122. Conscience as Act: Etymology, Functions, and Distinction from Synderesis

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Conscience: Act, Not Power #

• Proper meaning: Conscience is primarily an act, not a power or habit
• Etymology: From Latin con (with) + scientia (knowledge), implying the application of knowledge to something particular
• Why it’s an act: The very structure of the word indicates application, which is characteristic of acts rather than powers or habits
• Functions of conscience: All functions (testify, bind, instigate, excuse, accuse) are actions following upon application of knowledge

Three Applications of Conscience #

Conscience operates in three distinct ways:

1. Testimony (testificari): Recognizing what has or has not been done

   • Example: “Your conscience knows that you have spoken badly of others” (Ecclesiastes 7:23)
   • The conscience bears witness to past acts

2. Judgment/Binding (digari, instigari): Determining what ought or ought not be done

   • Examples: “Thou shalt not steal”; “Thou shalt not commit adultery”; “Honor thy father and mother”
   • The conscience applies universal moral principles to future action
   • Binds the will to obligation

3. Evaluation (excusare, accusare, remordere): Judging whether a deed was done well or poorly

   • “Remordere” (to bite again): Conscience gnaws at us when we have acted wrongly
   • The conscience evaluates past action against what should have been done

Synderesis: The Habit Underlying Conscience #

• Definition: A natural habit of practical reason containing the first principles of action
• Relationship to conscience: While conscience is the act of applying knowledge, synderesis is the habit or principle from which conscience springs
• Why synderesis is a habit, not a power: It does not have opposites; it always inclines only to good, never to evil
• Multiple habits, one first habit: Although many particular habits (virtues) guide our actions, they all derive their efficacy from synderesis as the foundational habit
• Common usage: Sometimes the word “conscience” is loosely applied to synderesis itself (as Jerome does), though this is not its proper meaning

The Relationship Between Act and Habit #

• Acts remain in their causes: Although acts do not always remain in themselves, they remain in their causes—namely, in the power and habit from which they proceed
• This resolves the objection: When someone “sets aside their conscience,” they are not abandoning a power but failing to apply the knowledge they possess through the habit of synderesis
• Application failure: A person with conscience knows what is right but chooses not to apply this knowledge to his action (e.g., pursuing wealth or pleasure instead)
• Analogy to bullying: Like convincing a bully to apply knowledge he already possesses—“What would it be like if someone did this to you?"—the conscience acts by applying existing knowledge

Key Arguments #

Why Conscience Must Be an Act #

From the structure of the word itself:

• Con = with; Scientia = knowledge
• Together: “with knowledge” or more precisely, the application of knowledge to something
• The application of science to something occurs through an act

From the functions attributed to conscience:

• Conscience is said to testify (characteristic of acts)
• Conscience is said to bind (characteristic of acts)
• Conscience is said to instigate (characteristic of acts)
• Conscience is said to accuse or excuse (characteristic of acts)
• Conscience “bothers” us or “bites” us (characteristic of acts)
• All these functions follow upon the application of knowledge to particular deeds

Response to the Objection: “If Conscience Is an Act, Why Don’t We Always Possess It?” #

The objection: Acts do not always remain; conscience is not always present; therefore it cannot be an act (it must be a power or habit)

Thomas’s response:

• Acts, though not always remaining in themselves, always remain in their causes
• The causes are the power and the habit
• Although conscience involves many particular habits (prudence regarding various matters), all these habits derive their efficacy from one first habit: synderesis
• Therefore, conscience, as an act informed by synderesis, always remains present in its principle, even when not actively exercised

Response to “People Set Aside Conscience” #

The objection (from Shakespeare): If people can set aside their conscience, it cannot be a power (one cannot set aside a power)

Thomas’s response:

• One does not set aside the power or the habit (synderesis)
• Rather, one fails to apply the knowledge one possesses
• The person chooses to focus on something else (financial reward, pleasure) rather than applying the moral knowledge he has through synderesis
• This is a failure of the act, not a loss of the power or habit

Important Definitions #

Conscience (conscientia): The act of applying knowledge (acquired through synderesis or through specific moral knowledge) to particular actions, resulting in testimony about past deeds, judgment about future obligations, or evaluation of completed actions

