Lecture 51

51. Natural and Rational Abilities: Distinguishing Nature from Reason

Summary
This lecture explores Aristotle’s distinction between natural abilities (determined to one of two contraries) and rational abilities (open to contraries or opposites). Berquist emphasizes that this distinction should not be misunderstood as an absolute separation, but rather as analogous to the relationship between two and three—reason possesses nature plus something more. The lecture addresses how modern philosophers (Mill, Sartre) err by denying that reason and will have any natural determination, and clarifies the proper understanding of this nuanced metaphysical principle.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Natural vs. Rational Abilities #

Natural Abilities:

  • Determined strictly to one of two contraries
  • Example: Fire only heats; it cannot cool
  • Nature operates in a fixed, limited manner
  • No ability to produce opposite effects

Rational Abilities:

  • Open to contraries or opposites
  • Example: A doctor, through medical art, can both heal and harm
  • Example: Shakespeare can write both tragedy and comedy
  • Same knowledge enables knowledge of both contraries
  • Reason can think things well or poorly, teach or deceive

The Problem of Distinguishing Nature from Reason #

Berquist emphasizes a critical misunderstanding in modern philosophy. The distinction between natural and rational abilities is NOT like distinguishing sweet from bitter (absolute separation), but rather like distinguishing two from three:

  • Three contains two plus something more
  • Similarly, reason is not purely rational; it has a nature underlying it
  • The will is not purely free; it has natural inclinations underlying it
  • The distinction highlights what reason/will has in addition to nature, not the absence of nature

How Knowledge of Contraries Works #

The same knowledge enables understanding of opposites because:

  • In definition, one contrary involves understanding the other (e.g., sight is involved in understanding blindness)
  • In reality, contraries exclude each other (if you have sight, you cannot be blind)
  • In knowledge/thought, one contrary helps us understand the other
  • This is why the soul with reason can act toward both contraries, but nature is determined to one

Key Arguments #

The Misunderstanding of Modern Philosophers #

John Stuart Mill’s Error:

  • Denies that reason is naturally determined to anything
  • Claims all thought is merely hypothesis to be tested
  • Nothing in reason is certain or naturally known

Jean-Paul Sartre’s Error:

  • Claims the will is completely undetermined
  • Asserts nothing is naturally willed; everything is choice
  • Denies any natural inclination or determination in the will

Common Modern Error:

  • Treating axioms (like non-contradiction) as hypotheses to be tested rather than naturally known truths
  • This stems from accustomedness to the experimental method in science
  • Scientists test hypotheses by consequences, leading them to think all ideas are hypotheses

Why This Distinction Matters #

Berquist emphasizes that reason does naturally know certain things:

  • Reason naturally knows that the whole is greater than the part
  • Reason cannot actually think that something both is and is not simultaneously in the same way
  • One may say this, but cannot truly think it
  • The will naturally wills happiness, not misery
  • One cannot genuinely choose to be miserable

The Analogy of Two and Three #

When distinguishing three from two:

  • We do not deny that two is in three
  • Rather, three is two plus one; three is not just two
  • The distinction highlights what three has beyond two
  • Similarly, when distinguishing will from nature, we highlight what the will has beyond nature, not the absence of nature

Important Definitions #

Rational Ability (ἡ δύναμις τοῦ λόγου): The capacity to act toward contraries or opposites, found in the soul, especially in the part having reason. Unlike natural abilities, rational abilities are not limited to producing one effect.

Natural Ability (ἡ δύναμις τῆς φύσεως): A capacity or power found in soulless things and in living things without reason, determined strictly to one of two contraries. Nature cannot produce opposite effects.

