Prima Pars #

A systematic study of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Prima Pars (First Part of the Summa Theologiae). These lectures examine God’s existence, essence, and attributes—simplicity, perfection, infinity, eternity—the Trinity, divine knowledge and will, and the foundations of theological inquiry according to Thomistic principles.

Listen #

Subscribe in Podcast App

Lectures #

1. Vatican I on God’s Nature and Distinction from Creation #

This lecture examines Vatican I’s first chapter on God in Himself, focusing on the divine attributes (unity, eternity, simplicity, immutability, spirituality) and God’s absolute distinction from creation. Berquist analyzes the council’s structure as following Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles and emphasizes how Vatican I addresses the modern error of pantheism by insisting on God’s transcendence. The lecture discusses how contemporary philosophical currents—democratic customs, scientific methodology, and rationalism—dispose modern minds toward pantheistic confusion.

2. Creation, Divine Providence, and the Canons of Faith #

This lecture continues exposition of the Summa Contra Gentiles Book I, focusing on God’s creation of the world by his goodness and almighty power, the nature of divine providence, and the doctrinal canons that specify what must be believed regarding creation and God’s relationship to creatures. Berquist emphasizes the necessity of revelation for understanding God’s creative act and analyzes the Latin terminology (omnibotens, potentia) and their philosophical implications.

3. Two Roads to Knowledge of God: Revelation and Reason #

This lecture examines Vatican I’s treatment of the two paths by which humans come to knowledge of God: the natural road through reason and created things, and the supernatural road through divine revelation. Berquist explains why revelation is necessary both for knowledge of supernatural truths and for natural truths to be known well by all people, using Aristotle’s distinctions of necessity and illustrating the weakness of human reason. The lecture establishes both roads as divinely ordained and complements the council’s teaching with biblical support and canons against rationalist and naturalist heresies.

4. Faith as Foundation: Definition, Necessity, and the Church’s Role #

This lecture explores the nature of faith as a supernatural virtue, its definition from the Council and Scripture, and its absolute necessity for salvation. Berquist examines faith’s relationship to reason, the distinction between formed and unformed faith, and the twofold necessity of the Church as both guardian of revealed truth and motive of credibility. The lecture concludes with Vatican I’s canons defending faith against rationalism and fideism.

5. Faith and Reason: Their Harmony and Mutual Support #

This lecture explores the relationship between faith and reason according to Vatican I and Thomistic theology. Berquist examines how faith and reason are distinct modes of knowledge that can never truly contradict each other, how reason aids faith through analogy and connection between mysteries, and how faith protects reason from error. The discussion includes the nature of credibility of miracles, the necessity of grace for meritorious faith, and the proper limits of philosophy and theology in relation to each other.

6. Sacred Doctrine and the Necessity of Revelation #

Berquist examines the foundational relationship between philosophy and theology, arguing that sacred doctrine (theology) is distinct from and superior to philosophy. He analyzes the hierarchical ordering of knowledge, critiques modern philosophers’ failure to recognize this hierarchy, and then begins detailed study of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, particularly the prologue and first article on why sacred doctrine is necessary beyond philosophical disciplines. The lecture emphasizes the four Aristotelian senses of necessity and how sacred doctrine satisfies both the absolute necessity (for salvation) and the relative necessity (for well-being) of revelation.

7. Sacred Doctrine as Science and Its Superiority #

This lecture explores whether sacred doctrine qualifies as a science, arguing that it does as a subalternate science proceeding from principles known by divine knowledge. Berquist examines how sacred doctrine achieves unity despite treating diverse subjects, how it transcends the philosophical distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, and why it surpasses all other sciences in both certitude and subject matter.

8. Sacred Doctrine as Wisdom and Its Nature #

This lecture examines whether sacred doctrine deserves the designation of wisdom, comparing it to other forms of human knowledge and philosophical wisdom. Berquist explores the hierarchy of wisdoms through examples of ordering and judgment, explains how sacred doctrine relates to natural reason, and clarifies the distinction between wisdom as an acquired intellectual virtue and wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit. The lecture emphasizes that sacred doctrine considers the highest cause (God) absolutely, making it supreme among all human wisdoms.

9. God as Subject of Sacred Doctrine #

This lecture examines whether God is the proper subject of sacred doctrine, distinguishing it from natural theology where God is merely the end. Berquist explores how all things treated in theology—creatures, morals, scripture—are comprehended under God either as God himself, as ordered to God as beginning (principium), or as ordered to God as end (finis). The lecture clarifies the relationship between sacred doctrine and sacred scripture, arguing that while theology properly has God as its subject, scripture more properly concerns the Word made flesh.

10. Sacred Doctrine’s Method: Argumentation and Metaphor #

This lecture explores Articles 8 and 9 of Aquinas’s treatment of sacred doctrine, examining how theology proceeds argumentatively and why it appropriately uses metaphors. Berquist clarifies that sacred doctrine argues from its principles (articles of faith) rather than to prove them, paralleling how geometry uses axioms as starting points. The lecture addresses objections that metaphors are unsuitable for the highest science, showing instead that metaphors are necessary to accommodate divine truth to human nature, which learns through sensible things.

11. Metaphor, Multiple Senses, and Sacred Scripture #

This lecture explores why Sacred Scripture appropriately employs metaphorical language (Article 9) and how it can legitimately contain multiple senses under a single text (Article 10). Berquist examines the distinction between the sense of the letter and spiritual senses, clarifies how figurative speech functions, and addresses objections about confusion and equivocation. The discussion emphasizes that God as the author of Scripture can intend multiple meanings simultaneously, all grounded in the literal sense.

12. Scripture’s Senses and God’s Existence #

This lecture completes the discussion of Scripture’s multiple senses before transitioning to the crucial question of whether God’s existence is self-evident. Berquist clarifies how the literal sense of Scripture includes metaphorical language, then begins Q2 on God’s existence by establishing the distinction between what is self-evident in itself versus self-evident to us, setting up the demonstration that while God’s existence is not obvious to human knowledge, it can be proven through effects.

13. God’s Existence: Self-Evidence and Demonstrability #

This lecture examines whether God’s existence is self-evident and whether it can be demonstrated through reason. Berquist covers Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between what is self-evident in itself versus self-evident to us, critiques Anselm’s ontological argument, and introduces the two kinds of demonstration (propter quid and quia) that ground Thomas’s five ways of proving God’s existence. The lecture emphasizes the middle position between those who claim God’s existence is obvious and those who deny it can be known by reason.

14. God’s Existence: The Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas #

Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s five arguments for God’s existence from Summa Theologiae I, Questions 2-3, focusing on the metaphysical principles underlying each demonstration. The lecture emphasizes the careful philosophical reasoning required to understand these arguments, highlighting how they proceed from observable features of the world (motion, causality, contingency, perfection, and governance) to the necessary existence of God. Special attention is given to comparing the treatments in the Summa Theologiae with the more developed presentations in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

15. The Third and Fourth Ways: Necessity and Perfection #

Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s third and fourth arguments for God’s existence, focusing on contingent versus necessary being and the grades of perfection found in creation. The lecture carefully distinguishes between two meanings of ‘able’ (potency in natural philosophy versus logical compatibility), explores how contingent beings require a necessary being, and examines how degrees of perfection in things point to a most perfect cause. Central themes include the impossibility of infinite regress, the principle that what is most of a quality in a genus causes that quality in others, and connections to divine grace and human perseverance.

16. Divine Simplicity and the Five Attributes of God #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s division of divine substance into five attributes: simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity. Berquist demonstrates that the human mind naturally inclines toward conceiving of a first principle possessing four of these characteristics (simplicity, unity, infinity, unchangeability) by examining pre-Socratic natural philosophers and modern mathematical physicists. He then addresses the methodological question of why these five attributes are divided as they are, arguing that simplicity and unity share an affinity through the concept of ‘having no parts,’ and that perfection stands apart because it does not naturally emerge from thinking about material first principles.

17. Divine Simplicity and God’s Non-Corporeal Nature #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s simplicity, specifically addressing whether God is a body. Berquist presents the pedagogical structure of the Summa Theologiae compared to the Summa Contra Gentiles, analyzes three main syllogistic arguments proving God is not a body, and demonstrates how to handle Scripture’s metaphorical language about God. The lecture includes detailed analysis of logical forms (second-figure syllogisms) and the conversion of universal negative propositions.

18. God’s Simplicity: Matter, Form, and Divine Essence #

This lecture examines Articles 2 and 3 of Question 3 from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, establishing that God is not composed of matter and form, and that God’s essence is identical to His being. Berquist explores three arguments proving God is pure form (not matter-form composition) and demonstrates why the distinction between essence and existence—present in creatures—cannot exist in God. The lecture also addresses how human reason must speak of simple divine realities through the language of composition, and discusses the proper use of concrete and abstract names for God.

19. God’s Simplicity: Essence and Existence in God #

This lecture explores Article 4 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s simplicity, specifically the distinction between essence and existence in God. Berquist presents Thomas’s three key arguments demonstrating that in God, essence and existence are identical—a claim foundational to understanding God as pure act (actus purus). The lecture addresses how creatures differ from God by having existence as something added to their nature, and clarifies how identifying God with the common being said of all things (as Hegel does) leads to philosophical error.

20. God Not in a Genus: Article 5 on Divine Simplicity #

This lecture covers Thomas Aquinas’s fifth article proving God is not contained in any genus, systematically eliminating the composition of genus and difference. Berquist explains the distinction between being in a genus ‘simply and properly’ (as a species) versus ‘by reduction’ (as a principle), then demonstrates through three arguments why God cannot be a species of any genus. The lecture emphasizes how understanding the Isagoge and Aristotelian logic is essential for grasping why God has no genus, no differences, and therefore no definition.

