83. The Soul's Union with Body and Accidental Dispositions
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
- The Union of Soul and Body: Whether accidental dispositions (accidents) stand between the soul and body as intermediaries
- Substantial vs. Accidental Form: Substantial forms give being simply (simpliciter); accidents give being only in some qualified way (secundum quid)
- Matter and Potency: Matter is the capacity for all acts in a certain order; substantial form must be first understood in matter, not accidents
- The Problem of Intermediaries: Refutation of theories claiming dispositions, quantity, or power mediate soul-body union
- The Agent as Cause: Only the agent (not an intermediary thing) causes the union of form and matter
Key Arguments #
Article 6: Accidental Dispositions as Intermediaries #
Objection 1 (Sense Qualities):
- The human body requires certain accidental qualities (hot/cold, wet/dry) to be suitable for the soul
- Every form needs matter disposed for it; these dispositions are accidents
- Therefore accidental forms must precede and mediate between matter and soul
Objection 2 (Quantity/Continuous Quantity):
- Diverse forms of one species require diverse parts of matter
- Diverse parts of matter cannot be understood except by division of continuous quantity (dimensions)
- Therefore dimensions must be understood before substantial forms
- Analogy: Cookie dough must have dimensions to be divided into many cookies
Objection 3 (Power/Potency):
- The spirit (immaterial soul) is applied to the bodily through the contact of power (virtus/potency), not dimensions
- The power of the soul is an accident (in the category of quality)
- Therefore the soul is joined to the body through an accidental disposition
Thomas’s Response (I answer, it ought to be said):
- The fundamental principle: Accident is after substance in time and in definition (Aristotle, Metaphysics Book 7)
- Matter cannot receive accidental forms before it receives substantial form
- An accident cannot exist before substance, for accident is that which exists in another (substance is that which exists not in another)
- If the understanding soul is united to the body as substantial form, no accidental disposition can fall as a middle between them
- Matter as potency: Matter has the capacity for all acts in a certain order; what is first among all acts is being (esse)
- It is impossible to understand matter to have accidents (to be hot, to be large) before it actually is
- Matter actually is through substantial form, which makes it to be absolutely (simpliciter)
- Therefore accidents follow from the body’s nature, not precede the soul’s union with it
Important Definitions #
Substantial Form (forma substantialis):
- Gives being simply/absolutely (esse simpliciter) to matter
- Makes something actually to be what it is
- Comes before accidents in time and definition
- Example: the soul in a living body
Accidental Form:
- Gives being only in some qualified way (secundum quid)
- Presupposes substance already existing
- Comes after substance in time and definition
- Examples: heat, coldness, quantity, shape
Matter as Potency (materia ut potentia):
- The capacity or openness to receive all acts in a certain order
- Cannot have actual being before receiving substantial form
- The subject of accidental forms, but only after it is actualized by substantial form
Simpliciter vs. Secundum quid:
- Simpliciter (simply, absolutely): Without qualification, in itself, speaking of the being of the thing itself
- Secundum quid (in some way, in some qualified sense): With qualification, in a limited or diminished manner
- A potion can be good in some qualified way (tastes good) but bad simply (poisonous)
- Matter exists simply through substantial form; it exists in some way through accidents
Dimensive Quality (Continuous Quantity):
- The one, two, and three dimensions (lines, surfaces, bodies) by which matter can be divided
- An accident that follows from bodiliness, not preceding it
- Enables distinction of individuals of the same species
Contact of Power (contactus virtutis):
- How immaterial things are joined to material things
- Not surface-to-surface contact (which would require bodies)
- One thing acts upon another through its power
- Example: “My misery touched you” (moved you to compassion)
Examples & Illustrations #
Cookie Dough Analogy #
- Objection 2 uses this: dough must have dimensions to be divided into many cookies
- Thomas’s response: dimensions are accidents following from bodily form, not preceding substantial form
- The multiplication of individuals requires divided matter, but the division itself presupposes matter already informed by form
The Poisoned Potion #
- Illustrates simpliciter vs. secundum quid distinction
- “Is it good to drink?” spoken simply = bad (it kills)
- “In some way it is good” = good to taste
- Shows how we choose things for qualified goods (robbery gives money, annoyance is eliminated) while avoiding the simple good
The Body’s Complexion (Hot/Cold, Wet/Dry) #
- A body too hot or too cold kills the organism
- A body that is completely dry (dust) or completely wet (water) cannot receive the soul
- These accidental qualities (sense qualities in the first species of quality) are effects of the body being informed by the soul
- They are not causes of the union
The Finger on the Glasses #
- Practical illustration of needing many different tools
- A screw falls, requiring a magnifying glass and tiny screwdriver
- Shows that the dispositions and tools one needs follow from the operations one performs, not vice versa
Questions Addressed #
How can the soul be united to a body with certain required temperament without accidents being intermediaries? #
- The required temperament (hot/cold, wet/dry balance) is an effect of the body being alive, not a cause of the soul’s union
- The soul, as substantial form, directly makes the body actually to be and actually to live
- Accidental dispositions follow upon this living being, but do not precede or mediate the union
If matter needs to be divided to have many individuals of one species, doesn’t quantity precede substantial form? #
- Quantity (dimensions) is indeed necessary for the distinction of individuals
- But quantity is an accident that follows upon bodily form, not something prior to substantial form
- The same substantial form gives diverse grades of perfection to matter according to reason’s consideration of its dimensions
- The division presupposes matter already informed by form
How does an immaterial soul touch/join with a material body if not through accidental intermediaries? #
- The soul as substantial form is united to matter as act to potency
- They are united immediately without intermediary, like wax and its shape
- The agent (God) causes this union by actualizing matter’s potency through the substantial form
- The soul administers the body through its powers (which are accidents), but this power is how it acts, not how it is joined
Notable Quotes #
“The accident is, what, after substance in time and in definition, as is said in the seventh book of Wisdom of the Metaphysics.”
“Matter is an ability or potency to all acts in a certain order. It is necessary, therefore, that what is first simply among acts be first understood in matter.”
“What is first among all acts is what? Being, to be. It is impossible, therefore, to understand matter, to be hot or to be so big or so large, before it actually is.”
“Matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely.”
“The unity of a thing composed from matter and form is through the form itself, which by itself is united to the matter as its act.”