Synderesis (synderesis): A natural habit of practical reason containing the first principles of action, such as “good should be done and evil avoided”; it is the natural understanding that incites toward good and complains about evil

Spirit (spiritus) in relation to conscience: Used to mean “mind” or intellect; conscience is a dictamen (saying or utterance) of the mind, an act by which the mind applies knowledge to action

Application (applicatio): The act by which knowledge is brought to bear on particular circumstances or actions; this is the essence of conscience

First principles (principia prima): The foundational truths of practical reason known through synderesis, such as that one should honor father and mother or not commit adultery

Examples & Illustrations #

From Scripture and Literature #

Richard III (Shakespeare):

• On the night before the Battle of Bosworth Field, Richard dreams of all those he has murdered
• They appear to him saying they pray for his opponent, Henry Tudor
• Richard’s famous line: “Conscience makes cowards of us all”
• This illustrates conscience at work when the person’s guard is down (in sleep/dream) and realizes what he has done
• Paradox: “Richard loves Richard, that is, I am I”—he loves himself yet has done evil; at night his conscience troubles him

Italian Revenge Story (Washington Irving):

• A man kills another in passion due to a love rivalry
• While the victim’s body searches go on, the man is constantly “bitten by his conscience”
• Eventually confesses and accepts punishment
• Illustrates the third function of conscience: judging a past deed and finding oneself culpable

Dickens Novel:

• A man who has committed murder constantly anticipates seeing the body discovered in the newspaper
• He tries to maintain composure when such news is announced
• His conscience gnaws at him internally even as he attempts to maintain external composure
• Shows conscience as a continuing internal act that cannot simply be “set aside”

Moral Principles as Self-Evident #

From Aristotle’s Topics:

• Aristotle notes that if a man doubts whether snow is white, he needs sensation, not argument
• Similarly, if a man doubts whether he should honor his father and mother, “he needs punishment, not argument”
• This shows that such principles are naturally known through synderesis and applied through conscience
• To question them is not to show ignorance but to show oneself in need of correction

Adultery as having no mean:

• Aristotle notes that moral virtue typically exists in a mean between two extremes
• But some acts have no mean—e.g., murder, theft, adultery
• Adultery is given as the obvious example: there is no virtue in “not committing adultery too much but just the right amount”
• This suggests that Aristotle recognized through natural understanding that any adultery is wrong
• The conscience applying the principle “do not commit adultery” admits of no exception

Questions Addressed #

Objection 1: “Conscience is called ‘spirit’ (pneuma); spirit is a power; therefore conscience is a power” #

Resolution:

• “Spirit” in this context means “mind” or intellect, not a power
• Conscience is a dictamen (saying, utterance) of the mind
• A dictamen is an act, not a power
• The power (reason/mind) produces the act (conscience), but conscience itself is the act

Objection 2: “Conscience is subject to defilement/staining; only powers can be subjects of sin; therefore conscience is a power” #

Resolution:

• Staining is said of conscience not as a subject (which would be the power) but as something known
• When we say “conscience is stained,” we mean that one knows oneself to be stained or defiled
• It is the person who is stained, known through the act of conscience
• English usage supports this: “I have a bad conscience” means not that conscience is intrinsically bad but that I am conscious of something bad in myself

Objection 3: “Conscience must be either act, habit, or power. It’s not always present (so not an act); it involves many habits (so not one habit); therefore it must be a power.” #

Resolution:

• Acts, though not always remaining in themselves, remain always in their causes (power and habit)
• Multiple habits direct us in different matters, yet all derive their efficacy from one first habit: synderesis
• Synderesis is always present as the foundational habit
• Therefore, conscience remains always present in its principle (synderesis) even when not actively exercised

Notable Quotes #

“Conscience, properly speaking, is not a power but an act.”

“Con, which means with, right? And scientia, with knowledge, right… the application of science to something comes about through an act.”

“Conscience makes cowards of us all.” — Shakespeare, Hamlet

“And so he doesn’t apply the knowledge that he has… It’s a bit like when you have a kid who’s a bully… you try to make the kid realize, now, what would it be like if someone did this to you?”

“If a man is in doubt whether he should honor his father and mother… he doesn’t need an argument. He needs punishment.” — Aristotle, cited in Berquist’s discussion