21. God’s Universal Simplicity and Non-Composition with Creation #

This lecture focuses on Articles 7 and 8 of Aquinas’s treatment of divine simplicity in the Summa Theologiae. Berquist presents Thomas’s inductive argument that God is altogether simple (omnino simplex) by eliminating six particular kinds of composition found in creatures, and then addresses how God does not enter into composition with other things. The lecture emphasizes the relationship between God as pure act and divine simplicity, clarifies how we know simple things through negation of composed properties, and refutes historical errors (pantheism, Amalric of Bena, David of Dinant) that confused God’s causality with intrinsic composition.

22. Divine Simplicity and God’s Non-Composition with Creatures #

Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s arguments establishing God’s absolute simplicity (Article 7) and demonstrates why God cannot enter into composition with other things (Article 8). The lecture examines how composed things are posterior to their components, how all particular compositions are eliminated from God through previous articles, and addresses the error of pantheism and related heresies that confused God with the world or first matter. Special attention is given to the distinction between things that differ ‘by something’ versus things that are other ‘by themselves,’ particularly regarding God and prime matter.

23. God’s Simplicity, Perfection, and Likeness to Creatures #

This lecture completes the treatment of God’s simplicity (Question 3) and introduces God’s perfection (Question 4), addressing how God can be absolutely simple yet absolutely perfect, and how creatures can be said to be like God despite the infinite distance between them. Berquist emphasizes the distinction between simplicity in material things (imperfect) and God’s simplicity (pure actuality and most perfect), and explains the pedagogical ordering of Thomas’s Summa Theologiae, which deliberately places the treatment of perfection immediately after simplicity to correct the student’s natural assumption that simplicity implies imperfection.

24. God’s Perfection and the Likeness of Creatures to God #

This lecture explores how God can be both absolutely simple and universally perfect, addressing the apparent paradox that simplicity usually correlates with imperfection in material things. Berquist examines two arguments establishing God’s universal perfection: through His role as first efficient cause and through His identity as ipsum esse (being itself). The lecture concludes by explaining how creatures can be like God through analogical likeness despite the infinite distance between them, grounding this in the Fourth Lateran Council’s principle that there is a likeness between God and creatures ‘without a greater unlikeness.’

25. The Transcendentals: Being, One, True, and Good #

This lecture explores the six transcendental properties of being—those properties that apply to all beings and transcend the ten Aristotelian categories. Berquist focuses particularly on the distinctions among being, thing, one, true, and good, examining how each adds a particular meaning to being while remaining really identical with it. The lecture emphasizes the subtle distinctions between different types of opposition (contradictory, contrary, and privative) and illustrates how the same distinction operates differently for different transcendentals.

26. Being and Good: Identity, Distinction, and Universality #

This lecture examines the relationship between being and good in Thomistic metaphysics, focusing on their identity in reality (secundum rem) versus their distinction in definition (secundum rationem). Berquist explores how being is prior in the order of knowing while the good functions as the final cause in causation, addresses three objections to the convertibility of being and good, and culminates in demonstrating that every being is good insofar as it is being—while bad is understood as privation rather than positive being.

27. Evil as Privation and the Good as Final Cause #

This lecture explores how badness is understood not as a positive being but as the privation or lack of a perfection that something should have. Berquist clarifies the distinction between non-being and lack, explains why only subjects capable of possessing a perfection can be said to lack it, and establishes that the good properly has the nature of a final cause. The lecture includes Aristotelian analysis of different types of opposition (contradiction, privation, contrariety, and relation) and concludes by examining how mathematical objects and the good itself escape certain categories of being.

28. Mode, Species, Order, and the Division of Good #

This lecture explores the constitution of goodness in created things through mode, species, and order, drawing on Augustine and Ambrose. Berquist addresses objections to whether these three elements truly constitute the ratio of good, and then examines the three-fold division of good into the honorable (honestum), useful (utile), and pleasant (delectabile), explaining how this division relates to motion, desire, and the attainment of ends.

29. The Goodness of God: Essence, Causation, and Perfection #

This lecture covers Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s goodness in Summa Theologiae I.6, examining whether goodness belongs to God, whether God is the highest good (sumum bonum), whether God alone is good through His essence, and whether all things are good by divine goodness. Berquist explores the relationship between perfection and goodness, God’s role as equivocal cause, and the distinction between univocal and equivocal causation, while addressing objections about composition, participation, and the nature of desire.

30. Divine Goodness and God’s Infinity #

This lecture examines whether all things are good by divine goodness (Question 6, Article 4) and introduces the infinity of God (Question 7). Berquist analyzes Augustine’s and Boethius’s claims about divine goodness as the source of all goodness, distinguishing between God as exemplar/efficient/final cause versus the intrinsic formal goodness inhering in creatures. He then addresses objections to God’s infinity, explaining how infinity attributed to matter is imperfect while God’s infinity as subsisting existence is perfect, and clarifying that God cannot be limited by quantity, form, or the categories of substance.

31. God’s Infinity and Its Distinctions #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s infinity (Summa Theologiae Question 7), focusing on the crucial distinction between infinity in essence versus infinity in magnitude or multitude. Berquist explores how created things cannot be infinite in the way God is infinite, and clarifies the different senses in which infinity can be predicated of quantity, matter, and form. The discussion includes arguments against infinite magnitude and infinite multitude in act, and establishes that only God is simply infinite because His essence is His existence.

32. Infinite Multitude and God’s Presence in All Things #

This lecture continues the examination of divine infinity by addressing whether an infinite multitude can exist in act, and then pivots to establish that God is present in all things as their agent and immediate cause of being. Berquist carefully distinguishes between infinity in potency (possible for creatures) and infinity in act (proper to God alone), using the medieval debate between Avicenna and Al-Ghazali as a foil for Thomas Aquinas’s more rigorous position. The lecture then explores God’s ubiquity—not as spatial presence but as causal presence—and how this omnipresence is consistent with God’s transcendence above all things.

33. God’s Presence in All Things and Omnipresence #

This lecture examines whether God is present in all things and whether He is everywhere (ubiquitous). Berquist explores how God can be both transcendent (above all things) and immanent (in all things) through His role as the cause of all being. The discussion clarifies the distinction between bodily presence and spiritual presence, addresses objections regarding God’s presence in demons, and distinguishes between different senses of being “in” something.

34. God’s Omnipresence: Essence, Power, and Presence #

This lecture examines whether God is in all things and everywhere, establishing that God’s presence operates through three distinct modes: essence (as cause of being), power (as all things subject to His power), and presence/knowledge (as all things open to His sight). Berquist clarifies how omnipresence is proper to God alone by distinguishing it from the merely accidental ubiquity of created things like universals, matter, and the universe itself.

35. God’s Immutability and the Nature of Motion #

This lecture explores the fourth divine attribute—God’s immutability or unchangeableness—demonstrating that God is altogether unchangeable through arguments from pure actuality, simplicity, and infinity. Berquist carefully distinguishes between motion (motus) as imperfect act and operation (operatio) as perfect act, explaining how Augustine’s Platonic language about God ‘moving himself’ refers to divine operation rather than motion in the Aristotelian sense. The lecture addresses apparent scriptural contradictions regarding God’s movement and approaches while clarifying how divine wisdom diffuses through creation.

36. God’s Immutability and Eternity: Definition and Nature #

This lecture covers God’s immutability as a divine attribute proper to God alone, establishing that only God is altogether unchangeable while all creatures participate in changeability through dependence on divine causality. The lecture then introduces Boethius’s classical definition of eternity—’the all at once and perfect possession of unending life’—and explores how eternity relates to time, using the analogy of the standing now versus the flowing now to explain how God’s eternal present differs from temporal succession.

37. Eternity, Time, and the Divine Nature #

This lecture explores the relationship between eternity and time through a series of objections and responses to Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of divine eternity. Berquist examines whether eternity is proper to God alone, how eternity differs from time, and discusses the equivocal uses of the term ’eternal’ across different domains (God, the blessed, hell, and created things). The lecture emphasizes that eternity is characterized by being all-at-once (totesimo) rather than merely endless duration, and demonstrates how Thomas orders philosophical concepts to arrive at precise theological understanding.

38. Eternity, Time, and the Aevum: Their Distinctions and Measures #

This lecture explores the fundamental distinctions between eternity, time, and the aevum (aeon) as three distinct measures of being. Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical framework for understanding duration, drawing on Boethius’s definition of eternity and Aristotle’s analysis of time and motion. The lecture addresses how these three measures relate to different orders of being: God (eternity), creatures subject to change (time), and spiritual substances like angels (aevum). Central questions concern whether these distinctions rest on whether things have beginning/end or merely on the presence/absence of before and after in being and operations.

39. The Continuous, Becoming, and the Unity of Being #

This lecture explores the philosophical foundations of understanding continuous quantity, motion, and change through Aristotelian physics, with particular attention to how medieval theologians (especially Thomas Aquinas) resolved paradoxes of becoming in Eucharistic theology. Berquist examines the distinction between temporal and eternal duration, the unity of time and eternity (aevum), and how our knowledge begins with the continuous but must ascend to understand immaterial and divine realities.

40. Unity, Division, and God’s Supreme Oneness #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of divine unity (Question 11) through a detailed analysis of the relationship between being and one, the distinction between mathematical and transcendental unity, and objections regarding how one and many relate. Berquist systematically works through the four articles demonstrating that God is one and supremely one, grounding divine unity in divine simplicity. The lecture emphasizes the epistemological order by which our minds ascend from being to division to one to many, and clarifies how privation and negation function in theological language about God.

