Lecture 88

88. Powers of the Soul: Essence, Accidents, and Natural Properties

Summary
This lecture addresses Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections regarding whether the powers of the soul are identical to its essence or constitute accidental properties. Berquist carefully distinguishes between accidents in the strict sense (as opposed to substance) and properties in Porphyry’s sense (as natural effects flowing from essence), explaining how the powers of the soul occupy a middle ground as natural properties. The discussion integrates Aristotelian metaphysics, Augustine’s theology, and complex examples from geometry and natural philosophy to clarify how substantial and accidental forms relate to operation and action.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fourth and Fifth Objections: Essence vs. Accident #

  • Objection 4: The soul is the principle by which we sense and understand (from Aristotle’s De Anima)

    • Solution: Distinguishes immediate principle (proximate cause) from remote principle (first cause)
    • The soul is the remote/first principle by which we understand
    • Reason (the ability to understand) is the proximate principle
    • Analogy: Just as we teach geometry both “by reason” and “by the art of geometry in reason,” one is more proximate than the other
    • Shakespearean example: “Since my dear soul was Mr. Suffer’s choice” — we choose by our soul (remote) but by our will (proximate)
  • Objection 5: Powers of the soul cannot be accidents because they transcend their subject (Augustine, On the Trinity, Book IX)

    • Augustine argues the mind exceeds its subject because it can know and love things beyond itself
    • Solution: Distinguishes two meanings of “accident”

Two Meanings of “Accident” (Critical Distinction) #

Accident in the strict sense (opposed to substance):

  • Something that exists in a subject (not in itself)
  • Contrasted with substance, which exists not in another
  • Division: Either a thing exists in a subject OR it doesn’t — tertium non datur (no middle ground)
  • Powers of the soul ARE accidents in this sense; they are in the category of quality (second species: inborn power/πῇ δύναμις)

Accident in Porphyry’s sense (one of five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident):

  • Here there IS a middle ground between substance and accident: the property (proprium)
  • Property (proprium): Something outside the essence but caused from the essential principles of the species
    • Has no necessary connection with essence alone (unlike difference)
    • But flows from the essential nature as an effect from a cause
    • Always belongs to that species, to every member, and only to that species
  • Accident (in this sense): Has no necessary connection and can be present or absent

The Three-Fold Division #

  1. Essential to the thing (genus, species, difference): Signify what the thing is
  2. Property (proprium): Outside essence but caused from essential principles; flows as effect from cause
  3. Accident (in strict sense): Outside essence with no connection to essential principles; can be present or absent

The Powers of the Soul as Natural Properties:

  • Not of the essence of the soul (hence not “substance”)
  • But caused from the essential principles of the soul (hence not “accident” in the strict sense)
  • They are natural properties flowing from the soul’s nature
  • Therefore: In a middle position between substance and accident (using Porphyry’s framework)

The Distinction Illustrated: Geometric Examples #

Accidental vs. Essential Differences:

  • A triangle being green: No connection to the nature of a triangle (three-sided plane figure); known only by sensation; cannot be reasoned from definition
    • This is an accident (not a property)
  • A triangle having interior angles equal to two right angles: Outside the definition but provable from it through reasoning; follows upon the nature of triangularity
    • This is a property
    • Can be demonstrated by Euclid’s method (extending side, drawing parallel, using alternate angles)

Another Example: Two is half of four

  • Two is in the category of quantity (discrete quantity/number)
  • Half of four is in the category of relation (towards something)
  • Yet it is caused from what two is (one + one = two)
  • The relation follows upon the nature as an effect from a cause
  • This is a property even though in a different category

Augustine’s Objection Resolved #

Augustine says knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject. Thomas clarifies:

  • One can compare knowledge and love to the soul in two ways:

    1. As the soul being the subject (in which case they are in the soul and nowhere else) — here they would be accidents
    2. As the soul being the known and loved object — here the accident exceeds the subject because the soul can know/love things beyond itself (God, neighbor, angels)
  • Augustine is comparing them in the second way — knowledge and love in relation to what they are directed toward, not in relation to the soul as subject

  • This removes the paradox: the soul knows infinitely many things, but the accident “knowledge” is still in the soul as a subject

The Sixth Objection (Briefly Addressed) #

  • Objection claims powers cannot be accidents because the soul (like all creatures) has potentiality mixed with act
  • The soul’s substance is not its existence (only in God is this true)
  • Therefore the soul can be a subject of accidents, including the powers
  • Solution: Even a spiritual substance like the soul (or an angel) is not pure act; hence can receive accidental properties

The Seventh Objection: Using Accidents as Differences #

  • Objection: We use “rational” and “sensible” as differences (essential differentiations), but these are taken from powers
  • Solution: Substantial forms (essences) are unknown to us; we know them through their accidents and properties
  • Therefore we sometimes use accident-names in place of substantial differences
  • Example: Rational animal — “rational” is derived from the power of reason (in genus of quality), but designates the substantial difference that grounds this power
  • Why?: The essential differences are hidden — nature loves to hide (Heraclitus)
  • We can know what a triangle is through properties that are convertible with it (like having interior angles equal to two right angles)

Second Article: Why Many Powers of the Soul? #

The Problem: If the understanding soul approaches God’s likeness, and God has one simple power (His essence), why doesn’t the human soul have just one power?

