Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005) #
A systematic study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and first philosophy. These lectures trace the ascent from sensation to wisdom, examining being as being, substance and accident, act and potency, and the first causes—culminating in knowledge of God as pure actuality and first principle.
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Lectures #
1. The Title and Naming of Aristotle’s Metaphysics #
This lecture examines the origins and meanings of the title ‘Metaphysics’ for Aristotle’s 14 Books of Wisdom, tracing how Andronicus of Rhodes’s editorial placement created a misleading name that persists through custom. Berquist argues for alternative titles—‘14 Books of Wisdom’ or ‘14 Books of First Philosophy’—and explores the three distinct meanings of ‘First Philosophy’: first in dignity/worth, first in the order of knowledge a lover of wisdom would pursue, and first in subject matter (first causes and principles). The lecture also introduces the distinction between editorial/reference division and logical/understandable division of texts, establishing foundational concepts for understanding how philosophical works are organized and understood.
2. Aristotle’s Opening Statement and the Natural Road in Knowledge #
Berquist analyzes Aristotle’s famous opening statement of the Metaphysics—‘All men by nature desire to know’—examining its meaning, truth, and purpose. He explores the distinction between identi (to understand) and to know, examines signs that verify the statement’s truth through sensory experience and curiosity, and introduces the natural road in knowledge as the foundational progression from sensation into reason. The lecture establishes that wisdom, as the perfection of reason, is the goal toward which all human knowledge naturally tends.
3. Experience, Art, and the Wisdom of Knowing Causes #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s natural road of knowledge from sensation through memory to experience and finally to art/science (techne/episteme), demonstrating how wisdom consists fundamentally in knowing causes rather than merely knowing facts. Berquist examines two critical differences between experience and art/science: first, that experience knows singulars while art/science knows universals, and second, that experience knows only ’that something is so’ while art/science knows ‘why it is so.’ Through multiple examples—from medicine to education to political governance—the lecture establishes that the man of art or science who understands causes is wiser than the man of mere experience, and that wisdom consists more in knowing than in doing.
4. Wisdom, Teaching, and Knowledge of Causes #
Berquist develops Aristotle’s three arguments for why wisdom consists in knowledge of causes rather than mere experience or sensation. The lecture traces the natural progression of human knowledge from sensation through memory, experience, and art/science toward wisdom as knowledge of first causes. Through the examples of teachers, artists, and craftsmen, Berquist demonstrates that the ability to teach and explain why something is so—rather than merely knowing that it is so—marks the wise person.
5. The Six Attributes of Wisdom and Two Senses of Universality #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s construction of a six-part description of the wise man and wisdom, establishing that wisdom must be about both what is said of all things and what is the cause of all things. Berquist emphasizes the critical distinction between universale in praedicando (what is predicated of many) and universale in causando (what causes all things), arguing that conflating these two senses leads to pantheistic errors like Hegel’s. The lecture develops three arguments showing how the first three attributes of wisdom lead to knowledge of universals, while the last three lead to knowledge of first causes.
6. Wisdom as Universal and Causal Knowledge #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s foundational account of wisdom (sophia) in the Proem of the Metaphysics, demonstrating through six attributes of the wise man how wisdom must concern itself with what is said of all things (universals) and with first causes. Berquist emphasizes the critical distinction between these two senses of ‘common to all’ and shows how ascending to greater universality provides greater certainty and understanding.
7. Wisdom as Contemplative, Liberal, and Divine Knowledge #
This lecture establishes that wisdom (sophia) is contemplative rather than practical knowledge by analyzing philosophy’s origins in wonder rather than necessity. Berquist demonstrates that wisdom is liberal (free) knowledge pursued for its own sake, not servile knowledge serving external purposes. He argues that wisdom transcends ordinary human capacity and is more divine than human, while remaining the most honorable of all knowledge because it concerns God and what God most perfectly possesses.
8. Wisdom as Knowledge of God and the Beginning of Wonder #
This lecture explores wisdom as the most divine knowledge in both senses—knowledge about God and knowledge had by God. Berquist examines how wisdom concerns the first cause through the lens of Heraclitus, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato, emphasizing that philosophical wonder arises not from mere ignorance but from encountering what contradicts expectation. The lecture also clarifies the double meaning inherent in phrases like ‘knowledge of God,’ paralleling how ‘definition of reason’ is knowledge of reason in both senses.
