Lecture 80

80. The Soul as Substantial Form and the Unity of Man

Summary
This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether man possesses multiple substantial forms or one unified soul. Berquist explores the Thomistic argument that the rational soul, as the substantial form of the body, necessarily contains and perfects the operations of lower forms (vegetative and sensitive), making man a unified being rather than a composite of distinct substances. The lecture addresses objections from medieval philosophers and clarifies the metaphysical principles underlying the doctrine of the soul’s unity.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 4: Whether There Is Another Substantial Form Besides the Understanding Soul #

  • The question concerns whether man possesses a substantial form distinct from and underlying the rational soul that would make the body a body
  • This differs from Article 3 (multiple souls) by asking about more fundamental forms that constitute bodily existence itself
  • The problem arises because philosophers struggle to understand how an immaterial substance (the rational soul) can be the form of a material body

The Root Problem: Understanding the Nature of the Human Soul #

  • Philosophers recognize the soul is immaterial and has immaterial operations (understanding, willing, separation of the intelligible from images)
  • Yet the soul is also the form of a body and gives to the body what material forms give
  • This creates the false dichotomy: either the soul is entirely immaterial (like angels, not tied to body) or entirely material (unable to understand)
  • The Arab philosophers described man as existing “on the horizon” between material and immaterial worlds—one foot in each realm

The Principle of Form Containment #

  • Higher substantial forms contain and exceed the perfections of lower forms
  • Like the number five contains four, three, two, one but adds something more
  • The understanding soul gives what the vegetative soul gives (nutrition, growth, reproduction)
  • It gives what the sensitive soul gives (sensation, emotion, locomotion)
  • It gives what the rational soul gives (understanding, willing, deliberation)—all through one substantial form

Man’s Unique Ontological Status #

  • Man shares bodily operations with animals (the content of the sensible experience)
  • Man shares immaterial operations with angels (understanding and willing)
  • The human soul contains perfections of both lower and higher orders but in diminished form compared to pure angels
  • This unified being is difficult to conceptualize but necessary to preserve man’s unity

Substantial Form vs. Accidental Form #

  • Substantial form: Gives being simply (simpliciter), without qualification. Through it something comes to be or ceases to be absolutely
  • Accidental form: Gives being in some qualified way (secundum quid). Through it something comes to be or ceases to be in some respect
  • Example: When medicine cured the lecturer’s illness, he came to be healthy (secundum quid), but he did not come to be (simpliciter). When one dies, one ceases to be (simpliciter)
  • This distinction is crucial: the substantial form gives unity of being; accidental forms do not

The Argument from Being and Unity #

  • Principle: Of one thing, there is one substantial being
  • Accidental being can be multiple (I can be healthy, white, a geometer)
  • Substantial being cannot be multiple (I cannot be a man and a dog and a cat simultaneously)
  • The substantial form gives substantial being
  • Conclusion: There can be only one substantial form in man, namely the understanding soul

The Problem of Retaliation and Unity #

  • If a student from Holy Cross beats an Assumption student, it is unjust for Assumption students to beat just any Holy Cross student
  • But if one person hits another with their right fist, the victim may justly retaliate by hitting them in the chest—this is recognized as just retaliation
  • This shows we intuitively recognize ourselves as one unified substance, not a collection of cellular substances
  • If we were truly a collection of substances, retaliation against any part would be as unjust as beating up a stranger from another school
  • Similarly, if a Jew kills a Palestinian, it is unjust for Palestinians to kill any Jew; but the state may punish one person for a crime committed by any part of their body

The Response to the Objections #

  • Against objection that elements must have forms in a mixture: Thomas denies that the substantial forms of elements remain in the mixed body. A true mixture involves a new substance with its own substantial form
  • Against the view of multiple forms: If the rational soul is the substantial form of the body, it is impossible that another substantial form exists besides it

Key Arguments #

The Argument from Being (Contra) #

  • Premise 1: Of one thing, there is one substantial being
  • Premise 2: The substantial form is that which gives being
  • Premise 3: The soul is the substantial form of man
  • Conclusion: There is only one substantial form in man

