115. Higher and Lower Reason: Unity of Powers Through Diverse Acts

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Higher and Lower Reason #

• Augustine distinguishes higher reason (contemplating eternal things) from lower reason (dealing with temporal things)
• The central question: Are these different powers or different acts of the same power?
• Thomas argues they are the same power distinguished by diverse acts and habits, NOT by being different powers
• The distinction follows from diverse objects and offices, not from diverse powers

Equivocation by Reason (Univocal to Equivocal) #

• When a term is applied to two things where one possesses a perfection the other lacks, the term becomes equivocal by reason
• Example: Sophia (wisdom) and episteme (science) - Aristotle sometimes distinguishes them, sometimes identifies wisdom as a type of science
  • Wisdom is distinguished because it has excellence as knowledge of the first cause
  • Yet wisdom is also a kind of episteme
  • The higher (wisdom) keeps its own name; the lower keeps the common name (science)
• Analogy: In a nursery, trees are not called “plants” even though trees are technically plants. The term gets reserved for smaller things.

The Three Objections and Responses #

First Objection: Augustine says the Trinity’s image is in the higher reason. If only higher reason has this image, they must be different parts/powers.

• Response: “Part” (pars) has many meanings. When reason is divided by diverse acts and offices, it is called “parts” or “partitions” (partes), but not because they are diverse powers (potentiae diversae).

Second Objection: Lower reason arises from and is ruled by higher reason; therefore they must be different powers.

• Response: Lower reason uses principles deduced from and directed by higher reason, but this occurs even within a single power
• Example: Arithmetic provides principles to music; geometry provides principles to astronomy (specifically mentioned)
• Medical example: A blade wound heals faster than a round wound because the blade creates an angle where parts can come together. This goes back to geometry—the higher science provides principles to the lower science.

Third Objection: Aristotle distinguishes between scientifico (knowledge of necessary things) and knowledge of contingent things. Augustine distinguishes between higher and lower reason. Are these the same distinction?

• Response: No, they are different distinctions
• Scientifico concerns knowledge of what is necessary, and necessary things are found even in temporal matters (e.g., “change is between opposites” is necessarily true; “man is always an animal”)
• Natural science and mathematics both deal with material things but differ: natural science requires definition by sensible matter (flesh, blood, bones); mathematics defines things without sensible matter (the geometrical sphere is neither hard nor soft, hot nor cold)
• Augustine’s higher reason concerns divine and eternal things specifically
• Aristotle’s opinativum and ratio sinativum concern knowledge of contingent things
• Key principle: Perfect and imperfect do not diversify a power in act, but they diversify the acts themselves and their mode of acting (modus operandi)

Necessary vs. Contingent Knowledge #

• Necessary things: Known perfectly and completely. They have perfect being and truth. Reason knows these by demonstrative understanding
  • Example: The angles of a triangle necessarily equal two right angles
  • Example: Intersecting straight lines have opposite angles that are necessarily equal
• Contingent things: Known imperfectly. They have imperfect being and truth
  • Example: “Berkowitz is sitting” is sometimes true, sometimes false
  • Cannot be known with complete certitude except through present sensation
• Both fall under reason’s common object: Being and truth (ens and verum)
• The soul is perfected more by knowing necessary things than contingent things, which indicates the soul’s immortal nature (the soul is akin to the eternal and necessary)

The Fourth Objection: Acts of Understanding #

• John of Damascus distinguishes multiple acts: intelligentsia, intention, excogitatio, judgment, interior speech
• Berquist’s response based on Thomas: All these are acts of ONE power, not diverse powers
• They are distinguished according to diverse acts that cannot be reduced to the same principle
• Acts are prior to powers; we know powers through their acts

Intelligentsia vs. Intellectus #

• Intelligentsia (ἐνέργεια): Names the act of understanding itself; the first simple grasp of something
• Intellectus (δύναμις): Names the power or ability to understand
• Distinguished as act from power, not as two different powers
• In separated substances (angels), intelligentsia and intellectus are identified because angels always understand in act
• For humans, there is distinction because we possess the power but do not always exercise it

Key Arguments #

The Higher Science Provides Principles to the Lower #

• This demonstrates that one can rule and direct another without being a different power
• The principle works both within a single science and across sciences
• Medical example: Why a blade wound heals faster than a round wound comes back to geometry. The blade creates an angle where parts can come together; the round hole cannot close as easily.

Contingent Things Show Imperfect Knowledge #

• Political alliances exemplify contingency: “England has no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests”
• France was ally in Revolutionary War, enemy in Napoleonic Wars, ally in WWII, opponent in Iraq War
• Germany: enemy in WWI and WWII, later more friendly
• These shift because contingent things can be otherwise; there is no necessary reason they must remain allies
• Contrast: The intersection of straight lines MUST have equal opposite angles; this cannot change

Reason is Perfected by Knowing the Necessary #

• The soul is perfected by what is akin to its nature
• Since the soul is perfected by knowing necessary and eternal things, this suggests the soul itself is immortal and akin to eternity
• Principle: “Perfection and the perfectible are relative to each other”

Important Definitions #

Higher Reason (ratio superior): Reason applied to eternal and divine things; contemplates eternal things for their own sake and consults them to draw rules for action.