9. Four Causes and the Method of Learning from Predecessors #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes (matter, form, mover, and end) as the fundamental framework for understanding causation in natural philosophy and metaphysics. Berquist examines why it is reasonable to learn from predecessors rather than discover everything oneself, using the principle that wisdom—the most desirable knowledge—is best acquired through learning from those who have already achieved it. The lecture establishes the methodological foundation for examining pre-Socratic thought in subsequent discussions.
10. Thales, Anaximander, and the Search for First Principles #
This lecture examines the pre-Socratic philosophers’ quest for the arche (first principle) of all things, beginning with Thales’ hypothesis that water is the beginning of all things and Anaximander’s refinement into the concept of the unlimited (apeiron). Berquist demonstrates how these early natural philosophers make reasonable guesses based on rational considerations about simplicity, formlessness, and order, and shows how their thinking anticipates later theological insights about God’s attributes and the nature of causality.
11. The Pre-Socratics: From Matter to Form to Mover #
This lecture traces the development of early Greek philosophy from Thales through Heraclitus, examining how successive thinkers progressively discover different kinds of causes: matter (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), form (Pythagoras), and mover/change (Heraclitus). Berquist shows how these philosophers improve upon one another’s guesses about the beginning of all things, moving from water to the unlimited to air, and introduces the critical insight that nature is fundamentally about change between contraries.
12. Heraclitus, Change, and the Problem of Contradiction #
This lecture explores Heraclitus’s doctrine of universal flux and his apparent admission that opposites are the same, which generates a fundamental dichotomy in ancient philosophy: either everything changes (Heraclitus) and contradiction is real, or nothing changes (Parmenides) and change is illusion. Berquist examines how Heraclitus uses apparent contradictions to stimulate thinking, discusses the hidden harmony of opposites, explores Heraclitus’s identification of fire as both first matter and mover, and shows how this anticipates later developments in understanding the distinction between material and efficient causes.
13. Empedocles: Elements, Love, Hate, and Change #
This lecture examines Empedocles’ philosophical response to the pre-Socratic problem of finding a single first matter. Berquist explores how Empedocles proposes four basic elements (earth, fire, air, water) distinguished by the contraries hot/cold and wet/dry, combined in numerical ratios to explain material diversity. The lecture covers Empedocles’ rejection of true generation and corruption in favor of mixing and separation, his introduction of Love and Hate as cosmic movers, and the implications for understanding change and causation in ancient and modern philosophy.
14. Anaxagoras on Matter, Continuity, and Mind #
This lecture explores Anaxagoras’s theory that everything comes from everything through the principle that nothing comes from nothing, leading to the conclusion that infinitesimal parts of all things exist in everything. Berquist examines Anaxagoras’s understanding of the continuous—that lines are divisible forever and cannot be composed of points—and introduces Anaxagoras’s revolutionary argument that a greater mind (nous) must exist as the cause of order in the natural world, separate from and ruling over matter.
15. Anaxagoras on Mind: Unlimited, Self-Ruling, and Unmixed #
This lecture examines Anaxagoras’s theory of the greater mind (nous) through the lens of three fundamental characteristics: that mind is unlimited in its ability to know, self-ruling through logic and reason, and unmixed with matter to maintain its ruling power. Berquist uses contemporary examples from military hierarchy, jurisprudence, and industry to illuminate the principle that the ruler must be separated from the ruled, and argues that this principle applies both to governance and to epistemology. The lecture also connects Anaxagoras’s understanding of mind to Christian theology, specifically to understanding the Trinity through the concept of relation (pros te).
16. Mind, Self-Rule, and the Separation of Known from Unknown #
This lecture examines Anaxagoras’s doctrine that the greater mind (νοῦς/nous) must be unmixed with matter and explores the apparent contradiction between mind being self-ruling and the principle that rulers must be separated from the ruled. Through Socratic method and concrete examples, Berquist resolves this paradox by showing that self-rule operates through the separation of what is known from what is unknown, establishing the logical and epistemological conditions for genuine self-governance.
