114. Higher and Lower Reason: Unity of Power and Distinction of Acts

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Unity of Reason: Augustine’s distinction between higher and lower reason does not imply two separate powers but rather two different offices or operations of the same rational power
• Acts versus Powers: The critical distinction between naming something according to its acts versus naming it according to its powers; Augustine uses “part” to mean different acts, not different powers
• Eternal versus Temporal Objects: Higher reason contemplates eternal and divine things; lower reason applies eternal principles to temporal affairs
• Equivocation by Reason: How names become equivocally applied when one thing has a perfection that another lacks, with two primary ways this occurs

Key Arguments #

Against Distinguishing Higher and Lower Reason as Separate Powers #

• Augustine’s Own Testimony: Augustine explicitly states in the 12th book of De Trinitate that higher and lower reason are distinguished only by their offices (acts), not by being different powers
• The Motion-Rest Analogy: Just as the same mobile thing moves through a middle term to arrive at an end, so the same power of reason moves from one thing to another. It is the same power both when it knows premises and when it arrives at conclusions
• Mediation of Temporal and Eternal: Temporal and eternal things are related as means to end—through temporal things we arrive at knowledge of eternal things (via discovery); through eternal things we judge temporal things (via judgment). This mutual mediation suggests they belong to the same power
• Habit Distinction, Not Power Distinction: Higher reason is perfected by the habit of sapientia (wisdom); lower reason by the habit of scientia (science). These are diverse habits of one power, not diverse powers

The Aristotelian Distinction #

• Aristotle distinguishes the part of the soul that knows necessary things from the part that has opinions and reasons about contingent things
• These differ because the necessary and contingent are other in genus, but both fall under the common object of reason: being and truth
• The distinction is one of perfect versus imperfect modes of knowing, not different powers

Important Definitions #

Higher Reason (ratio superior) #

• The aspect of reason that contemplates eternal things for their own sake (speculatim)
• Also consults eternal things to derive rules of action for temporal matters (consulentes)
• Perfected by the habit of wisdom (sapientia)
• Aims at the divine and eternal

Lower Reason (ratio inferior) #

• The aspect of reason that applies itself to temporal things
• Receives principles from higher reason and applies them to particular circumstances
• Perfected by the habit of science (scientia) in the broad sense of reasoned knowledge
• Concerned with disposing and ordering temporal affairs

Equivocation by Reason (aequivocatio a ratione) #

• When a common name is kept by one thing as its own proper name while another thing receives a new name
• Occurs when one of two things has a perfection that the other lacks
• Two primary forms:
  1. Excellence-based: One thing possesses the fullness of what the name means; the other has it imperfectly (e.g., sapientia versus scientia; intellectus versus ratio)
  2. Addition-based: One thing has something noteworthy added to the common meaning (e.g., verb adds temporal signification to the common meaning of nomen; woman may derive from additions to man)

Sapientia (Wisdom) versus Scientia (Science/Knowledge) #

• Sapientia: Knowledge of the highest causes, divine things, eternal truths; the most excellent form of knowledge
• Scientia: Knowledge of causes in general; understanding reached through reasoning and demonstration
• Sometimes these are distinguished as separate; sometimes wisdom is called a form of science because it is the most excellent science
• This apparent contradiction is resolved through equivocation by reason—the same word used in different senses

Necessary versus Contingent #

• Necessary: What is not able not to be; what must be (e.g., two is half of four; geometric truths)
• Contingent: What is able to be and not to be; what may or may not occur (e.g., a person standing or sitting; temporal affairs)

Examples & Illustrations #

The Eye’s Dual Use #

• One can use the eyes to drive a car (practical, lower function) or to contemplate a beautiful sunset or painting (contemplative, higher function)
• These are not two different eyes but two different uses of the same power
• Similarly, one power of reason can be directed toward temporal things or eternal things

Divine Beauty and Contemplation #

• Augustine begins his Confessions with “Too late have I come to know thee, thou ancient beauty”
• Higher reason contemplates the beauty of God not to derive action but for the sake of contemplation itself, as will happen in heaven

