131. The Will's Necessity and Freedom in Willing Particulars
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
- Will’s Necessity vs. Freedom: The will necessarily wills beatitude (happiness) as its ultimate end, but this natural necessity does not contradict voluntariness or freedom
- Understanding-Will Analogy: Just as the understanding necessarily adheres to first principles but may not assent to conclusions until demonstrating their necessary connection, the will necessarily wills the end but need not will particular means until perceiving their necessity
- Universal Good vs. Particular Goods: Because good is a transcendental extending to infinite things in multiple ways, the will cannot be determined from necessity to any single particular good
- The Mover-Movable Problem: The object moves the will as a mover moves the movable, but only when the mover’s power exceeds the movable’s capacity to resist—the will’s capacity for universal good is never exhausted by any particular good
- Sense Appetite vs. Rational Appetite: Sense appetite lacks the collativa power (ability to bring together diverse considerations) and is determined by singular sensible objects; reason and will possess this power and thus maintain freedom
- Theodicy and Gratitude: Opening discussion on God’s superfluous goodness (analogized as a point to a line) establishes the unreasonable ingratitude of not acknowledging divine providence
Key Arguments #
First Objection: Dionysius and the Bad #
- Claim: Dionysius says “the bad is aside from the will” (preter voluntatem); the will always wills something good; therefore from necessity the will tends toward any good proposed to it
- Thomas’s Response: While the will always wills something under the aspect of good, good is multiplex (manifold), so the will is not determined from necessity to any single good. Even apparent goods (like the last drink at a party) are willed because they appear good, not because they are truly good
Second Objection: Mover-Movable Relationship #
- Claim: The object of the will is compared to it as the mover to the movable; the motion of the movable necessarily follows the mover; therefore the object moves the will from necessity
- Thomas’s Response: The mover causes motion from necessity only when its power exceeds the movable’s power to resist—when the movable’s “whole possibility” is subject to the mover. Since the will’s possibility regarding universal good is not exhausted by any particular good, particular goods do not move it from necessity. Analogy: a car salesman cannot make an offer one “cannot resist” because the will can always will something more perfect
Third Objection: Sense Appetite Analogy #
- Claim: What is grasped by the senses necessarily moves sense appetite; what is grasped by understanding is the object of the will; therefore what is grasped by the understanding necessarily moves the will
- Implied Response: This objection assumes sense and intellectual appetite function identically, but they differ fundamentally—sense lacks the collative power
Important Definitions #
- Beatitude (beatitudo): The ultimate end; the perfect happiness the will necessarily wills
- Natural Necessity: That which belongs to something from its intrinsic principle (form or nature); does not contradict freedom or proper operation
- Necessity of Force (necessitas coactionis): External compulsion contrary to a thing’s inclination; utterly repugnant to the will
- Transcendental: A property extending to all being; good is transcendental because everything that is, is good insofar as it is
- Collativa: The power to bring together diverse considerations; characteristic of reason and will, enabling freedom regarding particulars
- Preter voluntatem: “Aside from the will”; Dionysius’s phrase meaning the bad is never willed as such
Examples & Illustrations #
The Tie Example #
When a wife offers two ties that both match, neither is necessarily connected to happiness; the will does not necessarily will one over the other. Shows how particular goods lack necessary connection to beatitude despite being genuinely good.
The Restaurant Menu #
Multiple acceptable dishes are available; none is strictly necessary for happiness. Illustrates how the will’s capacity extends far beyond any single good option.
The Car Salesman / Infinity of Goods #
Even an attractive sales offer cannot force the will because the will’s ability to will good universally is not exhausted by the car, house, or computer being sold. Demonstrates that no particular good can fill the entire capacity of the will.
The Last Drink at the Party #
One wills the last drink not because it is bad (causing sickness) but because it appears good (continuing the good time). Shows how the will wills things under the appearance of good, not the bad as such.
The Bank Robber #
Asked why he robs banks, the famous robber replies: “That’s where the money is.” He pursues robbery under the aspect of good (acquiring wealth), not because robbery is evil.
Crime and Punishment (Dostoevsky Reference) #
A young man murders an innocent woman to prove he is above the law, pursuing a false appearance of good (superiority) while committing actual evil. Illustrates perverse willing under distorted goodness.
The Pythagorean Theorem #
Before seeing the mathematical demonstration, one may doubt the theorem’s truth; only upon understanding its necessary connection to first principles does the understanding necessarily assent. Parallels how the will does not necessarily will particular goods until seeing their necessary connection to happiness.
Exam Answer on Anaximenes #
A student confuses Genesis (God breathing the soul into Adam) with Anaximenes’s theory (air as the principle of all things), writing “Adam breathed into Eve air.” Illustrates how students misunderstand and conflate concepts.
The Refrigerator of Soda #
As a child, Berquist thought his father foolish for not filling the refrigerator with soda; he believed constant soda-drinking would make him happy. Later realizing soda alone cannot satisfy, he illustrates how particular goods fail to constitute complete happiness—a motif continuing through his own pursuit (waiting for college, then graduate school, then teaching freedom) without finding ultimate satisfaction.
Augustine’s Confessions #
Quoted: “Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee.” Demonstrates that hearts seeking rest in created things rather than God remain restless.
Questions Addressed #
Does the will will something from necessity? #
Answer: Yes, the will necessarily wills beatitude (happiness) as its ultimate end. This natural necessity arises from the will’s own nature and does not contradict its freedom. However, the will does not necessarily will particular goods that lead to happiness unless it first perceives their necessary connection to the ultimate end.
What is the difference between natural necessity and necessity of force? #
Answer: Natural necessity belongs to something from its intrinsic principle and preserves the thing’s proper operation and freedom. Necessity of force is external compulsion contrary to a thing’s inclination and is altogether repugnant to the will.
Why cannot any particular good move the will from necessity? #
Answer: Because the will’s capacity regarding universal good is not exhausted by any single particular good. The will can always will something more perfect or different. The mover-movable principle requires the mover’s power to exceed the movable’s capacity to resist; no particular good’s power exceeds the will’s infinite capacity to will other goods.
How does the will differ from sense appetite regarding their objects? #
Answer: Sense appetite lacks the collative power and apprehends only singular sensible objects; it is therefore determined by what it senses. The will, informed by reason, possesses the collative power and can consider multiple intelligible goods; it therefore maintains freedom regarding particulars.
Theological Context #
Berquist opens the lecture with a prayer invoking guardian angels and citing Thomas Aquinas’s angelic doctrine, establishing the theological framework. The discussion emphasizes God’s superfluous goodness (using Thomas’s analogy of a point to a line) and the radical contingency and gratuitousness of human existence, grounding the entire discussion of the will’s freedom in an understanding of divine providence and human dependence on God.