137. Free Will as a Power: Nature and Objections

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Free Will Lost Through Sin #

• Augustine’s claim: “Man, badly using his free will, loses both himself and his free will”
• Thomas’s resolution: Man does not lose his natural freedom from force, but loses freedom from guilt and misery
• Man cannot entirely avoid all sins (especially venial sins) even with effort
• Example: One cannot maintain perfect concentration while typing; misspellings occur despite knowing correct spelling
• St. John’s teaching: “If we say we have no sin, we are liars” (1 John 1:8)

Free Will as Power vs. Habit #

The Question #

Is liberum arbitrium (free judgment) properly named:

1. An act (therefore not a power)?
2. A habit?
3. A power?

Against Free Will Being Merely an Act #

• Objection: “Free judgment” (liberum arbitrium) names an act, not a power
• Counter: A power is often named from its act (understanding, sight, taste)
• Example: “John Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding” refers to the ability to understand, not the act
• A blind man “doesn’t see” means he lacks the power of sight, not merely that he’s not seeing right now
• Thomas’s reply: “It is customary that a power be signified by the name of its act.”

Against Free Will Being a Habit #

Two-part elimination:

1. If it were a natural habit: It would incline by nature like assent to first principles (“the whole is greater than the part”)

   • But things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free will
   • Therefore, it contradicts the definition of free will to be a natural habit

2. If it were an acquired habit: It would not be naturally possessed by humans

   • But free will is naturally present to man
   • Therefore, it cannot be an acquired habit

The indifference of free will:

• A habit disposes one toward acting well or badly (but determined to one or the other)
• Temperance disposes toward good sense desires; intemperance toward bad
• But free will indifferently has itself toward choosing well or badly
• By free will, I can choose to do something or not do it; this way or that way
• Therefore, free will cannot be a habit

Conclusion: Free will must be a power (potentia)

The Meaning of “Facultas” #

• Objection: “Free will is said to be a facultas of will and of reason”
• Facultas sometimes means a power that is expeditious or habituated to something
• Bernard’s definition: Free will is “a habit of the soul, free of itself”
• Thomas’s clarification:
  • Habitum is not used as divided against power
  • Rather, it signifies a relation by which something is disposed toward some act
  • Aristotle calls the act of understanding a “habit” in this sense—as opposed to the lack of it
  • Thus: through a power, man is able to do something; through a habit, he is apt to do it well or badly

Natural Virtue and Habituation #

• Aristotle distinguishes virtues of reason:
  • Nous (Latin: intellectus) = intellectual intuition of principles
  • Epistēmē (Latin: scientia) = scientific knowledge (systematic)
  • Phronesis (Latin: prudentia) = practical wisdom
• These can be considered natural habits (nous is naturally present)
• Acquired virtues (moral habits) are developed through repeated acts
• Example of natural love: Love of one’s neighbor as oneself is not commanded; self-love is natural

Key Arguments #

Argument That Free Will Is Lost Through Sin #

Objection Structure:

• Premise 1: Augustine says man loses free will through sin
• Premise 2: No natural power is taken away through sin
• Conclusion: Free will cannot be a natural power

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Man does not lose his natural freedom (freedom from external force)
• Man loses freedom from guilt and from misery (inability to avoid sin)
• Man can, with concentration, avoid a particular sin here and now
• But man cannot maintain such concentration always; therefore, he fails sometimes (especially in venial sins)
• This is not a loss of power but a diminishment of its exercise

Argument That Free Will Cannot Be a Habit #

Logical Structure:

1. Any habit naturally present to us inclines us by nature
2. What inclines us by nature is not subject to free will
3. Free will is subject to free will
4. Therefore, free will cannot be a natural habit

And:

1. Any habit acquired must not be naturally present
2. But free will is naturally present to man
3. Therefore, free will cannot be an acquired habit

And:

1. A habit disposes toward one particular mode of action (well or badly)
2. Free will is indifferent to choosing well or badly
3. Therefore, free will is not a habit

