117. The Speculative and Practical Intellect

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Lecture Notes

Opening: Pride and Humility #

Berquist begins by correcting a rumor about his credentials and uses this as an entry point to discuss pride—specifically, claiming an excellence one does not possess. He identifies four species of pride following Gregory the Great:

1. Claiming false excellence: Asserting knowledge or skill one does not have (e.g., claiming a Ph.D. in physics when one has only read popular physics books)
2. Attributing excellence to oneself rather than to sources: Having genuine excellence (e.g., knowledge of philosophy) but claiming it as one’s own discovery rather than acknowledging it comes from Thomas and Aristotle
3. Claiming to merit divine grace: Two sub-species:
   • Thinking one deserves the grace God gives (e.g., deserving baptism or the Eucharist by one’s own merits)
   • Thinking one’s good works entitle one to further grace
4. Wanting to be above everyone else: Desiring unique excellence or being the only one who knows something

Humility is opposed to all these forms of pride. It involves:

• Recognizing one’s dependence on God’s help
• Not attributing one’s goods to oneself but to divine grace
• Understanding that grace is given from divine mercy alone (Thomas’s prayer: “Nullis meis meritis… sola dignatione misericordiae tuae”—“By no merits of my own… only by your divine mercy”)
• Acknowledging that even when one uses grace well and appears to “merit” more grace, one does not have a strict right to it; it remains a gift of mercy

Berquist illustrates this with the parable of the talents and the example of Saint Teresa of Avila surpassing older nuns in spiritual development despite less time in religious life.

Main Topics #

The Distinction Between Speculative and Practical Intellect #

Speculative intellect (Latin speculari, “to look at”; Greek theoretike, theoretical):

• Ordered toward knowing truth for its own sake
• Its end is truth itself
• Does not order what it grasps to making or doing something
• Concerned with necessary truths

Practical intellect (Latin practicus, “doing”; Greek praktike, operativus):

• Ordered toward action and doing
• Its end is doing, not truth itself
• Orders what it grasps to making or doing something
• Concerned with contingent truths (truths about particular circumstances)

Key Claim: These are NOT two diverse powers but rather the same intellectual power ordered toward different ends.

The Problem of Contingent vs. Necessary Truth #

The practical intellect deals with contingent truths—truths that are sometimes true and sometimes false:

• “I am sick today” (true today, false tomorrow)
• “France is our ally” (true during American Revolution, false during Iraq War debates)
• Political and practical judgments depend on particular, changing circumstances

The speculative intellect deals with necessary truths that cannot be otherwise:

• Geometric theorems
• Mathematical principles
• Eternal truths

Key Arguments #

Thomas’s Main Position #

Thomas argues that the speculative and practical intellects are not diverse powers because:

What is accidental to the definition of an object does not diversify the power grasping it. Example: The eye grasps colored things whether they are men, large, or small—these accidents do not create diverse powers of sight.

Similarly, whether something grasped by the intellect is ordered to action is accidental to the thing itself. Therefore:

• The same intellectual power grasps truths ordered to action (practical)
• And truths not ordered to action (speculative)
• The difference lies in the end to which the power is ordered, not in the power itself

Against Objection 1: The Mover vs. Grasping Power #

Objection: In the second book of De Anima, the moving power is a distinct genus from the grasping powers. The practical intellect moves things (directs action); the speculative only grasps. Therefore they must be diverse powers.

Response: The practical intellect is a mover not by carrying out the motion (that belongs to the bodily motive power) but by directing motion. Like a commander directing soldiers:

• The commander knows what to do but doesn’t carry out the work
• The soldiers carry out the motion but are directed by the commander
• Similarly, reason directs the body’s actions while remaining itself a grasping power

If someone becomes paralyzed, the motive power is defective, but practical reason can still be active (it can direct others to carry out what it conceives).

Against Objection 2: True vs. Good as Objects #

Objection: The object of speculative intellect is true; the object of practical intellect is good. Since true and good differ in definition, the powers must differ.

Response: True and good include each other:

• The true is a kind of good (truth is desirable)
• The good is something true (otherwise it would be incomprehensible)

The real distinction is between intellect (whose object is truth) and will (whose object is good), not between two intellects. Both speculative and practical intellects grasp truths—what differs is the ordering of these truths to action or contemplation.

Against Objection 3: The Analogy from Sensation #

Objection: Scaligero (in the Nicomachean Ethics commentary) compares the practical intellect to the speculative as the estimative power is to the imaginative power. Since these are diverse powers in sensation, the intellects must be diverse.

• Imaginative power: pictures something but doesn’t say “pursue” or “avoid”
• Estimative power: recognizes something to pursue or avoid

Response: This comparison may hold regarding function but not necessarily regarding power. Many differences diversify the sensing powers; the same should not apply to intellectual powers.

Caution about likeness: Berquist emphasizes that likeness is “slippery” (Plato, Sophist). One must carefully analyze exactly in what respect two things are similar. The proportion “two is to three” can match multiple descriptions (prime to prime, even to odd), but only one captures the true likeness. Similarly, speculative and practical intellect may be alike in certain respects without being diverse powers.

