Lecture 148

148. Understanding Multiple Things and Composition in the Mind

Summary
This lecture explores whether the human understanding can grasp multiple things simultaneously, establishing that while God understands all things through one simple act, humans must understand things either confusedly as parts of a whole or distinctly through separate acts. Berquist examines the nature of intelligible forms, the discrete (rather than continuous) character of thought, and how composition and division necessarily characterize human understanding as it proceeds from potency to act.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Whether Understanding Understands Multiple Things Together (Article 4) #

The central question is whether the human intellect can grasp many things simultaneously or must understand them sequentially. Berquist clarifies the Thomistic position: the understanding can grasp multiple things “by way of being one” but not “by way of being many.”

Key Principle: The understanding cannot be perfected by two intelligible forms of the same kind at the same time, just as clay cannot simultaneously be both a sphere and a cube.

The Distinction Between Continuous and Discrete Time #

Thomas distinguishes the temporal order that the soul transcends (continuous time—the numbering of motion) from a discrete kind of “time” in the operations of intellect and angels. Berquist emphasizes:

  • Continuous time: tied to bodily motion (the sun’s movement), with infinite divisibility and no “next” point
  • Discrete time: like numbers, with a determinate successor (after 6 comes 7), characterizing the succession of thoughts in reasoning
  • Thinking is therefore not continuous; thoughts are like numbers, not like geometrical lines

This explains why the soul can be in “purgatory for a long time” without being subject to earthly continuous time.

Understanding Wholes and Parts #

Parts can be understood in two ways:

  1. Confusedly: as contained in a whole through one intelligible form (e.g., seeing a painting as a whole)
  2. Distinctly: each through its own form, requiring separate acts of understanding (e.g., focusing on individual details in sequence)

When understanding confusedly, the parts are grasped together through the one form of the whole.

Intelligible Forms and the Unity of the Mind #

All intelligible forms are of one genus (perfections of the one power of understanding), even though the things they represent may be of diverse genera. Therefore, the mind cannot be simultaneously perfected by two diverse intelligible forms as it can acquire diverse sensible qualities (like color and smell in an apple, which are of different sensible kinds).

Composition and Division (Article 5) #

The human understanding necessarily understands through composition and division because:

  • Human understanding proceeds from potency to act, acquiring knowledge gradually
  • The understanding first grasps the quidditas (what-it-is) of a thing
  • It then must compose or divide to understand what properties belong or do not belong to the thing grasped
  • From one composition/division, it proceeds to another through reasoning (the syllogism)

In contrast, God and the angels, having their whole perfection at once, understand through one simple act what humans must discover through multiple compositions and reasonings.

The Hierarchy of Intelligences #

Berquist presents a descending hierarchy:

  • God: Understands all things through understanding Himself alone (one simple act)
  • Higher angels: Understand themselves completely; need additional thoughts for what they do not contain
  • Lower angels: Require more thoughts as they descend in nature
  • Humans: Require the most thoughts, approaching understanding most gradually and discretely

The human mind strives to be more like its guardian angel, grasping two things together (as in understanding the distinction between polygon and circle as a limiting case).

Key Arguments #

Against the Plurality of Understanding #

Objection 1: Understanding is above time

  • If understanding transcends time and before/after belong to time, then understanding should grasp many things together without succession
  • Response: The understanding transcends continuous bodily time but not discrete succession in thought. Augustine calls this discrete before-and-after “time” equivocally.

Objection 2: Diverse forms not opposed can be together

  • Color and smell coexist in an apple without opposition; therefore, diverse intelligible forms should coexist in the mind
  • Response: While color and smell are different kinds of sensible qualities, all intelligible forms are of one kind (perfections of one power). Just as clay cannot be simultaneously a sphere and a cube, the mind cannot be perfected by two forms of the same kind at once.

Objection 3: Understanding wholes involves understanding parts together

  • A whole contains many parts; therefore, understanding the whole means understanding many things together
  • Response: Parts understood confusedly as within a whole are grasped through one form. Distinct understanding of each part requires separate acts.

Objection 4: Knowing differences requires grasping things together

  • One cannot know that a dog differs from a cat without knowing both together
  • Response: When understanding the difference or comparison, both are grasped under one thought of the comparison itself, making them one in that respect.

For Composition and Division #

Against composition and division:

Objection 1: Composition requires understanding many things, which is impossible

  • Response: In composition/division, many things are made one through the comparison or difference itself

Objection 2: Composition and division involve time; understanding abstracts from time

  • Response: While understanding abstracts from images themselves, it must turn back toward images (which are in time) to understand in act

Objection 3: Understanding knows by likeness to things; composition is not in things

  • Response: The likeness is received according to the mode of the understanding, not the mode of the thing. Real composition in things (form to matter, accident to substance) corresponds to composition in the understanding.

For composition and division:

  • Vocal sounds signify the concepts/thoughts of the understanding (Aristotle, Perihermeneus)
  • In vocal sounds there is clear composition and division in affirmative and negative propositions
  • Therefore, the understanding composes and divides

Important Definitions #

Intelligible Form (species intelligibilis): That by which the understanding understands; not what is understood, but the means through which understanding occurs

Quidditas (What-it-is): The essence or whatness of a thing; the first thing grasped by the understanding. Also expressed as quidditative knowledge—understanding what a thing fundamentally is.

