55. The Two Movers: Intellect and Desire in Local Motion

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of What Causes Local Motion #

• Aristotle investigates which power of the soul moves animals from place to place
• This is distinct from nutrition, growth, and sensation, which are shared with lower animals
• The investigation addresses why some creatures with sensation (like sea creatures fixed to the ocean floor) do not move from place to place

Two Motive Powers: Practical Intellect and Desire #

• Both practical reason (νοῦς/nous) and desire (ὄρεξις/orexis) are necessary movers
• Neither alone is sufficient to cause motion:
  • The incontinent man knows what he should do (practical reason operates) but does not do it
  • Practical reason without appetite cannot move the body
  • Desire without understanding or imagination cannot direct action effectively
• These two must be unified to cause a single action

The Desirable Good as Unmoved Mover #

• The desirable good (the end desired) unites the two movers
• It moves desire by being the object of desire
• It moves practical reason by being the principle (ἀρχή/archē) from which practical reason begins its deliberation
• The desirable good acts like the unmoved mover in metaphysics—it moves without being moved

Distinction Between Theoretical and Practical Reason #

• Theoretical reason (θεωρητικός/theoretikos) aims at truth for its own sake
• Practical reason (πρακτικός/praktikos) aims at action or making something
• These are not two different faculties but the same intellect operating toward different ends
• Practical reason is a source of motion; theoretical reason is not

The Problem of Contrary Desires in Humans #

• Humans uniquely experience conflict between what reason commands and what sense desire pursues
• The incontinent man (ἀκρατής/akratēs) lacks self-control: reason tells him not to do something, but he does it anyway
• Examples: the dental coward who avoids the dentist despite knowing he should go; the smoker who continues smoking despite knowing it is harmful; the man buying whiskey in seven separate bags to pace himself
• This conflict does not occur in other animals, which lack temporal awareness

Practical Reason’s Procedure #

• Practical reason begins from the desired end and works backward to determine means
• Example: Desire to cure a headache → reason determines aspirin is needed → reason recognizes the drugstore has aspirin → reason identifies the drugstore’s location → arrives at the concrete action one can perform now (walking to the drugstore)
• The final action is what Aristotle calls “the extremity” (τὸ ἔσχατον)—the actual deed that can be done here and now

Mind Including Imagination #

• Aristotle uses “mind” (νοῦς/nous) to include both reason and imagination (φαντασία/phantasia)
• Many things move us according to imagination rather than strict understanding
• In animals without reason, imagination must be what moves them
• Both imagination and desire appear to be movers, but they are unified in the desirable object

Key Arguments #

Why Practical Reason Alone Cannot Move Us #

• The incontinent man demonstrates that having practical knowledge does not guarantee action
• Reason can give commands, but without appetite, the body is not moved to obey
• Even when the mind urges to flee or pursue something, one is not moved if sense desire opposes it
• Augustine’s Confessions illustrates this: “I will repent now, but not today”

Why Desire Alone Cannot Move Us #

• Desire without knowledge or imagination has no direction
• Animals must imagine what they desire in order to pursue it
• The desirable must be known (at least through imagination) for desire to be effective

The Knowledge of Opposites Does Not Determine Action #

• By medical knowledge, a doctor can make someone healthy or sick through the same knowledge
• By logical knowledge, one can reason well or deceive others through the same art
• By grammatical knowledge, one can speak correctly or incorrectly
• Therefore, knowledge alone is not sufficient—desire must determine which capacity will be exercised
• The same is true of practical reason: it can deliberate about how to preserve or overthrow a government

The Unity of the Two Movers in the Desirable #

• If two things cause one motion, they must be unified in some way
• They are unified “according to a common form” (κατὰ τὸ εἶδος)
• The same thing is both desired and known/imagined
• Therefore, the desirable (the good or end) is the one thing that unites intellect and desire as movers

Important Definitions #

Appetite (ὄρεξις/orexis) #

• The broad genus of desiring powers in the soul
• Includes: sense desire (ἐπιθυμία/epithumia), spirited appetite (θυμός/thumos), and rational appetite (will/βούλησις/boulēsis)

Sense Desire (ἐπιθυμία/epithumia) #

• Desire for what is pleasant and agreeable to the senses
• Translated in Latin by concupiscentia
• Can conflict with reason in humans who have temporal awareness
• Distinguished from rational desire (will), which follows upon reason

Practical Reason (νοῦς πρακτικός/nous praktikos) #

• Reason ordered toward doing or making something
• Begins from the desired end and deliberates about means
• Issues in command (προαίρεσις/proairesis—choice or election)
• Differs from theoretical reason by its end, not by its nature as a power