Aristotle’s Principle (from De Caelo, Book II):

  • Lowest things: Achieve imperfect goodness with few means
  • Middle things: Achieve greater perfection but require many means
  • Highest things: Achieve perfect goodness with few means
  • Analogy of health:
    • Poor disposition: Cannot achieve perfect health, gets limited health with few remedies
    • Better disposition: Can achieve perfect health but needs many remedies
    • Best disposition: Achieves perfect health with few or no remedies

Application to Powers:

  • Plants (lowest): Simple, few operations, limited perfection
  • Animals (middle): More complex, many operations, greater perfection than plants
  • Humans (middle but higher): Very complex, many diverse powers, approach universal and perfect goodness; yet below angels in nature
  • Angels (highest among creatures): Fewer means/simpler, yet more perfect than humans
  • God (absolute): Absolutely simple, absolutely perfect; one verbo (one thought)

Why Humans Have Diversity of Powers:

  1. Man achieves universal and perfect goodness (approaching beatitude) but through many means
  2. Man is on the horizon (border) between the spiritual and bodily worlds
    • Like angels: understanding and will
    • Like animals: sensation and emotion
    • Like plants: nourishment and reproduction
  3. This composite nature requires diverse powers to bridge the material and immaterial

The Paradox: Perfection and Simplicity #

  • God: Most perfect AND absolutely simple
  • Angels: More perfect than humans AND simpler than humans
  • Humans: More perfect than animals but more complex/less simple
  • Animals: Less perfect than humans but simpler than humans
  • Plants: Least perfect but simplest (few operations)

Resolution: Perfection and simplicity are joined in God; in creatures they are separated. A more perfect creature in the natural order (man vs. animal) may require more complexity to achieve that perfection. Yet the angels show that simplicity can increase with perfection at higher levels.

Implication for the First Objection’s Reply: The understanding soul approaches God’s likeness in being able to achieve perfect goodness, but it does so through many and diverse means (unlike the simple unity of God or the simplicity of angels). This is not a failure of the soul’s likeness to God, but rather reflects the soul’s position as an intellectual creature in the lowest grade of those capable of beatitude.

Key Arguments #

The Potentiality in All Creatures #

  • Only God’s substance is His existence
  • All creatures have substance distinct from existence
  • Therefore all creatures (even angels, even the soul) have a composition of substance (potency) and existence (act)
  • Therefore all creatures can be subjects of accidental forms

The Hidden Nature of Essences #

  • Essential differences are unknown to us
  • We know substantial forms through their accidents and natural properties
  • Therefore we use combinations of accidents/properties to express essential differences
  • Example: Rational animal uses the name of a power (rational) to designate the essential difference

The Hierarchy of Complexity and Perfection #

  • Things that achieve less perfection may use fewer means or parts
  • Things that achieve greater perfection may require more means or parts (in middle creatures)
  • But the highest creatures achieve greatest perfection with greatest simplicity
  • Human souls, positioned between material and spiritual, require many powers precisely to bridge these natures

Important Definitions #

Accident (Two Senses) #

Sense 1 (metaphysical): Something existing in a subject (not in itself), as opposed to substance

  • In creatures, every non-substantial form is an accident in this sense
  • Powers of the soul are accidents in this sense
  • These are in the second species of quality: πῇ δύναμις (inborn power/ability)

Sense 2 (logical, from Porphyry’s five universals): Something that can be present or absent with the same nature; has no necessary connection to the essential principles

  • Distinguished from property (proprium), which flows from essential principles
  • Powers are NOT accidents in this second sense; they are properties

Property (Proprium) #

  • Something not of the essence but caused from the essential principles of a species
  • Belongs to only one species
  • Belongs to every member of that species
  • Always belongs (not contingent like accidents in the second sense)
  • Example: Having interior angles equal to two right angles (for triangles)
  • Example: The relation “half of four” (for the number two)

Natural Property #

  • A property that flows from the nature of a thing as an effect from its cause
  • The powers of the soul are natural properties of the soul
  • They are not identical to the soul’s essence, but they are not accidental in the strict sense either
  • They occupy a middle position between substance and accident (using Porphyry’s framework)

Substantial Form vs. Accidental Form #

  • Substantial form: The form that makes a thing to be (to exist as a substance)
  • Accidental form: A form that gives a further determination to what already exists
  • The soul is a substantial form; the powers are accidental forms
  • Yet powers are natural accidental forms that flow from the substantial form
  • The substantial form is the remote principle of action; the power is the proximate principle

