55. Act, Ability, and the Problem of Beauty

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Act and Ability: The Equivocity of the Term #

• The word “act” (actus) is equivocal: it is applied first to motion or activity (the most sensible type), and only secondarily to form
• Act is prior to ability in three ways: in definition, in being, and in causation
• However, people readily confuse motion with activity because things in motion “catch the eye” more than perfect, stationary operations

Perfect Acts vs. Imperfect Acts #

• Perfect acts: Operations that are complete in themselves (understanding, loving, seeing); they do not require further actualization
• Imperfect acts: Operations ordered toward further actualization (reading, walking, learning); they are incomplete and on the way to completion
• A person who has finished reading has no longer read it; one who understands (perfectly) is no longer learning (imperfectly)
• This distinction resolves the apparent contradiction: “reading” and “having read” cannot be simultaneous states

Intrinsic Acts vs. Transitive Acts #

• Intrinsic (immanent) acts: Operations that remain in the agent—seeing, understanding, loving
• Transitive acts: Operations that pass into something external—building, creating, ruling
• This distinction is crucial for theology: God cannot have performed transitive acts (creation, rule, providence) before creatures existed, because transitive acts require something external; but God could (and does) eternally love and understand Himself, because these are intrinsic acts
• Examples of transitive acts in creatures: making wine, making dinner, building a house, healing

The Five Senses of “Before” Applied to Beauty #

Berquist applies the five senses of priority to the relationship between Juliet’s beauty and Romeo’s seeing:

1. Before in time: Juliet’s beauty existed before Romeo saw it
2. Before in being: Her beauty can exist without his seeing it; his seeing cannot exist without her beauty
3. Before in definition: Her beauty must be defined to understand what his seeing is; his seeing is “seeing the beauty of Juliet”
4. Before in causation (the “crowning sense”): Her beauty acts upon his eyes, causing him to see
5. Before in goodness: Is her beauty better than his seeing it?

The Problem of Whether Beauty Exists for the Sake of Being Seen #

• Paradox: If we say “the beautiful is for the sake of being seen,” then we must conclude that Romeo’s seeing Juliet’s beauty is the end or purpose of her beauty, and thus better than her beauty itself
• Support for this view: Paintings, music, churches, and stained glass windows are made beautiful precisely to be seen/heard; the end is always better than what is ordered to the end
• But this leads to absurdity: Romeo’s seeing would be better than Juliet’s beauty; thus creatures would be better than what they contemplate
• Extended to God: If God’s beauty is for the sake of being seen, then our seeing of God’s beauty would be better than God’s beauty itself, making creatures superior to God

The Resolution Through Divine Self-Knowledge #

• God knows and loves His own goodness and beauty infinitely; moreover, He knows and loves it as much as it is knowable and lovable
• God is the only one who can know and love Himself as much as He is knowable and lovable (infinitely)
• Therefore, God’s knowing and loving His beauty is not an end or purpose of His beauty, because the end must be really distinct from that which is ordered to it, and in God all is simple
• Our knowing and loving God adds nothing to His being known and loved, just as a point adds nothing to a line
• Thus the beauty of created things (paintings, Juliet if she is a work of God’s creation) can rightly be said to be for the sake of being seen; but God’s beauty cannot be, because God infinitely knows Himself

Distinction Between Divine Substance and Divine Operations #

• In creatures, substance and operation are really distinct (my being and my walking are different things)
• In God, substance and operation are identical; God’s understanding and loving are not distinct from His substance
• The distinction between the treatise on God’s substance and the treatise on God’s operations exists in our mode of knowing, not in God’s being
• We know God from creatures in reverse direction: starting from many effects, we arrive at understanding the One simple God
• In God Himself, the simple reality that is His substance is simultaneously His operation (understanding and loving)

Plato’s Deficiency: The Good and Beautiful Without Self-Knowledge #

• Plato speaks of “the Good itself” (Republic) and “the Beautiful itself” (Symposium) but does not clearly (from the dialogues at least) attribute knowledge and love of themselves to these realities
• If the Good and Beautiful themselves did not know and love themselves, then only creatures could know and love them
• This would make creatures the only knowers/lovers of God, putting creatures in a position superior to God—absurd
• The problem is compounded if we accept (as we must) that God knows and loves Himself infinitely

Key Arguments #

The Visibility/Sensibility Problem #

• Premise: Things in motion are more readily apparent to the senses than things at rest
• Premise: Our knowledge originates in sensation
• Conclusion: We naturally associate “activity” and “act” with visible motion, though perfect acts (understanding, contemplation) are often immobile
• Illustration: A philosopher reading is in imperfect act; when he stops and reflects, he appears to be doing nothing but is actually achieving the perfect act of understanding