Important Definitions #

Speculative intellect: The intellect ordered toward knowing truth for its own sake; concerned with necessary truths and eternal principles that are the same always.

Practical intellect: The intellect ordered toward knowing contingent truths for the sake of guiding action; concerned with particular circumstances that change.

Contingent truth: A truth that is sometimes true and sometimes false; known imperfectly and only when actually present or considered.

Necessary truth: A truth that cannot be otherwise; demonstrated through deductive reasoning from necessarily true premises.

Humility (in the context opened): The virtue by which one recognizes dependence on God and divine mercy, not attributing one’s goods to oneself or claiming to merit what is given by grace.

Pride: The inordinate desire to be esteemed above what is true, manifesting in four species: false excellence, self-attribution, claiming merited grace, and desiring to be above all others.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Eye Analogy #

Berquist’s primary illustration for unity of power with diverse ends:

• Speculative use: Looking at a beautiful sunset, painting, mountains, or rainbow—seeing is itself the end
• Practical use: Driving a car, watching stop signs and other cars—seeing is ordered to the action of safe driving
• Conclusion: Same eye, same power, but different ends. Not two eyes for two purposes.

The Ear Analogy #

A parallel illustration:

• Speculative use: Listening to Mozart for its own sake—hearing is the end
• Practical use: Asking for directions at a gas station—hearing is ordered to reaching one’s destination
• Practical use: Hearing “Watch out!” to avoid an accident—hearing is ordered to safety
• Same ear serves both purposes

Contingent Truths in Politics and Medicine #

• “France is our ally” (true 1776, false 2003)
• “Germany is our enemy” (true 1917-1945, false now)
• “I need this medicine today” (true when sick, false when well)
• These concern practical judgment about singular, changing circumstances

Spiritual Development #

Saint Teresa of Avila advanced more rapidly in virtue than older nuns despite having been in religious life a shorter time. An older nun felt almost envious. This illustrates that:

• Good use of grace disposes one to receive more grace
• But this does not create a right to more grace—it remains gift
• Different people in the same circumstances may advance differently by God’s grace

The False Ink Trick #

Berquist describes a childhood prank: a fake pool of ink on white linen deceived people by likeness. Someone reaching to wipe it away realizes it’s fake. This illustrates Plato’s principle that likeness is deceptive—similarity can conceal difference, and one must be careful in analogical reasoning.

Notable Quotes #

“The looking understanding does not order to doing what it apprehends or grasps, but it is ordered only to the consideration of the truth. But the practical or doing understanding orders to doing what it grasps.” — Thomas Aquinas (as presented by Berquist)

“Nullis meis meritis… sola dignatione misericordiae tuae” (By no merits of my own… only by your divine mercy) — Thomas Aquinas, Prayer after Communion

“Likeness is a slippery thing.” — Plato, Sophist (cited by Berquist)

“There but for the grace of God go I.” — Traditional saying (Berquist discusses its possible attribution to various saints)

“If you use the grace that God has given you well, then to some extent you are deserving of receiving more grace… But strictly speaking, do you have a right to something more?” — Berquist’s paraphrase of Thomas’s position

Questions Addressed #

Are the speculative and practical intellects different powers? #

Question: If one merely grasps and the other directs action, must they be two different powers?

Resolution: No. The same power can be ordered toward different ends. What is accidental to the object (whether it is ordered to action) does not diversify the power. The eye and ear illustrate this: the same sensory power serves both contemplative and practical purposes.

How does practical reason move things if it is a grasping power? #

Question: The objection claims the moving power is a distinct genus from grasping powers, yet practical reason moves things. How is this possible?

Resolution: Practical reason is a mover by directing, not by carrying out. Like a commander directing soldiers, reason directs bodily action while remaining an intellectual (grasping) power. The actual carrying out of motion belongs to the bodily motive power.

If true and good are the objects of different powers, don’t the intellects differ? #

Question: Isn’t true the object of speculative intellect and good the object of practical intellect? Doesn’t this show they are diverse powers?

Resolution: True and good include each other; both intellects grasp truths. The distinction between true and good actually marks the difference between intellect and will, not between two intellects. What differs is how the intellect orders its truths—some to contemplation, some to action.

Why must one be careful with analogies and likenesses? #

Question: Doesn’t the comparison of practical to speculative intellect as estimative to imaginative power show they are diverse?

Resolution: Likeness is deceptive; one must determine exactly in what respect things are similar. The analogy may hold for function but not for power itself. Many things can differ in one respect without differing in the underlying power.

How should one understand “meriting” God’s grace? #

Question: If one uses grace well, does one not merit receiving more grace? Does one have a right to it?

Resolution: Even when one uses grace well, one does not strictly merit or have a right to more grace. It is appropriate that one receive more (one is disposed to receive it), but grace remains a gift of divine mercy, never a debt owed. This is the heart of humility in prayer.