Lecture 119

119. The Virtues of Reason: Speculative and Practical

Summary
This lecture explores the division of intellectual virtues into speculative (contemplative) and practical (doing) reason, grounded in their distinct ends: understanding truth versus directing action. Berquist explains how virtue perfects a power with respect to its end, and illustrates this principle through the five virtues of reason: natural understanding (intellectus), science (scientia), wisdom (sophia), prudence (phronesis), and art (technē). The lecture emphasizes that speculative and practical reason are not different powers but the same rational power ordered to different ends.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Connection Between End and Virtue #

  • Virtue defined: A disposition or quality that makes a thing and its own act good
  • Virtue perfects by end: A virtue perfects a thing with respect to its end or purpose
  • Example: A knife’s virtue is sharpness because cutting is its end; a cup’s virtue is the ability to hold liquid
  • The good is what all desire: First definition of good; connected to the concept of end (final cause)
  • End is that for the sake of which: The end is the final cause; all things aim at what they desire

The Two Ends of Reason #

  • Speculative (looking) reason: Ordered to understanding truth for its own sake; the end is understanding itself
  • Practical (doing) reason: Ordered to directing human action and making; the end is action or production
  • Not different powers: Both are acts of the same rational power, distinguished by their ends, not by their nature
  • Analogy of the eye: Just as the eye sees rainbows and sunsets (speculative) and also helps us navigate and drive (practical), reason has two uses

The Distinction Between Doing and Making #

  • Doing (praxis): Action whose end is internal to the action itself; the action is its own end
  • Making (poiesis): Action that produces something external; a product beyond the action
  • Example of doing: Taking a walk, playing baseball—the action itself is the end
  • Example of making: Building a church, carpentry, cooking—produces something external to the action
  • Significance of the distinction: Making is for the sake of the thing made, while doing is more its own end

The Five Virtues of Reason #

Virtues of Speculative Reason (Looking Reason) #

  1. Natural understanding (intellectus/νοῦς): Natural grasp of first principles without reasoning

    • Examples: “a whole is greater than a part,” “something cannot both be and not be”
    • Learned naturally through experience, not taught in school
    • Child learns by sharing candy that a whole differs from a part
  2. Science (scientia/ἐπιστήμη): Reasoned-out understanding; knowledge of conclusions derived from first principles

    • Example: Reasoning out the Pythagorean theorem or that interior angles of a triangle equal two right angles
    • Comes after reasoning (motion) arrives at understanding (rest)
    • Understanding before reasoning vs. understanding arrived at through reasoning
  3. Wisdom (σοφία): The highest virtue of speculative reason; knowledge of first causes and divine things

    • Perfects both natural understanding and science
    • Distinguishes equivocal meanings of axiom-words (like “whole” and “part”)
    • Defends axioms against sophistic objections
    • Sophists confuse different senses: integral whole (composed of parts) vs. universal whole (a set of parts)
    • Example: “Animal is a part of man” (composing part) vs. “animal includes more than man” (universal whole)—mixing these senses creates confusion

Virtues of Practical Reason (Doing Reason) #

  1. Prudence (φρόνησις/prudentia): Right reason about things to be done

    • Etymology: from Latin providentia (foresight)
    • Churchill preferred the term “foresight” to “prudence”
    • Not a lowest species but subdivides into different kinds by scope of common good aimed at:
      • Individual prudence: Considering good for oneself (e.g., reading Shakespeare)
      • Domestic prudence: Considering good of family (e.g., reading Beatrix Potter to children)
      • Political prudence: Considering good of the state or country (e.g., voting for national good)
    • Distinguished not by matter (like arts) but by the common good aimed at
  2. Art (τέχνη/ars): Right reason about things to be made

    • Distinguished by the matter worked upon, not by the product
    • Example: Carpentry (wood), metalworking (metal), tailoring (cloth), cooking (food)
    • Different tools and techniques required for different materials
    • Art enables one to make things “orderly, easily, without error or mistakes”
    • Example: Skilled chef makes good meals easily; untrained person struggles

Key Arguments #

Why Divide Virtues by the Two Ends of Reason #

  • Premise 1: Virtue perfects a power with respect to its end
  • Premise 2: Reason has two distinct ends (understanding truth and directing action/making)
  • Conclusion: There are naturally two groups of intellectual virtues corresponding to these ends
  • Significance: Everything fits together harmoniously; the distinction of virtues follows from the distinction of ends

The Relevance of End to Understanding Virtue Distinctions #

  • When reason is ordered to understanding only (speculative): virtues perfect understanding of truth
  • When reason is ordered to directing action or making (practical): virtues perfect reason’s ability to direct action well or make things well
  • The connection between end and virtue is not arbitrary but essential to understanding what virtue is

Important Definitions #

Speculative/Looking Reason (Theoretical Reason) #

  • Latin: speculari (to look at)
  • Greek: theoretikos
  • Ordered to understanding truth for its own sake
  • Not ordered to making or doing anything external
  • End: truth itself understood

Practical/Doing Reason #

  • Latin: practicus
  • Greek: praktikos
  • Ordered to directing action and making
  • End: external action or production

