28. Mode, Species, Order, and the Division of Good

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Mode, Species, and Order as Constituents of Good #

• Augustine’s Principle: Mode, species, and order are general goods in things made by God. Great goods have these three in abundance; small goods have them diminished; where none exist, there is no good at all.
• Aquinas’s Response: These three pertain to caused goods in creatures, not to good as such. Every thing is good insofar as it is perfect, and perfection requires form and the conditions presupposed and consequent to form.
• Etymology of “Mode”: The Latin modus is related to measure and implies a fitting proportion. Contrasts with Greek tropas (turning) and Latin via (road). Mode suggests the measured proportion appropriate to a thing’s nature.

The Three Constituent Elements #

1. Mode (Modus): What is presupposed to form—the determination or commensuration (commensuratio) of principles (material or efficient). Signified by “measure” in scripture.
2. Species (Species): The form by which each thing is constituted in its kind. Forms correspond to numbers in definition (adding or subtracting a difference changes the species, just as adding or subtracting unity changes the number).
3. Order (Ordo): The inclination to an end that follows upon form. Corresponds to weight in scripture; weight draws things to rest and stability.

The Problem of Infinite Regress #

• Objection: If mode, species, and order are good, don’t they need their own mode, species, and order, leading to infinite regress?
• Response: Mode, species, and order are not good formally by something else, but are that by which other things are good. Like whiteness: whiteness is not said to be a being because something is by it, but because something is white by it. Similarly, health makes the body healthy; health itself is not healthy (which would require another health, causing regress).
• Parallel: Just as the creature is not its own existence but exists by its existence, so mode, species, and order are not subsisting goods but that by which things are good.

Bad as Privation #

• Objection: The bad is a lack of mode, species, and order, yet the bad doesn’t entirely take away the good.
• Response: Every being has some mode, species, and order according to its own nature. Evil deprives of a particular mode, species, and order, not all such things. Example: blindness deprives of the mode, species, and order of sight, but leaves the mode, species, and order of the body itself. Even devils have a good nature with its own mode, species, and order, though they lack others.

Bad Modes, Species, and Orders #

• Objection: How can bad modes exist if that which constitutes the notion of good cannot be called bad?
• Response: Every mode, species, and order insofar as it is a mode, species, and order, is good. A “bad” mode or species is called bad because it is less than it ought to be or not accommodated to the things to which it pertains. Badness lies in deficiency and incongruity, not in positive being.

The Case of Light #

• Ambrose’s Authority: Light is said to be without number, weight, and measure—not absolutely, but in comparison to bodily things.
• Explanation: Light’s power extends to all bodily things as the active quality of the first body (heaven). The contrast between matter and light reflects this distinction; even modern physics contrasts matter and light while recognizing both as material in some sense.

The Three-fold Division of Good (Article 5) #

The Division: Honorable, Useful, Pleasant #

• Honorable (Honestum): The end itself, that which is desired for its own sake; that which has in itself the reason for being desired.
• Useful (Utile): That which is desired as a means; does not have in itself the reason for being desired, but is desired only for leading to something further.
• Pleasant (Delectabile): Rest in the attainment of the end; perfection of operation.

Basis in Natural Motion #

• Motion in a natural body terminates simply to the final resting place (ultimate term), but in a way also to the intermediate point through which one must pass.
• The ultimate term of motion can be taken two ways: (1) the thing itself toward which one tends (place or form), or (2) rest in that thing.
• Application to Desire:
  • The useful is the good that limits motion of desire in a middle way (like passing through a door to enter a room).
  • The honorable is the good that terminates the whole motion of desire as the ultimate end (being fully in the room).
  • The pleasant is the good that limits desire insofar as rest in the thing desired (sitting and resting in the room).

Objections and Responses #

First Objection: Aristotle divides good by the ten categories; but honorable, useful, and pleasant are found in one category.

• Response: Good insofar as convertible with being is divided by the categories. But according to its own definition (as desirable), the proper division is into end, means to end, and rest in the end. This division is more proper to the good as good.

Second Objection: Every division is by opposites, but these three are not opposed. Honorable things are sometimes delightful; nothing dishonorable is useful.

• Response: This division is not by opposite things but by opposite definitions. Things desired purely for pleasure may be dishonorable (e.g., adultery); things desired only as means are not inherently desirable (e.g., bitter medicine). The definitions are opposite, not the things themselves.

Third Objection: The useful is good only on account of the pleasant or honorable; therefore it should not be divided against them.

• Response: The good is not divided into these three as something univocal (said equally of all). It is said secundum prius et posterius—analogously, with order: primarily of the honorable (the end), secondarily of the pleasant (rest in the end), and tertiarily of the useful (means to the end).

Important Definitions #

Etymological Distinctions #

• Modus (Latin): Measure, fitted proportion; implies the appropriate measure or size for a thing’s nature. The pair of shoes that fits your foot, not pinching it.
• Tropas (Greek): A turning; involves changing one’s perspective or direction of mind. Aristotle speaks of the need to turn one’s mind differently when entering different sciences.
• Via (Latin): Road, path; more concrete than English “way.” Corresponds to Greek hodas (ὁδός).
• Hodas (Greek): Road. As in “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (Greek: ἡ ὁδός, not μόδος or just ὁδός as path).

