving the form of stone through sense and reason, not material contact

The Wooden Chair #

• A wooden chair contains wood, but merely possessing wood does not give knowledge of wood
• Physical composition ≠ knowledge of composed things

Locke’s Glass Mountain #

• One has seen glass separately and mountains separately
• The imagination can combine these images into a “glass mountain”
• Yet this is imagination combining particulars, not understanding a universal

The Three Types of Triangles #

• Equilateral, isosceles (δύσανγλον), and scalene triangles
• When understanding “triangle in general,” one must imagine a particular triangle
• But that particular must be one of these three types
• The universal grasps all three in potency; the imagination grasps only one in act

The Hand vs. Animal Claws #

• A cat’s claws are specialized: for grasping prey, defending against dogs
• A cat scratches a dog on the nose—usually enough to discourage the dog
• But the hand can do infinite things: paint, write, eat soup with a spoon, saw wood
• Therefore man has a hand (universal tool) while animals have specialized organs (fixed tools)

Man Has No “Niche in Nature” #

• Biologist’s observation: examining man’s body shows he doesn’t fit a specific ecological niche
• Fish body fits water, not land
• Ape hands are for swinging in trees
• Man’s body is proportioned to his universal reason—he can adapt to any environment and pursuit

Notable Quotes #

“Just as the hand is the tool of all tools, so the soul, in a way, is the form of all forms” — Aristotle

“When we imagine something, we make it actual in our imagination.” — Weitzacker (physicist)

“No one not sensing can learn or understand” — Aristotle (Book III.7.357)

“These three lines are all and none of these [types]” — Locke’s paradox, cited in Berquist’s critique

“The three straight lines are equilateral, scalene, isosceles in potency, but none in act.” — Berquist’s resolution

Questions Addressed #

How does the soul know all things without being materially composed of all things? #

• The soul receives forms and species immaterially
• Potency (not actual material composition) is sufficient for knowledge
• The eye receives the form of color without being colored; the reason receives the form of triangle without being triangular

Why must reason depend on phantasms (imagination)? #

• The soul is the form of a body—its natural object is what is sensed or imagined
• Reason’s object is the nature or essence (τὸ τί ἐστι) of sensible or imaginable things
• Just as the eye cannot see without colored objects, reason cannot understand without phantasms
• This is not a defect but follows from being an embodied rational soul

Can we understand universals without imagining them? #

• We cannot think without imagination
• But what we understand (the universal) is not what we imagine (the particular)
• Understanding triangle in general while imagining a particular triangle exemplifies this
• The universal is in the thought, not in the image

Why did Locke fail to understand general ideas? #

• He confused the image (which must be particular) with the thought (which is universal)
• He tried to imagine what is universal, expecting the imagination to grasp all types simultaneously
• He did not distinguish between what exists in potency versus in act
• He did not recognize that the three lines are all types in potency but only one in act

Connections to Literary and Linguistic Usage #

Shakespeare’s Definition of Reason #

• Reason is defined by “discourse”—knowing one thing in relation to another
• The prologue to Henry V appeals to imagination to fill out what the stage cannot fully show
• Shakespeare uses “imagine” and “think” somewhat interchangeably in common speech
• Philosophical precision requires separating these powers

Etymology: “Think” and “Thought” #

• Partridge’s etymological dictionary shows “think” and “thought” relate to “me thinks” (“seems to me”)
• This usage parallels Aristotle’s language about phantasm
• Common English blurs imagination and thought; philosophy must distinguish them