38. Nature, Art, and Choice: Distinguishing the Sciences

Summary

Berquist explores Aristotle’s fundamental distinction between nature (intrinsic cause), art (extrinsic cause), and choice (cause in the agent) to separate natural philosophy from making and doing sciences, and ultimately to establish wisdom as a distinct looking science. The lecture demonstrates how this threefold causal distinction provides the framework for understanding the hierarchy and relationships among all forms of reasoned knowledge.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Three Causes and Their Natures #

Nature: An intrinsic, inward cause of motion and rest

The principle of change resides within the thing itself
Exemplified by growth: a tree grows taller because of what is within the tree, not from external agency
Original meaning derives from birth (γένεσις): the baby comes from within the mother
Extended analogically to any intrinsic source of motion or change (growing, falling, etc.)

Art: An extrinsic, external cause of making

The principle resides in the maker, not in the thing made
Exemplified by construction: bricks do not build themselves into a wall; the cause is in the bricklayer
The carpenter is not inside the chair; the cook is not inside the pie
Art is right reason about making, with definite rules that can be taught

Choice (προαίρεσις): The cause of action in the doer

Located in the agent who performs the action, not in the action itself
The basis for distinguishing ethical, domestic, and political sciences
Distinguished from nature because “nature cannot choose its origin” (Shakespeare, Hamlet)

Why These Distinctions Matter for Separating Sciences #

Because nature, art, and choice are fundamentally different kinds of causes, the sciences studying things characterized by each will necessarily be different:

Natural philosophy: Studies things that move or change due to an intrinsic principle
Making sciences: Study things produced by external art (carpentry, cooking, tailoring, etc.)
Doing sciences: Study right action arising from choice (ethics, domestic philosophy, political philosophy)

Since natural philosophy studies things with intrinsic causality of motion, it cannot be a making or doing science.

The “Hiding” of Nature and Evidence for Intrinsic Causation #

Heraclitus says “nature loves to hide because it’s within.” What is internal is hidden from view. Yet we can recognize intrinsic causation by observing that identical external conditions produce different effects based on what is within the thing:

A rock and a tree in the same soil, rain, and sunshine: one grows, the other doesn’t
This difference cannot be explained by external causes alone; something within is responsible
Therefore, we can infer the existence of nature even though it remains hidden

Mathematical Philosophy as Further Removed from Making and Doing #

If natural philosophy (which studies motion and matter) is not a making or doing science, then:

A fortiori, mathematics (which studies things without motion and defined without sensible matter) is not a making or doing science
And even more so, wisdom (which studies immaterial things) cannot be practical

The argument proceeds by showing the closest case (natural philosophy) is already speculative, so more abstract cases must be as well.

Distinguishing the Making Sciences: The Role of Matter #

The making sciences are primarily distinguished by the matter in which they work:

Carpentry works in wood; tailoring works in cloth; metalworking works in metal
Different materials require different tools and techniques
A carpenter uses hammers and saws; a tailor uses scissors and needles
Where the material requires fundamentally different ways of working, you have a different art

This principle applies even to fine arts:

The painter imitates in line and color; the musician imitates in sound
What they imitate (happy faces vs. sad faces, tragedy vs. comedy) is secondary; the primary distinction is the medium in which they imitate

Key Arguments #

The Causal Argument for Natural Philosophy’s Distinctness #

Nature is an intrinsic cause of motion and rest within a thing
Art is an extrinsic cause external to the thing made
Choice is a cause in the agent, not in the action performed
If sciences are distinguished by the kinds of causes they study, then natural philosophy (studying intrinsic causality) is distinct from making sciences (studying extrinsic causality) and doing sciences (studying choice)
Therefore, natural philosophy is neither a making nor a doing science

The Argument from Abstraction: Mathematics Cannot Be Practical #

Natural philosophy studies things with motion and defined with matter
Natural philosophy is not a making or doing science
Mathematics studies things without motion and defined without sensible matter (though they exist in matter)
If the science closer to making and doing (natural philosophy) is not practical, then the more abstract science (mathematics) certainly is not
Therefore, mathematics is not a making or doing science

The Hierarchical Argument for Three Looking Sciences #

Three kinds of being require three kinds of looking science:

Things that have matter and motion, defined with both → Natural philosophy
Things that have matter but defined without it → Mathematics
Things that do not depend on matter → Wisdom (First Philosophy)

This exhausts the logical possibilities given two pairs of opposites: (with/without matter) and (defined with/without matter).

