146. Intelligible Forms and the Nature of Understanding

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Thomistic Position on Intelligible Forms #

• Intelligible forms are that by which we understand, not that which is understood
• They function as likenesses of external things received in the understanding
• The understanding can reflect upon itself, making the form secondarily that which is understood, but primarily that by which we understand
• This parallels the sensible form in perception: the sensible form is not what is sensed, but that by which the sense senses

The Problem of External Reality #

• Objection: If only intelligible forms are in the mind, how can we know external things outside the soul?
• Solution: The form is a likeness of the external thing; through the form, the mind knows the thing itself
• Sciences concern things outside the soul (dogs, cats, trees), not merely internal forms
• The form is the instrument or medium of knowing, not the primary object

Critique of Platonism and Idealism #

• The Platonic Error: Confusing the mind’s mode of knowing with the mode of being
• Platonists placed universals in a separate realm of forms, wrongly treating the universal as it exists in the mind as if it existed that way in reality
• Modern idealists make similar errors: treating subjective impressions as if they were the only knowable reality
• This leads to the sophistic conclusion that “everything that seems true is true”

The Relationship Between Form and External Thing #

• When I see the black of a garment, my eye receives a sensible form (likeness of color)
• The sensible form is not what I see; rather, it is that by which I see the color
• I see the actual garment outside, not the form in my eye
• Application to understanding: I understand the external thing through the intelligible form, not the form itself (except secondarily through reflection)

The Action Argument #

• There are two kinds of action: one that goes forth to an exterior thing (heating, sawing), and one that remains in the agent (seeing, understanding)
• Both kinds of action proceed from a form
• For actions that go forth, the form is a likeness of the object of action (the heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated)
• For actions remaining in the agent, the form is likewise a likeness of the object: the sensible form is a likeness of the sensible thing; the intelligible form is a likeness of the thing understood

The Ancient Principle #

• “Like is known by like”
• The soul knows things through the forms within it
• But the thing itself is not in the soul; rather, the form (likeness) of the thing is in the soul
• Through the form, the soul knows the external thing
• The stone example: The stone is not in the mind, but the form of the stone is in the mind; therefore, through the form, I know the stone

Key Arguments #

Against the Opinion That Only Forms Are Known #

First Objection: The understood in act must be in the one understanding, because the thing outside the soul is material and cannot be understood in act. Therefore, what is understood is the intelligible form abstracted.

• Thomistic Response: True that only immaterial things can be understood in act, but the form is a likeness of the material thing. Through the form, the understanding knows the material thing itself
• The form is not the primary object of understanding; rather, the thing of which the form is a likeness is the primary object

Second Objection: Vocal sounds signify what the soul has undergone (i.e., intelligible forms). Therefore, intelligible forms are what are understood in act.

• Thomistic Response: Speech signifies the thoughts we form, not the forms by which we think
• The understanding has two operations: (1) being informed by the intelligible form (like sensation by the sensible form), and (2) forming a thought, definition, or statement that can be expressed in words
• Words signify what we form when we think, not that by which we think

The Proportion Argument (Counter to Objections) #

• Key premise: The sensible form is to sense as the intelligible form is to understanding
• Conclusion: Just as the sensible form is not what is sensed but that by which sense senses, the intelligible form is not what is understood but that by which understanding understands
• Example: When I see the black garment, do I see the black of your outfit, or do I see the sensible form in my eye? I see the black of your outfit. Similarly, I understand the thing itself, not the intelligible form (except through reflection)

Against Skepticism Regarding External Things #

• The objection: If we only have internal forms, how can we be sure external things exist?
• Berquist’s response: It is through sensation—particularly the sense of touch—that we are convinced of external things
• The reductio: If senses cannot know external things, then reason (which depends on senses) cannot know them either
• The dialogical fragment from Democritus: When reason tries to convince the senses they know nothing, the senses reply, “Our overthrow is your overthrow”—if the senses are unreliable, so is reason
• Practical refutation: Any criticism of sensation must rely on other sensations (e.g., trusting touch to correct vision when a stick in water appears bent)

Against Descartes’s Methodical Doubt #

• Descartes’s principle: Because the senses have sometimes deceived us, they are not trustworthy (like a person who has lied)
• Berquist’s counter-argument: Even reason sometimes deceives (e.g., in mathematics). By Descartes’s own principle, reason should not be trusted either
• The performative contradiction: If reason is not trustworthy, then reason cannot say that reason is not trustworthy—this is self-defeating
• Conclusion: The man who says reason is not trustworthy uses his reason to say this, which contradicts itself

Important Definitions #

Intelligible Form (Intelligibile Spēciēs) #

The immaterial likeness of a thing received in the possible intellect (intellectus possibilis), which actualizes the intellect to understand. It functions as the means by which understanding occurs, not as the primary object of understanding.

Understandable Form Abstracted #

The species withdrawn from phantasms (images) in the imagination, which remains immaterial and suitable for reception in an immaterial power (the intellect).

