124. Appetite as a Distinct Power of the Soul

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Appetite as a Distinct Power: Whether appetite constitutes a separate genus of soul powers, or merely describes what all powers share in common
• Forms and Inclinations: Every form generates inclination or tendency; knowing beings have forms in a higher way than non-knowing things, thus generating unique inclinations
• Natural vs. Elicited Desire: The distinction between inclination following from what something is (natural desire) and inclination following from what is apprehended (animal/elicited desire)
• Sense vs. Intellectual Desire: The distinction between appetite following sensation and appetite following understanding
• The Unmoved Mover and Moved Mover: The apprehended good as unmoved mover; desire as moved mover

Key Arguments #

Article 1: Is Appetite a Distinct Power? #

The Core Syllogism:

1. Every form generates some inclination or tendency
2. Knowing things have forms in a higher way than non-knowing things
3. Therefore, knowing things have inclinations and desires in a higher way

Objections:

• Desire is common to all things (animate and inanimate), so it shouldn’t be assigned to a special power of the soul
• Each power of the soul naturally tends toward its own act/object; appetite is not something additional to this common tendency (the “division against the common” objection)

Thomas’s Response:

• Appetite is found in knowing things in a higher way than in non-knowing things
• All things have natural inclination following their form; but knowing things receive forms of other things, generating a special kind of inclination not found in non-knowing things
• This superior inclination pertains to the desiring power, enabling the animal to desire things it apprehends, not merely those to which its natural form inclines it
• To distinguish appetite from the natural tendency each power has toward its own object is not dividing the common against the particular, because appetite is a distinct kind of tendency, not merely what is common to all tendencies

Article 2: Are Sense Desire and Intellectual Desire Distinct Powers? #

Objections:

• Sensation and understanding are accidental to desire; powers aren’t diversified by accidental differences
• Understanding apprehends universals while sensation apprehends singulars, but desire is always for singular things (objects exist outside the soul as singulars), so this distinction should not apply to desire
• The power of locomotion is not doubled (one following sensation, one following intellect), so neither should appetite be doubled

Thomas’s Response:

• The desiring power is a potentia passiva (passive power) that is moved by its object
• Passive powers are distinguished according to the distinction of what acts upon them and moves them
• Since understanding apprehends differently than sensation, the desire following understanding is a different power from desire following sensation
• Even when desiring the same singular thing, intellectual desire desires it under a universal reason (e.g., “because it is good”), while sense desire desires it as agreeable to the senses
• The object formally considered differs: the good as sensed vs. the good as understood

Important Definitions #

Natural Desire (desiderium naturale)

• The inclination that follows upon a thing’s natural form
• Found in all things, even non-knowing things
• Example: Fire’s natural tendency to rise; a plant’s tendency to grow toward water

Animal/Elicited Desire (desiderium animale)

• Desire following upon knowledge (sensation or understanding)
• Unique to knowing beings
• Requires apprehension; does not follow merely from what something is by nature

Sense Desire (sensualitas)

• Appetite following upon sensory apprehension
• Desires things as agreeable or disagreeable to the senses

Intellectual Desire (voluntas)

• Appetite following upon intellectual apprehension
• Can desire things under universal reasons

Unmoved Mover vs. Moved Mover

• Unmoved Mover: The apprehended good, which moves desire without being moved itself
• Moved Mover: Desire, which is moved by the apprehended good while itself moving toward that object

Examples & Illustrations #

Hunger and Eating

• When you smell bacon cooking and desire it, this is sense desire following apprehension of the sensible object
• The stomach’s natural inclination to digest food once consumed is natural desire (not appetite proper)
• These are distinct: you can smell bacon and desire it without having eaten; your stomach doesn’t “desire” food until it’s already present

Touch vs. Sight of Shape

• You can know the shape of a glass through touch (hardness) or through sight (color)
• The shape is the same object, but not apprehended in the same way
• Similarly, food can be desired through sense (as agreeable) and through intellect (as necessary for health), making the ways of desiring different even though the object is the same

Eating for Different Reasons

• Sense desire: Eating because hungry; motivated by sensible agreeableness of food
• Intellectual desire: Eating because reason recognizes the need to maintain strength for duties ahead, even without hunger
• Example from St. Francis de Sales: Eating while recognizing it as God’s will for maintaining one’s body and health, not merely following bodily urge

The Heavy Body and Equivocal Language

• A heavy body naturally tends toward the ground
• We say it “desires” to go to earth, but this word is used equivocally by reason (analogically): what is true of appetite in knowing things is not the same as natural tendency in inanimate things

Questions Addressed #

Why distinguish appetite from the natural tendency each power has toward its own object?

• This is not dividing the common against the particular
• Appetite is a distinct kind of tendency that follows upon apprehension, not merely upon natural form
• Each power (eye, ear, stomach) naturally tends toward its own act, but appetite is a separate power that can tend toward things not strictly suited to any single other power, but to the animal/person as a whole

How can intellectual desire desire the same singular thing as sense desire if intellect knows universals?

• Intellectual desire desires the singular object under a universal reason
• Example: Desiring to eat this food not merely because it tastes good (singular), but because it is good for maintaining health (universal reason)
• The formal object differs: the good as sensed vs. the good as understood

Why do we need both sense desire and intellectual desire as distinct powers?

• They are moved by different kinds of apprehension (sensation vs. understanding)
• Passive powers are distinguished by what moves them
• If understanding apprehends differently, then desire following understanding must be a different power