24. God's Perfection and the Likeness of Creatures to God

Summary

This lecture explores how God can be both absolutely simple and universally perfect, addressing the apparent paradox that simplicity usually correlates with imperfection in material things. Berquist examines two arguments establishing God’s universal perfection: through His role as first efficient cause and through His identity as ipsum esse (being itself). The lecture concludes by explaining how creatures can be like God through analogical likeness despite the infinite distance between them, grounding this in the Fourth Lateran Council’s principle that there is a likeness between God and creatures ‘without a greater unlikeness.’

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Paradox of Simplicity and Perfection #

In material experience, simplicity correlates with imperfection (atoms are simpler than complex molecules)
Yet God is absolutely simple and infinitely perfect—these appear contradictory
Thomas deliberately treats simplicity before perfection to overturn our material intuitions
The difficulty lies in transcending our experience of material composition to grasp how the simpler can be more perfect in immaterial being

God’s Perfection Through Two Arguments #

First Argument: From Efficient Causality

God as first efficient cause must contain all perfections found in effects
An efficient cause contains perfections in an equal or more perfect way than found in its effects
Since God is the universal cause of all things, He must possess their perfections in Himself
But He possesses them in a simple way, not in multiplicity

Second Argument: From Being Itself (Ipsum Esse)

God is ipsum esse—being itself subsisting through itself
Whatever perfections creatures possess, they possess through partaking of being in limited, contracted ways
God, being being itself, lacks nothing of the perfection of being
All perfections pertain to the perfection of being (e.g., one is perfect through wisdom by being wise, through life by living, etc.)
Therefore, as being itself, God must contain all perfections in a simple way

The Heat Analogy

Heat is that by which hot things are hot
If heat itself subsisted (rather than merely existing in hot things), it would lack nothing of the power of heat
Similarly, God as being itself lacks nothing that creatures possess through partaking in being
God contains in a simple way the perfections that all things have through being in particular, limited ways

Reconciling Simplicity and Multiplicity #

Things that are “other and opposed” in themselves pre-exist as one in God without detriment to divine simplicity
The apparent multiplicity of perfections in creatures corresponds to the singular, simple perfection of God
True friendship example: utility, pleasure, and virtue come together in one relationship in the highest friendship—similarly, opposing perfections unite simply in God
Geometric analogy: a square (simpler) contains more area for less perimeter than any non-square rectangle—the simpler figure is more perfect

The Doctrine of Analogical Likeness #

Three Kinds of Likeness

Perfect likeness: Things coming together in the same form according to the same ratio (e.g., two equally white things)
Imperfect likeness: Things coming together in the same form but according to more and less (e.g., something less white compared to something more white)
Remote analogical likeness: Things not coming together in the same form or ratio but related through analogy (e.g., effects to universal cause)

Creatures and God

Creatures cannot be like God in the first two ways (not in same species or genus)
All creatures are assimilated to God insofar as they are beings
This is a remote likeness through analogy, as creatures are effects of the universal cause of all being
Scripture affirms both that creatures are made in God’s image and that none is like Him—both truths hold: likeness insofar as creatures imitate; unlikeness insofar as they fall short of the equivocal cause

Analogy of Proportionality

Thomas illustrates with numerical ratios: 2 to 4 versus 1 to 2; 50 to 100 versus 1 to 2
While 2:4 is numerically closer to 1:2, the ratios themselves are not more similar
Proportionality can make things very far apart comparable through sameness of ratio
Example: “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us” creates a proportion where the creature stands to the neighbor as God stands to the creature

The Asymmetry of Likeness

Creatures can be said to be like God, but God cannot be said to be like creatures
As Dionysius notes, mutual likeness exists only among things of the same order
In cause and effect relationships, we say the image is like the man, not conversely
God is not assimilated to creatures; rather, creatures are made like God

Key Arguments #

Argument That God Contains All Perfections #

God is ipsum esse subsisting (being itself)
All perfections pertain to the perfection of being
Nothing of the perfection of being can lack from being itself
Therefore, God must contain all perfections (argument from Article 3, Question 4, as referenced in the text)

Argument for Analogical Likeness Despite Difference in Genus #

God is not in any genus
Yet God is the universal cause and origin of every genus/kind
Every agent produces effects like itself insofar as it is an agent
Therefore, all things must have some likeness to God as effects to their universal cause
This likeness is not generic or specific but analogical