The Desirable (τὸ ὀρεκτόν/to orekton) #

• The good or end that is both understood and desired
• Serves as the principle from which practical reason begins its deliberation
• Acts as the unmoved mover in the order of motion
• Can move imagination, desire, and practical reason because it is the object of desire and the starting point of practical reasoning

The Extremity (τὸ ἔσχατον/to eschaton) #

• The concrete, individual action that one can actually perform here and now
• The terminus of practical reason’s deliberation
• Reached by working backward from the desired end through means to what is actually doable immediately

Examples & Illustrations #

Curing a Headache #

• Desire (the desirable good): Cure my headache
• Practical reason: Aspirin cures headaches; I don’t have aspirin; the drugstore has aspirin; the drugstore is down the street
• Action (the extremity): Walk to the drugstore
• The desired end is the principle from which the entire chain of reasoning begins

The Alcoholic’s Strategy #

• A man with a drinking problem buys seven half bottles of whiskey instead of one large bottle
• He places each in a separate bag
• When he finishes one bottle, he stops for that day
• Demonstrates how one can devise external constraints against sense desire when reason and appetite conflict

The Dental Coward #

• A professor admits his teeth are in bad shape but cannot bring himself to visit the dentist
• His reason tells him he should go; his fear prevents him from going
• Example of how sense desire (or fear) can override practical reason

The Smoker Who Cannot Quit #

• A smoker warns others not to take up smoking
• Yet he cannot give it up himself, despite knowing the harm
• Even some doctors who smoke continue to do so while advising patients against it
• Illustrates the incontinence that can persist even when knowledge is present

The Toaster with Multiple Settings #

• A modern toaster has buttons numbered 1-10 for different browning levels
• Dark whole wheat bread might require level 8
• Cinnamon bread with raisins might require only level 4
• One must know the appropriate setting for different materials
• Illustrates how practical reason must apply general knowledge to particular circumstances

The Package Store Anecdote #

• A regular customer came in every Saturday morning to buy seven half bottles of whiskey
• He wanted each bottle in a separate bag within one larger bag
• Though economically inefficient (paying more per unit), it served his purpose: limiting daily consumption
• Shows how the rational appetite (will) can devise means to overcome disordered sense appetite

Questions Addressed #

What Single Thing Unites Intellect and Desire as Movers? #

• Answer: The desirable good (τὸ ὀρεκτόν/to orekton)—the end or object desired. This is both:
  • Moved by as the object of desire
  • The principle from which practical reason begins its deliberation
• The desirable moves without being moved itself, like the unmoved mover

Why Does Practical Reason Not Always Move Us to Action? #

• Answer: Because practical reason alone lacks the appetitive power to move the body. Even when reason commands action, if appetite is opposed or absent, the body is not moved. The incontinent man proves this: his reason knows what should be done, but desire prevents action.

Why Can Desire Not Move Us Without Understanding? #

• Answer: Because appetite must have some object—something it desires. This object must be known, at least through imagination, for desire to be directed toward it and for motion to occur. Blind desire without any understood or imagined object cannot produce purposeful motion.

How Does Practical Reason Determine Concrete Action? #

• Answer: By working backward from the desired end (ἀρχή/archē—the principle) through a chain of intermediate means until arriving at the extremity (τὸ ἔσχατον/to eschaton)—the concrete action that can be performed here and now. Each step asks: “To achieve this end, what must be done first?”

Why Do Animals Without Reason Not Experience the Conflict Humans Do? #

• Answer: Because animals lack temporal awareness and imagination directed by reason. They cannot look before and after in time. They are moved by their imagination of what is immediately pleasing or displeasing. They live in what Berquist calls “the ignorant present,” where only immediate sensation matters. Therefore, their sense desire and imagination move them in unified fashion without conflict.

Notable Quotes #

“For the desirable moves, and through this, thought moves, because it’s principle, right? The beginning of its reasoning is the appetible, huh?”

• Illustrates how the desired good is both the starting point of practical reasoning and the object that moves desire

“Give me that man that is not, what, passion slave, right?”

• Hamlet’s praise of Horatio, who is not enslaved to any passion—represents the ideal of reason governing desire

“Past reason hunted, right? Past reason hated afterwards, right?”

• Shakespeare quoted on how sense desire can override reason at the moment but lead to regret afterward

“Knowledge of the opposites” principle

• By the same knowledge, one can achieve opposite effects; therefore, knowledge alone does not determine action—desire must determine which capacity will be exercised