17. Leucippus, Democritus, and Atomic Determinism #
This lecture examines the pre-Socratic philosophers Leucippus and Democritus, focusing on their doctrine of determinism and atomic theory. Berquist explores how Leucippus’s principle that “nothing happens at random” became foundational to modern science, traces the development of atomic theory through a thought experiment, and discusses the paradox of the void. The lecture also connects ancient atomism to modern quantum mechanics and examines how Democritus’s materialism contrasts with idealism and dualism.
18. Man’s Orientation Toward Truth: Easy and Difficult #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s foundational question about how man is oriented toward knowing truth—specifically whether truth-seeking is easy or difficult for human beings. Berquist establishes that both truth’s existence and man’s capacity to know truth are obvious (per se notum) and need not be questioned, then explores the paradox that while everyone grasps some truth, the most illuminating things are most difficult for us to know. The lecture emphasizes that difficulty in knowing truth stems primarily from defects in us (our cognitive weakness) rather than from the things themselves, and connects this analysis to Aristotle’s treatment of the wise man’s architectonic role in determining proper methods across all sciences.
19. Truth: Easy and Difficult for Man #
Berquist examines Aristotle’s paradoxical teaching that truth is both easy and difficult for man. The lecture explores three ways truth is easy (universal participation, cumulative progress through many, and foundational truths everyone grasps) and analyzes whether the difficulty of truth lies in the things themselves or in our weak minds. The discussion connects to why wisdom, concerned with first causes, is most concerned with truth, and emphasizes man’s dependence on others—both those who share our positions and those we must refute—in the pursuit of truth.
20. Truth, Wisdom, and First Causes in Aristotle #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s paradoxical claim that knowing truth is both easy and difficult, explores why the consideration of truth belongs most properly to the wise man (first philosophy), and introduces the crucial principle that effects possess properties in a derivative way from their causes. Berquist develops the argument that wisdom, as knowledge of first causes, is most fundamentally about truth itself, and establishes the logical foundation for demonstrating that first causes must exist.
21. First Causes and the Infinity Problem in Causation #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s arguments for the necessity of first causes across all four kinds of causation, with particular emphasis on the impossibility of infinite regress. Berquist explores how the concept of a ‘moved mover’ (a caused cause) logically requires an unmoved mover, applies this principle to matter, form, and end, and illustrates these abstract arguments through concrete examples. The lecture also discusses the pedagogical balance between hope and fear in philosophical inquiry, connecting Aristotelian arguments to broader spiritual and intellectual formation.
22. The Necessity of First Causes and the Problem of Infinite Regress #
This lecture demonstrates Aristotle’s arguments that causal chains cannot extend infinitely in any of the four kinds of causes—mover, matter, form, and end. Berquist shows how infinite regress in each category leads to contradictions and the elimination of causation itself, establishing the necessity of first causes in each kind. The lecture also introduces the problem of methodology and how custom, rather than argument, typically determines how we proceed in inquiry.
23. Custom, Method, and the Proper Way of Proceeding #
This lecture examines how custom shapes not only what we think but how we think, exploring the distinction between the content of knowledge and the proper method for acquiring it. Berquist uses Aristotle’s fifth reading from Book II of the Metaphysics to argue that the way of proceeding in any reasoned knowledge must fit the subject matter rather than conform to custom or individual inclination. The lecture illustrates this principle through diverse examples: mechanical arts, sensory perception, and linguistic precision, establishing that methodology must be proportionate to what is being studied.
24. Doubting Well and Discovery in Wisdom #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s teaching that examining difficulties and contradictions beforehand is necessary for discovery in wisdom and natural philosophy. Berquist explains the method of ‘doubting well’ (bene dubitare) through multiple disciplines—medieval theology, modern physics, and literature—demonstrating that formulating the right question and recognizing genuine contradictions are essential steps toward untying the knots of ignorance and advancing knowledge.
25. The Role of Contradiction in Discovery and Knowledge #
This lecture examines how contradiction and apparent paradoxes function as essential catalysts in the discovery of truth across philosophy, natural science, and theology. Drawing on Aristotle’s account of examining difficulties beforehand, Berquist traces this insight through Heraclitus, twentieth-century physicists (Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Einstein), and theological examples, arguing that recognizing contradictions orients the mind toward truth and serves as a sign of progress when contradictions are resolved.