Important Definitions #

Ipsum esse (being itself): God’s existence is not distinguishable from His essence; He does not merely have being but is being itself subsisting through itself

Analogia (analogy): A likeness of ratios or proportions that allows comparison between things in different genera or even outside genus relationships

Equivocal cause (causa aequivoca): A cause that produces effects unlike itself in nature; God is an equivocal cause relative to creatures, producing being in all things while not being any one kind of thing Himself

Perfection (perfectio): That which lacks nothing; actualization; what is desirable

Simplicity (simplicitas): Absolute unity, absence of composition; God has no distinction between essence and existence, substance and accidents, or potency and act

Examples & Illustrations #

The Square and Rectangle #

Rectangles with perimeter 20: square 5×5 (area 25); 4×6 (area 24); 3×7 (area 21); 2×8 (area 16)
The simpler figure (square) has the most area with the least perimeter
Demonstrates that simplicity and perfection can be compatible even in material things

Tragedy and Epic in Aristotle #

Both produce pity and fear but tragedy does so in a simpler, more compact way
Tragedy is simpler yet more perfect as a literary form
Shows that in immaterial matters, simplicity and perfection naturally go together

Simplicity in Saints and Wise Persons #

Mother Teresa from Albania: remarkable simplicity despite profound spiritual perfection
Bad people tend to be complicated (Machiavelli’s prince); saints are simple
Thomas Aquinas as model: writes simply yet profoundly, unlike more convoluted philosophers
John Paul II’s observation: amazed that Thomas could be so simple in expression yet so profound in thought
“The way to become wise is to be a man of one book”—concentration on what is essential brings wisdom

The Proportion Analogy #

2:4 compared to 1:2 is numerically nearer but not proportionally more similar
50:100 has the same proportion to 1:2 as 2:4 does
Shows how analogy of proportionality bridges infinite distance

Notable Quotes #

“The way to become wise is to be a man of one book.”
— Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist as a saying he believes he has read but cannot locate again)

“God is altogether simple, and the closer one gets to God, the simpler one gets.”
— St. Teresa of Avila (cited by Berquist)

“When sacred scripture says that something is not like God, this is not contrary to its having an assimilation of likeness to Him.”
— Dionysius the Areopagite, Divine Names ch. 9 (cited by Thomas)

“Between God and creatures, there can be noted a likeness without a greater unlikeness.”
— Fourth Lateran Council (1215)

“Although Ipsum Esse is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered according as they are distinguished by reason, nevertheless what is living is more perfect than what is merely being.”
— Thomas Aquinas, discussing Dionysius (Article 3, Question 4)

Questions Addressed #

Objection 1: How Can the Simple Contain the Multiple? #

Objection: God is simple, but the affections and qualities of all things are many and diverse.

Resolution: Following Dionysius, God as being itself “takes beforehand” (pre-contains) all things. Things that are other and opposed in themselves pre-exist as one in God without detriment to simplicity. The many and different qualities and substances that are divided in creatures are unified in God as their universal cause.

Objection 2: How Can Opposites Be in God? #

Implied in the objection above.

Resolution: The argument from being itself shows why opposites can coexist in God: all perfections pertain to the perfection of being, and God is being itself. What are opposed as separate ways of partaking in being are united in the simple fullness of being itself.

Objection 3: Is Being More Perfect Than Life and Wisdom? #

Objection: Being (esse) seems less perfect than life and wisdom.

Resolution: While life and wisdom may be considered more perfect than bare being by reason of distinction, in God they all collapse into one. Being is the actuality through which all other perfections are actual. Since God is ipsum esse, He necessarily possesses life and wisdom (and all perfections) because one is only wise insofar as one is living, and one is only living insofar as one is being.

Objection 1 to Article on Likeness: No Creature Is Like God #

Objection: Psalm 85 says “there is none like you among the gods,” so surely no creature can be like God; moreover, things of different genera cannot be compared.

Resolution: When Scripture denies likeness to God, this does not contradict analogical assimilation. Creatures are like God insofar as they imitate Him; unlike insofar as they fall short. The Fourth Lateran Council captures this: likeness between God and creature holds “without a greater unlikeness.”

Objection 4 to Article on Likeness: Mutual Likeness Should Follow #

Objection: In things that are alike, the likeness is mutual—if creature is like God, then God is like creature.

Resolution: Mutual likeness exists only among things of the same order. In cause and effect relationships, the effect is assimilated to the cause; we say the image is like the man, not conversely. Only the creature is said to be like God, not God like the creature.