87. The Soul's Essence and Its Powers

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Identity Question: Whether the essence (essentia) of the soul is the same as its power or powers
• Potency and Act: How the metaphysical division of being into ability (potentia) and act (actus) applies to the soul
• Augustine’s Potential Whole Doctrine: Understanding how the soul can be wholly present in the whole body and in each part
• The Nature of Operation: Why the soul’s operations (understanding, willing, sensing) cannot be identical with the soul’s substance

Key Arguments #

The Potency-Act Argument (First Proof) #

• Fundamental Principle: Ability and act divide being and must be in the same genus of being
• Application to Soul: The soul’s operations (sensing, understanding, willing, walking) are not in the genus of substance—they belong to other categories
• Conclusion: Therefore, the powers that enable these operations cannot be in the genus of substance either. Powers must be accidents (qualities of the second species), not the soul’s essence
• Exception: Only in God is operation identical with substance, so only God’s power is His essence

The Soul as Already Act (Second Proof) #

• Definition: The soul, by its very nature as a form, is an act (actus primus)
• Problem: An act, insofar as it is act, cannot itself be ability or potency
• Consequence: The soul cannot be its own operative power
• Evidence: Living things are not always in the act of living operations (e.g., during sleep), yet they still possess the soul. This proves the soul’s essence is distinct from its operative powers

Important Definitions #

• Essentia (Essence): The very nature or substance of what a thing is; in the soul’s case, its form as the principle of life
• Potentia (Ability/Power): The capacity to perform an operation; the proximate principle of action, correlative to act
• Actus (Act): The actual performance of an operation; what something does in reality
• Actus Primus (First Act): The soul as form and principle of being, existing in potency to further operations
• Operatio (Operation): An action proceeding from a power; not in the genus of substance except in God
• Potentia Integralis (Integral/Composed Whole): A whole made from parts but not said of parts (e.g., a chair from legs and seat)
• Potentia Universalis (Universal Whole): A whole said of each part according to whole essence and power (e.g., animal said of dog, cat, horse)
• Potentia Protestativa (Potential Whole): A middle ground: present to each part according to whole nature but not whole power (the proper way to understand the soul’s presence in the body)

Examples & Illustrations #

• History as Incomplete Investigation: Berquist opens with the example of historians constantly revising history (e.g., newly discovered details about spies in the American Revolution and the capture of Major André) to illustrate how investigation is incomplete in contingent human affairs. This sets up the contrast with philosophy, where more definitive conclusions can be reached.
• Sleep as Potency to Act: When a person sleeps, they still have the soul (it remains with them), but they are not in act regarding the operations of life. This shows that the soul’s essence is not identical to its operative powers.
• Different Powers in Different Parts: The ability to walk is not found in the eye, and the ability to see is not found in the leg, yet the soul (whose essence is simple) is wholly present in both. This demonstrates the soul as a potential whole.
• Circles and Substantial Form: One circle is not more a circle than another; similarly, one human is not more human than another in substance, even if humans differ in accidental qualities like height.
• Heat and Fire: Just as heat is an accidental active form flowing from the substantial form of fire, the soul’s powers (active accidental forms) flow from the substantial form of the soul.

Questions Addressed #

Article 1: Is the Essence of the Soul Its Power? #

• Objections Presented: Seven objections attempt to show the soul’s essence is its power, citing Augustine, the nobility of the soul, the simplicity of substantial form, the definition of the soul, and the nature of accidents
• Answer: No. The soul’s essence is distinct from its powers. Powers are accidents (qualities) that flow from the soul’s essence
• Resolution of Augustine: When Augustine says knowledge and love are “substantially” (substantialiter) in the soul, he does not mean they inhere in the soul’s substance as subject. Rather, knowledge and love relate to the soul as their object—they refer to the soul itself as known and loved. Therefore, what is being made substantial is the soul (the object of knowledge), not the knowing itself.
• The Potential Whole Solution: Augustine’s statement that the soul is wholly in the whole body and wholly in each part can be understood through the doctrine of the potential whole. The soul is present to each part according to its whole essence, but not according to its whole power. Thus, memory, understanding, and will are the “one essence” of the soul because they all participate in one simple substance, even though that substance does not exercise all its powers in each part.

Connections to Prior Doctrine #

• Aristotle’s Definition: The soul is “that by which we first sense and understand” (De Anima II.2)
• Actus-Potentia Division: Applies to every genus of being, not only substance but also quantity and quality
• The Created-Uncreated Distinction: In creatures, substance and operation are always distinct; in God alone are they identical
• Form as Act: The soul as a substantial form is itself an act (actus primus), ordered to further acts (actus secundus) which are the soul’s operations