Privation (στέρησις / privatio): In the strict sense, the non-existence of something that should be present in a subject capable of having it. A stone does not lack life (privation) because it is not apt to have life. A blind man lacks sight (privation) because he is apt to have it but does not.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Doctor and Medical Art #

  • Medical art can both heal and harm
  • The doctor knows how to cure disease and how to cause it
  • Both are included in the same knowledge
  • But the purpose aims at healing, not harming
  • Illustrates how rational ability is open to contraries

Cooking the Steak #

  • One knows how to cook a steak correctly (still pink inside)
  • The same knowledge includes knowing how to overcook it
  • One does not aim at both, but has the ability for both
  • Demonstrates rational ability to opposites in practical matters

Shakespeare’s Dramatic Works #

  • Can write both tragedies and comedies
  • Same knowledge of dramatic art enables both
  • Modern audiences may not realize this breadth (as Berquist’s brother noted)
  • Contrasts with those determined to one genre

Grammar and Language #

  • By grammar, one can speak correctly: “I am your professor”
  • Same grammar enables incorrect speech: “I is your professor”
  • One knows what is incorrect because one knows what is correct
  • Same knowledge of both contraries

Homer and Greek Poetry #

  • Homer wrote both the Iliad (tragic epic) and the Marjites (comic)
  • If Marjites is as good a comic work as Iliad is tragic, Homer could do both
  • Demonstrates that supreme knowledge enables both contraries

The Fifth Book of the Politics #

  • Aristotle shows both how to overthrow a government and how to preserve it
  • Developed in the same work as if one knowledge covers both
  • Illustrates rational knowledge of contraries in political matters

The Logical Works (Topics and Sophistical Refutations) #

  • Learns about both correct reasoning and incorrect reasoning
  • Same knowledge enables understanding both
  • The tools for demonstrating truth are the tools for detecting sophistry

Socrates and Virtue (Meno) #

  • Socrates reasons that virtue can be taught (with probability)
  • Also reasons that virtue cannot be taught (with probability)
  • Shows reason’s openness to contraries in matters of opinion

Reading and Choice #

  • One can choose to read the Gospel of St. John or not read it
  • Can read the Gospel of St. John or the Gospel of St. Matthew
  • Not determined to one choice
  • Illustrates rational freedom beyond natural determination

Desire to Know #

  • One naturally desires to know, not to be ignorant
  • But this natural desire does not determine what to study tonight
  • One can choose natural philosophy, geometry, or theology
  • Illustrates how natural inclination coexists with rational freedom in particulars

Beautiful and Ugly #

  • One naturally likes the beautiful and dislikes the ugly
  • This is natural determination, not choice
  • Yet one’s reasoning can analyze both beauty and ugliness
  • Shows natural determination coexisting with rational openness to opposites

Notable Quotes #

“The beginning of trouble for our mind is not seeing some distinction or misunderstanding some distinction.”

Berquist’s foundational principle for understanding philosophical errors. Most mistakes arise from overlooking or misinterpreting distinctions.

“You don’t want to misunderstand the distinction between two and three. There is a distinction between two and three, right? But you don’t want to misunderstand it and deny that in some way there’s a two in three. But you want to understand that three is not just two. There’s two and something more.”

Berquist’s central analogy for understanding the distinction between natural and rational abilities without denying that nature underlies reason.

Questions Addressed #

Can reason know anything with certainty? #

Yes. While reason is open to contraries in many matters, it is naturally determined to certain truths. Reason cannot actually think that something both is and is not in the same way. Modern philosophers err in denying this natural determination.

Is the will completely free? #

No. The will naturally wills happiness and not misery. It naturally desires to know. But within the framework of these natural inclinations, the will has freedom to choose among particular goods.

How do modern philosophers misunderstand this distinction? #

They treat it as absolute separation (reason has no nature, will has no natural inclination), when it should be understood as a distinction between what is just natural and what is natural plus something more. This stems from their accustomedness to the experimental method.

Why do scientists think all ideas are hypotheses? #

Because they are accustomed to testing hypotheses by their consequences. But this method assumes what it cannot prove—axioms cannot be tested as hypotheses without already assuming them.