41. God’s Knowledge, Names, and the Structure of Theology #

This lecture examines the structure of Thomas Aquinas’s theological inquiry into God, focusing on how Questions 12-13 transition from the substance of God to our knowledge and naming of God. Berquist explains why theology proceeds in three distinct stages (existence, substance, operations) despite God’s absolute simplicity, drawing parallels between our inadequate human knowledge of God and modern physics’s complementary descriptions of reality. The lecture emphasizes that our mode of knowing requires multiple imperfect perspectives to approach God’s infinite perfection.

42. Whether Created Intellects Can See God’s Essence #

This lecture addresses the central metaphysical and theological question of whether any created understanding can see God through His very essence, rather than through created likenesses. Berquist explores the apparent paradox that what is most knowable in itself (God as pure act) is least knowable to us due to the weakness of our intellect, examining objections from authority and reason, and explaining how supernatural elevation through the light of glory enables the beatific vision.

43. Analogy, Proportion, and the Beatific Vision #

This lecture explores how we can know God through analogical and proportional reasoning, and whether God’s essence can be seen through created likenesses. Berquist explains equivocation by reason—how words like ‘proportion,’ ’light,’ and ‘seeing’ are carried over from material to immaterial realities by dropping part of their original meaning. He then develops Thomas Aquinas’s solution to the apparent impossibility of seeing God: the divine essence itself must be the intelligible form by which we see God, not any created likeness, and this requires the supernatural disposition called the light of glory.

44. Whether God’s Essence Can Be Seen by the Bodily Eye #

This lecture addresses Article 3 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether God’s essence can be seen by bodily sight. Berquist explores the distinction between bodily vision, imagination, and intellectual understanding, arguing that God, being bodiless, cannot be seen by sensory powers or imagination but only by the intellect. The lecture examines scriptural objections from Job and Isaiah, distinguishes between literal and metaphorical uses of the word ’eye’ and ‘see,’ and explains how the glorified intellect will recognize God’s effects with extraordinary clarity, analogous to how we recognize life in others through their bodily movements.

45. Divine Vision and the Knowledge of God’s Essence #

This lecture examines whether created intellects can naturally know God’s essence, focusing on the fourth article of Aquinas’s treatment of divine knowledge. Berquist explores the principle that knowledge occurs according as the known is in the knower, and develops the argument that God’s essence cannot be known through created likenesses but requires the supernatural light of glory to elevate the intellect beyond its natural capacity. The discussion encompasses the immateriality of the intellect, the distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge, and the role of grace in enabling the beatific vision.

46. The Light of Glory and Differential Vision of God #

This lecture examines Articles 5 and 6 of Aquinas’s treatment of the beatific vision, focusing on whether created understanding requires supernatural light to see God’s essence, and whether all blessed souls see God with equal perfection. Berquist explains the light of glory (lumen gloriae) as a supernatural disposition that elevates the intellect’s power to receive God as its intelligible form, and demonstrates how differential perfection in the beatific vision results from varying degrees of participation in this light, proportionate to charity.

47. Comprehension of God and Knowledge of All Things #

This lecture covers Articles 7 and 8 from Aquinas’s treatment of the beatific vision, addressing whether created intellects can comprehend God (know Him as fully as He is knowable) and whether those seeing God’s essence see all things that God makes or can make. Berquist explores the distinction between comprehension in the strict sense (grasping entirely) versus the loose sense (attaining/holding), the infinite knowability of God versus the finite capacity of creatures, and the principle that effects are known through their causes according to how perfectly the cause is known.

48. Seeing All Things in God and the Beatific Vision #

This lecture explores whether those who see God in the beatific vision also see all other things in Him, and if so, how. Berquist discusses Gregory the Great’s treatment of the sufficiency of God as the object of vision, examines objections regarding the mirror analogy and natural desire to know, and explains how creatures are seen through the divine essence rather than through separate likenesses. The lecture concludes with Aristotelian objections about simultaneous understanding and their resolution through the doctrine that all things are seen at once (simul) through the one divine form in eternity.

49. The Vision of God: Essence vs. Effects in This Life #

This lecture examines whether a human soul can see God through His essence during mortal life, and how knowledge of God relates to our natural mode of understanding. Berquist works through Aquinas’s treatment of objections from Scripture (Jacob, Moses, Paul) and Augustine’s teaching on divine illumination, ultimately establishing that pure humans cannot see God’s essence in this life except through extraordinary grace, while our natural knowledge of God comes through participation in divine light.

50. Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God #

This lecture covers Articles 12 and 13 of Aquinas’s treatment on the knowledge of God in this life, examining how God can be known through natural reason via creatures as effects, and how grace provides a more perfect knowledge than natural reason alone. Berquist explores the objections against natural knowledge of God (from Boethius on divine simplicity and the problem of imagination), defends that natural knowledge is possible while limited to knowing that God is and His attributes as first cause, and explains how grace strengthens the intellect’s light and provides divinely-formed images for deeper understanding.

51. Knowledge of God and the Divine Names #

This lecture concludes the treatment of how we know God (Question 12) and introduces the doctrine of divine names (Question 13). Berquist explores the relationship between knowledge and naming, the threefold light by which God is known (natural reason, faith, and glory), and the fundamental problem of how God—who is absolutely simple and unknowable in His essence—can be truly named by us. The lecture establishes why speaking about God necessarily involves both concrete names (signifying His perfection) and abstract names (signifying His simplicity), and previews the twelve articles of Question 13 that will examine proper versus metaphorical names, univocal versus equivocal predication, and particular divine names.

52. Naming God: Divine Names and Their Signification #

This lecture addresses the central problem of whether God can be named at all, given His transcendence and simplicity. Berquist explores how names signify God through our knowledge of creatures via three modes: causality, excellence, and negation. The lecture examines the tension between concrete and abstract names, explains why both are necessary for properly speaking about God, and distinguishes between names that signify God’s substance imperfectly versus those that merely indicate negation or relation.

53. Proper and Metaphorical Names of God #

This lecture examines Article 3 of Question 13 in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, addressing whether names said of God are said properly or only metaphorically. Berquist carefully distinguishes between proper divine names (like ‘good,’ ’living,’ ‘being’) that signify perfections absolutely, and metaphorical names (like ‘rock,’ ‘stone,’ ’lion’) that signify perfections with a mode of participation proper to creatures. The lecture includes extensive analysis of figures of speech—particularly metaphor, irony, synecdoche, antonomasia, and metonymy—to clarify how language functions when speaking of God and in Scripture.

54. Figures of Speech and Divine Names in Scripture #

This lecture examines how Scripture uses figures of speech—particularly metaphor—to speak about God and spiritual realities. Berquist explains the distinction between proper and metaphorical language, why Scripture employs metaphors despite their potential for misuse, and how Thomas Aquinas reconciles the multiplicity of divine names with God’s absolute simplicity. The lecture concludes with a detailed discussion of analogical predication, showing how diverse names signify the one divine substance through different thoughts or concepts.

55. Analogy: The Middle Way Between Univocity and Equivocation #

This lecture explores how we can meaningfully speak of God and creatures despite their infinite difference, resolving the tension between univocal predication (identical meaning) and pure equivocation (completely different meanings). Berquist presents analogy as the proper framework for theological language, drawing on Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy. The lecture addresses how names are transferred from creatures to God, the nature of univocal versus equivocal causation, and the underlying principle that creatures imperfectly represent divine perfections.

56. Analogy, Relations, and the Predication of Names about God #

This lecture covers the resolution of objections concerning how names are predicated of God and creatures, focusing on the distinction between univocal and analogical predication, the nature of relations (especially those involving God), and the order of imposition versus the order of things. Berquist explores how certain names implying relation to creatures (such as ‘Lord’ and ‘Creator’) can be said of God in time without implying change in the eternal God, drawing on Aristotle’s analysis of relations and Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on analogy.

57. The Name ‘God’ and the Divine Nature #

This lecture examines whether the name ‘God’ (Deus) signifies the divine nature or merely divine operations, and whether this name is communicable to creatures. Berquist explores the distinction between the etymology of a name (the source from which it derives) and its meaning (what it is imposed to signify), arguing that while ‘God’ is derived from divine operations, it is imposed to signify the divine nature itself. The lecture also addresses how the divine nature can be communicated to creatures through participation while remaining incommunicable in its primary meaning.

58. Analogical Predication: God Said of Nature, Participation, and Opinion #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of how the name ‘God’ is predicated of God by nature, by participation in divine likeness, and by opinion (false gods). Berquist carefully distinguishes univocal, equivocal, and analogical predication, demonstrating that ‘God’ is said analogically rather than univocally or purely equivocally. The lecture emphasizes the critical philosophical distinction between the predication of a name (what it is said of) and the signification of a name (what it means), and applies this to resolve apparent contradictions between Catholic and pagan uses of the term ‘God.’

59. The Divine Names: ‘Who Is’ as God’s Proper Name #

This lecture examines Article 11 of Question 13 in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, arguing that the name ‘who is’ (qui est) is the most proper name of God. Berquist explores three reasons for this primacy: the meaning of the name as signifying being itself rather than form, its universality above other names, and its consignification of the eternal present. The lecture also introduces Article 12 on affirmative propositions about God, addressing how human compositional knowledge can truthfully express the simple divine reality.

