135. The Irascible and Concupiscible in the Will

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Division of Appetite Powers #

• Sensory level: Two distinct powers—concupiscible (desire for pleasant goods) and irascible (resistance to harmful obstacles)
• Rational level: Unity in the will despite nominal reference to both types of desiring
• The irascible serves as “defender” of the concupiscible, fighting to overcome obstacles to desired goods

Why the Powers Are Not Divided in the Will #

• The will’s object is bonum universale (the universal good), not particular sensible goods
• Powers are not multiplied when their objects fall under a common universal notion
• Just as reason knows all sensibles through one intellective power (not multiplied like the senses), the will desires all goods through one power
• The concupiscible and irascible are distinguished by differences in particular goods that fall under their own proper notions

The Transposition of Emotional Names to the Will #

• Names of emotions (the eleven passions) are carried over to acts of the will
• When transposed: the bodily aspect is dropped, but the formal aspect is retained
• Example: concupiscentia (desire for food/candy) becomes the formal act of willing a good without the bodily disturbance
• Example: Anger at injustice becomes a volitional opposition to vice without the physiological arousal of passion

Further Transposition to Divine Attributes #

• Names of emotions can be carried further to describe God’s will, but with restrictions
• Most emotional terms cannot apply to God because:
  • Desire requires lacking a good (God lacks nothing)
  • Fear requires the possibility of harm (nothing can harm God)
  • Hope requires striving for a difficult good (God already possesses all good)
• Only two emotional names apply properly to God: amor (love) and gaudium (joy)
• Other transpositions are metaphorical, based on similarity of operation (e.g., God’s punishment called “anger” because it operates like human anger)

The Role of Internal Senses #

• The irascible responds not to direct sensory disagreement but to perceived threat or obstacle
• The aestimativa (estimative power) judges something as harmful even when not directly unpleasant to the senses
• Example: An animal flees from a wolf not because the wolf’s color is disagreeable, but because the animal estimates the wolf as a threat

Virtues Regulate Both Powers Differently #

• Temperantia (temperance) regulates concupiscible desires—requires restraint
• Mansuctudo (mildness) regulates irascible responses—requires restraint
• Fortitudo (courage) regulates irascible responses—requires moving forward against difficulty
• Both temperance and mildness address strong emotions requiring restraint; courage requires different regulation

Key Arguments #

The Argument from Universal vs. Particular Objects #

• Premise 1: Powers are not multiplied when their objects fall under a common universal notion
• Premise 2: The will’s object is the universal good (bonum universale)
• Premise 3: The concupiscible and irascible differ by particular reasons of good (pleasant, difficult to obtain)
• Conclusion: The concupiscible and irascible cannot be distinguished as separate powers in the will, only in sensory appetite

The Analogy from Sight and Reason #

• Sensory level: Vision is not multiplied into separate powers for colors (white, black, green) because all are apprehended as colored
• Rational level: Similarly, sensory appetite is multiplied (concupiscible and irascible) because senses grasp only particulars
• Will level: The will is not multiplied because reason grasps the universal good, just as intellect grasps universal being

The Objection from Charity and Hope #

• Objection: Charity is located in the concupiscible, hope in the irascible (traditional attribution), so they must be distinguished in the will
• Resolution: These names are transposed from emotion to will-act. Though the original emotions belong to two powers, the transposed terms refer only to acts of the single will, not to two powers

Important Definitions #

Concupiscibilis (Concupiscible) #

• The power of sensory appetite oriented toward pleasant goods (what agrees with the senses)
• Concerned with goods that are agreeable, delectable, suitable to nature
• In rational appetite: the formal desire for good without bodily disturbance

Irascibilis (Irascible) #

• The power of sensory appetite oriented toward resisting obstacles and fighting for goods
• Concerned with goods as difficult to obtain or as requiring defense against harm
• In rational appetite: the formal opposition to evil or obstacles without anger’s bodily manifestation

Aestimativa (Estimative Power) #

• Internal sense that judges things as harmful, threatening, or beneficial beyond mere sensory agreeableness
• Allows animals to perceive threat without direct sensory disagreement
• Source of fear and aggressive response in animals