The Definition of Motion #

• Definition: Motion is the imperfect act of what is able to be, insofar as it is able to be
• Key points:
  • “The act of what is able to be” distinguishes motion from mere ability (potentiality)
  • “Insofar as it is able to be” indicates incompleteness and continued ordering toward further actualization
  • “Imperfect” separates it from both full actualization (being in the room) and mere static state (standing in doorway)

Learning as Imperfect Act #

• Premise: Learning is not the same as knowing (having learned)
• Premise: When one is learning, one has not yet fully achieved knowledge
• Premise: The learner still retains the ability to learn more (is “able to know” in the ordering toward fuller knowledge)
• Conclusion: Learning is the imperfect act of the ability to know, ordered toward the perfect act of knowing
• Application: A student may withdraw from a course, retaining some information but losing the ordering toward fuller knowledge; this shows learning requires continuation toward the end

The God-and-Beauty Paradox #

• Premises: (1) The end is always better than what is ordered to the end. (2) If beauty exists for the sake of being seen, then seeing is the end of beauty. (3) Therefore, seeing would be better than beauty.
• Problem: Extending this to God, we get an absurdity—creatures’ seeing would be better than God’s beauty.
• Resolution: God’s knowing and loving His beauty is not an end or purpose of His beauty (as if His beauty existed for the sake of being known), because (a) God’s operations are identical with His substance, and (b) God infinitely knows and loves Himself, so nothing external can be the end or purpose of His beauty.

Important Definitions #

Act (Actus/Energeia) #

• The existence or activity of a thing in actuality, not merely in ability
• Three primary applications:
  1. Motion/Activity: The most readily sensible form of act
  2. Form: The actualization of matter; secondary in our recognition
  3. Existence: The ultimate actuality; requires theological development

Ability (Potentia/Dynamis) #

• The capacity or readiness to actualize or be actualized
• Defined through and known by its corresponding act
• Cannot exist without the existence of act somewhere in the causal chain

Perfect Act #

• An operation complete in itself, not requiring further actualization to be itself
• Examples: seeing, understanding, loving
• Once achieved, one does not continue in this act as if it were incomplete

Imperfect Act #

• An operation that is incomplete and ordered toward further actualization
• Examples: walking (ordered toward arriving), reading (ordered toward having read), learning (ordered toward knowing)
• Defined partly by what it is progressing toward

Intrinsic/Immanent Act (Actio Immanens) #

• An operation that remains within the agent; its perfection is internal to the doer
• Examples: seeing, understanding, loving, choosing
• Can proceed eternally without requiring an external terminus

Transitive Act (Actio Transiens) #

• An operation that passes into something external; its perfection involves something outside the agent
• Examples: creating, building, healing, ruling, shepherding
• Cannot proceed without an external object or patient

Examples & Illustrations #

The Philosopher Reading #

• A philosopher reads a page (imperfect act, visible motion)
• When he finishes reading and sits back to reflect, he appears to be doing nothing
• But this reflective moment is the perfect act of understanding—the key movement of study
• A wife mistakes this apparent inactivity for laziness, not recognizing the deep thinking occurring
• Point: The most important intellectual activity appears as inactivity because it lacks visible motion

Romeo and Juliet’s Beauty #

• In time: Her beauty existed before he saw it
• In being: Her beauty is independent; his seeing depends on her beauty
• In definition: His seeing is defined as “seeing Juliet’s beauty”; without reference to her beauty, we cannot define his act
• In causation: Her beauty acts upon his eyes, causing his seeing
• In goodness: Paradoxically, if beauty is for the sake of being seen, then his seeing would be better than her beauty—which seems wrong

Coming Into the Room #

• Problem: How to define motion without circularity or falsity?
  • “Coming into the room is the act of being in the room”—circular, defines by itself
  • “Coming into the room is the act of the ability to be in the room”—avoids circularity but seems false (one who is fully in the room is not coming into it)
• Solution: “Coming into the room is the imperfect act of the ability to be in the room, insofar as one is still able to be in the room and ordered toward further actualization”
  • “Insofar as one is able to be in the room”: One has not yet fully actualized the ability; one is still in a state of ordered incompleteness
  • This distinguishes it from: (a) full actualization (being entirely in the room), and (b) mere stasis (standing in the doorway, not moving)

Learning as Imperfect Act #

• Contrast: Learning vs. knowing (having learned)
• Paradox: How can one do the act of learning if one hasn’t yet learned? (Similar to the Meno: how investigate what one doesn’t know?)
• Resolution: While learning, one possesses imperfect actualization of the ability to know; one is on the way to the perfect act of knowing
• Illustration: A student enrolls, begins learning, but halfway through decides to withdraw. Once withdrawn, is he still learning? No—learning requires continued ordering toward fuller knowledge. He may retain fragments of what was taught, but he has abandoned the act of learning.