Important Definitions #

Liberum Arbitrium (Free Judgment/Free Will) #

• The power by which humans freely judge and choose among contingent goods
• Not merely a natural inclination (which would determine by necessity)
• Must involve the use of reason to distinguish and compare alternatives
• Remains indifferent to choosing well or badly

Facultas #

• Latin term often meaning the facility or ready-disposition of a power
• Can refer to either the power itself (when expeditious/habituated) or a relation of disposition toward an act
• Not to be confused with a determinate habit

Habitum (Habit in Thomas’s usage) #

• Sometimes signifies a relation by which something is disposed toward an act
• Distinguished from privation (the complete lack)
• Not necessarily opposed to power, but rather a mode of the power’s orientation
• Can be natural (like assent to first principles) or acquired (like virtues)

Natural Habit #

• A disposition naturally present to us without acquisition
• Example: assent to first principles (“the whole is greater than the part”)
• Inclines us by nature, not by choice
• Not subject to free judgment in itself

Examples & Illustrations #

The Typo Example #

• Berquist describes typing an email quickly vs. with concentration
• With full concentration, no misspellings
• Typing quickly always produces reverse letters or misspellings
• People who don’t reread emails always have misspellings
• Point: Even though one knows how to spell, one cannot maintain perfect concentration on every detail
• This illustrates why man cannot avoid all sins, even though he has the power to avoid particular sins

The Lottery Conversation #

• Two workers on a shipping dock asked what they’d do if they won the state lottery
• One said: “Find a quiet place and do some reading”
• Other said: “Get a harem”
• Point: Both naturally desire to “live well,” but understand living well differently
• Shows how free will can choose different goods even when the natural end (happiness/living well) is the same

The Torn Pictures #

• Berquist’s brother Mark took over the dock during summer vacation
• Removed pinup pictures that had been posted
• Original worker returned angry: “Where are my pictures?”
• Context: Factory workers post pictures to make the workplace more pleasant
• Illustrates how different people have different dispositions or habits regarding their environment

Notable Quotes #

“Man, badly using his free will, loses both himself and his free will” — Augustine (cited by Thomas)

“If we say we have no sin, we are liars, and the truth is not in us” — St. John (1 John 1:8)

“It is customary that a power be signified by the name of its act” — Thomas Aquinas

“By free will, I can choose to do this or not to do it, to do it this way or that way—always free to choose” — Berquist’s summary of Thomas’s position

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does man lose free will through sin? #

Objection: Augustine says “man, badly using his free will, loses both himself and his free will”

Answer:

• Man does not lose his natural freedom (freedom from external force)
• He loses freedom from guilt and misery
• He cannot maintain such diligent effort to avoid all sins
• This is a diminishment of freedom’s exercise, not loss of the power itself
• Even with knowledge and effort, one cannot maintain perfect concentration on avoiding every sin

Q2: Is free will an act or a power? #

Objection: “Free judgment” names an act (judging), not a power

Answer:

• Although liberum arbitrium names an act by strict definition, common usage applies it to the principle of that act
• Powers are frequently named from their acts (understanding, sight)
• Therefore, free will is properly a power, though named from its characteristic act of judging

Q3: Is free will a natural habit or an acquired habit? #

Objection 1: If it’s a natural habit, it would incline by nature; then it wouldn’t be subject to free will

Objection 2: If it’s an acquired habit, man wouldn’t naturally possess it

Answer:

• Free will is neither a natural habit nor an acquired habit
• It must be a power, because:
  • A natural habit would determine by necessity (contradicting freedom)
  • An acquired habit would mean free will is not naturally possessed (contradicting that it’s natural to man)
  • Free will must remain indifferent to choosing well or badly

Q4: What is meant by “facultas of will and reason”? #

Answer:

• Facultas can mean the facility or ready-disposition of a power
• When Bernard says free will is a “habit,” he means a relation of disposition toward acts, not a determinate habit
• This is consistent with Aristotle’s usage of calling the act of understanding a “habit”—meaning the actualization of the power, opposed to its privation
• Through power, man is able to do something; through this disposition/habit, he is apt to do it well or badly