Ethics #
A systematic study of Aristotelian ethics and moral philosophy. These lectures examine fundamental questions about the nature of good, human desire, and the ultimate end of human life, developing an understanding of virtue, the mean between extremes, and the relationship between happiness and virtuous action.
Listen #
Lectures #
1. Definition, Examples, and the Question of Good as Cause or Effect #
This lecture explores the Socratic method of distinguishing between examples and universal definitions, using the nature of good as the primary case study. Berquist applies Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue to the foundational question: Is something good because we want it, or do we want it because it is good? He employs inductive reasoning to examine particular goods (food, water, sleep, health, etc.) and their corresponding desires, arguing that goodness is the cause of desire rather than its effect.
2. Good as Cause of Desire: Resolving the Objections #
This lecture resolves two major objections to the thesis that good is the cause of desire rather than desire being the cause of good. Berquist argues that the good as known (through sensation or reason) is the proper object of desire, and uses this insight to explain why people sometimes don’t desire genuine goods (due to ignorance) and sometimes desire apparent goods or bad things (due to deception or incomplete knowledge). The analysis draws on Thomas Aquinas’s treatise on love and concludes that the bad is never desired as bad, only insofar as it resembles or contains some real good.
3. The Better: Logic, Desire, and Comparative Goodness #
Building on the foundational understanding that we want things because they are good (not vice versa), this lecture introduces the concept of “the better” (melius) and applies conditional logic to show that something cannot be better merely because we want it more. Berquist reviews the inductive argument about goodness as cause of desire, addresses remaining objections, teaches the logical structure of if-then statements, and begins discussing which kinds of human goods are better than others, setting up the framework for understanding Socrates’ disagreement with the Athenians in Plato’s Apology.
4. The Better and the Hierarchy of Human Goods #
This lecture examines how something is determined to be ‘better’ as distinct from merely being ‘good,’ establishing that something is not better because we want it more. Berquist develops the principle that the end is always better than the means through both inductive examples and the universal principle of causality, then applies this to analyze the three categories of human goods: exterior goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. The disagreement between Socrates and the Athenians about which goods are superior is revealed to be a fundamental disagreement about the very purpose and end of human life.
5. A Thing’s Own Act Is Its End: The Two-Layered Induction #
This lecture establishes through systematic induction that a thing’s own act is its end or purpose. Beginning with tools, then organs, then occupations, Berquist demonstrates that in each case, a thing’s distinctive activity (what it alone does or does best) constitutes its purpose or end. He then applies this principle to man, arguing that since man’s own act is the act with reason, man’s end must be the act with reason done well, or equivalently, the act with reason according to human virtue.
6. Virtue, the Eye’s Own Act, and Man’s Purpose #
This lecture explores the concept of virtue in its broad philosophical sense as the quality that enables a thing to perform its own act well. Through the example of the eye’s virtue (proper corneal shape enabling good vision), Berquist illustrates how virtue differs from the act itself while being essential to it. The discussion connects this understanding to the larger framework of man’s purpose as the act with reason done well throughout life, establishing why discovering a thing’s own act is prerequisite to understanding its virtue.
7. The Three Goods of Man and Their Hierarchy #
This lecture examines the classical division of human goods into goods of the soul, goods of the body, and exterior goods, establishing their proper hierarchy through inductive and syllogistic reasoning. Berquist demonstrates that the goods of the soul are superior to bodily and exterior goods by showing that exterior goods exist for the sake of interior goods, and that goods of the soul are closer to man’s ultimate end. The lecture addresses why people mistakenly prioritize lesser goods and explains this through the principle that what is more known is more desired.
8. Practical Philosophy, the End of Man, and the Division of Human Goods #
This lecture establishes the foundational principles of practical philosophy by examining what it studies—chiefly the end (purpose) of man and all human goods. Berquist develops the argument that practical philosophy must address not only goods of the soul but also goods of the body and exterior goods, while demonstrating through inductive reasoning that goods of the soul are superior because they are closest to man’s ultimate end. The lecture introduces the connection between a thing’s own act and its purpose, and concludes by previewing how this leads necessarily to the study of human virtue.
9. Virtue in General and the Division of Human Virtue #
This lecture explores the foundational relationship between a thing’s virtue and its own act, using concrete examples like knives and pianos to establish the principle that virtue is the condition enabling proper function. Berquist then moves to the division of human virtue into intellectual virtues (virtues of reason) and moral virtues (virtues that partake of reason), presenting both Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’s organizational schemes and explaining why different divisions illuminate different aspects of virtue.
10. Moral Virtues and the Order of Their Treatment #
Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s ordering of the cardinal virtues in the Summa Theologiae II-II and compares it with Aristotle’s ordering in the Nicomachean Ethics. The lecture explores why Aristotle begins with courage and moderation (virtues concerning bodily emotions) before progressing to justice and the lesser moral virtues. Berquist explains the theological versus philosophical ordering of virtues, showing how theology proceeds from God downward while philosophy proceeds from creatures upward to God.
11. The Definition of Moral Virtue and the Mean #
This lecture develops Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue from the Nicomachean Ethics, establishing that moral virtue is a habit or disposition lying in the mean between two vicious extremes. Berquist carefully unpacks the five components of the definition: habit, choice, the mean, the mean toward us, and determination by right reason, illustrating each through practical examples from the arts and daily life. The lecture demonstrates that virtue is not equidistant from both extremes, showing how courage is closer to foolhardiness while moderation is closer to insensibility, and establishing that right reason (prudence/foresight) determines what is appropriate in each circumstance.
12. The Premium to the Nicomachean Ethics and the Human End #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s introduction (premium) to the Nicomachean Ethics, focusing on how Aristotle establishes that all human actions aim at some good, and that there must be a single chief good—the human end or purpose—to which all other goods are subordinated. Berquist explains the structure of the premium, the inductive argument for the existence of an ultimate end, and how the political art commands all other arts and sciences by aiming at the common good of the city.
13. Man’s Proper Function and the End of Human Life #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s method for determining man’s proper function (ergon) and ultimate end (eudaimonia) through inductive elimination of functions shared with plants and animals. Berquist explores how the discovery that man’s unique function is activity of the soul in accordance with reason grounds the definition of human good as virtuous activity, and discusses how this definition must account for the complete life rather than momentary acts.