Natural Knowledge of God #

• Romans 1:20 teaches that “the invisible things of God through the things which have been made…are looked upon”
• Temporal, material things are the means by which we arrive at some knowledge of eternal things
• The first argument for God’s existence begins from motion (a temporal thing) and reasons to the unmoved mover (eternal)

Letter versus Spoken Words #

• When someone speaks “I don’t want to see you anymore” in anger, the words are more easily retracted
• When the same person writes a letter saying this, the act is more permanent because there was time to deliberate and decide
• Writing the letter involves the will and intellect more directly than passionate speech, making it more the person’s true act

Premeditated versus Passionate Murder #

• A jury considers premeditated murder more severe than a crime of passion
• The premeditated murderer had time to think, making the act more truly an expression of the will
• This shows that deliberation and rational choice constitute the more authentic self than mere emotion

Joe in the Bar #

• When Joe’s anger is in control, Joe is not in control of himself
• When Joe’s reason gets into control, then Joe is truly in control of himself
• This illustrates that reason and will constitute the true self more than emotions do

Noun versus Verb #

• The noun “action” signifies without time (it is not past, present, or future)
• The verb “acts” or “acted” signifies with time (present, past, or future)
• The verb adds temporal signification to the common meaning of name (nomen), receiving its own distinct name

Cat versus Kitten #

• The cat (adult) has the fullness of what it means to be a cat
• The kitten is an immature, not fully developed cat
• The kitten gets a new name while “cat” is kept as the proper name for the adult

Man versus Woman #

• “Man” in the broad sense includes woman; in this sense woman is a man
• “Man” in the narrow sense excludes woman; in this sense woman is not a man
• The word “man” becomes equivocal by reason, with one sense as its own proper name and another sense giving rise to a new name

Reason versus Understanding (Intellectus) #

• Man has his ability to understand (intellectus) in a very weak and imperfect way
• Shakespeare defines reason (ratio) as “his ability for large discourse, looking before and after”
• Angels understand everything immediately without needing to reason or study
• Because man’s understanding is defective, he receives the new name ratio (reason, discursive thinking) while intellectus is kept as the common term

Questions Addressed #

Q: Are higher and lower reason two different powers? #

A: No. Augustine himself explicitly states they are distinguished only by their offices (acts), not by being different powers. They are one power of reason that can direct itself toward eternal things or temporal things, just as one mobile thing can move through a middle term to reach an end.

Q: How can one power know both eternal and temporal things? #

A: Eternal and temporal things are related as means to end. Through temporal things we come to knowledge of eternal things; through eternal things we judge and order temporal things. This mutual mediation, together with the fact that one power of reason can know premises and conclusions, shows these should belong to one power.

Q: Is Aristotle contradicting himself when he distinguishes wisdom from science and then calls wisdom a science? #

A: No. This is equivocation by reason. Wisdom is the most excellent form of science, having a peculiar excellence in that it is knowledge of the very first cause (God). So wisdom gets its own name while other sciences keep the common name scientia. Both statements—“wisdom is science” and “wisdom differs from science”—are true in different senses.

Q: What is the relationship between parts in Augustine and powers in Aristotle? #

A: Augustine uses “part” in the sense of different acts and functions within the same power, not different powers themselves. Aristotle uses “part” for different powers of the soul. The distinction they make is the same: higher reason contemplates eternal things; lower reason applies principles to temporal things. But this is one power acting in two different ways, not two powers.

Notable Quotes #

“Augustine is saying that higher reason looks towards the divine, the eternal things, right? Probably just to look upon them because they’re beautiful and want to contemplate them, but also in order to draw from them rules for action down here, right?”

“Augustine means what Thomas Aquinas says he means.” (Berquist’s rule of thumb for interpreting authorities)

“When his anger is in control, then Joe is not in control of himself, right? When his reason gets into control, you know, then Joe’s…” (illustrating that reason constitutes the true self)

“The invisible things of God through the things which have been made…are looked upon.” (Romans 1:20, on the mediation between temporal and eternal knowledge)