Important Definitions #

Nature (φύσις): “A beginning and cause of motion and rest in that in which it is, being an inward cause, as such and not by happening.”

The intrinsic, active principle of motion characteristic of natural things
Distinguished from accidental properties (“not by happening”)
Contrasts sharply with art and choice

Art (τέχνη): Right reason about making with definite rules

An external cause whose principle resides in the maker’s mind and skill
Includes both productive arts (carpentry, cooking) and imitative arts (painting, music)
Teachable because it has rational principles

Choice (προαίρεσις): The cause of human actions in practical philosophy

The deliberate selection of means to achieve a good
Basis for moral virtue (habitual choice) and vice (habitual misdirected choice)
Defines the subject matter of ethics, domestic philosophy, and political philosophy

Examples & Illustrations #

The Tree and the Rock #

In the same soil, rain, and sunshine, a tree grows while a rock does not. This disparity cannot be explained by external causes alone; something within each substance accounts for the difference. The cause of the tree’s growth is internal to the tree; the cause of the rock’s inertness is also internal to the rock.

The Carpenter and the Chair #

When a carpenter makes a chair:

The art of carpentry is not in the chair itself
The carpenter is external to the chair
The form imposed on the wood comes from the carpenter’s mind and skill
This contrasts with natural growth, where the source of form and motion is within

The Bricklayer and the Brick Wall #

Bricks do not assemble themselves into a wall. The cause of the wall’s form is entirely external—in the bricklayer’s skill and intention. The material (bricks) is passive; all active causality resides in the agent.

The Cook and the Pie #

The cook is not inside the pie. The pie is made by external agency imposing form on ingredients. This exemplifies art as extrinsic causality.

Distinguishing Making Arts by Matter #

Carpentry (wood) vs. Tailoring (cloth): Different tools (hammer/saw vs. scissors/needle), different techniques
Blacksmithing (metal): Heats and bends metal, unlike woodworking
Glass-blowing: Works with fundamentally different material requiring different methods

Distinguishing Imitative Arts by Medium #

Painter: Imitates in line and color
Musician: Imitates in sound
Poet: Imitates in words
Primary distinction is the medium, not what is imitated

Questions Addressed #

Why is natural philosophy not a making or doing science? #

Answer: Because nature is an intrinsic cause of motion residing within the thing, whereas art and choice are extrinsic causes. Making and doing sciences study things that depend on external agency (art) or external choice (action), but natural things have their principle of motion within themselves. Therefore, natural philosophy studies a fundamentally different kind of causality and cannot be grouped with making or doing sciences.

How can we recognize nature if it “loves to hide”? #

Answer: Although nature is hidden because it is internal, we can recognize its presence by observing that identical external conditions produce different effects in different substances. A rock and a tree in the same environment behave differently because of something within each. This internal difference is evidence of nature even though nature itself remains concealed.

Why are the making sciences distinguished primarily by matter rather than by product? #

Answer: Because what is made can vary while the art remains the same, but the material determines the tools and techniques required. A carpenter makes chairs, tables, and houses all in wood using the same tools and methods. But a tailor cannot use a carpenter’s tools to make a dress, nor vice versa, because the material (cloth vs. wood) fundamentally changes the work required. Matter is the primary principle of division among making sciences.

How does the argument from natural philosophy establish that mathematics and wisdom are also looking sciences? #

Answer: By a fortiori reasoning: If natural philosophy (which studies motion and matter and seems closest to making and doing) is nonetheless a looking science aimed at understanding causes, then mathematics (which abstracts from motion and sensible matter) and wisdom (which studies immaterial things) must also be looking sciences. The argument “climbs” from the most concrete to the most abstract, showing that if the former is speculative, the latter certainly must be.

Notable Quotes #

“Nature loves to hide because it’s within.” — Heraclitus (cited by Berquist)

“Nature cannot choose its origin.” — Shakespeare, Hamlet (cited by Berquist; used to distinguish nature from choice)

“Now, in the fourth paragraph, he’s going to begin to separate natural philosophy from the other kinds of looking philosophy…Aristotle doesn’t subdivide [making and doing sciences] because that’s not his purpose here. He wants to separate wisdom from the rest.”

“The reason why the way you distinguish the looking sciences and the way you distinguish the making sciences and the way you distinguish the doing sciences, all three ways are different. And there’s a reason why.” — Berquist (presenting the puzzle for students to contemplate)