Lower Reason (ratio inferior): Reason applied to temporal things; concerned with disposing and deliberating about contingent matters requiring prudence and art.

Necessary (necessarium): That which cannot be otherwise; that which must be. Known perfectly and completely by reason. Example: mathematical and eternal truths.

Contingent (contingens): That which can be and can not-be; that which sometimes is and sometimes is not. Known imperfectly by reason. Example: temporal, changing facts.

Equivocation by Reason (aequivocatio secundum rationem): When a term is applied to two things where one possesses a perfection the other lacks, the term becomes equivocal by reason. The name remains common, but the definitions differ according to perfect and imperfect.

Intelligentsia (ἐνέργεια): The act of simple understanding; the first grasp of an intelligible object.

Intellectus (δύναμις): The power or ability of understanding; contrasted with intelligentsia as power to act.

Scientifico (ἐπιστήμη, episteme): Knowledge of what is necessary, arrived at through demonstration. From Greek word meaning “to halt” or “come to a stop”—the mind comes to rest after successful reasoning.

Sophia (σοφία, wisdom): Knowledge of the first cause; distinguished from episteme by having excellence as knowledge of divine things, yet also a kind of episteme.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Blade vs. Round Wound: A blade wound heals faster than a round wound because the blade creates an angle (from geometry) where the parts can come together more easily. The round hole cannot close as easily. This medical fact goes back to geometric principles, showing how a higher science (geometry) provides principles to a lower science (medicine).

Tree-Cutting Example: Berquist cut down a tree in his yard. The neighbor asked if he knew which way it would fall. Berquist knew it would fall toward the neighbor’s house because he cut more on that side. This illustrates contingency: the tree could have been cut differently; there was no necessary way it had to fall.

Political Alliances:

• France: ally in Revolutionary War → enemy in Napoleonic Wars → ally in WWII → opponent in Iraq War
• Germany: enemy in WWI and WWII → later friend → now somewhat unfriendly but still friend
• These shifts show contingency: there is no necessary link determining who remains allies
• Contrasts with the necessary truth that opposite angles of intersecting lines are always equal

Kennedy and LBJ: Two political rivals for nomination (enemies) became allies when Kennedy needed LBJ to carry the South on his ticket. This shows how contingent alliances depend on circumstances and interests, not necessity.

The Contradictory Statements:

• “Berkowitz is standing” vs. “Berkowitz is not standing”
• Same subject, same predicate, one affirmative, one negative
• One must be true, one must be false, but logic alone does not tell us which without sensation or understanding the terms
• With universal subjects: “Every man is standing” contradicts “Some man is not standing”
• “No man is standing” contradicts “Some man is standing”

The Triangle Example: By understanding what a triangle is and using previous theorems, one can demonstrate that the interior angles must equal two right angles. This is necessary knowledge. One can draw a line through the vertex parallel to the base, and by the parallel postulate, the alternate angles are equal, so the third angle makes up two right angles with the other two.

Notable Quotes #

“When you read the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle is distinguishing the virtues of reason…he’ll distinguish between Epistame and Sophia. Two different things, right? And yet, in another book where he’s talking about Sophia…He’ll say that Sophia is the Epistame…Is he contradicting himself? No.”

“Perfect and imperfect do not diversify a power in act, but they diversify the acts as far as the way of…mode of acting.”

“Contingent things…although they differ according to their own genera, they come together in a common notion of being, which the understanding regards.”

“The fact that the reason is perfected by a knowledge of necessary shows that it’s akin to the necessary. Because the perfection of the thing and the perfectible are relative to each other.”

“England has no permanent friends or enemies. We might have permanent interests, he says, but no permanent friends.”

“These things are always changing, right? Who’s your friend and who’s your enemy? Who’s in competition? But that’s the nature of the contingent.”

Questions Addressed #

Q: Are higher and lower reason different powers? A: No. They are the same power of reason distinguished by their acts and objects (eternal vs. temporal things), not by being different powers. The division is according to diverse offices and acts, not diverse powers.

Q: How can a higher science rule and direct a lower one if they are the same power? A: Even within a single power, principles can flow from one to another. Arithmetic provides principles to music; geometry provides principles to astronomy. Similarly, within one power of reason, higher principles guide lower application. This proves that direction from higher to lower does not require different powers.

Q: Do necessary and contingent knowledge require different powers? A: No. Both fall under the common object of reason: being and truth. Reason knows necessary things perfectly; contingent things imperfectly. The difference is in the mode of knowing (perfect vs. imperfect), not in different powers.

Q: What is the distinction between intelligentsia and intellectus? A: Intelligentsia names the act of understanding (the actual grasp), while intellectus names the power or ability. They are distinguished as act from power, not as two different powers. In angels (separated substances), they are identical because angels always understand in act.

Q: How do the acts enumerated by Damascene (intelligentsia, intention, excogitatio, judgment) relate to powers? A: All are acts of the single power of understanding. They are distinguished according to diverse operations but do not constitute diverse powers.