The Argument from the Definition of Soul #

  • Premise: Aristotle defines soul as the actuality (form) of a natural body having life in potentiality
  • Implication: The definition points out which part of the composite is the soul—the form, not matter
  • Conclusion: The soul cannot be something added to a body already constituted by another form

The Argument from Bodily Reality #

  • Experience shows man is material: loss of body parts is loss of self, not loss of possessions
  • Yet man has immaterial operations: understanding universals requires a form not tied to singular matter
  • This shows one soul must account for both material and immaterial aspects

Important Definitions #

Substantial Form (forma substantialis) #

  • The intrinsic principle that makes something be what it is in its very essence
  • Gives being simply, without qualification (simpliciter)
  • When lost, the thing ceases to be (dies)

Accidental Form #

  • An intrinsic principle that gives being in some respect only (secundum quid)
  • When lost, the thing ceases to be in that respect but does not cease to be altogether
  • Example: heat makes something be hot; losing heat means losing hotness, not being

Being Simply (Simpliciter) vs. Being in Some Way (Secundum Quid) #

  • Simpliciter: Without qualification; absolute sense
  • Secundum Quid: In some respect; qualified sense
  • Example: Born I came to be (simpliciter); cured I came to be healthy (secundum quid)
  • This distinction prevents fallacy in confusing what is true in qualified sense with absolute truth

Examples & Illustrations #

Medical Recovery #

  • Before taking medicine: stuffy nose, fever, unable to breathe normally
  • After taking medicine: healthy, breathing normally through nose
  • Did the lecturer come to be? No—he came to be healthy (secundum quid)
  • But when someone dies, they cease to be (simpliciter)

Geometric Knowledge #

  • After reading Euclid’s Elements, did the lecturer come to be? No
  • He came to be a geometer
  • This is being in some way (secundum quid), not being simply

The Cat and Meat #

  • Both the lecturer and a cat enjoy good meat
  • They share something in common (sensible appetite)
  • But the lecturer has emotions in a more elevated way than the cat
  • The lecturer also has understanding and will, though depressed compared to angels
  • This illustrates how one soul contains lower perfections while adding higher ones

Amputation and Identity #

  • When one loses a tooth, there is a feeling of losing something of oneself
  • Loss of a limb (like Reagan’s leg in film) is losing part of oneself, not a possession
  • One naturally recognizes oneself as materially constituted while remaining oneself

The Friendship Analogy #

  • Friendship of utility: friends because useful to each other
  • Friendship of pleasure: friends because enjoyable company
  • Friendship of virtue: friends because both are good
  • The highest friendship contains usefulness and pleasure but perfects them through virtue
  • Two virtuous friends are more useful and more pleasant than two vicious friends
  • This parallels how the rational soul contains vegetative and sensitive perfections while adding rational perfection

Notable Quotes #

“Now cracks the noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest.” — Shakespeare (Hamlet, cited regarding angels singing at death, with reference to Padre Pio’s experience)

“The elements are so mixed in him, that all the earth might snap and say to all the world, this was a man.” — Shakespeare (Julius Caesar, cited regarding the fine balance and mixture of elements in a great man)

“Where’s the rest of me?” — Ronald Reagan (cited when discussing amputation and loss of bodily parts as loss of self)

Questions Addressed #

Why Do Philosophers Posit Multiple Substantial Forms? #

  • Answer: Because they struggle to understand how an immaterial substance can be the form of matter. They want to make something either entirely immaterial or entirely material, unable to conceive a being that is partially in each realm.

How Can One Soul Give Both Bodily and Immaterial Operations? #

  • Answer: The soul is a substantial form that, in itself, constitutes the body’s being. Through it, the body has life and operations. Some of its powers operate through bodily organs (sensation, emotion, locomotion); other powers do not require bodily organs (understanding, willing).

What Is the Relationship Between the Human Soul and Lower Forms? #

  • Answer: Like numbers where five contains four but adds something more. The human soul contains what vegetative and sensitive forms give but perfects these with rational perfection. The higher form does not replace the lower; it includes and elevates it.

How Does This Preserve Man’s Unity? #

  • Answer: By positing one substantial form (the rational soul) that gives being and unity to man. One thing has one substantial being. Man is unified—not a plant, animal, and rational being coexisting, but one being that is all three in ascending degrees of perfection.