Composition and Division (compositio et divisio): The second act of reason, where the understanding puts together or separates things in affirmative statements (composing) or negative statements (dividing)

Discrete (discretum) vs. Continuous (continuum):

  • Discrete: possesses a determinate successor (like numbers: 6, 7, 8). Characteristic of thought and reasoning.
  • Continuous: possesses infinite divisibility and no determinate next point (like geometrical lines and bodily time)

Simple Apprehension vs. Composition/Division:

  • Simple apprehension: grasping what a thing is without affirming or denying
  • Composition/Division: affirming that something is or denying that something is not

Confused Knowledge (confuse) vs. Distinct Knowledge (distincte):

  • Confused: grasping something indistinctly (e.g., knowing “animal” without distinguishing dog from cat)
  • Distinct: grasping something precisely (e.g., knowing specifically what a dog is)

Examples & Illustrations #

The Trial by Fire of St. Dominic #

Berquist opens with an anecdote where St. Dominic debated heretics publicly. When the townspeople could not decide between them, they tested both by fire: the heretics’ writings burned, while Dominic’s were unharmed. (Berquist notes the church may still possess wood from this trial.)

The Apple: Color and Smell #

An apple can simultaneously possess both color and smell because these are different kinds of sensible qualities. However, it cannot be both red and blue at the same time in the same part, illustrating that things of the same kind cannot coexist in the same subject.

The Square and Triangle #

Understanding that a square has more sides than a triangle requires thinking of both together. This comparison unifies them in one thought of the difference itself.

The Polygon Approaching a Circle #

By inscribing and bisecting chords in a circle to create successive polygons, each closer to the circle’s area, the mind grasps a distinction between polygon and circle as a limiting case. Though never achieving equality, the mind comprehends two things together through their relationship.

The Painting: Confused vs. Distinct Knowledge #

When viewing a painting as a whole, one sees all elements confusedly together. When focusing on how the artist executed a particular section, attention narrows to distinct knowledge of that part. This mirrors how the understanding can know parts confusedly in the whole or distinctly through separate acts.

The Triangle’s Interior Angles #

Understanding what a triangle is does not immediately reveal that its interior angles equal two right angles. This requires reasoning through theorems about parallel lines (drawing a line through a vertex parallel to the base), using alternate interior angles, and seeing how the three angles of the triangle correspond to two right angles. The angelic or divine understanding would see this immediately upon understanding what a triangle is.

The Anatomy Example #

An anatomist first grasps the human being as a whole. Later, focused study examines the arm distinctly, then on another day the foot distinctly. These are separate, distinct acts of understanding, showing how detailed knowledge of parts cannot occur simultaneously with detailed knowledge of other parts.

Shakespeare on Reason #

Berquist quotes Shakespeare’s definition of reason as “the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after,” illustrating that human reasoning proceeds step by step through time, with one thought following another.

The Archworm and the Angel #

Berquist relates an anecdote describing an angel observing a human making a decision as comparable to a human watching an archworm move—so slow is human deliberation compared to the angel’s instantaneous understanding.

The Guardian Angel and Divine Majesty #

When encountering one’s guardian angel after death, one might say, “This is God!” The angel corrects this, saying God Himself is even more marvelous, and while accepting admiration, redirects it properly to God.

Mozart Collection Analogy #

Berquist uses his personal experience of possessing a 600-piece Mozart collection: he cannot listen to all pieces simultaneously, cannot hear the first movement and second movement of a symphony at once, and must rotate through symphonies, concertos, and sonatas. This mirrors the human mind’s limitation: it cannot know many particular things distinctly at the same time.

Notable Quotes #

“The understanding is able to understand many things by way of being one of those many things, but it cannot understand many by way of being many.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“God understands all things at once because he sees all things by one thing, which is his own essence.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“The understanding is above the time that is a number of the motion of bodily things.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“Thoughts are like numbers.” — Aristotle, cited by Berquist to show that thinking is discrete rather than continuous

“Reason is the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after.” — Shakespeare (via Berquist)

“God moves the spiritual creature through time.” — Augustine, On Genesis (cited by Berquist to indicate a discrete kind of time proper to angels)

Questions Addressed #

Can the Understanding Grasp Multiple Things Simultaneously? #

Question: If the understanding cannot be perfected by two intelligible forms of the same kind at once, how can it understand wholes with their parts, or grasp differences between things?

Resolution:

  • When understanding a whole with its parts confusedly, the understanding grasps them through one form (the form of the whole itself)
  • When understanding differences or comparisons, both things are grasped under one unified thought of the comparison or difference
  • Only when seeking distinct knowledge of each element separately does the understanding require separate successive acts

Why Must Human Understanding Use Composition and Division? #

Question: If understanding is above time and particular conditions, why must it engage in composition and division, which seem to involve temporal succession?

Resolution:

  • Human understanding proceeds from potency to act (unlike God and angels, who possess their whole perfection at once)
  • The understanding first grasps the quidditas (what-it-is), then gradually discovers what properties belong or do not belong to it
  • This gradual acquisition of knowledge necessitates composition (affirming properties) and division (denying improper properties)
  • When turning back toward images to understand in act, the understanding re-enters contact with time through the continuous nature of imagination

What is the Relationship Between Continuous and Discrete Time? #

Question: How can the soul be “in purgatory a long time” without being subject to continuous bodily time?

Resolution:

  • Continuous time is the numbering of before-and-after in bodily motion (e.g., the motion of the sun), characterized by infinite divisibility and no determinate “next” point
  • Discrete time characterizes the succession of intellectual operations (thoughts following thoughts), possessing determinate succession like numbers (6, then 7, then 8)
  • The soul, though transcending continuous bodily time, remains subject to this discrete kind of temporal succession in its operations
  • Augustine calls this latter kind “time” equivocally, noting that God moves even spiritual creatures through such discrete succession