Remote vs. Proximate Principle #

  • Remote principle: The first source from which something flows (e.g., the soul as the source of understanding)
  • Proximate principle: The immediate source through which an action is performed (e.g., reason, the power of understanding)
  • We understand by our soul (remote) and by our reason (proximate)
  • This distinction resolves the apparent contradiction between Aristotle (soul is that by which we understand) and Thomas (powers are distinct from essence)

Examples & Illustrations #

The Teaching of Geometry #

  • When I teach you geometry, I teach:
    • Remotely: By my reason (my rational soul)
    • Proximately: By the knowledge of geometry that I have in my reason
  • The one closer at hand is the knowledge of geometry I possess
  • Yet also truly said: I teach by my reason
  • Both are true; one is more immediate than the other
  • Application: Similarly, we understand by our soul (remotely) and by our ability to understand (proximately)

Shakespeare on Choice (Hamlet, Act 5, Scene 2) #

  • “Since my dear soul was Mr. Suffer’s choice,” Hamlet says when choosing Horatius as a friend
  • Shakespeare is precise: the will is not in the body, so it is by the soul we make choices
  • Yet also by the will (the proximate power) that we choose
  • “Her election has sealed thee for herself” — the soul’s will as the proximate source

The Triangle and Its Properties #

  • Triangle is green: Accidental; no connection to being a three-sided plane figure; known only by sensation
  • Triangle has interior angles equal to two right angles: A property; outside the definition but provable from the nature; demonstrable through Euclidean geometry
    • Proof: Extend one side, draw parallel to opposite side, use parallel postulate and alternate angles to show the three angles sum to two right angles

The Number Two and the Relation “Half of Four” #

  • Two is in the category of quantity (discrete quantity/number)
  • Half of four is in the category of relation (towards something)
  • Yet “two is half of four” is true because of what two is (one plus one)
  • If asked “Is two because it’s half of four, or is it half of four because it is two?” — clearly the latter
  • This shows that a property can be in a different category from the thing yet caused from its nature
  • Two would equally be “a third of six,” “a fourth of eight,” etc. — these relations follow upon what two is

Complexity in the Natural World #

  • Old radios: Filled a whole room, barely audible, needed constant maintenance
  • Modern radios: Tiny, crystal clear, no maintenance — simpler yet better
  • Old wind-up watches: Complicated mechanism, needs regular oiling and cleaning, still loses time
  • Timex watches: Simple mechanism, keeps better time, costs $15-$20
  • Plants vs. Animals: Plants are simpler but cannot do what animals do; animals are more complex but achieve greater perfection
  • The cat in the house: Sleeps, eats from a can, needs no preparation — simple life with few needs
  • Human life: Requires toasters, frying pans, tea kettles, and countless other tools — complex to achieve a higher kind of perfection

Aristotle’s Three Levels (from De Caelo) #

  • Lowest: The sick person poorly disposed toward health — cannot achieve perfect health even with few remedies; gets some imperfect health with few aids
  • Middle: The better-disposed person — can achieve perfect health but needs many remedies and medicines
  • Highest: The well-disposed person — achieves perfect health with few or no remedies; or like someone naturally of perfect health

Human Soul on the Horizon #

  • In common with angels: Understanding and will
  • In common with animals: Sensation and emotion
  • In common with plants: Nutrition and reproduction
  • Therefore the human soul has many diverse powers drawn from both the spiritual and bodily worlds

Notable Quotes #

“The soul is that by which we first sense and understand.” — Aristotle (De Anima) (Thomas adds: “First” = remote principle; but not whereby we immediately sense and understand, which is by the powers/abilities)

“Nature loves to hide.” — Heraclitus (Cited by Berquist on why essential natures are hidden from us and known through their accidents)

“Belief, seeking understanding.” — St. Anselm (Cited as the definition of theology; implicit in Augustine’s definition of faith as “assenting while thinking about it”)

“To assent firmly while thinking about it.” — St. Augustine (on faith) (Contrasted with assenting without thinking—obvious truths—or assenting after thinking—scientific conclusions)

Questions Addressed #

How can powers be accidents if they transcend their subject (Augustine’s objection)? #

  • Augustine is comparing knowledge and love to the soul as known and loved object, not as subject
  • In relation to the subject (the soul), knowledge and love are accidents contained in it
  • But the objects of knowledge and love extend beyond the soul (to God, neighbors, etc.)
  • Therefore the accident does not have the limitation of its subject in terms of what it apprehends, though it is still in the soul

If the soul’s essence is unknown, how can we distinguish it into powers? #

  • Powers are known through their acts and objects (which are closer to sense)
  • We name the essence (substantial form) indirectly through its natural properties/powers
  • Example: “Understanding soul” names the substantial difference through the ultimate power that follows upon it

Why must the human soul have many powers when God has only one? #

  • God achieves absolute perfection with absolute simplicity (one essence = one power)
  • Angels achieve great perfection with relative simplicity (fewer thoughts than men)
  • Humans achieve universal and perfect goodness but only through many and diverse means
  • This is appropriate to man’s position as the lowest grade of intellectual creatures
  • Humans also bridge the material and spiritual worlds, requiring powers from both orders