116. Intelligentsia, Understanding, and the Acts of Reason

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Intelligentsia vs. Intellectus #

• The term intelligentsia (Latin) is often confused with intellectus (understanding/intellect) as though they were two distinct powers
• Thomas Aquinas argues they are NOT distinct powers, but rather an act (intelligentsia) and its corresponding power (intellectus)
• The confusion arises from translation difficulties and historical misattribution of texts

Classification of Understanding and Its Acts #

Damascene enumerates several acts of understanding that proceed from a single power:

1. Intelligentsia: the first simple grasping of something
2. Intention: ordering what is grasped toward knowing something else or operating on it
3. Excogitatio (thinking out): persisting in investigation of what is intended
4. Phronesis (wisdom/practical wisdom): examining in light of certain principles with certitude and judgment
5. Interior speech: disposing thought internally before it becomes exterior speech

All these are acts of the same power, not diverse powers, because they can be reduced to understanding as their common principle.

Acts vs. Powers #

• Acts are prior to powers: We know powers only through their acts
• Example: We know the ability to see only through the act of seeing
• Because intelligentsia is a distinct act (separable from other acts of understanding), it appears to be a distinct power—but this is a mistake
• Acts that cannot be reduced to the same principle diversify powers; these acts CAN be so reduced

The Role of End (Purpose) in Distinguishing Acts #

• The various acts of understanding differ according to their end or purpose
• First act (intelligentsia): grasps the simple essence of a thing
• Subsequent acts: order that grasped knowledge toward further knowledge or action
• All proceed from the same understanding ordered to different purposes within the act of knowing

Translation and Linguistic Problems #

• Greek/Latin: The same word (onoma/nomin) served for both “name” and “noun,” while English has two words
• Intelligentsia appears in Arabic translations: In works translated from Arabic (particularly Avicennian texts and the Liber de Causis), separated substances (angels) are called intelligentsia because they are always actually understanding
• Greek translations use different terminology: In works translated from Greek, these substances are called “understandings” (intellectus) or “minds”
• Latin can have two words, English often has only one: This creates problems when rendering intelligentsia into English, where “understanding” must do double duty for both the act and the power

Key Arguments #

Thomas’s Solution to the Problem #

The Term Intelligentsia Properly Signifies the Act Itself

• Intelligentsia = the act of understanding (intelligere)
• Just as imagination is named from the act of forming images, intelligentsia is named from the act of understanding
• The word appears to denote a power only because languages sometimes use action-words to name powers metonymically

Why Angels Are Called Intelligentsia

• Separated substances are called intelligentsia not because they have a special power different from intellect
• Rather, they are named from their characteristic act: they are always actually understanding (semper in actu intelligunt)
• In contrast, human intellect has the power to understand but is not always in act
• Therefore, intelligentsia distinguishes act from power, not power from power

Philosophical Acts Distinguished According to States of Possible Understanding

• Possible understanding (intellectus possibilis): the passive intellect that receives intelligible forms
• This power has three states:
  • Ability only (potentia tantum): before receiving any intelligible forms—called potential understanding
  • First act (actus primus): after receiving intelligible forms but not actively considering them—called understanding in habit (habitus)
  • Second act (actus secundus): actively exercising the understanding of what has been learned—called intellect in act or adeptus intellectus

Distinctions Among the Five Acts Named by Damascene #

Intelligentsia (first simple grasping):

• The initial apprehension of an intelligible form
• Occurs when the mind first grasps what something is
• This is the fundamental act from which others proceed

Intention (ordering to further knowledge):

• Taking what has been grasped and directing it toward understanding something else
• Or directing it toward some operation
• The act of the mind “intending” or aiming at further knowledge

Excogitatio (thinking out):

• Persisting in examination and investigation
• The mind working through the implications of what it intends to understand
• Involves sustained mental effort and deliberation

Phronesis (wisdom/judgment):

• Examining what has been thought out in light of certain principles
• Arriving at judgment and certitude about the matter
• The mind “fixing itself” on truth known with certainty