Commensuratio #

• The determination or measured proportion of principles (material or efficient) that is presupposed to form. This is what “mode” signifies.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Room (Door Analogy) #

• Coming through the door = the useful good (means)
• Being fully within the room = the honorable good (the end itself)
• Sitting and resting in the room = the pleasant good (rest in attainment)

The Pythagorean Theorem (Euclid II.5) #

• The Theorem: If a straight line is divided into equal and unequal segments, a rectangle contained by the unequal segments plus the square on the line between the points of division equals the square on the half.
• The Mathematical Delight: For a fixed perimeter, a square has more area than any rectangle. The difference in area equals the square of the difference between the side of the square and either side of the rectangle. Example: A 5×5 square vs. 4×6 rectangle (both with perimeter 20): area difference is 1² = 1. A 5×5 square vs. 3×7 rectangle: area difference is 2² = 4.
• Application: Knowing the theorem = honorable good (the end of study); delight in understanding it = pleasant good (rest in knowledge); the study itself = useful good (means).

Medicine #

• Bitter Medicine: Example of the useful good. It has no pleasure in itself but is desired for leading to health.
• Pleasant-Tasting Medicine: If medicine is delicious (like cinnamon-coated), it acquires an additional reason to take it (the pleasant good), though the useful remains.
• Health Itself: The honorable good (the end).

The Contrast of Sense and Intellect #

• An upset child quieted by ice cream illustrates how the pleasant can temporarily satisfy desire.
• But the child’s long-term good is the honorable—proper development and true happiness—not mere sensory pleasure.

Pleasure as Perfection of Operation #

• Aristotle’s View: Pleasure perfects operation as beauty perfects youth.
• Example from Learning: When studying geometry, one’s goal is primarily to know the theorem (honorable), but the delight in discovering it perfects that operation (pleasant). Yet the delight is not a means to knowledge; it rests in the attainment.

Inversion of Goods: Torturing #

• If one enjoys torturing people, is that pleasure good? No.
• Why: The object of desire (torturing) is evil. Enjoying something bad makes the enjoyment worse than merely wanting it, because enjoyment involves resting in the evil itself.
• The wanting is bad because the object is bad; enjoying it is worse because enjoyment unites one more closely to the bad object.

Notable Quotes #

“Mode, species, and order are general goods in things made by God. Where these three are great, there is great goodness; where they are little, there is little good; where none, there is no good at all.” — Augustine, On the Nature of the Good (cited by Aquinas)

“The body is healthy by health. Now, would you say that health itself is healthy? No. Because if you said that health itself is healthy, then you have to have another health, by which health itself is healthy, right?” — Berquist’s explanation of the infinite regress problem

“By them other things are good, not because they themselves are subsisting goods.” — Berquist’s summary of the response to the objection about infinite regress

“The notion of good does not consist in mode, species, and order [univocally]. Rather, it is said secundum prius et posterius—primarily of the honorable, secondarily of the pleasant, and tertiarily of the useful.” — Berquist’s exposition of Aquinas

“Entering into the joy of your Master” — Referenced as pertaining to both the honorable (end) and the pleasant (delectabile), the resting in the end

Questions Addressed #

Does goodness consist essentially in mode, species, and order? #

• Answer: Yes, for created goods. These three follow upon being insofar as it is perfect. But this applies to caused goods; good as such transcends these categories.

Do mode, species, and order themselves need mode, species, and order (infinite regress)? #

• Answer: No. They are not good formally by something else but are that by which other things are good. This avoids regress by recognizing a distinction between what is good (the creature) and that by which it is good (mode, species, order).

Is the bad a being or a privation? #

• Answer: Bad is a privation—the lack of a mode, species, or order that a thing ought to have. It is not a positive being but the absence of perfection.

Can bad modes, species, and orders exist if these constitute goodness? #

• Answer: A “bad” mode, species, or order is so-called because it is deficient (less than it ought to be) or incongruous (not accommodated to its subject). The badness is in the deficiency, not in a positive being.

Is the three-fold division of good (honorable, useful, pleasant) properly ordered? #

• Answer: Yes, it is ordered analogously (secundum prius et posterius), not univocally. The honorable is the primary meaning (the end itself); the pleasant is secondary (rest in the end); the useful is tertiary (means to the end). This is analogous to how the categories are ordered with substance primary.

How do the useful, honorable, and pleasant relate to motion and rest? #

• Answer: Motion of desire terminates to an ultimate end, but also passes through intermediate goods. The useful limits desire’s motion intermediately (like a door to pass through); the honorable is the ultimate terminus; the pleasant is rest at that terminus.

Connections to Broader Thomistic Metaphysics #

• Act and Potency: The foundation for understanding perfection. Every being insofar as it is in act is good; evil corresponds to privation of act.
• Essence and Existence: Mode, species, and order in creatures stand to the creature as the creature’s existence stands to its essence—they are not subsisting but constitute the creature’s being and goodness.
• God’s Goodness: This investigation of created goods prepares for understanding God as pure actuality (pure good) in the next question.
• Moral Theology: The distinction of goods illuminates the moral life: the virtue (honorable) is the end; the pleasure in virtue is secondary; actions are useful as means to virtue.