26. Wisdom, Causes, and Axioms in Aristotelian Philosophy #
This lecture explores the foundational questions of Aristotelian wisdom: which causes wisdom studies, whether wisdom must consider axioms or only substances, and how equivocation in terms affects our understanding of axioms. Berquist uses examples from theology and mathematics to show why defending axioms against objections is necessary for achieving distinct knowledge, drawing on Aristotle’s doctrine that discovery requires examining difficulties beforehand.
27. Axioms, First Principles, and the Central Question of Philosophy #
This lecture explores why wisdom must investigate axioms and first principles despite their being universally known, using the example of ’the whole is greater than a part’ to show how equivocation on word meanings reveals confused rather than distinct knowledge. Berquist then moves to the central philosophical question: Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are? He contrasts Plato’s affirmative answer (leading to forms and mathematical substances) with Aristotle’s negative answer, showing how this question underwrites debates about immaterial substances and the nature of knowledge itself.
28. Wisdom’s Subject Matter: Substances and Immaterial Causes #
This lecture explores the foundational questions about wisdom’s proper subject matter, particularly whether wisdom concerns only material substances or also immaterial ones. Berquist examines how natural philosophy leads to recognition of immaterial substances (the unmoved mover, the greater mind, the human soul) and discusses the disagreement among philosophers about whether immaterial causes exist at all, whether they exist in matter or without matter, and whether they are one or many. The lecture addresses Plato’s theory of separated forms and mathematical things as a response to the assumption that the way we know must be the way things are.
29. Division, Whole and Part, and the Four Senses of Causality #
This lecture explores division (divisio) as a method for discovering the fundamental principles and causes of things, examining four distinct senses of whole and part: quantitative, universal, definitional, and matter-form. Berquist demonstrates how different methods of division—corresponding to materialist, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions—lead to different answers about what constitutes the beginning of things, using the example of the word ‘cat’ and its letters to illustrate the elusive distinction between intrinsic material parts and formal principles.
30. The Six Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics #
Berquist examines the first six fundamental questions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book III, which concern the nature of causes, the relationship between matter and mind, and the distinction between the one (as principle of number) and being itself. He explores how these questions expose a critical philosophical gap: the necessity of understanding immaterial mind as independent from matter before one can properly ask whether mind is responsible for matter’s existence. The lecture emphasizes that neglecting the intermediate position between materialism and Platonism makes the ascent to truth philosophically impossible.
31. Being as Being and Reasoned Knowledge #
Berquist introduces the foundational concept of Aristotle’s metaphysics: that there exists a reasoned-out knowledge (ἐπιστήμη/episteme) which considers being as being and what belongs to it through itself (κατὰ τὸ/kath’auto, per se). The lecture explores the relationship between wisdom and being, examines how being can be the subject of a unified science despite its equivocity, and explains why wisdom must consider universal principles that apply to all things. Through detailed analysis of the concept of per se (through itself/as such), Berquist establishes why particular sciences are limited in scope while wisdom alone can consider being in its universality.
32. Being as Being and the Unity of Wisdom #
Berquist examines Aristotle’s foundational argument that wisdom is the reasoned-out knowledge (episteme) of being as being, not merely a particular science. He addresses the apparent problem of equivocation: if being is said in multiple ways, how can there be one unified science of it? Through the distinction between equivocation by chance and equivocation by reason, and using political philosophy as an exemplary case, Berquist demonstrates how the universality of a cause correlates with the universality of its subject, establishing why the science seeking the first cause must study what is said of all things.
33. Equivocation by Reason and the Unity of Being #
This lecture explores how being is said equivocally by reason rather than by chance, allowing for a unified science of being despite the word’s multiple meanings. Berquist examines the distinction between equivocation by chance and equivocation by reason through examples of theological concepts (imago dei, grace, theological virtues), natural examples (healthy, medical, political), and scholastic logic. The lecture emphasizes how Thomas Aquinas identifies four ordered meanings of being—substance, accident, coming-to-be, and privation—all referring back to substance as their primary meaning, and demonstrates why understanding equivocation is critical for both philosophy and defending axioms against sophistical arguments.