Interior Speech (disposing for exterior speech):

• The final ordering of understanding into a form that can be communicated
• Preparing the interior intellectual act to become exterior spoken discourse
• The bridge between internal understanding and external communication

Why These Are Not Diverse Powers #

Common Principle: All these acts proceed from and return to understanding as their single principle

• Understanding is the power that initiates, sustains, and completes all these operations
• Their diversity is a diversity of acts, not powers
• Just as the eye performs diverse acts (seeing color, perceiving motion, focusing distance) without becoming two powers

Reducibility: Acts that can be reduced to a common principle do not diversify the power

• All five acts can be understood as modifications or progressions of the single act of grasping intelligible forms
• They differ in what they accomplish, not in their fundamental source

Important Definitions #

Intelligentsia (Latin: intelligentia) #

• Properly and primarily: the act itself of understanding (actus ipsius intelligendi)
• The simple, direct apprehension of an intelligible form by the mind
• In some Arab philosophical texts: used to name separated substances (angels) who are always actually understanding
• Should be distinguished from intellectus (the power/faculty of understanding)

Intellectus (Latin: intellectus) #

• The power or faculty of understanding
• The passive intellect that receives and operates on intelligible forms
• The agent by which all the acts named by Damascene are performed
• Can refer to intellect in three states: potential, habitual, and actual

Intentio (Latin: intentio) #

• The act of the mind directing or aiming at something for the sake of further knowledge or action
• The ordering of what has been grasped toward a purpose beyond the initial grasping
• Not to be confused with modern psychological usage; it is a deliberate ordering of the intellect

Excogitatio (Latin: excogitatio) #

• Thinking out or thinking through something
• The sustained mental investigation and examination of a matter
• Involves working through implications and connections
• Literally: ex (out) + cogitatio (thinking) = thinking something out to its conclusion

Phronesis (Greek: φρόνησις) #

• Practical wisdom or practical prudence in some contexts
• In this context (from Damascene): wisdom or the act of judging with certitude
• The intellect’s act of examining something in light of first principles and arriving at certain judgment
• Can mean both practical wisdom (prudence in action) and speculative wisdom (judgment about truth)

Sophia (Greek: σοφία) #

• Wisdom (supreme intellectual virtue)
• Sometimes distinguished from phronesis as higher or more speculative
• The speaker notes that in Greek they have two words; in Latin sometimes they use the same word for both practical and speculative wisdom

Examples & Illustrations #

The Problem of Translation #

English vs. Latin: English uses “understanding” to mean both:

1. The act of understanding (“I have an understanding of geometry”)
2. The power/faculty of understanding (“Understanding is the intellect’s power”)

Latin can make this distinction with intelligentsia (act) and intellectus (power), but English cannot without circumlocution.

Translation of Aristotle: The same Greek text about intelligentsia (νόησις, noesis) appears in translations:

• From Arabic: may be called intelligentsia (named from the act)
• From Greek: may be called intellectus or “mind” (named from the power)

The Acts in Progression #

Berquist traces Damascene’s enumeration:

1. I see a triangle (intelligentsia: simple grasping)
2. I direct my mind to finding its properties (intention)
3. I work through the geometric relationships (excogitatio)
4. I arrive at certainty: “The angles equal 180 degrees” (phronesis)
5. I prepare to explain this to someone else (interior speech leading to exterior speech)

Angels and Always-Actual Understanding #

• Angels are called intelligentsia in some Arabic philosophical texts
• Reason: They are always actually understanding (semper in actu)
• Unlike humans whose intellect passes from potential to actual
• Named from the act (intelligentsia) because the act is their permanent state

Habit vs. Act in the Possible Intellect #

First Act (Habitus):

• A student learns geometry and can state its theorems
• The understanding is in first act: the forms are habitually possessed
• The student “has” the knowledge but is not actively thinking

Second Act (Adeptus):