Bonum Universale (Universal Good) #

• The object proper to the will
• Encompasses all particular goods under the universal formality of “good”
• Grounds the unity and freedom of will

Transponere (To Carry Over) #

• The process of applying names from one level of reality to another while adjusting their meaning
• Example: “Undergoing” (pati) is first a destructive passive reception, then a perfective reception in sensation, then entirely immaterial reception in intellect
• In emotions: names move from sensory passions to volitional acts to divine attributes, dropping material aspects while retaining formal aspects

Examples & Illustrations #

Animal Behavior: The Dogs Fighting Over Meat #

• Two dogs see a piece of meat (concupiscible: pleasant, desirable)
• They fight over it (irascible: defending the good against an obstacle—the other dog)
• The meat is pleasant, but the fight itself is not pleasant to the senses
• Yet they fight because of a different reason for the good: obtaining it requires overcoming the rival
• The irascible presupposes and defends the concupiscible

Animal Flight: The Creature Fleeing Danger #

• A small animal perceives a predator (wolf)
• The wolf’s color or appearance is not disagreeable to the senses
• Yet the animal flees with fear (irascible emotion)
• The estimative power judges the wolf as harmful and threatening
• This shows the irascible operates on a judgment beyond direct sensory agreeableness

Saint Benedict’s Temptation #

• Tempted by lustful desire (concupiscible)
• Jumped into thorny brambles to distract himself (irascible—using discomfort to defeat concupiscent desire)
• Shows the irascible can be enlisted in service of reason against the concupiscible

Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Temptation #

• Tempted with a loose woman (concupiscible temptation)
• Picked up a poker from the fire and chased her away (irascible resistance)
• Marked the door with a cross
• Shows anger (irascible) properly directed against vice, not mere bodily passion

Shakespeare on Lovers’ Intensity #

• “They are in the very wrath of love. Clubs cannot part them.”
• Love (concupiscible) is so strong it requires “wrath” to describe its intensity
• When desires are strong, words from the irascible (wrath) are borrowed to express their force
• Shows the connection between concupiscible desire and irascible strength

The Lover’s Staff #

• “Hope is a lover’s staff” (Shakespeare)
• Hope (irascible emotion) supports the effort required to obtain the beloved (concupiscible good)
• Illustrates how the irascible enables the pursuit of concupiscible goods

Questions Addressed #

Q: If the concupiscible and irascible are divided in sensory appetite, why not in the will? #

A: Because the will’s object is the universal good, while the senses apprehend only particular goods. Powers are multiplied according to differences in their objects. Since the will grasps all goods under the universal formality of “good,” all desires remain united in a single power. Just as reason (which knows universals) is not multiplied into sight, hearing, touch, etc., the will (which desires the universal good) is not multiplied into concupiscible and irascible powers.

Q: How can charity (located in the concupiscible) and hope (located in the irascible) both be in the will? #

A: The names “charity” and “hope” are transposed from emotions to volitional acts. In the emotional order, love belongs to the concupiscible and hope to the irascible as two distinct powers. But when these names are applied to the will, they refer to two acts of a single power, not to two powers. The formal aspect (desire for good, striving for difficult good) is retained; the bodily aspect and the multiplicity of powers is abandoned.

Q: What is the difference between sensory anger and volitional anger? #

A: Sensory anger is an emotion with bodily disturbance, arousal, and physiological change. Volitional “anger” (at vice, injustice) is a formal opposition of the will to evil without any bodily aspect. When the will is said to be “angry” at vice, we retain the formal meaning (strong opposition) while dropping the bodily component. This shows how the same name can apply to both the sensory and rational orders while meaning something quite different.

Q: Why can only love and joy be attributed to God’s will? #

A: Love and joy refer to goods already possessed or apprehended. Since God fully possesses infinite goodness, He can be said to love (know and approve His goodness) and rejoice (delight in His goodness). But desire, hope, fear, anger, etc., imply lacking a good, facing difficulty, or facing threat—none of which apply to God. Even the formal aspects of these emotions are incompatible with God’s perfection and immutability.