26. Being and Good: Identity, Distinction, and Universality

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Being and Good: Identity and Distinction #

• Being and good are the same secundum rem (in reality) but differ secundum rationem (in definition/meaning)
• Being properly expresses actuality; good expresses desirability and perfection
• The distinction is contrary rather than contradictory—they read the same reality but from different perspectives
• Good is being in some way; being good is being in some qualified way—showing how the relationship can be reversed

The Priority of Being in Knowledge #

• Being is prior secundum rationem (in our understanding) because things are knowable insofar as they are in act
• Each thing is knowable according as it is in act—this is fundamental to why being is the proper object of the understanding
• Just as sound is the first hearable, being is the first understandable
• Good presupposes being in the order of knowing, though in causation the end (final cause) is first

The Problem of Dionysius and Platonic Language #

• Dionysius places good before being when discussing God’s divine names—but this is according to causality, not according to the order of knowing
• Augustine adopts Platonic modes of speaking “as far as he can so long as Plato conforms to the faith”
• Dionysius is more in the Platonic tradition than the Aristotelian tradition
• Thomas understands there is a special reason why Dionysius orders the names this way: good has the character of the final cause, which is the cause of all other causes being caused
• The end is causa causarum—the cause of causes—because the agent acts only for the sake of the end

Whether Every Being is Good #

• Every being, insofar as it is being, is good because every being is in act to some degree
• Act is a kind of perfection; the perfect has the character of desirable and good
• Being in potency (ability) also partakes of good in a remote way, as it is ordered toward act
• Bad is not a being but a privation—the lack of something a subject is capable of having
• Nothing is bad insofar as it is being; badness consists entirely in lacking perfection

Key Arguments #

Three Distinctions in Being and Good #

Thomas solves three objections by distinguishing between being simply and being in some respect:

First Objection: Good and being are not the same because you come to be good through virtue, but you come to be (simply) through generation.

• Solution: When you are generated, you are good in some way (in potency). When you acquire virtue, you become good simply (in act). Being simply and good simply are contrary distinctions, like the difference between being and being in some qualified way.

Second Objection: Good is more universal because it extends to both existing things and non-existing things (according to Dionysius).

• Solution: Good extends to non-existing things not by predication but by causality. Good has the character of the end, which moves things that are not yet in act but are in potency. Being extends only to things in act and to formal causality. The causality of form does not extend except to things in act.

Third Objection: Good is said according to more and less (you can be more courageous or less courageous), but can you be more or less than I am? No.

• Solution: Where you find good simply, you find being with more and less. Where you find good only in some respect, being simply has no more and less. Good as a particular quality admits degrees; good as such does not.

The Objection from Matthew 26:24 (Judas) #

• Objection: It would have been good for Judas had he not been born—but he does not desire non-being. Therefore good extends beyond being.
• Solution: This uses the distinction between as such (per se) and by happening (per accidens). Judas does not desire non-being as such; he desires it only because of tragic circumstances. When the good properly is considered, it is the desirable, but not everything desired is good as such—desire can be mistaken.

The Mathematical Science Problem #

• Objection: Aristotle says in Metaphysics III that in mathematics there is not the good, yet mathematics are beings.
• Context: Modern science dominates through mathematical thinking, which excludes sense qualities, substance, and purpose—making it difficult to understand the good and the end in nature.
• The mathematical abstraction from matter and motion also abstracts from goodness and finality

Every Being is Good #

• Premise 1: Every being, insofar as it is being, is in act
• Premise 2: Every act is a kind of perfection
• Premise 3: The perfect has the character of desirable and good
• Conclusion: Therefore every being is good
• Qualification: Badness is not a being; it is a privation—a lack in a subject capable of having what it lacks

Important Definitions #

Being #

• The proper object of the understanding
• Primarily: actuality (ἀκτυαλιτᾶς)
• Secondarily: potency/ability (δυνάμις)