• The same student actively works through a geometric proof
• Now the understanding is in second act: actively exercising what it habitually possesses
• The knowledge is now in operation

Notable Quotes #

“It is said in the book about the spirit and the soul that when we wish to ascend from lower things to higher things, what first occurs to us is sensing, then imagination, then reason, then understanding and last of all intelligentsia.” — De Spiritu et Anima (cited by Berquist as problematic text sometimes attributed to Augustine)

“The first act of reason is understanding of what something is… intelligentsia as of indivisibles in which there is not a false.” — Aristotle, De Anima Book III (cited by Berquist to show Aristotle uses intelligentsia for an act of reason)

“Therefore that is wisdom… phronesis however spread out makes cogitation, that is interiorly disposed speech from which comes about speech through what spoken language.” — Damascene (as cited by Berquist on the acts proceeding from understanding)

“Intelligentsia properly signifies right the very act itself of the understanding, which is to understand.” — Thomas Aquinas (Berquist’s interpretation of Thomas’s solution)

“In some books translated from the arabic, the separated substances, which we call angels, they are called intelligentsia… perhaps on account of this fact that these substances always understand in what in act.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited on why angels receive this name in Arabic translations)

Questions Addressed #

Is Intelligentsia a Distinct Power from Intellectus? #

Answer: No. Thomas Aquinas argues that intelligentsia is not a diverse power but rather the act of the intellect (intellectus) itself. The confusion arises from:

• Languages making different explicit distinctions
• Historical misattribution of texts
• The tendency to name powers metonymically from their acts

Why Do Different Translations Use Different Terminology? #

Answer:

• Arabic translations: Use intelligentsia (from the act, emphasizing always-actual understanding)
• Greek translations: Use intellectus or “mind” (from the power, emphasizing the faculty)
• Both refer to the same reality (separated substances/angels) but emphasize different aspects

How Can All These Different Acts (Intelligentsia, Intention, Excogitatio, etc.) Come from One Power? #

Answer: Through reduction to a common principle. Just as:

• The eye performs many diverse acts (seeing colors, judging distance, perceiving motion) from one power
• The ear performs diverse acts (hearing music, hearing warnings, discerning pitch) from one power
• So understanding performs diverse acts from one power (intellect)

The acts differ in their purpose or what they accomplish, not in their source.

What Is the Relationship Between Acts and Powers? #

Answer:

• Acts are prior to powers in knowledge: We know what a power is only through knowing its act
• Powers are prior to acts in being: The power must exist before it can perform its act
• Example: We know we have the power to see because we see; but the power to see must exist before any seeing occurs

How Should We Understand the Three States of the Possible Intellect? #

Answer:

1. Potential (mere ability): The intellect before receiving any intelligible forms—like a blank tablet
2. Habitual (first act): The intellect possessing intelligible forms but not actively considering them—like knowing facts you’re not thinking about
3. Actual (second act): The intellect actively exercising understanding—like actively thinking through a problem

All three are states of the same power, not distinct powers.

Is There a Problem in English for This Discussion? #

Answer: Yes. English uses “understanding” for both the act and the power, making translation of texts that distinguish intelligentsia and intellectus difficult. The speaker notes that this is “almost impossible to translate into English because they don’t have the same problem in English that you have in the greek words.”

Connections and Further Context #

Disputed Texts #

• The De Spiritu et Anima was historically attributed to Augustine but is now recognized as non-Augustinian
• It is “apocryphally attached” to Augustine’s works
• Despite disputed authorship, scholars and theologians continue to quote it, and the text keeps “cropping up”
• Thomas Aquinas applies careful principles about accepting or rejecting the authority of such texts

The Active Intellect (intellectus agens) #

• Mentioned in the context of the distinction between active and passive intellect
• The agent intellect abstracts intelligible forms from sensible particulars
• The possible intellect receives these abstracted forms
• Both are powers of the same soul, not distinct powers
• This follows Aristotelian philosophy as mediated through Arabic and medieval interpretations