60. God’s Knowledge: Science, Immateriality, and Self-Understanding #

This lecture examines whether God possesses knowledge (scientia) and what God primarily knows, with particular emphasis on immateriality as the root of knowledge. Berquist demonstrates that God’s knowledge is his substance (not a habit or accident), and that God understands himself through himself as pure act. The lecture resolves objections from Aristotle and the Book of Causes while establishing that God’s self-knowledge is primary and foundational.

61. Suffering, Undergoing, and Divine Understanding #

This lecture explores the multiple meanings of suffering (passio) and undergoing, tracing a progression from physical transformation to intellectual perfection. Berquist then transitions to Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of divine understanding, establishing that God’s understanding is his substance, not a habit or accident, and that understanding is an act of the perfect rather than motion in the imperfect sense. The lecture concludes by examining how God’s understanding differs fundamentally from human understanding due to God being pure act.

62. God’s Knowledge of Particular Things and the Universal/Particular Distinction #

This lecture explores how God can know particular things distinctly while knowing them through his essence as a universal cause. Berquist examines the objection that universal causes yield only universal knowledge, demonstrates how the divine essence contains all perfections (not merely what is common), and uses mathematical limits and the distinction between perfect and imperfect acts to illuminate how God achieves particular knowledge of all things simultaneously without discursivity.

63. Divine Knowledge and the Absence of Discourse in God #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on God’s knowledge, specifically addressing whether God’s knowledge is discursive (reasoning from premises to conclusions). Berquist distinguishes two types of discourse—succession only and discourse by causality—and argues that God’s knowledge transcends both. The lecture explores how God knows all things at once in himself, rather than moving successively from one thing to another, and clarifies the relationship between God’s knowledge and causality.

64. God’s Knowledge of Things Not in Act #

This lecture addresses how God can have knowledge of things that do not exist in act, including non-beings, future contingents, and evil things. Berquist explores the distinction between being in act and being in potency, explains how God’s knowledge differs fundamentally from human knowledge, and resolves apparent contradictions through careful application of Thomistic metaphysical principles.

65. God’s Knowledge of Singular Things #

This lecture addresses how God can know singular, individual things when human understanding knows singulars only through the senses while reason grasps universals. Berquist explores the central problem: if God’s understanding is purely immaterial, how can it extend to the material conditions that individuate singular beings? The solution centers on understanding that God’s knowledge is not derived from things (as human knowledge is) but is the cause of things, extending to matter itself, not merely to universal forms.

66. God’s Knowledge of Infinite Things and Evil #

This lecture addresses Article 12 of the Summa Theologiae, examining whether God can know infinite things. Berquist explores the apparent paradox that the infinite is unknowable, yet God must comprehend infinite things. The discussion ranges from Aristotle’s definition of infinity and measure to Augustine’s understanding of God’s immeasurable knowledge, concluding that God’s knowledge extends to infinite things both in act and in potency through His divine essence as the measure of all things.

67. Five Senses of ‘In’ and God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents #

This lecture explores how equivocation—particularly the five senses of the word ‘in’ (ἐν)—leads to philosophical confusion, especially regarding matter and form. Berquist applies these distinctions to contemporary physics and then transitions to Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s knowledge of future contingent things, explaining how God can know contingent events with certainty through His eternal perspective outside time.

68. God’s Knowledge of Statements and Immutability #

This lecture explores how God knows enunciabilia (statable things/propositions) without composing and dividing as human understanding does, and how God’s knowledge remains entirely immutable despite the variability of creatures. Berquist addresses the apparent contradictions between God’s simplicity and knowledge of composed statements, and between God’s immutability and His knowledge of changing things, using distinctions between the way of knowing and the way of being.

69. God’s Speculative and Practical Knowledge #

This lecture addresses the sixteenth article of Question 14, examining whether God possesses speculative (theoretical) or practical knowledge. Berquist explores how God’s knowledge differs fundamentally from human knowing, distinguishing three ways knowledge can be called speculative and analyzing how God’s knowledge of Himself is purely speculative while His knowledge of other things is both speculative and practical. The discussion connects divine knowledge to the composition of matter-and-form and substance-and-accident, establishing that God’s knowledge transcends the dichotomy between theoretical and practical modes of understanding found in created intellects.

70. Divine Ideas: Nature and Multiplicity #

This lecture explores the metaphysical question of whether God possesses ideas (divine forms) and, if so, whether these ideas are multiple or singular. Berquist examines the historical debate between Platonic and Aristotelian approaches, Augustine’s theological reconciliation of Platonism with Christianity, and Thomas Aquinas’s definitive position that God necessarily possesses multiple ideas while remaining absolutely simple. The central philosophical problem concerns whether truth requires that the way we know something must be the way it exists in reality.

71. The Ideas in God and the Location of Truth #

This lecture continues the discussion of divine ideas from Question 15, then transitions to Question 16 on the nature of truth. Berquist addresses whether all things known by God have corresponding ideas in Him, resolving objections about evil, non-existent things, prime matter, and particulars. The lecture then introduces the consideration of truth, establishing that truth is primarily in the understanding rather than in things, while explaining how truth relates to being and goodness as transcendental properties.

72. Truth in the Mind and Things #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s account of truth, focusing on where truth primarily resides—in the understanding rather than in things themselves. Berquist explores the definition of truth as the conformity or equality of mind and thing (adaequatio mentis et rei), distinguishes between saying more than, less than, and exactly the truth, and contrasts truth (which resides in the mind) with goodness (which resides in things). The lecture emphasizes how knowledge takes the known into the knower, whereas love goes out toward the thing loved, explaining why truth and goodness have opposite primary locations.

73. Truth in the Understanding and Composition and Division #

This lecture addresses Questions 16.2 and 16.3 of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, examining whether truth resides primarily in the understanding, in things, or only in the second act of reason (composition and division). Berquist explores the distinction between simple apprehension and judgment, explains why senses and simple understanding cannot properly know truth, and clarifies how truth as known exists only when the mind judges reality. The lecture culminates in establishing that true and being are convertible terms, resolving apparent objections through careful attention to different senses of being, including beings of reason.

74. The Order of True and Good in Definition #

This lecture examines the fourth and fifth articles of Question 16 in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, exploring the metaphysical order of the transcendentals—specifically whether good or truth is prior in definition. Berquist establishes that truth is prior to good because it is closer to being and because knowledge naturally precedes desire. The lecture culminates in demonstrating that God is truth itself, the highest and first truth from which all created truths derive.

75. Opposites, Non-Being, and the Analogy of Truth #

This lecture explores the nature of opposites (contradictories, contraries, and privations), the problematic status of non-being and privation in metaphysics, and culminates in a detailed examination of Article 6 on whether there is only one truth. Berquist analyzes how truth is predicated analogically rather than univocally of God and creatures, using the mirror analogy to explain how one divine truth generates multiple created truths in created minds.

76. Divine Simplicity, Knowledge, and the Order of God’s Attributes #

This lecture explores how God’s infinite knowledge differs fundamentally from created intellects, examining why God requires no multiplication of thoughts despite knowing all things. Berquist discusses the structural ordering of divine attributes (simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity) across Thomas Aquinas’s major works, and demonstrates how the greater a mind’s power, the more it comprehends from a single principle—culminating in God’s comprehensive knowledge through His own substance alone.

77. Truth as Unchangeable and Falsity in Things #

This lecture examines whether truth is unchangeable and whether falsity exists in things themselves or only in relation to understanding. Berquist develops the Thomistic distinction between divine truth (absolutely unchangeable) and created truth (changeable in human minds), and explores how falsity relates to non-being and deficiency in things. The discussion integrates arguments from Augustine, Anselm, and Aristotle regarding the nature of truth, statement-truth, and the types of falsity.

78. Falsity in Things and the Senses #

This lecture examines where falsity is located—in things, in the senses, or in the understanding. Berquist develops Thomas Aquinas’s account of how things can be called false by resemblance, how the senses can be deceived regarding common and accidental sensibles, and how falsity differs from truth not as absolute opposites but as relative to different orders of understanding (divine vs. human). The discussion emphasizes the threefold distinction among private sensibles, common sensibles, and accidental sensibles, and shows how deception arises from organ indisposition and false imagination.

79. Falsity in Understanding and the Kinds of Opposition #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of falsity in the understanding (Question 17, Article 3) and introduces the four kinds of opposition necessary for understanding formal distinction. Berquist clarifies the equivocation of the term ‘understanding’ (intellectus/nous) between the faculty of understanding and natural understanding, explores how falsity occurs through composition and division rather than in simple apprehension, and develops the framework of oppositions (contradiction, privation, contrariety, and relation) that grounds metaphysical distinctions.

80. True and False as Contraries: Opposition and Foundation #

Berquist examines whether true and false are opposed as contraries or contradictories, establishing that they are contraries because both involve actual thinking that posits something real. The lecture explores the three types of opposition (negation, privation, contrariety), explains how falsity is founded in truth as its subject, and addresses objections from Augustine regarding divine simplicity. The discussion concludes by introducing divine life and its connection to understanding, preparing for the treatment of God’s life in Question 18.

81. Life as Being and Self-Motion #

This lecture examines whether life belongs to all natural things and whether life is fundamentally an operation or the being of a living thing. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections that would extend life to inanimate bodies like stones and water, establishing that life properly belongs to things that move themselves. The lecture culminates in the distinction between life as the substance or existence of a living thing versus life as its operations, with implications for understanding divine life.

82. Life in God: Divine Life and Self-Motion #

This lecture examines whether life belongs to God and how all things are life in God according to Thomas Aquinas. Through an analysis of self-motion and the grades of life from plants to humans to God, Berquist explains how God’s eternal act of understanding constitutes divine life in its most perfect form. The lecture clarifies the distinction between motion in the strict sense (imperfect act) and understanding/willing (perfect acts), showing how Plato and Aristotle’s seemingly different formulations about God—that God moves Himself versus that God is the unmoved mover—are ultimately compatible.