That by Which We Understand vs. That Which Is Understood #

• That by which (id quo): The form that actualizes the power of understanding and enables understanding to occur
• That which (id quod): The primary object of understanding—the thing itself, known through and by means of the form

The Understood in Act (Intellectum in Actu) #

The thing as it exists in the state of being actually understood. This occurs when the understanding is actualized by the intelligible form.

• Two components: (1) the thing which is understood, and (2) the fact that it is understood

Verbum (The Thought/Word) #

What the understanding forms when it understands something. This proceeds from the intellect (as a word proceeds from thought). In human understanding, it may be as explicit as a definition or as vague as an inchoate conception. This term becomes crucial in theology when discussing God’s eternal Logos (the Word in John’s Gospel).

Examples & Illustrations #

The Color of Your Garment #

• When I see the black of a garment, my eye is acted upon by the color of the garment
• This acting results in a sensible form (likeness of the color) in my eye
• But the sensible form is not what I actually see
• I see the black of your outfit itself, not the form in my eye
• Application to understanding: Similarly, when understanding receives an intelligible form from something, the form is not what is primarily understood; rather, the thing itself (of which the form is a likeness) is what is understood

The Stick in Water #

• A stick partially in water appears bent
• But I know it is not really bent because I trust other sensations (e.g., running my hand down the stick)
• This shows that we must use multiple senses to judge reality, but we always rely on sensation
• Principle: Any criticism of sensation requires trusting other sensations

The Mirage on the Highway #

• In summer heat, a puddle appears on the highway
• I know I was deceived only by trusting other sensations (approaching the place and finding no water)
• I cannot know I was deceived without using other sensations to correct my judgment
• Principle: The senses cannot be criticized except by other senses

Healthy vs. Diseased Taste #

• A person with a healthy taste judges honey to be sweet
• A person with a diseased tongue judges honey to be bitter
• If taste sensed only its own undergoing (and nothing outside), both would be judging truly according to their affection
• But in fact, the diseased person is judging falsely
• Therefore: The sense must judge according to the external thing, not merely according to its own affection

The Gold Mountain #

• I can imagine a gold mountain even though no gold mountain exists outside
• This shows that imagination, like understanding, can form an image of something not present
• But imagination does so by forming an image; understanding does so by forming a thought
• The thought the understanding forms (the verbum) is what is signified by words when we speak

Questions Addressed #

Q: If only intelligible forms are in the mind, how can we know external things? #

A: The intelligible form is a likeness of the external thing. Through receiving the form, the mind is actualized to know the thing itself. The form is the means of knowing, not the primary object of knowledge. We know the thing through the form, just as we see the color through the sensible form in the eye.

Q: Doesn’t the understanding depend on imagination the way sensation depends on the sensible form? #

A: Yes, with an important difference. Sensation directly receives the sensible form from the external thing. Understanding receives the intelligible form from the image (phantasm) in imagination. Since the thing understood is universal but does not exist universally outside the mind, the understanding must form a universal thought. This parallels imagination: I cannot imagine a gold mountain without forming an image, just as I cannot understand a triangle without forming a thought of what a triangle is.

Q: How can words signify if they only signify our internal thoughts, not external things? #

A: Words signify the thoughts we form, but these thoughts are about external things. When I speak the word “triangle,” I signify the thought of triangle that my understanding has formed. But this thought is a thought of the triangle—of the nature found in actual triangles outside my mind. So through the thought, the word refers to the external thing.

Q: Doesn’t this view lead to the sophistic conclusion that all opinions are equally true? #

A: No. Truth is saying what is, is, and what is not, is not. If you say “Berquist is sitting” (when he is), you are true. If you say “Berquist is standing” (when he is sitting), you are false. Truth depends on conformity with reality, not on the subjective affection of the knower. If we knew only our own undergoings, then contradictory opinions would both be true, and the sophistic error would follow. But we know the external thing, so reality determines truth.

Q: What makes you certain that external things exist if all you have are internal forms? #

A: It is through sensation, especially touch, that we are convinced of external things. Reason depends on sensation for its knowledge of externals. If sensation does not reach external things, reason cannot either. Moreover, any skeptic who doubts external things must rely on sensation to be convinced (e.g., by the sense of touch). The skeptic’s doubt is performatively refuted by his own reliance on sensation.

Notable Quotes #

“The stone is not in the soul, but the form of the stone is in the soul.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“Like is known by like.” — Ancient philosophical principle

“Our overthrow is your overthrow.” — Fragment attributed to Democritus, spoken by the senses to reason

“Kick him in the ass.” — Berquist’s teacher Kasurik, when asked how to argue with someone denying external things

“True is what? It’s saying what is, is, and what is not, is not.” — Berquist, defining truth

“If your senses don’t convince you… then reason is further away, right? Reason knows about the things outside of us through the senses.” — Berquist, on the dependence of reason on sensation