34. Axioms, Equivocation, and the Defense of First Principles #
This lecture examines why axioms (self-evident first principles) must be defended against sophistic objections, despite being known to all people. Berquist explains how equivocation—particularly equivocation by reason—creates confusion about axioms, and demonstrates why only the wise man (the metaphysician) can properly defend them. The lecture introduces ’the great turnaround,’ showing how Aristotle’s treatment of topics reverses the order in which wisdom’s subject matter is introduced.
35. The Six Senses of Beginning and Equivocation by Reason #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s analysis of the word ‘beginning’ (ἀρχή/arche) in Book 5 of the Metaphysics, distinguishing six senses through which ‘beginning’ is equivocal by reason rather than by chance. Berquist explains how understanding equivocal terms is essential for defending axioms and establishing a coherent science of being, and demonstrates the principle that small mistakes in the beginning lead to great errors in the end. The lecture also introduces the framework for understanding being according to different categories: being by happening (accidental being) versus being per se (essential being).
36. Being Per Se: Three Groups of Meanings #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s division of being into accidental being (kata symbebekos) and being per se (kath’auto), with detailed analysis of three groups of meanings within being per se: being according to figures of predication (categories), being as true/false (including beings of reason), and being as act/potency. Berquist emphasizes how these distinctions are essential for understanding equivocation in being and how wisdom ascends from less universal to more universal senses of being.
37. Being and Becoming: Motion, Time, and Perfection #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s analysis of becoming and being in relation to motion and time, drawing connections to the problem of instantaneous change (particularly in transubstantiation). Berquist then transitions to a detailed examination of the word ‘perfect’ (teleios) and its three distinct meanings: having all parts, possessing all the ability of one’s kind, and achieving one’s end or purpose. Throughout, he emphasizes how understanding these distinctions illuminates both metaphysics and theology.
38. Nature, Art, and Choice: Distinguishing the Sciences #
Berquist explores Aristotle’s fundamental distinction between nature (intrinsic cause), art (extrinsic cause), and choice (cause in the agent) to separate natural philosophy from making and doing sciences, and ultimately to establish wisdom as a distinct looking science. The lecture demonstrates how this threefold causal distinction provides the framework for understanding the hierarchy and relationships among all forms of reasoned knowledge.
39. The Three Looking Sciences and Their Distinctions #
Berquist explores how Aristotle distinguishes the three kinds of looking (speculative) philosophy—natural philosophy, mathematics, and first philosophy (wisdom)—by their relationship to matter and change rather than by their end. He explains why mathematical objects can be understood without matter despite existing in matter, and establishes the unique order of philosophical inquiry that begins with things needing not to be in matter but capable of it, ascending toward pure immaterial substances.
40. Accidental Being and the Limits of Wisdom #
This lecture examines accidental being (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) as one of the key senses of being discussed in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book 5, and argues why accidental being cannot be the primary concern of wisdom or science. Berquist explores two fundamental reasons: first, no reasoned-out knowledge addresses the accidental because science concerns what belongs to things as such or through themselves; second, accidental being ‘hardly is’—it lacks the reality and necessity of essential being. The lecture illustrates these principles through literary examples (Romeo and Juliet, Oedipus Rex) and practical cases (the Christian geometer, Senator Bridges), while acknowledging that accidental being, though philosophically marginal, profoundly influences human life and is the proper concern of historians, biographers, and poets.
41. Accidental Being and the Limits of Science #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s analysis of accidental being (kata symbebikos)—things that happen to belong together without intrinsic unity—and explains why there can be no science or art of the accidental. Berquist examines the distinction between things that exist always, for the most part, or rarely; analyzes accidental causation; and addresses the modern principle of determinism as it conflicts with Aristotelian metaphysics. The lecture concludes by establishing the fundamental distinction between truth (found in the mind) and goodness (found in things).
42. Truth in the Mind and the Contrariety of Knowledge and Love #
This lecture explores where truth and falsity are located, arguing they exist primarily in the mind through statements that compose or divide concepts, not in things themselves. Berquist contrasts this with goodness and badness, which exist in things, and develops the profound principle that knowledge and love operate in contrary ways: knowledge draws things into the mind, while love directs the heart toward the thing loved. He illustrates how this distinction affects theological considerations of God’s goodness (under substance) versus God’s truth (under operations), and reflects on how Plato and Aristotle differently approached understanding the first principles of all things.
43. Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories #
This lecture examines Porphyry’s Isagoge as a complete logical distinction of names said univocally of many things, distinguishing the five predicables (genus, difference, species, property, accident) and contrasting this with Aristotle’s ten categories. Berquist explores how univocal names differ from equivocal names, how the categories are distinguished by how names are said of individual substances, and how these logical distinctions reflect real metaphysical distinctions between substance and accident. The lecture also addresses how understanding these logical tools is essential for metaphysical inquiry and for avoiding philosophical errors such as those made by Descartes and Locke regarding motion.
44. Matter, Form, and the Principle of Change #
This lecture begins Book 8 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics by recalling the investigation of substance and introducing the distinction between matter and form in material substances. Berquist presents the classical problem of change posed by Heraclitus and Parmenides, resolves it through the concept of an underlying subject, and explains how accidental change differs fundamentally from substantial change. The lecture culminates in an analysis of prime matter and substantial form using the method of proportion.
45. Accidental and Substantial Form: The Proportion #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s distinction between accidental and substantial forms through the method of proportion, using the analogy of clay and shapes to explain how first matter underlies all change. Berquist examines how accidental forms differ from substantial forms in their relationship to being, and how neither matter alone nor form alone can account for what a thing fundamentally is. The lecture addresses why substantial form makes something ‘be’ simply, while accidental form makes something ‘be’ only in a qualified sense.
46. Matter and Form in Sensible Substance #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s analysis of sensible substances as composites of matter and form, examining how form actualizes matter’s potential and why form cannot be generated from matter. Berquist emphasizes the use of proportion to understand these principles, drawing connections to mathematics, natural philosophy, theology, and Scripture. The lecture addresses whether substantial forms can exist separately from matter and how this principle applies to immaterial substances like angels and the human soul.
47. Definitions, Numbers, and the Nature of Form #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s four-fold comparison between definitions and numbers to illuminate the nature of substantial form. Berquist demonstrates how both definitions and numbers share structural similarities: neither is infinitely divisible, both change entirely when an element is added or removed, both exhibit unity through act and potentiality, and neither admits of degree. Through this analogy, the lecture clarifies how form actualizes matter’s potential and why Plato’s separated forms are philosophically incoherent.
48. Matter, Form, and Their Union in Natural Substances #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s account of matter and form in Reading 4 of the Metaphysics, focusing on the distinction between remote and proximate matter, the relationship between matter and the other causes (especially the mover), and the nature of generation and corruption. Berquist explores how forms do not come to be from matter, why certain changes between contraries are reversible while others are not, and how matter and form are immediately united without requiring an external principle of unity.
49. The Unity of Matter and Form Through Act and Potency #
This lecture explores how matter and form achieve immediate unity without requiring an external cause, using the distinction between potency (ability) and act (actuality) as the explanatory framework. Berquist examines this problem through natural examples (clay and shape), mathematical cases (geometrical figures), and immaterial substances (angels and God), clarifying why people mistakenly look for a third thing to unite matter and form. The lecture also addresses the linguistic and conceptual difficulties that arise from applying spatial metaphors to non-spatial realities like composition.
50. Book 9 Structure: Potency and Act in Metaphysics #
This lecture introduces Aristotle’s Book 9 of the Metaphysics, which examines the distinction of being according to potency and act. Berquist explains how Book 9 is structured in three parts: the first part treats potency and act primarily in relation to motion and material change; the second part expands to a universal understanding of act and potency applicable to all beings including immaterial substances; and the third part examines the priority of act over potency, leading to the conclusion that the first cause must be pure act. The lecture emphasizes that understanding this distinction is essential for arriving at knowledge of God as the ultimate end of all knowledge.
51. Natural and Rational Abilities: Distinguishing Nature from Reason #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s distinction between natural abilities (determined to one of two contraries) and rational abilities (open to contraries or opposites). Berquist emphasizes that this distinction should not be misunderstood as an absolute separation, but rather as analogous to the relationship between two and three—reason possesses nature plus something more. The lecture addresses how modern philosophers (Mill, Sartre) err by denying that reason and will have any natural determination, and clarifies the proper understanding of this nuanced metaphysical principle.