83. Divine Life and the Two Senses of Being in God #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of Article 4 from the Summa Theologiae, addressing the apparent paradox of how all things can be life in God when many things are not alive in themselves. Berquist explores the distinction between two senses in which creatures are said to be ‘in God’: first, as contained and conserved in divine power; second, as existing through their proper reasons or essences in the divine mind. The lecture also introduces the transition to the study of God’s will, connecting divine life to divine knowledge and understanding.

84. The Divine Will: God’s Willing of Himself and Creatures #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of will in God and God’s willing of things other than himself. Berquist analyzes three main questions: whether God has a will, whether God wills creatures in addition to himself, and whether God necessarily wills everything he wills. The lecture emphasizes the distinction between absolute necessity and necessity from supposition, and clarifies the crucial difference between divine knowledge and divine will through Aristotle’s principle that knowledge extends to things as they are in the knower while will extends to things as they are in themselves.

85. God’s Will as Cause of Things and Whether It Has a Cause #

This lecture addresses two critical questions in Thomistic theology: whether God acts through will or by necessity of nature (Article 4), and whether the divine will itself has a cause (Article 5). Berquist explores how God’s infinite perfection requires Him to act through understanding and will rather than natural necessity, and establishes that while God’s willing is reasonable, it cannot be caused by anything external or even by itself. The lecture emphasizes the distinction between nature (determined to one effect) and will (open to opposites), and clarifies how God wills all things in one simple act without multiplying His acts or composing His being.

86. Whether God’s Will Is Always Fulfilled #

This lecture examines Article 6 of Aquinas’s treatment of God’s will, addressing the apparent conflict between God’s universal will that all men be saved and the fact that not all are saved. Berquist explores Thomas’s resolution through the distinction between antecedent and consequent will, explaining how God’s will as the universal cause of all things cannot fail to achieve its effects, even when particular causes seem to impede them.

87. God’s Unchangeable Will and Divine Necessity #

This lecture explores Articles 7 and 8 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s will, addressing whether God’s will is changeable and whether it imposes necessity on created things. Berquist clarifies the crucial distinction between willing change and changing one’s will, and explains how God’s efficacious will can be compatible with contingent effects in the created order. The lecture emphasizes that God’s unchangeable will extends not only to what comes about but to how it comes about—whether by necessity or contingency.

88. God’s Will of Sign and Its Distinction from Divine Will #

This lecture examines the distinction between God’s will properly understood (voluntas bene placiti) and the metaphorical attribution of will to God through signs (voluntas signi). Berquist explores how Scripture and theological tradition speak of God’s will through commands, counsels, prohibitions, operations, and permissions—none of which are God’s will itself but rather signs pointing to what God wills. The lecture clarifies why knowledge and will differ in their relationship to effects, and establishes the philosophical groundwork for understanding how human language about God’s will functions.

89. The Five Signs of Divine Will #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of how God’s will is manifested through five signs: prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission. Berquist explores the proper division of these signs, their relationship to rational versus irrational creatures, and how they account for both good and evil in God’s providential ordering. The lecture includes detailed treatment of the distinction between direct operation and indirect permission, as well as how command and counsel differ as forms of God’s ordering of rational creatures.

90. Divine Love: God’s Love of All Things and Degrees of Love #

This lecture examines Question 20 of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, focusing on whether God loves all things and whether God loves some things more than others. Berquist clarifies the distinction between amor concupiscentiæ (love of wanting) and amor amicitiæ (love of friendship/wishing well), explains how God’s love differs fundamentally from human love by being the cause rather than the effect of goodness, and resolves apparent contradictions regarding differential divine love through the distinction between intensity of willing and magnitude of goods willed.

91. Divine Justice and Distributive Order in God #

This lecture examines whether justice belongs to God, focusing on Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between commutative justice (exchange between equals) and distributive justice (distribution by a governor according to merit). Berquist explains why commutative justice does not apply to God while distributive justice supremely characterizes God’s ordering of the universe. The lecture also addresses objections about God’s will, God’s nature, and whether justice can be attributed to a being that owes nothing to anyone.

92. Divine Justice, Truth, and Mercy in God #

This lecture explores three interconnected divine attributes: justice, truth, and mercy. Berquist examines whether justice properly belongs to God, how God’s justice relates to truth, and how mercy—understood as the removal of defects rather than an emotion—can be attributed to the divine nature. The discussion emphasizes that distributive justice applies to God as governor of creation, while commutative justice does not, and shows how mercy and justice work together rather than in opposition.

93. Divine Justice and Mercy in God’s Works #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on how divine justice and mercy appear together in all of God’s works, not as conflicting attributes but as complementary perfections. Berquist explores the four divine attributes involved in bestowing perfections (goodness, justice, liberality, and mercy), analyzes objections that seem to pit justice against mercy in specific divine acts, and establishes that mercy is the foundation upon which divine justice rests, using distinctions between types of justice and defects in rational creatures.

94. Divine Providence and God’s Foresight #

This lecture introduces Question 22 on the providence of God, examining whether foresight (providentia) belongs to God and how divine providence differs from human prudence. Berquist explores the relationship between providence and prudence, analyzes the three integral parts of prudence (deliberation, judgment, and command), and addresses the apparent tension between God’s eternal nature and His providential ordering of temporal things. The lecture establishes that God’s providence is the eternal reason of ordering all things to their ultimate end—God’s own goodness.

95. Divine Sweetness, Justice, and Mercy in Scripture #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of how divine mercy and justice are expressed through scriptural metaphor, particularly the metaphor of sweetness (dulcis) applied to God. Berquist examines how Thomas explains sweetness as a metaphor grounded in bodily experience—refreshing, quieting, and delighting—and applies it spiritually to divine mercy, goodness, beauty, and love. The lecture addresses why mercy is mentioned before justice in Scripture despite justice being more knowable to us, and discusses the spiritual necessity of maintaining both hope (in divine mercy) and fear (of divine justice) for a balanced spiritual life.

96. Divine Providence and Its Extension to All Things #

This lecture examines Summa Theologiae I, Question 22, Article 2, concerning whether divine providence extends to all things or only to universals and incorruptible things. Berquist addresses five major objections—drawn from fortune, evil, necessity, human free will, and irrational creatures—and develops Thomas Aquinas’s response through the argument from God’s universal causality. The lecture explores how God’s foresight encompasses contingent, necessary, and evil things while preserving human freedom and the integrity of secondary causes.

97. Divine Providence: Knowledge, Execution, and Secondary Causes #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of objections against universal divine providence, focusing on the critical distinction between God’s immediate knowledge of all particulars and His governance through secondary causes. Berquist examines how divine providence encompasses contingent things, free will, and irrational creatures while preserving the proper causality of created things. The lecture demonstrates how God’s foresight of particulars does not eliminate chance, necessity, or secondary causality.

98. Divine Providence and Necessity in Contingent Things #

This lecture addresses whether divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen by God. Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of the apparent paradox: God’s providence is infallible and certain, yet extends to both necessary and contingent beings. The discussion explores how God’s causality encompasses not merely that things occur, but the very mode of their occurrence—whether necessarily, contingently, by chance, or through free choice. The lecture also introduces predestination as a part of providence specifically concerned with rational creatures ordered to eternal salvation.

99. Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Choice #

This lecture covers Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of predestination and reprobation as parts of divine providence, focusing on whether predestination places something in the predestined, whether God reprobates some men, and whether the predestined are chosen by God. Berquist carefully distinguishes predestination as an eternal reason in God’s mind from its temporal execution, and clarifies the asymmetry between predestination (which actively directs to salvation) and reprobation (which permits falling away). The lecture emphasizes the critical distinction between God’s knowledge and will versus their effects in creatures, and explores how divine choice presupposes both love and the exercise of human freedom.

100. Foreknowledge of Merits and Divine Predestination #

This lecture examines Article 5 of Question 23 in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, which addresses whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. Berquist explores objections from Scripture and reason, clarifying the relationship between divine will, human merit, grace, and predestination. The discussion includes refutations of Pelagian and Origen’s views, distinctions between different kinds of causality, and the ultimate grounding of predestination in God’s goodness rather than human merit.

101. Predestination, Certainty, and the Number of the Elect #

This lecture addresses Articles 6 and 7 from Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of predestination, examining how predestination can be certain and infallible while preserving human free will and contingency. Berquist explores the distinction between the eternal act of predestination in God’s mind and its temporal execution through secondary causes, discusses various theological opinions on the number of the predestined, and analyzes how prayers and good works aid predestination without changing God’s eternal decree.

102. The Book of Life and Divine Predestination #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the Book of Life as a metaphorical expression of God’s knowledge of those predestined to eternal life. Berquist discusses three main articles: whether the Book of Life differs from predestination, whether it pertains only to the life of glory, and whether anyone can be deleted from it. The lecture emphasizes the critical distinction between simply (simpliciter) and in some way (secundum quid), demonstrating how this distinction resolves apparent contradictions about God’s unchanging knowledge and human changing states.

103. Immanent and Transitive Operations; The Nature of Power #

This lecture explores the distinction between immanent operations (those that remain in the agent and perfect the agent) and transitive operations (those that produce external effects and perfect the thing made). Berquist then transitions to a detailed discussion of the meaning of potentia (power/ability) in God, particularly distinguishing between active and passive potency, and arguing that God possesses infinite active power while being utterly free from passive potency. The lecture addresses translation difficulties in rendering Greek dunamis and Latin potentia into English, and resolves apparent contradictions between divine simplicity and the notion of divine power.

