120. Synderesis as Natural Habit and Reason's First Principles
Summary
This lecture explores the nature of synderesis as a natural habit rather than a distinct power in practical reason. Berquist addresses objections that synderesis is a special power and clarifies how synderesis relates to reason as nature versus reason as reason. The discussion parallels the structure of speculative reason, establishing that both speculative and practical reason naturally know first principles—the axioms in speculative reason and ‘do good and avoid evil’ in practical reason.
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
Synderesis: Nature and Definition #
- Synderesis is a natural habit, not a power - Thomas Aquinas argues against viewing synderesis as a distinct power like the irascible (θυμοειδές) or concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν) powers
- Synderesis as reason perfected by nature - It represents reason insofar as it naturally knows certain principles, distinguished from reason as reason which investigates through reasoning
- Inclination to good without opposites - Synderesis naturally inclines only toward good and away from evil, lacking the openness to opposites that characterizes rational powers proper
Reason as Nature vs. Reason as Reason #
- Reason as nature (natura) - Determined to one understanding; naturally knows what cannot be otherwise; parallel to fire’s nature being determined to heat
- Reason as reason (ratio) - Open to opposites; capable of reasoning to contradictory conclusions; can think one thing then its opposite
- Distinction is not like virtue and vice - The distinction between nature and reason is like the distinction between animal and man (man contains animal plus something more), not like black and white (entirely separate categories)
Parallel Structure: Speculative and Practical Reason #
- Speculative reason naturally knows axioms - First principles like “something cannot both be and not be” and “a whole is greater than a part”
- Practical reason naturally knows principles of action - “Do good and avoid evil” are natural to practical reason, just as axioms are natural to speculative reason
- Natural understanding (νοῦς/intellectus) in both - In speculative reason, called understanding of beginnings (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI); in practical reason, this same noetic function is called synderesis
The Role of Natural Understanding #
- Foundation for reasoning - If one understood nothing before beginning to reason, there would be nothing to reason from; reasoning depends upon naturally known principles
- Circular process - Knowledge proceeds from naturally known principles through investigation by reason (ratio) and returns to judge findings by those same principles
- Motion depends on rest - Analogy: as physical motion depends upon something at rest (cannot walk in water; earth supports walking), reasoning depends upon understanding that is not in motion
Key Arguments #
Against Synderesis Being a Power #
- Rational powers have opposites - Both reason and will are capable of reasoning to contradictory conclusions and choosing opposites
- Synderesis lacks opposites - It inclines only to good, never to evil
- Therefore synderesis cannot be a rational power - It must instead be a habit perfecting reason
- Analogy with natural understanding - Just as natural understanding (νοῦς) in speculative reason is a habit not a power, synderesis in practical reason is a habit
Establishing Natural Principles in Practical Reason #
- Premise: Speculative and practical reason are analogous - Just as speculative reason reasons about speculable things, practical reason reasons about things to be done
- Natural principles are necessary in both - Speculative reason has natural principles of speculation; therefore practical reason must have natural principles of action
- These natural principles are not a power but a habit - Called synderesis or understanding in practical matters
Against Misunderstanding the Nature/Reason Distinction #
- Common error: treating distinction between nature and reason as though they are entirely separate (like black and white)
- Correct understanding: nature is contained in reason, like how the number two is contained in three (three = two plus one)
- Practical implication - Reason as nature knows certain things necessarily; reason as reason additionally can investigate what is not naturally known
Important Definitions #
Synderesis (σύνδεσις) #
- A natural habit of practical reason that naturally inclines toward good and away from evil
- Represents the first principles of things to be done (principia agibilium), analogous to νοῦς (natural understanding) in speculative reason
- Not a distinct power but a perfection of reason insofar as reason is nature (reason as nature, not reason as reason)
- The unchangeable rules by which we judge practical matters
Reason as Nature (ratio ut natura) #
- Reason determined to one understanding
- Knows what it naturally knows without investigation
- Incapable of thinking the opposite of what it naturally understands
- Example: one naturally understands that “a whole is greater than a part”
Reason as Reason (ratio ut ratio) #
- Reason open to opposites
- Capable of investigating what is not naturally known
- Can reason to contradictory conclusions
- Can think one thing at one time and its opposite at another time
Νοῦς (Nous/Intellectus in Latin) #
- In speculative reason: natural understanding of first principles (Aristotle calls this understanding of beginnings in Nicomachean Ethics VI)
- In practical reason: the same function but called synderesis in Latin philosophical tradition
- That which always grasps what is correct (ὀρθός) according to Aristotle (On the Soul III)
Examples & Illustrations #
Natural Understanding vs. Reasoned Understanding #
- The Pythagorean theorem - An example of reasoned-out understanding (science/episteme); we reason through proofs to arrive at it
- A whole is greater than a part - An example of natural understanding; we seem always to have known this; it appears naturally with experience without needing to reason it out
- One is not the same as many - A principle we never doubt; naturally understood
Motion Depends on Rest #
- Walking on earth vs. water - Can walk on firm earth because it remains at rest; cannot walk on water because water moves and gives way
- Grain and the mouse - A mouse standing on a mound of grain cannot get off because the grain keeps moving beneath it
- Airplanes and automobiles - Improvements come through reasoning over time; the first airplane and car were crude compared to later versions, showing reason’s work through investigation
Birds Making Nests (from Boswell’s Life of Johnson) #
- A bird makes its nest the same way the first time as every subsequent time
- By contrast, human inventions improve over time through reason
- This suggests birds do not operate by reason as humans do, but by natural instinct
Questions Addressed #
Is Synderesis a Power Distinct from Others? #
- Objection 1: It is divided against irascible and concupiscible powers (from Jerome’s gloss on Ezekiel 1:6), so it must be a power
- Objection 2: Synderesis and sensuality are opposed; therefore synderesis is a power just as sensuality is
- Objection 3: Augustine speaks of unchangeable rules in the natural judging power, suggesting synderesis is a power (Augustine, On Free Will)
- Resolution: Synderesis is a natural habit, not a power. The opposition between synderesis and sensuality is in their acts and inclinations, not in them being distinct powers. The unchangeable rules belong to reason as nature, not a separate power
How Does Synderesis Relate to Reason Itself? #
- Objection: Some say synderesis is reason itself, not as reason but as nature (Alexander of Hales position)
- Resolution: This is essentially correct. Synderesis is reason understood as nature, which has determination to one understanding. But this does not mean synderesis is a power distinct from reason; it is reason itself perfected by nature, which is the opposite (potentiality-wise) of reason as reason, which is open to investigation
How Can Reasoning Depend on Natural Understanding? #
- The circular dependency - Reasoning proceeds from naturally known principles, investigates through reasoning, and returns to judge findings by those same principles
- Historical reference: Aristotle explains this in the Prior and Posterior Analytics; the Analytics is named for the process of resolving conclusions back to principles (ἀνάλυσις)
- Why it is not infinite regress - Some things we understand naturally without reasoning them out; everything cannot be reasoned out or reasoning would never begin
Notable Quotes #
“Synderesis is not a power but a natural habit” — Thomas Aquinas (from the lecture, presenting the resolution)
“Reason as nature is determined to one understanding; reason as reason is open to opposites” — Berquist’s formulation of the fundamental distinction
“If the bird makes its nest the same way the first time as every time afterward, this suggests it is not operating by reason as we do” — Berquist, citing Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson on the nature of reason
“Motion depends upon something at rest. You cannot walk in water because the water gives way; you walk on earth because the earth remains at rest” — Berquist, illustrating the dependence of reasoning upon natural understanding