52. Ability and Act: Refuting the Megarian Error #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s distinction between ability (potentiality) and act (actuality), particularly through his refutation of the Megarian position that denies real potentiality. Berquist explains the five senses of ability, distinguishes natural from rational abilities, and demonstrates how the Megarian error leads to four philosophical absurdities. The lecture emphasizes that motion, though seemingly most real to us, is actually the least actual of all acts, and explores how this distinction is fundamental to understanding change, becoming, and ultimately leads to God as pure act.
53. Rational Ability, Natural Ability, and the Role of Desire #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s distinction between natural abilities (determined to one effect) and rational abilities (capable of producing contraries), using this framework to explain how desire and choice determine which contrary act a rational being will perform. Berquist applies this analysis to God’s creative action, early Greek philosophy, and human moral agency, arguing that neither pure intellect nor pure desire alone fully explains causation—both are required.
54. Act and Ability: From Motion to Universal Understanding #
Reading 5-6 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book IX extends the discussion of act beyond motion to a more universal understanding. Berquist explains why act cannot be defined (drawing on Aristotle’s principle that not everything can be defined), how act is known through induction and proportion rather than definition, and introduces a crucial distinction between imperfect acts (motion, doing—incomplete while occurring) and perfect acts (operations like seeing, understanding, loving—complete while occurring). This distinction has profound implications for understanding human happiness and divine nature.
55. Act, Ability, and the Problem of Beauty #
This lecture explores the relationship between act (actus) and ability (potentia), arguing that act is prior in definition, being, and causation. Berquist uses extended examples—including Romeo and Juliet’s beauty, the philosopher reading, and learning—to illustrate the distinction between perfect and imperfect acts, and between intrinsic and transitive operations. The discussion culminates in applying these distinctions to divine nature, particularly whether God’s beauty exists for the sake of being seen by creatures, and how God’s infinite self-knowledge resolves apparent problems in Platonic philosophy.
56. Act and Ability: Definition, Being, and Time #
This lecture examines Aristotle’s demonstration that act is prior to ability in three crucial ways: in definition, in being, and in time. Berquist explores the distinction between ‘simply’ (haplōs) and ‘in some way’ (pōs)—a critical philosophical move that resolves apparent paradoxes and refutes materialism by establishing that the first cause must be pure act, not matter in ability.
57. Act and Ability: Perfection and Causality #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s doctrine of act (actus) and ability (potentia) as fundamental to understanding perfection, causality, and the nature of being. Berquist demonstrates that act is prior to ability in definition, time, substance, and perfection, using the distinction between eternal and corruptible things to illustrate why actuality must be better than potentiality. The lecture culminates in showing how this framework leads toward understanding God as pure act.
58. Act, Ability, and the Nature of Evil #
Berquist explores Aristotle’s demonstration that act is more perfect than ability, particularly through comparing act and ability in different things (eternal versus corruptible beings). The lecture develops the connection between this metaphysical principle and the nature of evil as privation (lack) rather than positive being, showing how this relates to the transcendentals (being, thing, one, something, true, good) and ultimately to God as pure act.
59. Act, Ability, and the Nature of Badness #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s doctrine that act is more perfect than ability, and the crucial distinction between badness as a positive act versus badness as a privation or lack. Berquist demonstrates how badness is fundamentally the non-being of an act in a subject apt by nature to have it, examining examples from moral disorder, physical defects, and intellectual error. The lecture concludes by showing how this understanding of badness as privation (rather than as being) proves that God, as pure act, cannot be bad, and that all truths harmonize when the first cause is recognized as the best thing.
60. Act, Knowability, and Truth in Being #
This lecture explores Aristotle’s metaphysical principles connecting act (actuality) to knowability and truth. Berquist demonstrates how act is more perfect and more knowable than ability (potency), using geometric examples to show that ability becomes knowable only through actualization. The discussion establishes the foundation for understanding why God, as pure act, is supremely knowable yet difficult for human minds to grasp, and why truth follows the order of being.
61. Truth, Being, and the Acts of Reason #
This lecture explores the nature of truth as primarily existing in the mind through composition and division, examining how truth relates to being and distinguishing between the two acts of reason. Berquist works through Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX to explain how truth operates differently in composite material things versus simple immaterial substances, and connects this to the Thomistic understanding of faith as assent while thinking about something.