104. God’s Infinite Power and Divine Omnipotence #

This lecture examines whether God possesses power and whether that power is infinite, focusing on the distinction between active and passive potency. Berquist explores how God’s infinite essence grounds His infinite active power, clarifies that God is not a univocal agent, and distinguishes between divine power and its effects. The lecture addresses objections from Aristotle’s physics and establishes that God’s infinite power need not produce infinite effects.

105. God’s Omnipotence and the Nature of Possibility #

This lecture explores the third and fourth articles of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of God’s power, focusing on how God’s omnipotence should be properly understood as the ability to do all things that are absolutely possible—those which do not involve contradiction. Berquist addresses objections to God’s omnipotence (such as God’s inability to be moved, to sin, or to undo the past) and clarifies the crucial distinction between absolute possibility and possibility according to particular powers, grounding omnipotence in God’s infinite being rather than in defective limitations.

106. Divine Power: Absolute and Ordered Capacity #

This lecture examines whether God can do things He has not done, exploring the distinction between God’s absolute power (potentia absoluta)—His capacity to do all things that do not involve contradiction—and His ordered power (potentia ordinata)—what He actually does according to His foreknowledge and will. Berquist refutes two major errors: the necessitarian view that God acts by nature rather than will, and the position that God’s wisdom and justice limit Him to making only this world. The lecture clarifies how God’s infinite goodness transcends any single created order, allowing for multiple possible worlds that could be wise and just.

107. Divine Beatitude and God’s Perfect Understanding #

This lecture explores whether beatitude (blessedness) belongs to God and, if so, by what faculty it is attributed to Him. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of divine beatitude, examining objections based on divine simplicity and the reward-nature of beatitude, then establishing that beatitude belongs to God most perfectly through His act of understanding. The lecture emphasizes that God’s beatitude consists essentially in His perfect self-knowledge and knowledge of all things, and serves as the foundation for the transition to the Trinity treatise.

108. Divine Beatitude and the Trinity: Object and Act #

This lecture examines the nature of divine beatitude (blessedness) as the perfect good of intellectual nature, focusing on the distinction between the object of beatitude (God himself) and the act of beatitude (understanding) in both God and creatures. Berquist clarifies how God possesses all beatitudes in a superior way, reconciles apparent contradictions about perfection in heaven, and introduces the proper order of teaching for approaching the mystery of the Trinity.

109. Order of Teaching and Learning in Theology #

Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s foundational principle that theological truths must be taught in the order they can be learned. The lecture examines how this principle structures the Summa Theologiae, particularly regarding the hierarchical progression from God’s existence to substance to operations to the Trinity. Berquist demonstrates this principle through examples including the divisions of the Our Father, the sacraments, Christ’s final discourse, and the Psalms, while establishing that certain orderings are pedagogically necessary while others admit variation.

110. Procession in God: Internal Emanation and Divine Generation #

This lecture addresses the central question of how procession (processio—going forward) can exist within God given His absolute simplicity and immutability. Berquist explores two types of procession (external ad extra and internal ad intra) and uses the analogy of intellectual understanding to explain how the Word proceeds from the Father while remaining within the divine nature. The lecture establishes the foundation for understanding divine generation and the real distinction of persons in the Trinity.

111. Divine Procession and Generation: Internal Operations in God #

This lecture explores how procession and generation can occur in God without implying change or diversity of substance. Berquist distinguishes between procession ad extra (external, characteristic of creatures) and procession ad intra (internal, characteristic of God’s operations), and explains how the procession of the Word can be called ‘generation’ in the particular sense applicable to living things while avoiding the generic sense that implies potentiality and change.

112. The Second Procession in God: Love and the Holy Spirit #

This lecture examines whether there exists a second procession in God besides the generation of the Word, and if so, what its nature is. Berquist presents objections to a second procession, then develops Thomas Aquinas’s response that the procession of love from the divine will constitutes a genuine second procession. The lecture explores why this procession differs from generation and how it relates to God’s simplicity and the distinction between understanding and willing.

113. Procession of Love in God and Generation #

This lecture examines whether the procession of the Holy Spirit (understood as love in God) should be called ‘generation’ like the procession of the Son. Berquist explores the distinction between procession by way of understanding (which produces a likeness and thus generation) and procession by way of love (which does not produce a likeness and thus should not be called generation). The discussion includes Thomas Aquinas’s resolution that love proceeds more like breath or spiritual movement than like intellectual generation, grounded in the fundamental difference between how the intellect and will operate in both creatures and God.

114. Real Relations in God and Divine Distinction #

This lecture examines whether real relations exist in God and how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can be really distinct persons while remaining one divine substance. Berquist explores the distinction between real relations (those existing in the nature of things) and relations of reason (existing only in the mind), drawing on Aristotle’s analysis of the category of relation (ad aliquid). The lecture addresses how the processions of the Word and Love establish real relations among the divine persons without introducing composition into God’s absolutely simple nature.

115. Real Relations in God and Divine Simplicity #

This lecture examines whether relations in God are real or merely relations of reason, how relations can be identical with the divine essence while remaining really distinct from each other, and how to reconcile the Trinity with divine simplicity and absolute perfection. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of three key questions about the nature of divine relations, distinguishing real relations from various types of relations of reason and clarifying how relational distinctions differ fundamentally from distinctions in absolute things.

116. Relations in God: Real Distinction and Divine Simplicity #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of relations in God, focusing on how divine relations can be really distinct from each other while remaining identical with the divine essence without compromising God’s absolute simplicity. Berquist works through the second and third articles of Summa Theologiae I, Question 28, examining the apparent paradox that relations are both truly in God and truly constitute the Trinity, yet cannot be really distinct from God’s substance itself.

117. Equivocation, Opposition, and the Four Real Relations in God #

This lecture explores the nature of equivocal names (particularly those equivocal by reason) and their critical importance for understanding the Trinity. Berquist emphasizes how Aristotle’s theory of opposition and relation provides essential logical and metaphysical tools for grasping how God can have real relations without violating divine simplicity. The lecture culminates in establishing why there are exactly four real relations in God (fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and procession) based on two internal processions: understanding and willing.

118. Boethius’s Definition of Person and the Problem of Singulars #

This lecture examines Boethius’s definition of person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’ and addresses five major objections to this definition. Berquist explores the apparent paradox of defining singulars, analyzes the meaning of ‘substance’ in the definition, distinguishes between substance and intention, clarifies why accidents are individuated differently from substances, and explains why a separated soul is not properly a person. The discussion establishes why rational substances receive the special name ‘person’ and how individual substances are individuated through themselves rather than through external subjects.

119. Substance, Nature, and the Meanings of Person #

This lecture explores the multiple meanings of key metaphysical terms—substance, nature, hypostasis, subsistence, and essence—as they relate to Boethius’s definition of person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature.’ Berquist clarifies how these terms are equivocal by reason, using Aristotle’s doctrine of division and examines why substance terminology is essential for understanding personhood in both natural and theological contexts.

120. The Name and Meaning of Person in Divine Things #

This lecture examines whether the name ‘person’ can properly be applied to God, addressing objections from etymology, scripture, and theological tradition. Berquist clarifies the distinction between a term’s etymology and its meaning, arguing that while ‘person’ derives from theatrical masks, its meaning—something subsisting in a rational nature—applies supremely to God as the most perfect kind of being. The discussion includes careful analysis of related terms (essence, hypostasis, subsistence) and their appropriate application to the divine nature.

121. Etymology Versus Meaning: The Name ‘Person’ in Theology #

This lecture examines the critical distinction between etymology (that from which a name is taken) and meaning (that to which a name is applied), using the theological term ‘person’ as the primary case study. Berquist demonstrates how Thomas Aquinas defends the applicability of ‘person’ to God despite objections based on its theatrical origins and linguistic limitations, arguing that what matters for theological naming is meaning, not etymology. The lecture explores how the same principle applies to other theological terms like ‘hypostasis’ and ‘substance,’ and emphasizes the importance of precise language in defending Christian doctrine against heresy.

122. Person in Divine Things: Signification and Subsistence #

This lecture explores the meaning of ‘person’ as applied to God, focusing on how person signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature rather than as an accident. Berquist examines how the understanding of ‘person’ developed through the Church’s response to heretical challenges, and clarifies the subtle distinction between signifying something per modum relationis versus per modum substantiae. The lecture also addresses the apparent equivocation of ‘person’ when applied to God versus creatures, and shows how this can be resolved through careful philosophical analysis.

123. The Plurality of Persons in God and Divine Simplicity #

This lecture addresses whether multiple persons can exist in God without violating divine simplicity, examining how divine persons are distinguished by relations rather than by absolute properties. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to four objections, clarifying the distinction between substance as essence versus substance as individual subsisting thing (hypostasis), and demonstrating why the abstract number of three persons does not imply composition in God.

124. Why Three Persons in God, Not Four or More? #

This lecture addresses five major objections to the doctrine of three divine persons, arguing why there cannot be four persons (corresponding to four relations), three processions (nature, intellect, will), infinite persons, or why numerical terms do not contradict divine immensity. Berquist employs Thomas Aquinas’s solution based on relative opposition of relations and the distinction between procession by likeness versus procession by impression, ultimately demonstrating that exactly three persons are logically necessary given the structure of divine relations.