Virtue (Broad Sense) #

  • A disposition or quality that makes a thing and its own act good
  • Applies to any thing that has its own act or operation

Thing’s Own Act #

  • The act which a thing alone can do, or which it does better than other things
  • Basis for determining what virtue and vice are for any particular thing
  • Example: seeing (eye), cutting (knife), sitting (chair)

The Good #

  • First definition: What all desire or want
  • Connected to the end (final cause)
  • Something is good if people aim at it; people aim at things because they are good

Doing (Praxis) #

  • Action whose end is internal to the action itself
  • The action is its own end
  • Opposed to making

Making (Poiesis) #

  • Action that produces something external; creates a product
  • The action is for the sake of the thing made
  • Produces something noteworthy beyond the doing

Examples & Illustrations #

Learning to Enjoy Wine Moderately #

  • Children who learn to drink wine at the dinner table with parents learn to enjoy it without excess
  • College freshmen get sick from drinking beer more often than seniors because they lack experience
  • Habitual training allows one to enjoy something properly

The Tongue’s Multiple Functions #

  • Speaking: The tongue must be disposed/trained to form sounds in French, English, Chinese, etc.
  • Eating/Drinking: Tongue used differently when tasting wine (rolling on sides) than when eating or drinking water
  • Point: Same power (tongue) disposed differently for different ends, just as with reason

Distinguishing Whole and Part (Sophistic Confusion) #

  • Integral whole (composed whole): A chair made of legs, seat, and back; the whole contains more than any single part
  • Universal whole (set): “Animal” as a universal containing dog, cat, horse, elephant; the whole is not greater in the same way
  • Sophistic trick: Mix the two senses: “animal is a part of man” (using composed sense) + “animal includes more than man” (using universal sense) = “the whole is more than the whole”
  • Wisdom’s role: Distinguishing these senses clarifies the axiom and defends it

Arts Distinguished by Matter #

  • Carpentry: Makes things from wood; uses saws, nails, screws
  • Metalworking: Works with metal; uses heat, bending, welding (different tools and techniques)
  • Tailoring: Works with cloth; uses scissors and needles
  • Cooking: Works with food; uses recipes with definite rules
  • Point: Arts are distinguished primarily by the matter, not by the product

Prudence of Different Scopes #

  • Individual prudence: Reading Shakespeare for personal enrichment is better for oneself alone
  • Domestic prudence: Reading Beatrix Potter to children is better for the family’s good (children aren’t ready for Shakespeare)
  • Political prudence: Voting should be for the country’s good, not just one’s own family’s benefit; nepotism fails this prudence
  • Point: Same person exercises different kinds of prudence in different contexts

Defective Art/Skill #

  • Untrained cook: Puts coffee grains instead of coffee in a cake; obviously lacks the art
  • Unskilled carpenter: Work comes out wrong; “we’ve got to tear this off and do it over again”
  • Unskilled person at making things: Even seemingly simple tasks (plumbing repairs) reveal lack of art when attempted without training

Notable Quotes #

“Virtue is the disposition of the thing which makes it and its own act good.”

“A virtue perfects a thing with respect to its end or goal.”

“The looking reason and the doing reason, [they] differ by their end, right?”

“The end is tied up with the good, right? Good is tied up with what virtue is, right?”

“Everything fits together there, right? … All things harmonize.”

“The good is what all want. Now, that’s the first definition of good.”

“The end is especially important, too, when you’re trying to understand what is better. … The end is better than what is for the sake of the end.”

“In the case of making, apart from the doing, there is a … product.”

“Foresight would be the real name of this virtue in English.”

“Arts are differentiated by their materials because you have a different matter that requires different tools and a different way of being worked.”

Questions Addressed #

Why Divide the Virtues of Reason into Two Groups? #

  • Question: What is the connection between the distinction of speculative and practical reason and the distinction of virtues of reason?
  • Answer: Because virtue perfects a power with respect to its end, and reason has two distinct ends (understanding and directing action/making), there must be two groups of virtues corresponding to these ends. The distinction is natural and necessary.

What is the First Definition of Good? #

  • Question: How do we come to understand what “good” means?
  • Answer: Socratic induction shows the good is “what all want” or “what all desire.” A child, like Socrates’ slave boy, naturally grasps this by listing what he wants (candy, bicycle, baseball) and recognizing these are what he calls “good.”

How Are Axiom-Words Equivocal? #

  • Question: How can words like “whole” and “part” be used in multiple ways that are not merely accidental?
  • Answer: These are equivocal by reason (meaning connected by reason, not by chance) because they are the most universal terms used across all sciences. Their multiple meanings reflect genuine differences in how the concepts apply in different contexts—as integral wholes (composed) versus universal wholes (sets).

What is the Role of Wisdom in Understanding Axioms? #

  • Question: How does wisdom defend natural understanding and science against sophistic objections?
  • Answer: Wisdom distinguishes the equivocal meanings of axiom-words and clarifies which sense applies in which context. This prevents sophists from deceiving by mixing senses and defends the axioms from appearing contradictory.