27. Evil as Privation and the Good as Final Cause

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Evil as Privation, Not Non-Being #

• Badness is not a pure non-being (absolute negation) but a privation: the lack of a perfection in a subject that is able to have it and should have it
• Augustine’s statement “sin is nothing” requires precision: privation differs from mere negation because it occurs in a subject capable of the perfection
• Example: blindness is bad not because the mug doesn’t see (mere negation), but because the eye, which should see, lacks sight (privation)
• Three meanings of “bad”: (1) the privation itself; (2) what has the privation; (3) what produces the privation

The Distinction Between Non-Being and Lack #

• Non-being (negation): A thing simply lacking a quality (e.g., a stone not seeing)
• Lack (privatio): The absence of a perfection in a subject that is ordered toward having it
• For something to be bad (in the privation sense), three conditions must hold: it is a subject, it is able to have the perfection, and it should have it when it should

Four Types of Opposition #

• Contradiction: Being and non-being with no middle ground (e.g., seeing and not seeing)
• Privation/Lack: Absence of a perfection in a capable subject (e.g., sight and blindness)
• Contrariety: Opposition within the same genus (e.g., virtue and vice, both habits)
• Relation: Distinction by reference rather than opposition of being or absence (e.g., Father and Son in the Trinity, distinguished by relatives like “toward God”)

The Good as Final Cause #

• The good is fundamentally connected to the final cause (the finis, the end)
• Since “the good is what all desire,” and what is desired is what one aims at, the good has the notion of an end
• The end is the first mover in causation: it moves the efficient cause to act
• But in the effect, form appears first, then the power to effect, then the good as perfection
• The end is the causa causarum (cause of causes)

Clarification on Causality and Terminology #

• The word “move” (movere) is borrowed from the efficient cause but applies to the final cause: the end “moves” the agent by being desired
• The word “make” (facere) can refer to different causes: strictly to the efficient cause, but also to the formal cause when we say form “makes” a thing what it is
• God as the “unmoved mover” means He is unmoved by any efficient cause and unmoving toward any end beyond Himself

Prime Matter and Secondary Goodness #

• Prime matter participates in goodness only in ability (potentia), not in actuality
• Prime matter is desirous (appetens) but not desirable (appetibile), in contrast to things in act
• The human intellect, like prime matter in the sensible world, is the lowest of all minds: like a “tablet on which nothing is written” (Aristotle’s analogy)
• Angels, by contrast, are created already in act, with no initial potentiality

Mathematical Objects and Separation #

• Mathematical things do not subsist separately in reality but are separated in our knowing
• This reflects the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle: does truth require that the way we know match the way things exist?
• Aristotle says no: we can truly know things in separation that don’t exist in separation (e.g., knowing I’m a grandfather without knowing I’m a philosopher)
• Mathematical objects are abstracted from matter and motion in definition but not in being
• Geometric figures lack properties of physical objects: a geometric sphere has no melting point, weight, or fragility

Key Arguments #

On Evil as Privation #

1. Badness is said of a thing insofar as it lacks being, not insofar as it is being
2. What lacks a perfection requires: (a) a subject capable of the perfection, (b) the perfection should belong to it, (c) its actual absence
3. Therefore, badness is not a being but a privation in a proper subject

On the Four Types of Opposition #

1. Sight and blindness are opposed by privation: both require a subject capable of sight
2. Seeing and not-seeing are contradictory: no subject is required; no middle ground
3. Virtue and vice are contrary: both are habits in the same genus
4. Father and Son are distinguished by relation: not by being/non-being or lack or contrariety

On the Good as Final Cause #

1. The good is what all desire (definition by effect)
2. What all desire is the end aimed at
3. Therefore, the good has the notion of final cause
4. In causation, the end is first (moving the efficient cause); in effect, form is first (then power, then perfection)

On Mathematical Objects #

1. If mathematical things subsisted separately, they would have the good of their own being
2. Mathematical things are separated only in knowing, not in reality (following Aristotle against Plato)
3. Therefore, mathematical objects do not have the good they would have if they existed in separation

Important Definitions #

• Privatio (privation/lack): Non-being of a perfection in a subject that is able to have it and should have it
• Finis (end/final cause): That for the sake of which something is or is done; the good aimed at by desire and action
• Movere (to move): Strictly pertains to efficient cause, but metaphorically applied to final cause when the end “moves” an agent by being desired
• Facere (to make): Properly refers to efficient cause, but can be extended to formal cause when form “makes” a thing what it is
• Unmoved mover: God considered as not moved by any efficient cause and not acting for the sake of any end beyond Himself
• Separated in reason only (*secundum rationem): Abstracted in our knowing but not existing in separation in reality (as mathematical objects)