Paintings, Music, and Stained Glass #

• Beautiful paintings, music, and stained glass windows are made by artists with the intention of being seen/heard
• It seems correct to say these beautiful things are “for the sake of” being perceived
• The end (seeing/hearing beauty) is better than what is ordered to it (the beauty itself existing in matter/sound)
• This supports the intuition that beauty naturally calls for perception

The Separated Substances (Angels) and Necessity #

• According to Averroes (cited by Thomas): If separated substances are not seen/known by creatures, they would be without purpose
• Thomas’s response: The separated substances know themselves; therefore they are not without purpose even if no creature sees them
• Application to God: God knows and loves His own beauty infinitely; thus His beauty is never without the supreme form of knowledge and love (God’s own), regardless of whether creatures know it

Notable Quotes #

“You wouldn’t think of form as an act… It’s the contrary. So you begin to see that the word is equivocal, and it names first motion or something like that.” — Berquist, on the initial appearance of the equivocity of “act”

“Things in motion sort of catch the eye, but not stir us… So that’s the act that’s most known.” — Berquist, explaining why we mistake motion for the primary meaning of act

“But when you’re reading the page, have you read the page yet? No. When you have read something, are you reading it?” — Berquist, illustrating the incompleteness of imperfect acts

“The man sitting makes wisdom. By the way, I read the process of Thomas, Homo satiens, fit sapiens.” — Berquist, quoting Thomas on how the contemplative person (sitting) becomes wise

“So let it be clear then from these things and such as them and what and how it is to be an act, huh?” — Berquist, signaling the definition of motion as imperfect act

“So, does that always correspond, then, all, in other words, all intransitive acts are perfect, and vice versa? Well, no. If you take, in us, you know, something like learning, right? Learning is more like, what, motion, right?” — Berquist, showing that not all intrinsic acts are perfect (learning is intrinsic but imperfect)

“God alone is generous or liberal, right? He’s the one who gives, you know, gaining nothing by giving, right?” — Berquist, quoting Avicenna via Thomas, on God’s absolute generosity in creation

“If God didn’t know and love himself, then you have a problem, it seems to me, right? Because then only we would know and love God, right, huh? And then he’d be to some extent, right? So we’re late to us, right?” — Berquist, stating the core problem that Plato’s philosophy of the Good and Beautiful must address

“Our seeing adds nothing to God’s being seen, huh? Because it’s being seen by himself, right? As a kind of infinite character to it, huh? So our seeing adds nothing to it just like the point adds nothing to the, what? Line, right, huh?” — Berquist, resolving the paradox through God’s infinite self-knowledge

Questions Addressed #

What is the primary meaning of “act”? #

• Response: Motion or activity, because it is most readily sensible. But act is also applied to form (the actualization of matter) and ultimately to existence itself.

Why do people confuse activity (imperfect act) with the deepest forms of intellectual work? #

• Response: Because sensory knowledge comes first, and sensible motion is most apparent. Perfect acts like understanding and contemplation are invisible and appear as inactivity.

How can learning be defined without circularity or falsity? #

• Response: As the imperfect act of the ability to know, insofar as one is still able to know and is ordered toward fuller knowledge. This avoids defining it by itself while maintaining its incompleteness.

What distinguishes motion from standing still in a doorway? #

• Response: The ordering toward further actualization. One who is coming into the room is partially actualized (in the ability) and continues toward full actualization; one standing in the doorway is static and not ordered forward.

Is everything intrinsic (immanent) an act perfect? #

• Response: No. Learning is intrinsic but imperfect; understanding is intrinsic and perfect.

Are all transitive acts imperfect? #

• Response: Generally yes, in our experience, because our transitive acts (building, making, healing) take time. However, God’s creation is not temporal; it is all at once. But this may represent a different division of acts than the temporal examples.

Can the same relationship (e.g., beauty and seeing) have different orders depending on the sense of “before”? #

• Response: Yes. Juliet’s beauty is before Romeo’s seeing in time, being, definition, and causation; but his seeing is not before her beauty in goodness (it is not better). The order depends on which sense of priority is in question.

Is beauty for the sake of being seen? #

• Response: In creatures, plausibly yes (paintings, music, windows are made to be perceived). But in God, no—because God knows and loves Himself infinitely, and this self-knowledge exhausts all the perfection of being known. Our seeing adds nothing.

Did God create us, rule us, or shepherd us in eternity? #

• Response: No, because these are transitive acts and require an external object (creatures). God could love and choose us in eternity (intrinsic acts), but not create, rule, or shepherd us until we exist.

What did Plato miss about the Good and Beautiful? #

• Response: He seemed not to recognize (or at least did not emphasize) that the Good and Beautiful themselves know and love themselves. Without this, one falls into the paradox that creatures alone would be the knowers and lovers of God.

How are the distinction between divine substance and divine operations reconciled with God’s absolute simplicity? #

• Response: The distinction exists in our mode of knowing (we learn of God’s substance first, then His operations), not in God’s being. In God, substance and operation are identical; our distinction reflects our composite nature, not God’s.