125. Numerical Terms in God: Transcendental Multitude and Divine Persons #

This lecture addresses the central difficulty of how to speak of ’three persons’ in God without introducing composition, division, or quantity into the divine nature. Berquist explores the distinction between multitude as a species of discrete quantity (restricted to material things) and multitude as a transcendental property (applicable to immaterial reality). The resolution hinges on understanding that numerical terms predicated of God signify the divine things themselves with only the negation of division added, not any positive addition.

126. The Commonality of ‘Person’ in the Trinity #

This lecture examines Article 4 of Question 30, addressing how the term ‘person’ can be common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit despite each person being incommunicable. Berquist explores the distinction between community of thing versus community of reason, clarifies the relationship between singularity and universality in knowledge, and resolves apparent paradoxes in Trinitarian language through careful philosophical analysis.

127. Trinity and Distinction of Divine Persons #

This lecture examines the nature of the Trinity as a name in divine things, addressing objections to its use and clarifying how the three divine persons are distinguished while maintaining one essence. Berquist analyzes the proper language for speaking of divine persons, particularly the distinction between saying the Son is ‘other’ (alios) in person versus ‘other’ (aliud) in nature, drawing extensively on Augustine, Hilary, and Ambrose to establish the rules of appropriate theological discourse.

128. Exclusive Diction and the Trinity: Solus in Divine Things #

This lecture examines whether the exclusive word ‘solus’ (alone) can be properly applied to God or divine persons. Berquist explores the critical distinction between categorimatic usage (which would falsely imply God’s solitude and contradict the Trinity) and syncategorimatic usage (which properly excludes other subjects from sharing in divine predicates). Through analysis of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, the lecture demonstrates how precise theological language protects orthodox doctrine against heretical misinterpretation.

129. Exclusive Diction and Natural Reason’s Limits Regarding the Trinity #

This lecture completes the discussion of exclusive diction (words like ‘alone’ or ‘only’) applied to divine persons and essential predicates, then shifts to examining whether natural reason can arrive at knowledge of the Trinity of divine persons. Berquist addresses the distinction between categorical and syncategorematic uses of language, examines how Scripture uses exclusive language about the Trinity, and explains why philosophical arguments attempting to prove the Trinity—despite apparent support from pagan philosophers—ultimately fail because natural reason knows God only through effects (creation), which pertain to God’s common essence rather than the distinction of persons.

130. Divine Notions and the Trinity #

This lecture examines the necessity and nature of divine notions (properties) in Thomistic theology, particularly how abstract terms like fatherhood and sonship are required to distinguish the three divine persons while preserving divine simplicity. Berquist addresses the apparent problem of using both concrete and abstract names for God, explores why notions are needed despite not appearing explicitly in Scripture, and introduces the relationship between five notions, four relations, and three persons in the Trinity.

131. The Five Notions and the Distinction of Divine Persons #

This lecture examines Question 32, Article 3 of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, investigating why there are exactly five notions (unbornness, fatherhood, sonship, common breathing, and procession) by which the divine persons are known and distinguished. Berquist analyzes the objections against five notions, explains how five notions reduce to four relations and three persons without implying composition in God, and clarifies the distinction between notions as abstract concepts rather than real things. The lecture also introduces Article 4’s treatment of whether it is licit to hold contrary opinions about the notions.

132. The Proper Names of the Father in Divine Theology #

This lecture examines whether ‘Father’ is a proper name of the first divine person and how it functions both personally (denoting the first person of the Trinity) and essentially (denoting God in general). Berquist explores the distinction between fatherhood as a subsisting relation in God versus a non-subsisting accident in creatures, and develops an analogical hierarchy showing how the term ‘Father’ is predicated primarily of the eternal Father-Son relation and secondarily of God’s fatherhood toward creatures through various degrees of likeness.

133. The Word as Personal Name in God #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of ‘Word’ (verbum) as a personal name of the Son in God, establishing that Word signifies something properly—not metaphorically—proceeding from the Father’s understanding. Berquist examines three proper senses of ‘word’ in human knowledge (vocal sound, imagined word, interior thought), argues why only the interior thought applies properly to God, and addresses objections from Origen and the Arians who attempted to use the term metaphorically to deny the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father.

134. Word as the Son’s Personal Name and Relation to Creatures #

This lecture examines whether ‘Word’ (Verbum) is the Son’s own proper name in Trinitarian theology, and whether this name implies a relation to creatures. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to five major objections, establishing that the Word is a personal (not essential) name because it signifies the Son’s intellectual procession from the Father. The lecture also clarifies how God’s eternal understanding of himself necessarily includes understanding all creatures, yet the Word’s primary relation is to the Father while maintaining a secondary expressive and productive relation to creatures.

135. Image as a Personal Name in God #

This lecture examines whether ‘image’ (imago) is said personally or essentially of God, and whether it is proper to the Son. Berquist explores the relationship between thinking and imaging, distinguishes image from mere likeness and exemplar, and establishes that image requires both formal similarity and origin from another. The discussion centers on why the Son alone is properly called the image of the Father, proceeding as the thought of the Father, while the Holy Spirit, proceeding as love, is not called an image.

136. The Name and Procession of the Holy Spirit #

This lecture examines whether ‘Holy Spirit’ is a proper name private to the third divine person, and explains why the Holy Spirit must proceed from the Son as well as the Father. Berquist explores the distinction between the Son (who proceeds as Word/likeness) and the Holy Spirit (who proceeds as Love/inclination), using Thomistic metaphysics to show how accommodated names work in Trinitarian theology and how the persons are distinguished by relations of origin rather than absolute properties.

137. The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s theological argument that the Holy Spirit must proceed from both the Father and the Son to maintain the real distinction of persons in the Trinity. Berquist covers the scriptural, conciliar, and logical foundations for the Filioque doctrine, addressing major objections from both Eastern and Western traditions and clarifying how the relation of origin functions as the sole basis for distinguishing divine persons.

138. The Procession of the Holy Spirit and the Unity of Principles #

This lecture addresses Article 3 and Article 4 on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. Berquist explores whether the Holy Spirit proceeds ’through’ the Son, what this preposition means in different contexts, and whether the Father and Son constitute one or two beginnings of the Holy Spirit. The lecture employs Aristotelian principles of causality and examples of human agency to clarify how the divine processions maintain both unity of nature and distinction of persons.

139. Love and Gift as Personal Names of the Holy Spirit #

This lecture explores how love and gift function as proper personal names of the Holy Spirit in Thomistic theology. Berquist addresses the linguistic and conceptual challenges of naming the Holy Spirit, distinguishes between essential and personal predication of love, resolves the apparent paradox of the Father and Son loving each other “by” the Holy Spirit through careful analysis of causality and formal effects, and establishes gift as a personal name signifying the Holy Spirit’s procession as love.

140. Love and Gift as Divine Personal Names #

This lecture examines whether love and gift can be proper personal names of the Holy Spirit in Thomistic theology. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections about how the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, and why gift is appropriately attributed to the Holy Spirit rather than other divine persons. The discussion clarifies the distinction between essential and notional love, the meaning of gift as proceeding from the giver, and the relationship between gift and the divine processions.

141. Essence and Person in God: The Fundamental Question #

This lecture addresses the foundational question of whether the divine essence is identical to or distinct from the divine persons in God. Berquist examines three powerful objections to the identity thesis, particularly the apparent contradiction that immaterial substances cannot have multiple individuals of the same nature (following Plato and Aristotle), yet God has one essence and three persons. He explains Thomas Aquinas’s solution: essence and person are identical in reality but distinguished only in our understanding, with real distinction between persons grounded in relations of opposition rather than distinction from the essence.

142. Relations in God and Subsisting Forms #

This lecture explores how divine relations differ fundamentally from creaturely relations, examining the first objection to whether God’s nature can be distinguished through relations. Berquist clarifies that while relations in creatures are accidents and cannot distinguish substances, in God relations are subsisting and therefore capable of distinguishing persons. The lecture draws on Aristotelian metaphysics and demonstrates how relation functions as a kind of opposition that enables personal distinction without dividing the divine essence.

143. Predication and Trinitarian Theology: Substantial vs. Adjective Names #

This lecture examines how essential names like “God” are predicated of the three divine persons, using the distinction between substantial (noun) and adjective predication to resolve the apparent contradiction between saying “one God” and “three persons.” Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s third article on the Trinity, which defends orthodox predication against objections drawn from human language, Hebrew idiom, Augustine’s statements, and the logic of person-language.

144. Essential Names, Supposition, and Divine Generation #

This lecture examines Aquinas’s treatment of how essential concrete names like ‘God’ can stand for divine persons while signifying the divine essence. Berquist explores the distinction between a word’s meaning (significatio) and what it stands for in a particular context (suppositio), using examples from human generation and theological language to clarify how ‘God generates God’ avoids contradiction. The lecture addresses objections that appear to prove the statement false and demonstrates why abstract names like ’essence’ cannot properly stand for persons due to divine simplicity.

145. Meaning and Supposition: The Distinction in Theological Language #

This lecture explores the crucial distinction between the meaning of a word and what it stands for (supposition), using concrete examples like ‘I am the son of a man’ to illuminate how this applies to divine names. Berquist demonstrates how concrete names like ‘God’ can stand for different divine persons while maintaining a stable meaning, whereas abstract names like ’essence’ cannot stand for persons without contradiction. The lecture shows how understanding this linguistic principle resolves apparent contradictions in Scripture and Trinitarian theology, particularly through analysis of how substantial versus adjective names function differently in predication.