Examples & Illustrations #

The Bad Eye #

• An eye is said to be bad when it lacks clearness; the badness is the lack of a perfection it should have
• The same eye may be good for distance but bad for reading
• Badness is relative to what the eye should be capable of in a particular function

The Blind Mug #

• A mug is not blind because blindness requires a subject (an eye or animal) capable of sight
• The mug’s inability to see is mere negation, not privation
• Therefore, the mug cannot be said to be bad by not seeing

Poking Out an Eye #

• The badness of poking out someone’s eye is not the privation (blindness) but rather the act that produces the privation
• The fundamental badness is the blindness itself (privation), not the action that caused it

The Geometrical Sphere vs. Physical Spheres #

• A rubber ball bounces off a wall; a glass ball shatters; a steel ball may stick or go through
• A geometric sphere cannot be said to bounce, shatter, or stick because it has no matter, weight, or fragility
• Yet we can know geometry in separation from motion and matter even though geometric objects don’t exist separately

Romeo and Juliet #

• Romeo does not want Juliet at first even though she is as beautiful initially as later
• He does not want her because he does not know of her beauty
• The good as known is the cause of desire; what is not known is not desired

The Delicious Poison #

• Someone might want to drink a delicious poison not knowing it is poisonous
• They are moved by the good (deliciousness) they perceive, not by the poison they don’t perceive
• The intellect’s partial knowledge explains seeming desire for what is bad

Potential Vocations #

• One priest commented that they don’t want “prime matter” in vocations
• A potential vocation, like prime matter, has only the capacity and ordering toward good, not goodness in act

Notable Quotes #

“No being is said to be bad insofar as it is being, but insofar as it lacks a certain being.” — Thomas Aquinas, on the nature of evil

“The bad is rooted fundamentally in the non-being as something you’re able to have, and especially something you should have.” — Duane Berquist, summarizing the foundation of badness

“It’s not bad that the mug doesn’t see, but it’s a non-being of something in a subject able to have it and should have it.” — Duane Berquist, illustrating privation vs. negation

“The good is said to be diffusive of its being in the way an end is said to move.” — Thomas Aquinas (based on Pseudo-Dionysius), on analogical uses of “move”

“Everyone having a will is said to be good insofar as he has a good will.” — Thomas Aquinas, on divine goodness as willing itself

Questions Addressed #

Is Evil a Positive Being or a Non-Being? #

• Question: If God creates all being and all being is good, how can evil exist?
• Answer: Evil is not a being but a privation—the lack of a perfection in a subject. It is not created by God but results from the failure of a creature to have a perfection it should have.

What Distinguishes Privation from Mere Negation? #

• Question: How is the blindness of a man different from the fact that a stone doesn’t see?
• Answer: Privation requires a subject capable of the perfection; negation requires no such subject. The man is blind (privation); the stone is not blind but merely doesn’t see (negation).

What Are the Different Types of Opposition Among Beings? #

• Question: How do we distinguish between contradiction, privation, contrariety, and relation?
• Answer: Contradiction has no subject or middle ground; privation requires a capable subject; contrariety exists within the same genus; relation distinguishes by reference rather than opposition of being or absence.

Does the Good Have the Character of Final Cause? #

• Question: Is the good a material, formal, efficient, or final cause?
• Answer: The good properly has the notion of final cause because it is what all desire, and what is desired is the end. The end moves the efficient cause to act.

Do Mathematical Objects Participate in the Good? #

• Question: If mathematical objects don’t exist separately from sensible things, do they participate in the good of their own being?
• Answer: Mathematical objects are separated in our knowing only, not in reality. Therefore, they don’t have the good they would have if they subsisted separately, though they participate in goodness through the knowing power that grasps them.

Connections and Further Implications #

• The analysis of privation connects to the understanding of sin as a privation of grace or virtue
• The distinction of oppositions is crucial for understanding how the Father and Son are distinguished in the Trinity (by relation, not by being/non-being)
• The good as final cause underpins the entire Thomistic understanding of human action and virtue
• The clarification of how the end “moves” an agent informs the doctrine of divine causality and God’s love of Himself