78. Substantial Form, Unity of the Soul, and Per Se Predication

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Substantial vs. Accidental Form: Substantial form gives existence simply to a subject that has no prior actuality; accidental form gives qualified existence to an already actual subject. Matter exists for the sake of form, not vice versa.
• The Unity of the Soul: Against Plato and Averroes, Thomas argues there is one soul in man, not multiple souls. The soul has multiple powers (vegetative, sensitive, rational) but is unified as one substantial form.
• Per Se Predication: The distinction between two modes of per se (καθ’ αὑτό) predication is crucial for understanding how “man” and “animal” relate without requiring multiple souls.
• The Problem of Multiple Souls: If man had separate vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls, he would not be one thing simply but a composite of three distinct beings.

Key Arguments #

Argument from Unity of Being #

• A thing has unity in the same way it has being
• All unity comes from one substantial form to which a thing has existence
• If there were multiple souls, there would be multiple beings (a plant, an animal, a man) rather than one composite substance
• Therefore, man must have one soul

Argument from Per Se Predication #

• When we say “man is an animal,” this is not accidental predication (like “triangle is green”)
• Nor is it a property-relation (like “triangle has interior angles equal to two right angles”)
• Rather, “animal” is said of “man” in the second mode of per se predication, where the subject (man) is placed in the definition of the predicate (animal)
• This requires that it is through the same form that something is both an animal and a man
• If animal came from the sensing soul and man from the understanding soul, then “man is an animal” would have to be either accidental or a property-relation, both of which are manifestly false

Argument from Impediment of Operations #

• One operation of the soul, when intense, impedes another operation
• Example: emotional disturbance (a bodily/animal activity) impedes thinking
• This would not occur if sensing and understanding came from different substances
• Therefore, the principle of these actions must be one in its very nature

Important Definitions #

Per Se (καθ’ αὑτό) - Two Modes #

First Mode: The predicate is in the definition of the subject

• Example: “Two, as two, is a number” or “Two is half of four”
• The property follows from the nature itself

Second Mode: The subject is in the definition of the predicate

• Example: “Surface is colored” (surface is presupposed in the definition of color)
• The subject is a cause of the property

Per Accidens: Neither form is ordered to the other

• Example: “Triangle is green” (green is not part of being a triangle, nor is triangle part of being green)
• Also called “accidental” predication

Substantial Form #

• Comes to a subject that has only potentiality, not actuality
• Gives existence simply (not in a qualified way)
• Makes a thing to be what it is
• There is one substantial form per substance

Accidental Form #

• Comes to a subject that is already actual
• Gives existence in a limited, qualified way (e.g., “I came to be healthy,” not “I came to be”)
• Completes an already existing substance

Examples & Illustrations #

The Wood and Chair Example #

• Wood comes to be a chair, but the wood itself does not come to be (it already existed)
• This illustrates that accidental form does not give absolute existence
• The wood is already a substance before receiving the accidental form of “chair”

Recovery from Sickness #

• When sick, I recover health: I “came to be healthy,” not “I came to be”
• The predication requires qualification
• This is characteristic of accidental form

Geometric Predication #

• A surface is necessarily colored; color spreads over a surface
• This is second-mode per se predication: surface is presupposed in the definition of color
• Not accidental (like triangle being green) because color cannot exist without a surface

The Three Souls Problem #

• If man has three souls (vegetative, sensitive, rational), then:
  • There would be three beings in the same body
  • “Man is an animal” would be only accidental (like “white is sweet”)
  • The body would not hold them together (the body’s unity comes from one form)
• None of these consequences follow in reality

Predication and Experience #

• Lucy is a cat and Lucy is an animal—but these are not two different things about Lucy
• To be a cat is to be an animal
• Lucy’s being an animal is not something other than her being a cat in reality
• Contrast: Lucy is a cat and Lucy is orange—these are two different things

Intensity of Operations #

• St. Francis knew that intense intellectual study in theology can impede devotion (an act of the will)
• Conversely, intense emotion impedes clear thinking
• When a painter becomes absorbed in observing color, other operations are diminished
• A wine expert (like Robert Parker) can become so absorbed in tasting that it leaves little room for other activities
• Personal insomnia: thinking at night impedes sleep
• Even Aristotle may have suffered from chronic indigestion due to overwork

Love vs. Knowledge #

• Love goes out to the thing loved; knowledge brings the thing into the mind
• Popular speech reflects this: “I left my heart in San Francisco” (love extends outward)
• But we say the mind “grasps” or “takes” truth (knowledge is receptive)
• Augustine: “The soul is more where it loves than where it animates”

Notable Quotes #

“Nothing is simply one except through one form, to which a thing has existence, and from the same thing, a thing has that it is a being, and that it is one.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)

“Otherwise, man would not be truly that which is an animal, and thus animal would be said of man per se.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist, on the necessity of one form)

“The soul is more where it loves than where it animates.” — St. Augustine (cited by Berquist)

“Where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.” — Christ (cited by Berquist, illustrating how the heart goes out to what it loves)

“I’ve seen enough, but I haven’t drunk enough.” — A Frenchman (cited by Berquist, illustrating absorption in sensory experience)

Questions Addressed #

How can logical distinctions (animal vs. man) not entail real distinctions in substance? #

• The distinctions reflect different modes of understanding one reality, not different substances
• “Animal” expresses what man is more generally; “man” expresses it more precisely
• Both derive from the same substantial form understood in different ways

Why doesn’t the incorruptibility of the understanding soul mean it’s a different substance? #

• In man, the sensing soul is incorruptible not because it is sensing but because it is understanding
• The understanding soul contains the sensing power and perfects it with incorruptibility
• A merely sensing soul (in brute animals) is corruptible

How can predication illuminate the unity of soul? #

• Per se predication in the second mode shows that animal is in the definition of man
• This requires one form giving both animality and rationality
• If they came from different forms, “man is an animal” would be accidental or a mere property

What is the sign that the soul is one? #

• The empirical fact that intense emotion impedes thinking, and vice versa
• This proves a common source—one soul with multiple powers ordered hierarchically
• If the powers were from different substances, they would not interfere with each other