146. Appropriation of Essential Attributes to Divine Persons #

This lecture explores Article 7 of Aquinas’s treatment of the Trinity, specifically addressing why and how essential divine attributes (wisdom, power, goodness) can be appropriated to individual persons despite belonging essentially to all three. Berquist explains the distinction between what a word means and what it stands for, showing why we can say ‘God is three persons’ but not ’essence is three persons.’ The lecture demonstrates how appropriation serves as a legitimate pedagogical tool for manifesting the less-known (personal properties) through the more-known (essential attributes), using both likeness and unlikeness to guide understanding.

147. Appropriation of Divine Attributes to the Trinity #

This lecture explores how essential divine attributes (eternity, beauty, use/enjoyment, unity, equality, concord, power, wisdom, goodness) are appropriated to specific divine persons without implying those attributes belong exclusively to one person. Berquist explains appropriation as a pedagogical tool by which human understanding, ’led by the hand’ from creatures to God, manifests the less known (the Trinity) through the more known (essential attributes). The lecture follows Thomas Aquinas’s ordered presentation of four sets of appropriations drawn from Hilary of Poitiers and Augustine, each appropriation grounded in a different mode of considering creatures and God.

148. The Four Appropriations: Divine Attributes to Persons #

This lecture explores the Thomistic doctrine of appropriation, specifically examining Hillary and Augustine’s four major appropriations of essential divine attributes to the three persons of the Trinity. Berquist works through the appropriations of (1) eternity, beauty, and use; (2) unity, equality, and concord; (3) power, wisdom, and goodness; and (4) the prepositions from, through, and in—explaining how each reveals something proper to each divine person while maintaining that these attributes belong essentially to God. The lecture emphasizes the pedagogical function of appropriation and clarifies the distinction between appropriation and error through careful analysis of the likenesses between attributes and personal properties.

149. Relations and Persons in God: Identity and Distinction #

This lecture examines Question 40 of Aquinas’s treatment of the Trinity, focusing on whether relations (such as fatherhood and sonship) are identical with divine persons. Berquist explores how divine simplicity enables relations to be subsisting realities that constitute the persons themselves, while distinguishing between personal relations that constitute persons and non-personal relations that belong to multiple persons. The lecture emphasizes the subtle metaphysical differences between how relations exist in the divine essence versus in the divine persons, drawing on Aristotle’s analysis of the various senses of ‘in’ (ἐν) to clarify these distinctions.

150. Relations as Distinguishing Principles of Divine Persons #

This lecture addresses whether divine persons are distinguished by relations or by origin (generation/procession). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic refutation of objections to the thesis that relations—not origin—are the primary distinguishing principles of the Trinity. The discussion employs careful distinctions between relations as mere relations versus relations as constitutive of persons, and between how things are signified versus their reality.

151. Abstraction, Hypostasis, and Notional Acts in the Trinity #

This lecture explores whether divine hypostases remain when divine relations are abstracted by the understanding, and whether notional acts (generation, breathing) precede or follow divine relations. Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections raised by the medieval theological tradition, emphasizing the distinction between two types of abstraction (universal and form-matter) and between relations considered simply as relations versus relations as constituting persons. The lecture concludes with subtle distinctions about the order of understanding between relations and notional acts in the case of the Father and Son.

152. Notional Acts and the Necessity of Divine Generation #

This lecture examines whether notional acts (generation, breathing, nativity) can be properly attributed to divine persons, and whether these acts are necessary or voluntary. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections from Boethius and Augustine, establishing that origin in God must be designated through act, and that the Father generates the Son necessarily according to His nature rather than by choice. The lecture emphasizes the critical distinction between nature (determined to one) and will (open to opposites), and how this distinction resolves apparent contradictions in Trinitarian theology.

153. Necessity, Nature, and Divine Generation #

This lecture explores the distinction between natural necessity and rational will in understanding divine generation, drawing from Aristotle’s analysis of potency and act in Metaphysics IX. Berquist examines how the Father generates the Son necessarily through the divine nature rather than through an act of will, and how this differs from creation. The lecture addresses apparent contradictions in the tradition regarding whether generation is necessary or voluntary, and clarifies multiple senses of the word ’necessary’ as they apply to God.

154. Divine Power and Notional Acts in God #

This lecture examines whether divine power (potentia) must be attributed to God with respect to notional acts—specifically the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections that power implies passivity or contingency, arguing instead that power signifies ’the beginning of some act’ and that real distinction between persons justifies attribution of generative power to the Father and spirative power to the Father and Son.

155. Notional Acts and Divine Uniqueness in the Trinity #

This lecture addresses whether notional acts (generation and procession) can produce multiple divine persons, and establishes four theological reasons why there is only one Son and one Holy Spirit in God. Berquist examines the relationship between divine power, essence, and relation, clarifying how the power of generating signifies the divine essence directly but the relation of fatherhood obliquely. The lecture also addresses apparent objections from Augustine and explores the metaphysical grounds for divine uniqueness.

156. Equality and Order in the Divine Persons #

This lecture examines whether equality belongs to the divine persons and how order exists in God without temporal priority. Berquist explores the distinction between dimensive quantity (physical size) and virtual quantity (perfection of nature), showing how equality must be understood through negation of ‘more’ and ’less’ rather than quantitative magnitude. He clarifies that ‘order’ in God means origin or procession from one person to another without implying temporal before-and-after, distinguishing this from the generic meaning of order in creatures.

157. Divine Generation, Eternity, and Order of Nature #

This lecture addresses three interconnected questions in Thomistic theology: (1) whether the Son is co-eternal with the Father despite being generated, (2) how divine generation differs from temporal generation and succession, and (3) how to understand ‘order of nature’ in God without implying temporal before-and-after. Berquist explores the distinction between time and eternity, the analogy of thought proceeding from understanding, and the proper meaning of ‘order’ when transferred from creatures to God.

158. Equality in the Trinity: Eternity, Magnitude, and the Indwelling of Persons #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of equality among the divine persons in Question 42 of the Summa Theologiae. Berquist examines how equality can be predicated of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit despite their real distinction as persons, analyzing the order of nature among them (which signifies origin without temporal priority), their co-eternity, equality in magnitude (understood as perfection of nature rather than quantitative size), and the mutual indwelling of the persons. The lecture emphasizes how Thomas uses Aristotelian categories and distinctions to resolve apparent contradictions between Scripture and the doctrine of divine equality.

159. Divine Equality in Nature, Magnitude, and Power #

This lecture explores the third equality among the divine persons—equality of power—through systematic objections and Thomas Aquinas’s resolutions. Berquist examines scriptural texts that appear to subordinate the Son to the Father, demonstrates how these texts are reconciled with the doctrine of equal omnipotence, and clarifies the crucial distinction between acting ‘per se’ (through oneself) and acting ‘a se’ (from oneself). The discussion emphasizes that the Son’s power derives from the Father eternally through generation, yet remains numerically identical to the Father’s power.

160. The Three Acts of Reason and Divine Mission #

This lecture explores the three acts of reason (understanding essences through definition, forming judgments through statements, and reasoning through syllogisms) using examples from reproduction and mathematics. The main focus then shifts to the theological doctrine of divine mission, particularly addressing how divine persons can be ‘sent’ without implying inferiority, separation, or local motion. Berquist demonstrates how mission requires both eternal procession from a principle and a temporal term or new mode of indwelling in a creature.

161. Divine Mission: The Invisible Sending of the Son and Holy Spirit #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of the invisible missions of divine persons (Question 43, Articles 3-5 of the Summa Theologiae). Berquist explores how sanctifying grace (gratia gratum facientis) is the necessary condition for a divine person to be sent and indwell a creature, distinguishes why only the Son and Holy Spirit can be sent (not the Father), and clarifies how both the Son and Holy Spirit have invisible missions distinguished by their effects—the Son sent according to understanding (especially knowledge with love) and the Holy Spirit according to the gift of charity.

162. Divine Missions, Grace, and Newness in Creatures #

This lecture addresses whether invisible missions of the Holy Spirit come to all who receive grace, examining six objections and their resolutions. Berquist explores the essential components of mission (indwelling and newness), clarifies the distinction between continuous progress in grace and notable missions at new spiritual states, and explains how Christ and the blessed relate to invisible missions. The lecture also clarifies that sacraments contain grace instrumentally but are not themselves terms of divine missions.

163. The Visible Mission of the Holy Spirit #

This lecture examines Question 43, Article 7 of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, addressing whether it is appropriate for the Holy Spirit to be sent in a visible way. Berquist works through six objections to this doctrine and Thomas’s resolutions, establishing the crucial distinction between how the Son and Holy Spirit are visibly manifested. The lecture clarifies that visible missions are sensible signs formed to manifest invisible spiritual realities, grounded in God’s pedagogical accommodation to human nature.

164. Divine Missions and the Two Orders of Understanding #

This lecture addresses the eighth objection concerning divine missions: whether a divine person can be sent only by the one from whom he proceeds eternally. Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of Augustine’s apparent contradiction about whether the Son can be sent by the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit by itself. He then pivots to a broader pedagogical framework examining two distinct orders of understanding: the order of intention/manudaxio (sensible-to-intelligible, as in Peter’s confession) and the order of definition/demonstration (as in John’s Gospel), applying these to how we come to know the Trinity and Incarnation.

165. The Logic of Names and Divine Signification #

This lecture explores the foundational logic of names, examining how vocal sounds, things, and thoughts relate to create meaning. Berquist systematically analyzes eight possible combinations of names, things, and thoughts, determining which are logically real and which are impossible. The lecture culminates in applying this framework to theological language about God, showing how one name (God) can signify one reality through multiple distinct thoughts—a crucial principle for understanding divine attributes and Thomas’s five ways of proving God’s existence.