Good #

• What all desire; what all want
• Adds the notion of desirability and perfection to being
• Has the character of final cause (cause of all other causes being caused)

Bad (Malum) #

• Not a positive being but a privation—the absence of a perfection
• The lack of something a subject is capable of having and should have
• Examples: blindness in a seeing animal, vice in a rational being

Dionysius’s Approach #

• Names God according to God’s relation as cause to creatures
• Good is named first among God’s divine names because the good has the notion of the desirable and implies the relation of final cause
• The end is the causa causarum because the agent acts only for the sake of the end

Examples & Illustrations #

Becoming vs. Being #

• “I am said to be when my parents generated me. I did not come to be when I learned geometry, but I did come to be in some way—I came to be a geometer. But when I acquired virtue, I came to be good. But when I was generated, I was good in some way.”

The Distinction of Cause in the Carpenter #

• The carpenter makes a chair for the sake of sitting (the end)
• The agent (carpenter) is a cause because of the end—the agent does not act except for the sake of the end

Dialectic and Truth #

• Even after arriving at the truth, dialectic remains useful for leading someone toward truth
• After one is sure about what the truth is, one can see which probable things will lead somebody toward the truth
• Plato’s dialogues frustrate because they do not resolve the thing, but they are written for students entering the academy with unanswered questions

Form and Knowability (Geometrical Example) #

• When you draw a line to make a triangle actual (from potency), it has more being and becomes more knowable
• It is knowable insofar as it is actual, insofar as it has being—not because it is desirable

Isaiah 5:20 #

• “Woe to you who call bad good and good bad”
• Connected to Shakespeare’s Macbeth: “Fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air.”
• The two mistakes: thinking what is good is bad, and what is bad is good
• The two causes: the fog of the mind and the filthy air of your morals

First Matter and Privation #

• Augustine speaks of first matter as “a something that is a nothing, or a nothing that is a something”
• Platonists do not distinguish matter from privation/lack of form
• If you do not distinguish these, you think matter as formless, which seems evil because form is good
• Plotinus therefore speaks of matter as evil—leading toward Manichaeanism
• Aristotelian distinction: matter is being in ability (ens in potentia), not non-being; lack of form as such is non-being

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Are Being and Good the Same? #

• Answer: Yes secundum rem (in reality), but they differ secundum rationem (in definition)
• Why it matters: This explains how we can say both “being is good” and “good adds to being” without contradiction

Q2: Which is Prior: Being or Good? #

• In the order of knowing: Being is prior because things are knowable insofar as they are in act
• In causation: Good (as final cause) is prior because the agent acts only for the sake of the end
• Thomas’s solution: These are different orders; confusion arises from not distinguishing them

Q3: Why Does Dionysius Put Good Before Being? #

• Answer: Not because good is more universal in knowledge, but because Dionysius considers God’s divine names according to God’s causality
• The reason: Good has the notion of final cause, which is the cause of all other causes being caused
• Implication: The same text can be ordered differently depending on perspective (causality vs. knowledge)

Q4: Is Every Being Good? #

• Answer: Yes, every being insofar as it is being is good
• The apparent contradiction: Many things are bad
• Resolution: Bad is not a being; it is a privation—the lack of a perfection. Nothing is bad insofar as it is being.

Notable Quotes #

“I don’t even talk about the ideas; Augustine talks about the ideas in the way that is conforming to the faith, not in the way exactly Plato talks, but you see he’s pulling as much as he can out of Plato.”

“Being is the proper object of the understanding, just as sound is the first hearable.”

“Each thing is knowable in so far as it is act.”

“The good, since it has the meaning of the desirable, implies the relation of the final cause. And that’s the cause of all the other causes being caused.”

“The end is the causa causarum. The cause of causes.” [referring to Charles Holland’s doctoral thesis on this topic]

“Fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air.” — Shakespeare, Macbeth [illustrating moral confusion and its causes]